Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

Item

Title

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

Author

Thompson, William R.

Research Area

Social Processes

Topic

International Relations

Abstract

The analysis of interstate rivalries is still a relatively new approach to studying conflict in world politics. The basic idea is that a disproportionate amount of interstate conflict is traceable to a very small number of state pairs that engage in recidivistic hostilities. Why not focus more on the recidivists? The question is what should we focus on? Six analytical categories are reviewed. It is argued that we have good foundations in terms of rivalry origins, maintenance/escalation, and termination/de‐escalation. We can certainly improve on the foundations but we also need to expand our understanding of rivalry “complexities,” rivalry effects, and domestic rivalries.

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Identifier

etrds0369

extracted text

Trends in the Analysis
of Interstate Rivalries
WILLIAM R. THOMPSON

Abstract
The analysis of interstate rivalries is still a relatively new approach to studying
conflict in world politics. The basic idea is that a disproportionate amount of
interstate conflict is traceable to a very small number of state pairs that engage in
recidivistic hostilities. Why not focus more on the recidivists? The question is what
should we focus on? Six analytical categories are reviewed. It is argued that we
have good foundations in terms of rivalry origins, maintenance/escalation, and
termination/de-escalation. We can certainly improve on the foundations but we
also need to expand our understanding of rivalry “complexities,” rivalry effects,
and domestic rivalries.

INTRODUCTION
Studying interstate rivalries developed in part as a way to reduce some of the
noise in world politics. If one wants to analyze patterns of conflict between
states systematically and there are approximately 200 states in the world, that
means that there are as many as 19,900 possible pairs of conflicting states to
examine in a year. However, we know that this is an unreal situation. Most
states are either too far away or too remote to have disputes. Is there some
way to eliminate the less interesting cases so that we can better focus on the
more interesting ones?
One way is to focus solely on adjacent pairs. If two states are not contiguous, it is less likely that they will or could clash. Still, there are important
exceptions. Iran and Israel, for instance, need not be contiguous to regard
one another as enemies. A somewhat broader net could be cast by looking
at regional neighborhoods. Interregional conflict is less likely but the problem here is that some states belong to multiple regions (however defined)
and it is not implausible that states located on the fringe of one region could
have problems with states on the margins of the next region over. Examples
include Nicaragua and Colombia, Spain and Morocco, or China and Vietnam.
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Looking explicitly at rivalries represents a third approach. Rivalries may
be defined as competitive, threatening enemies. To qualify, two states need to
regard each other as competitive or operating more or less in the same league.
Many weak states may regard powerful threatening states as threatening
enemies, whether adjacent or afar, but there is often little that can be done
about it. Most of the time, the Finnish need to find ways to accommodate
the Russians. Identifying another state as an enemy requires some repeated
experience. In other words, the first time two states collide over some mutual
interest, it is simply a conflict. Allow the conflict to go unresolved or to fester over time and decision-makers will begin categorizing their adversary
as a persistent problem. Add some sense of potential military clash over the
persistent problem and you have a rivalry.
There are two or three bonuses associated with rivalry analysis. The
first bonus is that there are not that many of them. Fewer than a couple
of hundred have existed over the past 200 years. The second bonus is
that although a couple of hundred dyads represents less than 1% of the
universe in any given year, it turns out that they have been linked to a
vastly disproportionate three-fourths of all interstate violence.1 The third
bonus is that not only are rivals the conflict recidivists of the international
system, serial clashes between opponents increase the likelihood of conflict
escalation to more serious levels of hostility. Rivals are thus the states most
likely to clash, to clash repeatedly, and to go to war. They are not only the
actors who become involved in conflict but also the most likely culprits.
Focusing on them explicitly, accordingly, affords one useful way to reduce
the noise in world politics, without sacrificing too much.
In this essay, I try to summarize some of the things that we think we know
about rivalries, as well as some of the topics on which our understanding
might be improved. We have a respectable base for appreciating rivalry origins, maintenance/escalation, and termination/de-escalation. That does not
mean that the base cannot be improved upon, only that it is reasonably solid.
Rivalry topics on which we need to know much more include rivalry complexities, rivalry effects, and domestic rivalries.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
ORIGINS
The study of origins is influenced by a split among researchers on how to
empirically identify rivalries. One camp (for instance, Klein, Goertz, & Diehl,
2006) prefers a conflict density approach and requires evidence of some
1. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, p. 21) note that 77.3% of the 75 wars since 1816 have represented confrontations between rivals. If we focus only on the twentieth century, the proportion is 87.2 and
91.3% after 1945.

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

3

minimal number of militarized interstate disputes within a specified time
period to qualify a dyad as a rivalry. The other camp argues (Thompson,
2001) that not all rivalries engage in militarized interstate disputes, or at least
to the same extent. Therefore, the identification burden should be placed
on determining who decision-makers perceive to be their adversaries. The
main advantage of the conflict density approach is that it does not require
any analytical intervention beyond accepting the notion that rivals should
be equated with the most conflictual state pairs. The main disadvantage is
that a rivalry definition predicated on high levels of conflict should prohibit
rivalry information being used to explain conflict propensities. Otherwise,
one is using conflict to explain conflict, which is more than a bit circular.
The perceptual approach, on the other hand, is more subjective and labor
intensive but does permit the use of rivalry information to be used to explain
variation in conflict.
If a rivalry only begins when it exceeds a conflict density threshold, it is
quite possible that the identification assumption could bias our understanding of origins. For instance, if we ask how many rivalries begin at the onset
of independence, it is most unlikely that a dyad could possibly satisfy the
conflict density expectations immediately. As a consequence, most rivalries
would then be coded as beginning later, perhaps much later than independence. Similarly, some rivalries involve multiple issues and the different
issues tend to go through different life cycles. It is conceivable that an early
issue might not have been associated with sufficient physical conflict to
qualify but that the development of subsequent issues might be linked
to militarized disputes. The question then becomes whether we should
attribute the physical conflict to the subsequent issues, the maturation of
time in rivalry, or perhaps the multiple issues that have accumulated over
time? It is not a matter of the conflict density approach overtly misconstruing
origins questions. It is more a matter of there being some likely bias given
the assumptions on timing.2
Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, p. 78), relying on a perceptual
identification of rivalries, report that most rivalries (70.5%) are spatial in
nature—that is, they are contests over the exclusive control of territory.
A substantial proportion of these cases encompass dyads pitting a minor
power against another minor power. Almost 72% of minor power rivalries
2. This observation applies to rivalry termination questions as well. Conflict density-based rivalries
end when they no longer satisfy the criteria for qualification although in some cases the termination date
is specified as a set number of years after the criteria are no longer met. This approach creates some
ambiguity as to precisely when a rivalry should be viewed as having ended. As the conflict density criteria
are assessed for a particular period of time, there is also some inevitable ambiguity about the termination
status of rivalries that begin toward the end of the assessment period. Have they ended or will they be
shown to have been terminated when the assessment period is next extended? Then, there are the cases
in which the violence is sporadic. Should each cluster of violence, assuming the conflict density criteria
are satisfied for brief intervals of time, be viewed as a new rivalry?

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

are about spatial issues. However, many rivalries involve multiple issues.
Slightly more than half (54%) of the rivalries examined between 1816 and
1999 were positional rivalries, or about contests over relative influence
and prestige. All rivalries between major parties were at least partially
positional in nature whereas only 43% of minor power rivalries contained
some positional element. Almost 41% were characterized by ideological
differences. Ideological differences were also more likely in major power
rivalries (70%) than in minor power rivalries (40%).3
Many of these rivalries began fairly early. Of 128 rivalries that began after
1816, 72 (56%) began when one or more of the adversaries gained independence. Another 14% began within the first postindependence decade. Overall, 90% had begun within the first three decades after independence. This
early onset should not be surprising given the strong orientation toward spatial issues that often involve boundary questions among new states.4 Once
underway, rivalries tend to persist. The average duration of rivalries over the
past two centuries is about 42 years. Major power rivalries tend to last about
55 years on average while minor power rivalries average about 38 years in
duration.
Yet if most rivalry issues are spatial in nature, why is it that some territorial
disputes lead to protracted conflict and interstate rivalry while others do not?
It could be a matter of territorial dispute attributes. For instance, highly valued territory should be more prone to generating rivalries than less valued
territory, other things being equal. One possible experiment would be to isolate areas initially low in perceived value and examine what happens when
the territory in question abruptly comes to be seen as more desirable. Such an
analysis might be limited to prerivalry situations but it could also be useful
for examining rivalry escalation dynamics. That is, once a rivalry is underway, is it more likely to escalate if territorial issues become more pressing, as
Rasler and Thompson (2006), among others contend?
However, perhaps there is more at stake than just the issues. Miller (2007)
argues that the missing links for territorial disputes are groups that are
closely associated with the contested space. Minority groups resident on
or near a state’s boundaries, with co-ethnics across the border bring some
agency to clashes over territory. This is all the more the case if weak states
are unable to control the demands for incorporation or separatism. Are
then spatial rivalries more likely to emerge in the contexts of heterogeneous
societies and ethnic groups situated on both sides of a border?
3. A fourth type of rivalry, the interventionary rivalry, was proposed in the study by Thompson and
Dreyer (2011, p. 21). These rivalries, located mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, are about adjacent states seeking leverage on decisions in a neighbor usually focused on ethnic groups shared by the two states in
conflict.
4. See Senese and Vasquez (2008) and Vasquez (1993), among others, on the significance of territorial
issues in understanding interstate conflict.

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One of the more interesting new developments in international relations
theorizing is an argument called the territorial peace (Gibler, 2012). It states
that contested boundaries are the roots of preparations for, and involvement
in, interstate conflict. Resolve the boundary issues and a pacified external
environment will emerge that places much less stress on domestic political
systems to prepare for coping with external threats. Just how far the territorial peace and its implications for the internal effects of interstate conflict will
take us remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it opens up an excellent opportunity
for placing rivalry within a nexus of external threat environment and internal political-economic institutions and processes. Embedding rivalry within
a broader context is an attractive alternative to pursuing a slate of stand-alone
hypotheses about what stimulates the development of rivalries. It is likely
that the explanatory outcome will be much more complex than a straightforward territorial dispute resolution that equals international peace equation.
However, in the process of finding out how complex the equation is, we will
probably learn a great deal about both rivalry origins and effects.
MAINTENANCE/ESCALATION
Probably the least developed dimension of rivalry analyses is our understanding of how relations between adversaries are maintained over long
periods of time. Why do they fluctuate in hostility? What brings about
escalations in hostility? What constraints operate to restrain escalations? Of
course, answering these questions is tantamount to explaining why conflicts
occur—long a major and contested focus in international relations. Focusing
on rivalry processes cannot be expected to resolve all of the arguments that
we have about what drives conflict processes. It should, however, contribute
to their resolution if studying rivalries is on the right track for unraveling
the unknowns of hostility dynamics.
A core idea about rivalry maintenance (and perhaps escalation) is that interstate relationships are subject to short- and long-term inertia and reciprocity
(Dixon, 1986). Bureaucratic inertia means that state X has some likelihood
of behaving toward state Y exactly as it did earlier (both recently and in
general) and vice versa. Tit-for-tat dynamics imply that state X will behave
toward state Y as state Y has behaved toward state X, and vice versa. Escalation occurs in this instance when state X ratchets up its response to state Y
beyond whatever stimulus state Y initially sent to state X. The combination of
inertia and reciprocity can be expected to account for about half the variance
in dyadic relationships. Thus these core ideas are very useful even if they
leave as much unexplained. This same type of work suggests that these processes are relatively invulnerable to the comings and goings of personalities

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

and administrative regimes. Inertia and reciprocity do not work identically
in every regime but they rarely disappear altogether.
An alternative model for maintenance is the basic rivalry level (BRL) argument (Goertz, Jones, & Diehl, 2005). It argues that the nature of conflict is
established in clashes early on in the rivalry. As the issues cannot be resolved
coercively, the rivalry settles into a BRL that characterizes the antagonism
thereafter. An open question is the extent to which the rivalry path dependency is linked to the emphasis on militarized dispute behavior. Would we
find BRLs if we examined the month-to-month or year-to-year interactions of
rivals using events data? Nonetheless, this model hardly seems incompatible
with emphases on inertia and reciprocity.
Rivalry escalation examinations have focused primarily on crises. The basic
argument is that serial crisis behavior leads to a greater tendency to escalate to higher levels of conflict (Leng, 1983). Something happens in earlier
crises that changes the probability of subsequent crises turning into shooting
wars. In addition, the types of factors stressed in Steps to War theory (territorial disputes, alliances, arms buildups) also contribute to rivalry escalation
(Colaresi, Rasler, & Thompson, 2007). In sum, we seem to have a better handle on rivalry escalation than on rivalry maintenance—although, no doubt,
there is ample room for improvement in both areas.
TERMINATION/DE-ESCALATION
We know that about half of the rivalries that have ended have been due to
coercion of some kind (Colaresi, Rasler, & Thompson, 2007). If rivalries are
viewed as contests, one side was either defeated in war or conceded its inferiority to the stronger adversary. The other half of the terminated pool tend
to be de-escalated through negotiations. One or both sides develop incentives to engage in signaling and discussions with its adversarial counterpart.
Incentives to negotiate, however, are not enough to bring about de-escalation.
Precisely, what is necessary to obtain a successful outcome is a subject on
which analysts disagree.
The subject of why or how rivalries de-escalate and terminate has generated a number of competing theories. For instance, Rock (1989) argues that
decision-makers are more likely to seek rapprochement if they are confronted
with new security threats, the risk of disrupting important economic connections, and the prospect of internal warfare. A catalytic defeat can serve
to overcome inertia and a search for alternative strategies. For Orme (2004),
decision-makers will be more open to hostility de-escalation if they become
pessimistic about their own chances of remaining competitive. Cox (2010)
contends that what is needed is a policy failure that increases the perceived

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

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costs associated with maintaining the rivalry and/or improves the political
position of decision-makers interested in or open to ending the rivalry.
In situations involving transitions from authoritarian to democratic
regimes, Mani (2011) expects newly democratic regimes to prefer cooperation abroad and reform/consolidation at home. High costs in the last
authoritarian regime and weakened veto players facilitate a consistent and
cooperative interaction with rivals that can lead to de-escalation. Rasler,
Thompson, and Ganguly (2013) argue that decision-makers develop strategies for coping with adversaries based on external threats, the capabilities of
their enemies, and their own capabilities. Expectations about rivals become
entrenched. Shocks are needed to break through the inertia. Once new
strategies are formulated and tried, reciprocity from the adversary and
longer term reinforcement of the benefits linked to the new approach are
essential to successful de-escalation and termination.
There are some points of overlap in these arguments. Foreign policy inertia
needs to be overcome. New or alternative perspectives need to emerge and
ascend in the political hierarchy. However, how these situations are arrived at
is where the theories disagree most. Yet, for all the wealth of arguments about
termination/de-escalation, we have little in the way of comparative tests of
the competing theories.5 If more than one theory is able to generate support
for its claims, we would need to consider the possibility of more refined theories that can be applied to specific types of rivalries. So far, theories on rivalry
termination/de-escalation have assumed that one theory should fit all types
of rivalry. Of course, it is also conceivable that all of the theories will prove to
be deficient in some respect.6 All tests of the relevant theories on this subject,
to date, have focused on a limited number of cases.
ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
RIVALRY COMPLEXITIES
There are several ways in which the focus on specific rivalries can be misleading. A rivalry frame emphasizes the relationship between two adversaries
but that can introduce a different type of “noise” through distortion. What if
the dyad is not the most appropriate structure? There are at least two ways
in which alternative frames on rivalry interactions have been explored.7 One
focuses on triads while the other looks at the dynamics of rivalry fields.
5. Other approaches to termination exist as well—see Armstrong (1993), Bennett (1996), Diehl and
Goertz (2000), Lebow (1997), Maoz and Mor (2002), and Kupchan (2010).
6. It is also conceivable that a more generic theory that encompasses all of the different theoretical
emphases might be constructed.
7. A third approach suggests that more attention should be paid to “principal” rivalries—the ones
that are most important to foreign policy makers (Thompson, 1995).

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We do not have an inventory of conflict triangles but some prominent
ones come readily to mind. Perhaps the most prominent one was the Cold
War interactions of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Other
examples include Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, China, and the
Soviet Union or the multiple triangles in South Asia (Pakistan, China, India;
Soviet Union, India, Pakistan; United States, India, Pakistan, and so on).
The point here is there are plenty of rivalries in these cases but they do
not necessarily function along dyadic lines. In a three rival situation, what
happens if rivalry A influences rivalries B and C. If one focuses exclusively
on rivalry A, potentially valuable explanatory material is lost by ignoring
what is going on in rivalries B and C. Unfortunately, not a lot of triadic
rivalry analysis has been completed to date. It is difficult to assess how
much we may be missing. Obviously, more work on rivalry triangles would
be highly welcome.8
A focus on the dynamics of rivalry fields is in some ways a generalization
of the triadic situation to more complicated structures. There are several
ways in which these rivalry field dynamics might be conceptualized. An
easy example is the contention that not all rivalries are equally significant
in world politics. Alter one central one and there can be reverberations
throughout the field of rivalries. The termination of the Soviet-US Cold
War rivalry impacted conflicts throughout the world just as the end of
the Sino-Soviet rivalry had implications for the maintenance of rivalries in
northeast and southeast Asia. Freezing (not terminating) the Egyptian-Israeli
rivalry at Camp David changed what has been possible in Middle Eastern
politics for several decades. Converting the Franco-Germany rivalry into
the core of the European Union presumably altered the nature of European
politics for generations to come.9
Thompson (2003; Rasler and Thompson, 2014) explores a different interpretation of rivalry field dynamics. In developing a model of the outbreak
of World War I, rivalry is highlighted in several ways.10 Part of the argument is that in complex rivalry fields, nonlinear interactions between and
among rivalries can occur that are not unlike the complexities of freeway
accidents involving multiple collisions. In the run up to 1914, four chains of
rivalries are delineated. One begins with the Russian defeat by Japan and the
subsequent refocusing of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans that is linked
to six other rivalries. A second stream of rivalries starts with Franco-Italian
8. See, for instance, Dittmer (1981), Goldstein and Freeman (1990), Kisangani and Pickering (2014),
Rasler and Thompson (2014), Thompson (2003), Thompson and Dreyer (2011), Maoz, Terris, Kuperman,
and Talmud (2007).
9. Thompson (forthcoming) compares the consequences of the de-escalation of three regionally central rivalries: Egypt–Israel, Argentina–Brazil, and France–Germany and argues that economic integration
appears to be critical in advancing regional pacification.
10. Vasquez et al. (2011) also make use of the increasing number of rivalries in their modeling of World
War I’s outset.

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

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maneuvering in North Africa and leads to a number of other rivalries operating in the Mediterranean and Balkans. A third cluster of eight European
major power rivalries focuses on the bipolarization of the stronger states in
the region. The fourth cluster is focused on global and regional leadership
rivalries. Metaphorically, the interaction of these clusters of rivalries (within
and between the clusters) is likened to the confluence of four streams into a
turbulent whirlpool. The sheer complexity of the interactions can be analyzed
in retrospect. Whether anyone at the time could have been expected to follow
the entire ensemble as it evolved seems most unlikely. In this sense, the old
game of blaming one state for primary responsibility in bringing about the
war makes little sense. The nonlinear pinball dynamics that emerged in the
decade before the outbreak of World War I were not controlled or controllable
by any single state.
RIVALRY EFFECTS
Most of the work on rivalries looks at them as the primary focus (for instance,
how are rivalry relationships different from nonrivalry relationships) or uses
them as a control for intensive conflict. However, rivalries are beginning to
appear in theories as variables in more complex arguments. Colaresi (2004)
looks at the effect of rivalries on decision-makers who attempt more dovish
approaches to foreign policies. Thies (2004), for another example, regards
rivalries as a substitute for wars in the third world. In more developed states,
wars ratcheted upward the demands on state organizations and thereby
served as a principal agent of state-making. Wars in less-developed contexts
do not appear to have the same effect. Thies argues, however, that engaging
in rivalries has improved state extraction capabilities—thereby serving as a
substitute for war making in contributing to state-making.11
Another example is provided by Rasler and Thompson’s (2011) work on
regional pacification. Why have some regions become relatively peaceful
while others remain intensely conflictual? Part of the answer seems to be
the relationship between disputed boundaries and rivalries. As boundaries
become more accepted or less contested, spatial rivalries lose their raison
d’etre. Yet, this relationship is unlikely to stand in isolation from other
domestic and international processes. The question is whether we can
unpack how conflict is embedded in the context of domestic institutions and
other characteristics such as inequality and democratization. In other words,
it seems likely that external threats have had formative impacts on domestic
structures and processes (and perhaps vice versa).
11. However, see Kisangani and Pickering (2014) for an alternative interpretation.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

DOMESTIC RIVALRIES
One of the interesting extensions of the rivalry idea is to view domestic insurgencies as cases of rivalry. Certainly, rivals and rivalries exist at all levels.
However, the application of rivalry arguments to domestic insurgencies, so
far, has been limited to the conflict density approach. “Enduring internal
rivalries (EIRs)” are defined as conflicts between governments and insurgent
groups that persist through at least 10 years of armed conflict and 25 deaths
(DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008). If the identity of the insurgent groups changes
during this time, it does not matter as long as the fighting can be linked to the
initial onset of civil war. Research in this vein then proceeds to explore the
extent to which these protracted insurgencies last longer, recur more often,
and kill more people than non-EIRs.
This approach seems problematic from a rivalry perspective. By designating the conflict as the unit of analysis, government-insurgency group
relationships are obscured. Presumably, a rivalry perspective would seek
to draw attention to the nature of specific internal dyads. Duration and
recurrence might easily be traced to a long-running feud between specific
groups and their governments. In some cases, DeRouen and Bercovitch’s
EIRs are identical to what is being proposed. The Peruvian case is the
government-Sendero Luminoso dyad. In Spain, it is government versus
ETA or in Mozambique, it was government versus Renamo. Yet, once
insurgencies with multiple groups are mixed with cases featuring a single
group, control over who is a rival with whom is lost. For instance, civil war
recurrence could be linked to attributes of a specific government-insurgent
group relationship. Why is it that the Taliban, the IRA, or the LTTE are/were
so hard to defeat? In contrast, insurgencies with multiple groups should
work much differently, one would think, than civil wars with one prominent
rebel organization. Combat between insurgents, divide-and-conquer strategies, and alliances between governments and insurgents, or beleaguered
governments fighting small-scale rebellions on multiple fronts might be
expected in such cases.
Whatever might be said for the conflict density approach, its application
to domestic insurgency seems to sacrifice most of what might be gained by
the application of a rivalry perspective. Instead, we are told, somewhat circularly, that longer insurgency cases last longer and tend to recur. The idea
of applying a rivalry perspective to domestic conflict is attractive but it has
yet to be implemented successfully.
CONCLUSION
Six topical areas of rivalry analysis have been delineated. In terms of
origins, we have a pretty good idea of where they come from. For

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

11

maintenance and escalation, we appear to have a solid core set of ideas
about maintenance and escalation that has received successful treatment.
On termination/de-escalation, we are blessed with a large number of rival
theories that have yet to be sorted out for their efficiency and explanatory
power. Complexities to dyadic forms of rivalry analysis have been introduced but they have yet to receive sufficient attention. The rivalry idea is
beginning to diffuse and perhaps is even being mainstreamed into more
comprehensive arguments about political development and the interactions
of domestic and external processes. Finally, the rivalry perspective has been
applied to internal warfare with some success but would probably fare
better if distinctions were made between situations encompassing single
and multiple rebel groups.
None of these six areas, of course, are in such great shape that they could
not profit from more attention. The argument here is only that some of the
six are in better shape than some of the others. Rivalry analysis is a healthy
and ongoing enterprise even if it is still in its infancy. The six topical areas
notwithstanding, however, the real hallmark of success will be when analysts
outside of international politics begin paying attention to treating interstate
rivalries more explicitly. In this respect, we still have some way to go.12
REFERENCES
Armstrong, T. (1993). Breaking the ice: Rapprochement between east and west Germany,
the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of
Peace.
Bennett, D. S. (1996). Security, bargaining and the end of interstate rivalry. International Studies Quarterly, 40, 157–183.
Colaresi, M. (2004). When doves cry: International rivalry, unreciprocated cooperation, and leadership turnover. American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 535–570.
Colaresi, M. P., Rasler, K., & Thompson, W. R. (2007). Strategic rivalries in world politics:
Position, space, and conflict escalation. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.
Cox, E. (2010). Why enduring rivalries do—or don’t end. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
DeRouen, K., Jr., & Bercovitch, J. (2008). Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 55–74.
Diehl, P. F., & Goertz, G. (2000). War and Peace in International Rivalry. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Dittmer, L. (1981). The strategic triangle: An elementary game theoretical analysis.
World Politics, 33, 485–515.
Dixon, W. J. (1986). “Reciprocity in United States-Soviet relations: Multiple symmetry
or issue linkage?”. American Journal of Political Science, 30, 421–445.
12. Earlier attempts to encourage this type of interaction are found in Ganguly and Thompson (2011),
Paul (2005), and Thompson (1999).

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Ganguly, S., & Thompson, W. R. (Eds.) (2011). Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and
Limitations on Two-Level Games, edited with Sumit Ganguly. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Gibler, D. M. (2012). The territorial peace: Borders, state development and international
conflict. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Goertz, G., Jones, B., & Diehl, P. F. (2005). Maintenance processes in international
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WILLIAM R. THOMPSON SHORT BIOGRAPHY
William R. Thompson is a Distinguished Professor and the Donald A.
Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. He is a former
editor of International Studies Quarterly (1994–1998 and 2008–2013) and
a former President of the International Studies Association (2005–2006).
Recent books include Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitation on
Two-level Games (Stanford University Press, 2011, edited with Sumit Ganguly), Handbook of International Rivalries, 1494–2010 (Congressional Quarterly
Press, 2011, with David R. Dreyer), The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation and
Transformation (University of Chicago Press, 2011, with Jack S. Levy), How
Rivalries End (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, with Karen Rasler
and Sumit Ganguly), and Transition Scenarios: China and the United States in
the Twenty-first Century (University of Chicago Press, 2013, with David P.
Rapkin).
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