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Title
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Models of Duality
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Author
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Krishna, Anand
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Deutsch, Roland
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Strack, Fritz
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Research Area
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Cognition and Emotions
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Topic
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Information Processing
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Abstract
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Duality models generally assume that human psychology is based on two separate systems of information processing. These systems have specific characteristics that differentiate them from one another. Such models are increasingly common in social psychology today. A selection of duality models is discussed and categorized according to three factors: the type of mental representation used in the specified processes (experiential vs. nonexperiential), the methods of processing (associative vs. propositional), and the differing degree of automaticity (based on the aspects of efficiency, awareness, intentionality, and controllability) of the processes. In addition, models' statements about the superiority of one process over the other are enumerated. Foundational models of attribution, stereotyping, persuasion, and more general models are explained in an overview. Central aspects of these foundational models are extracted and applied in a discussion of current duality models in general social psychology, as well as newer dual‐process models of attitudes, moral judgments, and self‐regulation. Models positing a process superior in information processing are contrasted with models positing two processes with different specializations in information processing, and the implications of improved integration and specialization are discussed.
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extracted text
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Models of Duality
ANAND KRISHNA, ROLAND DEUTSCH, and FRITZ STRACK
Abstract
Duality models generally assume that human psychology is based on two separate systems of information processing. These systems have specific characteristics
that differentiate them from one another. Such models are increasingly common in
social psychology today. A selection of duality models is discussed and categorized
according to three factors: the type of mental representation used in the specified
processes (experiential vs. nonexperiential), the methods of processing (associative
vs. propositional), and the differing degree of automaticity (based on the aspects of
efficiency, awareness, intentionality, and controllability) of the processes. In addition,
models’ statements about the superiority of one process over the other are enumerated. Foundational models of attribution, stereotyping, persuasion, and more general
models are explained in an overview. Central aspects of these foundational models
are extracted and applied in a discussion of current duality models in general social
psychology, as well as newer dual-process models of attitudes, moral judgments,
and self-regulation. Models positing a process superior in information processing are
contrasted with models positing two processes with different specializations in information processing, and the implications of improved integration and specialization
are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DUALITY
The discipline of psychology aims to explain human feeling, thinking, and
behavior using a variety of theories. Many prominent psychological theories
stem from the information-processing paradigm, which concerns itself with
the investigation of psychological processes involved in the encoding and
retrieval of information as well as in inference generation. This paradigm
has led to a great proliferation of theories in psychology. Dual-process theories based on the information-processing paradigm have been formulated
with regard to many different types of behavior and judgment. Their most
important and fundamental similarity is the assumption that human feeling,
thinking, and behavior can best be explained by two different psychological
processes that jointly determine judgments and behavior. These mechanisms
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.
1
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
may work in tandem or may come into conflict when they specify incompatible behaviors or judgments.
Social psychology has produced so many duality models since the 1980s
that it has become necessary to categorize them to prevent theoretical
confusion and aid integration. According to Payne and Gawronski (2010),
social psychological duality models are typically influenced by either or
both of two dualities: the duality of implicit and explicit memory and the
duality of automatic and controlled processes. The distinction between
implicit and explicit processes corresponds to the difference between
conscious and unconscious processes, whereas the distinction between
automatic and controlled processes is more concerned with the differing
roles of effort, intentionality, and controllability in different processes. Many
social psychological models show structural similarities because they are
based on these similar conceptualizations of duality. For example, all models
agree that the different processes they specify may require different amounts
of cognitive capacity or effort, and therefore all models predict that one
psychological process will be favored over another under circumstances
where capacity or effort is limited. Typically, models will also specify a
process that leads to better or worse results than the other under specific
circumstances. However, there are often differences in the more detailed
specifications of these models, such that they are not exchangeable. In order
to present social psychological models of duality in an integrative manner, it
is therefore necessary to apply a systemization that reflects both conceptual
similarities and critical differences between them.
The system used to organize models in this essay is based on an earlier
review of duality models in social psychology by Strack and Deutsch
(2015). The system incorporates three factors that serve as a framework to
showcase both similarities and differences of psychological duality models.
The first factor is the representation type dealt with by the model. This refers
to whether processes work with or from subjective experiences, such as
affective feelings (e.g., emotions, moods), nonaffective feelings (e.g., hunger,
other bodily experiences), and perceptions, or whether they work with or
from nonexperiential information-bearing structures (e.g., episodic, procedural, semantic representations). The second factor is the type of information
processing postulated in the model, referring to whether information is processed in an associative or propositional (rule-based) manner. Associative
processing is based on factors such as frequency and recency of prior use,
which determine the accessibility of a concept and therefore influence how
likely it is that the same concept or a similar one is activated. Propositional
processing can apply relationships with truth-values between objects and
categories, allowing syllogistic reasoning about objects that do not necessarily depend on experience. Both methods of information processing may
Models of Duality
3
be applied to either type of representation, such that both experiential and
nonexperiential representations may be processed associatively or propositionally. This implies that experiential feelings may associatively activate
other feelings or related nonexperiential representations (e.g., seeing a snake
activates a feeling of fear and the semantic category “snake”) and vice versa
(e.g., thinking of the word “snake” may activate a feeling of fear). It further
implies that propositional reasoning may categorize and use nonexperiential
representations (e.g., applying the category “snake” to an animal seen in
the environment—“that is a snake”) as well as experiential feelings (e.g.,
attributing a feeling of fear to a snake—“I am afraid of that snake”). The
specification of how different representation types are processed is a useful
standard of comparison for duality models. In particular, the questions of
how the postulated processes interact and under what circumstances either
is dominant can be more easily addressed in this way.
The third factor used to compare models in this essay is the automaticity of
processes. Although automaticity is a heterogeneous term, containing (among
others) the facets of efficiency, intentionality, controllability, and awareness,
many models assume a connection between various conceptualizations of
automaticity and types of information processing. For example, associative
processes may be seen as more automatic than rule-based processes in a
given model. The facets of automaticity can be considered independent
(albeit often correlated) dichotomous (intentionality) or continuous (efficiency, controllability, and awareness) dimensions which are addressed
to various degrees by duality models. The efficiency of a process is the
degree to which it requires central resources (and therefore its susceptibility
to constraints on those resources). Intentionality is the degree to which a
process was started by an intention. Controllability is the degree to which
a process can be stopped or changed when a corresponding decision to do
so is formed. Awareness, broadly, is the degree to which a person is capable
of reporting a process that has taken place. Although not a duality in their
own right, these automaticity facets play an important role in many duality
theories. Therefore, they are included as a third factor in the system of
organization utilized in this essay.
Duality models often carry an implicit assumption that one of the two processes they postulate is more accurate than the other. Such assumptions may
also be informative in integrating these models—if a process that is conceived to be more accurate is also typically assigned similar characteristics
with regard to the factors of representation type, processing style, and automaticity, it makes sense to construct an integration with this in mind. In addition, models that contradict each other with regard to the accuracy of their
respective processes may be tested against one another using this attribute,
thereby giving future research an avenue to compare models.
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS OF DUALITY
FOUNDATIONAL MODELS
Many social psychological theories formulated before Steven A. Sloman’s
conceptually pioneering paper in 1996, as mentioned in the following
sections, already showed some attributes of duality. What follows is a short
overview of foundational models from varying areas of social psychology
and a discussion of their duality in terms of the three factors discussed
earlier (representation type, method of processing, and automaticity).
Models of Person Perception. When perceiving another person, people make
judgments about the determinants of that person’s behavior, so-called
attributions. Gilbert and his colleagues have postulated a three-stage model
of attribution that explains attributions in terms of three mental operations:
identifying what actions a target person is performing (categorization), inferring dispositional attributes of the target (characterization), and modifying
these attributes by factoring in situational constraints (correction). The duality
in this theory is between a highly automatic, noninferential categorization
process and the two other, more effortful inferential processes. The contents
dealt with in processing are uniformly abstract representations, so the duality here is based primarily on automaticity and effort of use. However, the
two sides of this duality interact to a degree; characterization is facilitated
by the outcome of the categorization process and therefore less effortful than
correction. This model thereby assumes that the automatic categorization
process cannot lead to any conclusions about a perceived actor without more
effortful, inferential processes—therefore, Gilbert’s model conceptualizes
the latter process as more important for correct information processing.
Indeed, even within the inferential processes, the more effortful one may
correct the correspondence bias of the less effortful one—effort leads to
better conclusions. As an example, a shouting manager might easily be
characterized as aggressive, but correcting this impression for the stress he
might be under due to an approaching project milestone is more difficult.
Another dualistic model of person perceptions is that of Brewer. More generally than Gilbert’s model, Brewer assumes that impressions of other people
are formed based on a categorization into a group and an individuation of
distinct attributes. In this case, both processes deal with abstract representations and may vary in the automaticity and method of processing. However, this model proposes that the process of categorization and the process
of individuation each lead to a separate representation of a given person.
Depending on the social requirements of dealing with this person (such as
whether one is dependent on the person), different processes and representations will be accessed. Unlike Gilbert’s model, Brewer does not assume that
Models of Duality
5
either process has the advantage in reaching correct conclusions. Instead,
contextual factors determine which process is adequate. Thus, an employee
might compare their manager to other managers using a group-based categorization, but might later individuate their manager when interacting informally at an office party, using different views according to the context.
Devine has proposed an influential model of stereotyping that has a dualistic core. Her dissociation model states that culturally prevalent stereotypes and
personal beliefs about their validity can exist in memory at the same time and
may contradict each other. The activation of stereotypes is held to be highly
automatic owing to long experience and learning for such stereotypes,
whereas the activation of personal beliefs requires cognitive effort. Both of
these representations are semantic rather than experiential, but stereotypes
are processed associatively while personal beliefs propositionally apply
truth-values to them. As such, the duality in this model is between an
automatic, associative process and an effortful, propositional process. This
duality carries the implicit assumption that the automatic process must be
corrected by the effortful process to counter stereotype processing, which
is typically conceptualized as inaccurate. The dissociation model therefore
tends toward judging the effortful, propositional process as leading to better
conclusions. Therefore, a tired employee might automatically stereotype a
manager as authoritarian, only allowing for other possibilities when rested
and capable of effort.
Models of Persuasion. Several influential models of persuasion and attitude
change also showed a dualistic structure. Two models in particular stand out:
the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) and the heuristic systematic model (HSM).
Petty and Cacioppo’s ELM describes attitude change through persuasion as
mediated by two different processes, namely central elaboration and heuristic
shortcuts. Central elaboration refers to an effortful processing of information
that is relevant to the topic. This information is extracted from the persuasive
message and other relevant input variables (e.g., features of the communicator), such as whether an argument holds up to logical analysis. Heuristic
shortcuts are the topic-independent aspects of input variables that may serve
as bases for evaluation of the argument based on simple rules. For example,
a long and involved argument may be more convincing irrespective of its
content if one applies the rule “long and involved arguments are usually
correct.” Both of these processes require the application of rules and both are
effortful (heuristic shortcuts less so than central elaboration), but the ELM
specifies different types of representations that might be utilized by either
process. Beyond nonexperiential representations such as arguments, experiential representations such as affect may be used as information by either
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
process. As such, the major duality in the ELM is between an effortful and a
less effortful process.
Chaiken and Trope’s (1999) HSM, on the other hand, assumes a similar
dichotomy of processes (heuristic vs. systematic processing), but conceptualizes their duality slightly differently. Heuristic processing also draws
on topic-irrelevant heuristic cues, but is conceptualized as less effortful
and less aware than systematic processing, which concentrates on the
judgment-relevant content of the persuasive message. These two processes
may interact in different ways, such that heuristic processing may introduce
biases into systematic processing, systematic processing may override
heuristic processing and both processes may work additively when in
agreement. Similarly to the ELM, affective and other experiential cues as
well as nonexperiential cues may be used by both processes in the HSM,
although both remain rule-based. With regard to the categorization applied
in this essay, the HSM differs from the ELM primarily in the inclusion of a
greater role of automaticity in the duality of its systems.
Both of these models of persuasion assume a highly effortful process that
evaluates persuasive information according to its own logical merits. If attitude change is assumed to be most accurate when new, attitude-relevant
information is systematically compared to existing attitudinal information
for consistency, then the more effortful process certainly has an advantage
over the less effortful process described in either theory. Therefore, it can be
said that models of persuasion assume that the accuracy advantage lies with
more elaborative, systematic processing.
General Models. Epstein’s cognitive experiential self-theory is a theory of personality that is based on a duality between an experiential system and a
rational system. The experiential system is associative in structure and comprises emotions and basic needs. The rational system, on the other hand, is
governed by logical rules and concerns itself with assessments and appraisals
of current events. The experiential system is conceptualized as highly automatic, whereas the rational system is not. The two systems operate in parallel
and interact, allowing each system to process the judgmental conclusions
of the other. Therefore, Epstein’s model contains a duality of an automatic,
associative system which is primarily concerned with experiential representations, but may be influenced by abstract representations, and a nonautomatic, rule-based system which is conversely concerned with abstract representations and influenced by experiential ones. It is important to note that
although Epstein discusses his theory in psychodynamic terms, he distances
himself from the negative view of the unconscious espoused by many psychodynamic theories and instead posits that the experiential system may be
Models of Duality
7
more efficient and accurate than the rational system under certain circumstances, thereby judging neither system superior.
The motivation and opportunity as determinants (MODE) model proposed by
Fazio and colleagues introduces important moderators of when different processes are dominant. In Fazio’s conception, attitudes may influence behavior
and judgments in different ways. The first possibility lies in providing a standard for deciding which outcomes of a given behavior might be positive or
negative. The second is seen as more automatic; in this case, attitudes directly
influence the construal of a situation and its components. Similarly, certain
attitudes themselves may be activated associatively and automatically on
perception of a relevant stimulus, whereas in other cases, attitudes may be
constructed by the integration of features of the attitude object, a process that
is less automatic and is seen as rule-based. In both processes, attitudes are
conceptualized as nonexperiential, abstract representations of an association
between an object and an evaluation. Neither process is seen as more accurate than the other. Moderators of process use are specified in the model:
As situation construal and attitude activation are highly automatic, they are
presumed to require little motivation and capacity to work—for example,
when making a low-investment choice of sweets in a shop, many people will
construct the set of possible choices completely without sweets they dislike
without explicitly comparatively evaluating them. They will also often rely
on their spontaneous feelings to select a sweet from the options they do consider. For less automatic rule-based application of attitudes, motivation and
capacity are seen as broadly multiplicative determinants. So when selecting a
new car, where the motivation to avoid error is high, people instead construct
the choice set and their attitudes toward the options effortfully. Importantly,
the MODE model introduces clear predictions of when which process will
be dominant into the emerging trend of delineation between generally automatic, associative processing and generally effortful, rule-based processing
in the foundational models listed.
This delineation is the subject of Sloman’s (1996) systems of reasoning
theory. As mentioned earlier, Sloman’s model has acted as a conceptual
basis for many dual-process theories since its publication in 1996. The
systems of reasoning theory is based on one of the dualities used in this
essay to describe dual-process models: the duality between associative and
rule-based reasoning. In detail, the model proposes two autonomous, noninteractive systems that operate in parallel. The associative system computes
based on the principles of similarity and temporal contiguity. The rule-based
system applies descriptive or normative rules to variables. Both systems
may process the same contents with their respective computation methods,
thereby generating possibly contradictory results, so that eating sweets may
be associated with good taste and pleasure, but violate the rule of “do not eat
8
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
unhealthy foods.” This may lead to judgmental errors or biases; however,
neither system is superior, as both are specialized in solving different types
of problems. Sloman’s model makes no statements about automaticity
and restricts itself mostly to nonexperiential representations (an exception
would be its inclusion of perceptual modalities in the associative system),
but it does conceptually summarize many aspects of the models listed
up to now. The somewhat different assumptions made in the theories of
persuasion, however (i.e., more automatic rule-based processing as opposed
to associative processing, the use of experiential representations), open up
several questions that have been addressed in more current research.
CURRENT MODELS
General Models of Duality. A model of memory that covers both experiential and nonexperiential representations as well as associative and rule-based
processing is the memory systems theory of Smith and DeCoster. This integrative model posits the existence of two systems of long-term memory—one
that is responsible for picking up general regularities in the environment (a
slow process) and one that stores episodic records quickly, including details
and the context. This duality is connected with a difference in method of
processing—the slow memory system is associative in nature, so that representations that are already associated with a given content are activated
when that content is activated, whereas the fast memory system operates
based on linguistic principles and rules. In addition, the slow memory system is assumed to be automatic, while the fast memory system depends on
motivation and effort and is controllable. The systems operate in parallel and
may also interact in various ways, with each system being specialized for
different tasks and neither being superior. This model provides more concrete specifications of how two systems of processing might be embedded
in memory, parsimoniously explaining many social phenomena (e.g., in persuasion, person perception) and nonsocial phenomena (e.g., in judgment and
decision-making).
A model that applies a similar integrative logic to reasoning is that of
Kahneman and Frederick (2004). On the basis of classical research showing
the existence of cognitive heuristics that are applied to simplify judgments
under uncertainty, this model aims to integrate these diverse effects into a
general dual-process theory. Kahneman and Frederick assume that judgments are generated based on intuitive (System 1) or reflective (System 2)
processes. System 1 is assumed to be highly automatic and associative, often
dealing with emotionally charged contents, whereas System 2 is effortful,
slow, and serial. This division reflects previous models in distinguishing
between an automatic, associative system and a nonautomatic, rule-based
Models of Duality
9
system. However, the systems can interact. For example, well-practiced,
complex cognitive operations may eventually become automated and move
from System 2 to System 1. In addition, System 2 may monitor System 1,
stepping in to “override” automatic responses if they are of insufficient
quality. The operation of cognitive heuristics is explained in the model
via the mechanism of attribute substitution—when performing a complex
judgment, heuristic processing involves substituting an attribute possessed
by the judgment object with an attribute that is easier to generate from
System 1. For example, when deciding which new car to buy, the complex
integration of attributes such as fuel efficiency and acceleration into a general
judgment of the value of each car in System 2 might be substituted by the
affective reaction to the cars elicited in System 1, so that the judgment basis
of “gut feeling” is suggested. System 2 may in turn correct this judgment
via monitoring. This model covers both types of representations as well as
both methods of processing. Attribute substitution offers an explanation
of many heuristics, but it remains open whether all types of judgmental
simplifications can be explained by purely associative processes or whether
they constitute a less effortful form of rule-based processing. The idea that
System 2 monitors System 1 and corrects judgments implies that System 1
is generally less accurate. System 2 may therefore be seen as the superior
system in this model.
A further attempt to integrate findings pointing at a general duality of processing is the reflective–impulsive model (RIM) of Strack and Deutsch (2004).
The RIM seeks to combine motivational, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral elements into one theory specifying their interaction in information
processing. Drawing on similar distinctions as mentioned earlier, between
an automatic, associative system and an effortful, rule-based system, the
RIM assumes that behavior is governed by an impulsive and a reflective system. The impulsive system is always active, whereas the reflective system
requires capacity and motivation. When the reflective system is activated,
both systems operate in parallel. The associative nature of the impulsive
system extends to experiential representations as well as nonexperiential
ones, including behavioral schemata. This implies that the impulsive system
can directly activate behavior associatively if the activation and connection
to the behavioral schema are strong enough. The reflective system, on
the other hand, may propositionally generate judgments and behavioral
intentions, which then activate behavioral schemata. Importantly, the two
systems interact continually, as the impulsive system is assumed to be the
long-term memory “store” from which the reflective system draws concepts
which it then links propositionally. Therefore, information preactivated
in the impulsive system is more likely to be used in propositions in the
reflective system and therefore to become a part of the reasoning process. On
10
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
the other hand, as the reflective system activates contents simultaneously
in the impulsive system, these contents may become linked to one another,
creating a degree of automaticity in often-repeated judgments or behaviors.
When, however, the two systems are in conflict (i.e., the impulsive system
automatically activates behaviors or thoughts that are antagonistic to the
reflective system’s propositional judgment), the capacity of the reflective
system to change the current activation pattern is dependent on cognitive
resources and motivation. Thus, the RIM captures everyday behavioral
impulses that we fall victim to when distracted or apathetic, such as breaking our diets by grabbing a sweet. In this model, both experiential and
nonexperiential cues can be processed in both associative and rule-based
ways and behavior is included directly in the theory. An important advantage of the RIM is an explanation of the effects of behavior on cognition,
motivation, and affect—as behavioral schemata are associatively linked to
cognitive, motivational, and affective structures via the impulsive system,
behavioral activation may spread to these areas as well. In general, the RIM
makes no statement on the relative accuracy of the two systems.
Duality Models in Specific Psychological Applications. Applications of newer
duality models to various areas of social psychology have increased in recent
years. In the following, examples of newer duality models in the areas of attitude research, moral judgments, and self-regulation will be discussed.
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2011) have applied the RIM, as mentioned
earlier, to attitude research in their associative and propositional processes in
evaluation (APE) model. Therein, explicit attitudes are evaluative propositional beliefs with subjective truth-values, whereas implicit attitudes are
associative clusters of concepts related to the attitude object with varying
valence and levels of accessibility, depending on the context of activation.
Behavioral consequences may result from both types of attitude. Responses
may be facilitated when implicit and explicit attitudes are in harmony or
inhibited when the two types of attitudes disagree. A drive for cognitive
consistency is assumed to be a motivational force in the model, so that
affective responses caused by the activation of implicit attitudes may be
integrated into the propositional judgment only if they are consistent with
other information currently active in propositional processing. In turn,
propositional processing can selectively activate specific associative clusters,
thereby influencing implicit attitudes. One of the implications of this model
is that a negation of a statement with a truth-value may have different
results depending on whether cognitive capacity is available in processing
it. As associative clusters can only represent an existing or nonexisting link,
not a negated link, negated statements (e.g., sweets are not healthy) should
Models of Duality
11
strengthen associative links (between “sweets” and “healthy”). Only via
propositional processing can the negative truth-value be applied to the
statement, implying that negated statements may have paradoxical effects
on attitudes under conditions suboptimal for propositional processing. In
addition, inconsistencies in cognitions or between cognition and behavior
should only lead to changes in explicit attitudes (processed propositionally),
as truth-values are required for a meaningful identification of inconsistency
between statements. Implicit attitudes should change only over the long
term as the modified explicit attitude influences associative activation patterns. For example, the proposition that wasteful sports cars are bad for the
environment is simply derived, but spontaneous positive associations with
such cars may not change without cognitively reaffirming this proposition
often over time. Similarly to the MODE model of attitudes, the APE model
makes no statement about whether either implicit or explicit attitudes are
more accurate or correct.
In the field of moral judgments, Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model has
helped understanding phenomena and inspired a new wave of research. This
model assumes that moral judgments are, on one hand, based on automatic,
affective moral intuitions and, on the other hand, effortful, aware, intentional
moral reasoning. Moral intuitions are seen as spontaneous judgments that
operate outside awareness but sometimes result in affective reactions, such as
a disgust response to consensual, safe incest between adults. These intuitions
function according to pattern matching and parallel distributed processing
principles, which are similar to associative processing as conceptualized earlier. In the model specifications, emotion and affect play no direct role (being
activated by moral intuitions but not necessarily being further processed).
However, much research supporting the model has focused on moral emotions, conflating them with moral intuitions. With this in mind, the model
covers experiential as well as nonexperiential processing in both associative
and rule-based ways. A link to nonaffective experiential cues drawn in the
social intuitionist model is the assumption that the associations used in moral
intuition are based on learned moral concepts and may contain representations of bodily experiences. Haidt mentions that moral judgments based on
intuition may often lead to suboptimal conclusions and describes moral reasoning as a highly biased process, leading to the tentative conclusion that
intuition in the social intuitionist model is conceptualized as generally inferior to reasoning.
Duality models have also contributed to research in the field of
self-regulation. Many behaviors in daily life are habitual; that is, they
occur with little effort or intentionality under appropriate circumstances.
Such habits may sometimes be inappropriate or unwanted responses to
a given situation. For example, not eating a habitual donut on coffee
12
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
break can cost us effort. A dual-process model that reflects this conflict
is Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) hot/cool system. In this model, hot processing is emotional, associative, and does not require much thought.
Cool processing, on the other hand, deals mainly with nonexperiential
contents and is required for volitional and goal-directed behavior. The
duality of this model again contrasts an automatic, associative system
against an effortful, rule-based system, but in this case, the hot system
deals primarily in experiential (emotional) contents, whereas the cool
system processes more abstract, nonexperiential contents. Many moderating
variables determine whether the hot or cool system prevails in a conflict,
among them internal strategies (such as directing attention away from “hot”
stimuli) and external strategies (such as blocking visual access to “hot”
stimuli). This duality model therefore serves to integrate many aspects of
self-regulation and provide a framework to test them. Coming from the
field of self-regulation, the hot/cool system model necessarily assumes the
cool, regulatory system is more relevant to the individual’s goals than the
hot, emotional system, leading to the conclusion that the cool system is
superior.
THE SEARCH FOR THE SUPERIOR PROCESS
Many of the models presented have made statements about whether one
of their two processes is more accurate than the other. Although several
models make no explicit statement on this point, two basic positions can be
extracted: The idea that the more effortful, systematic process is generally
superior (further referred to as effortful superiority) and the idea that either
system can outperform the other given the correct situational factors (further
referred to as specific adaptation). The idea of effortful superiority comes from
a research perspective that investigates the functioning of the less effortful
system by measuring errors in tasks with “correct” rational answers. This
“heuristics and biases” approach tends toward the general assumption
that less effortful processing cannot outperform more effortful, systematic
processing. This view is criticized by proponents of specific adaptation, who
argue that complex systematic processing may be inferior to the application
of simple rules under specific circumstances, such as when large amounts
of information must be processed to reach an optimal decision. Making
clear statements as to which position is correct is difficult, as often, different
duality theories do not agree on the exact architecture of the processes
described. For example, the debate whether the application of heuristics
can be superior to more effortful processing deals with two rule-based
processes of varying levels of automaticity, whereas many studies of the
performance of intuitive judgments versus systematic judgments examine
Models of Duality
13
the relative merits of associative and rule-based processing. Clearly, these
two questions are fundamentally different and may benefit from different
approaches.
To address the question of the “superior process,” it is therefore necessary
to clearly define the parameters of the processes involved. Specifically, a
deeper understanding of the architecture of the processes being examined
would allow the derivation of situational factors that favor one process over
the other.
REFERENCES
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.) (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. New
York, NY: Guilford Press.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. (2011). The associative–propositional evaluation
model: Theory, evidence, and open questions. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 59–127.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach
to moral judgement. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2004). Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
In M. Augier & J. G. March (Eds.), Models of a man: Essays in memory of Herbert A.
Simon (pp. 411–432). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool system analysis of delay of gratification:
Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106, 3–19.
Payne, B. K., & Gawronski, B. (2010). A history of implicit social cognition: Where is
it coming from? Where is it now? Where is it going?. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne
(Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications (pp.
1–15). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological
Bulletin, 119, 3–22.
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220–247.
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2015). The duality of everyday life: Dual-process and
dual-system models in social psychology. In P. Shaver & M. Mikulincer (Eds.),
APA handbook of personality and social psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
ANAND KRISHNA SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Anand Krishna is a graduate student in social psychology at the University of Würzburg. His research interests include the duality of implicit and
explicit processes as well as more economically focused topics, such as the
endowment effect and purchase behavior as symbolic self-completion.
14
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
ROLAND DEUTSCH SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Roland Deutsch is an associate professor of social psychology at the Technical University of Dresden (Germany) and a member of the Collaborative
Research Center on Volition and Cognitive Control. His research focuses
on attitude change, indirect measures of social cognition, and approach/
avoidance behavior. Jointly, Fritz Strack and Roland Deutsch have been
working on a dual-system model of social cognition and behavior, which
has been applied to various fields of psychological science.
FRITZ STRACK SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Fritz Strack is a professor of social psychology at the University of Würzburg
(Germany). His research interest lies in the domain of social cognition and
includes memory, judgment, emotion, and behavior. A list of his publications
can be obtained from Google Scholar.
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