Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic‐International Linkages in Chinese Politics

Item

Title

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic‐International Linkages in Chinese Politics

Author

Weiss, Jessica Chen

Research Area

Social Institutions

Topic

Government Systems

Abstract

The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can be defended with rigor. Yet many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two levels are connected and strategically linked. Nationalist, anti‐foreign protest is a good example, as Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or tolerate nationalist demonstrations based on domestic and international considerations. In turn, the decision to allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy, constraining the government's diplomatic options or enhancing its flexibility. Ongoing research into the subnational patterns of Chinese nationalism and popular protest offers a promising avenue of inquiry. Combined with close qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, meso‐level investigations can provide additional leverage in the study of Chinese nationalism. Future research should aim to bring nationalism back into the mainstream study of state‐society relations in China, bridging the gap between nationalism and other varieties of social mobilization and political contestation.

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Identifier

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extracted text

Popular Protest, Nationalism,
and Domestic-International
Linkages in Chinese Politics
JESSICA CHEN WEISS

Abstract
The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader
trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can be defended with
rigor. Yet many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two levels are connected and strategically linked. Nationalist, anti-foreign protest is a good example,
as Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or tolerate nationalist demonstrations based on domestic and international considerations. In turn, the decision to
allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy, constraining the government’s diplomatic options or enhancing
its flexibility. Ongoing research into the subnational patterns of Chinese nationalism
and popular protest offers a promising avenue of inquiry. Combined with close qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, meso-level investigations
can provide additional leverage in the study of Chinese nationalism. Future research
should aim to bring nationalism back into the mainstream study of state-society relations in China, bridging the gap between nationalism and other varieties of social
mobilization and political contestation.

INTRODUCTION
The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can
be defended with rigor. Whether rigor is defined by close process tracing or
well-identified quantitative tests, this trend has been described as the “hollowing out” of the China field, favoring small bore projects at the expense of
understanding the broader political system (O’Brien, 2011). Crossing subfield
and disciplinary boundaries is particularly difficult because audiences and
reviewers have different theoretical inclinations and evidentiary standards.
The attempt to do so is a high-risk gamble but one with high reward—not
only yielding insights and connections along paths less traveled but also
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

requiring the explorer to be potentially convincing to few and provocative
to many.
Crossing the domestic–international divide in Chinese politics is particularly challenging because it requires moving across traditional levels of
analysis, requiring scholars on both sides of the divide to yield explanatory power to factors they are not used to privileging. “Second image”
approaches, which look at how domestic factors influence foreign policy
choices and international outcomes, have long been recognized as an
important level of analysis (Waltz, 1979). But bringing domestic factors into
the study of China’s foreign relations is often empirically difficult because
the mechanisms are not formal. China’s leaders do not stand for election,
nor does the National People’s Congress take meaningful roll call votes.
Because the foreign policy process is so opaque, it is difficult to evaluate the
influence of bureaucratic, military, or factional interests on foreign policy in
a systematic way. Scholars of China’s international political economy may
have an advantage in this regard, because the variables of interest, such as
policies and patterns of foreign direct investment and trade, can often be
more easily disaggregated and observed than those of concern to security
scholars.
For those who study domestic phenomenon in Chinese politics, international factors are typically given a back seat to domestic variables. “Second
image-reversed” approaches (Gourevitch, 1978), which reverse the direction
of influence so that international factors influence domestic outcomes from
the outside in rather than inside out—are still relatively uncommon in
the study of Chinese politics.1 The study of Chinese political economy is
again an important exception, with many scholars showing that foreign
investment has altered local incentives and practices.2 In the security realm,
Tom Christensen cites international fears as crucial factors behind domestic
mobilization campaigns in China and the United States during the Cold
War (Christensen, 1996). But it is far more common in the China field to
view the relationship between domestic politics and international relations
as unidirectional, where domestic politics influence China’s foreign policy
choices, but not vice versa.
Many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two
levels are connected and strategically linked. As Rosemary Foot notes, “while
it remains valuable to study the role of domestic processes and domestic
interests in shaping policies toward the outside world, as liberal theorists
have long argued, it also has become essential to examine the reverse as well
as circular flows of influence” (Foot, 2013). Nationalist, anti-foreign protest
1. But see Ross (1986).
2. For example, see Gallagher (2005) and Wang (2015).

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

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is a good example of the intersection of domestic and international politics. In Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, I argue
that it is important to consider international as well as domestic variables in
explaining the pattern of nationalist protest in China (Weiss, 2014). In confronting popular anger, Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or
tolerate nationalist demonstrations, considering both domestic and international consequences. In turn, the decision to allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy,
constraining the government’s diplomatic options or enhancing flexibility.
At the same time, the international perception and credibility of nationalist protests depends on their domestic character. Anti-foreign protests that
appear government-mobilized or insincere are likely to be dismissed by international observers as “cheap talk,” revealing more about the government’s
domestic insecurity than its foreign policy intentions. After presenting this
framework, I contrast it with other primarily “second-image” approaches to
the role of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Next, I suggest directions
for future research, pointing out opportunities to leverage subnational variation in Chinese nationalism to assess our intuitions and hypotheses more
systematically. I conclude by noting the importance of incorporating nationalism more fully into the study of state-society relations in China.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH: PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONALISM
IN CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS
It has become a truism among many scholars as well as officials that public opinion has become a powerful driver of Chinese diplomacy. Less discussed are the mechanisms that link public opinion to policy making and
the conditions under which public sentiments constrain Chinese foreign policy. I argue that popular nationalism, particularly in the form of anti-foreign
street protests, often constrains China’s diplomatic options. But the extent to
which domestic pressures shape foreign policy—and the credibility of such
claims—depends on whether nationalist protests are allowed or repressed.3
FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: A “SECOND-IMAGE REVERSED” APPROACH TO NATIONALIST PROTEST
My argument gives weight to international as well as domestic factors
in explaining China’s management of nationalist protest. Conventionally,
domestic factors have been preeminent, with the Chinese government balancing the risks of allowing protest against the costs of suppressing them.4
3. This section adapts the arguments and evidence developed in Weiss (2013, 2014).
4. Johnston & Stockmann, 2007, p. 194. On the concession-repression dilemma more generally, see Cai
(2008).

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Allowing protests may be beneficial as a “safety valve” for citizens to vent
their domestic grievances. However, tolerating protests is also risky, as these
same domestic grievances may seize the opportunity to mobilize under the
protective cloak of patriotism. Likewise, nipping protests in the bud may
benefit regime stability, avoiding the risks that accompany mobilization.
But repression is also costly, exacerbating resentment against the regime’s
high-handed suppression of patriotic sentiments. These trade-offs suggest
that domestic factors are important but often not decisive as the government
considers how to respond to nationalist mobilization. Given these domestic
dilemmas, the government’s diplomatic motivations—a desire to show
resolve or reassurance—may tip the scales toward allowing or preventing
nationalist protest.
Demonstrations of popular anger can be helpful when the leadership
seeks to signal resolve and demonstrate its commitment to defending
China’s sovereignty and national interests. After US planes mistakenly
bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo during NATO airstrikes in 1999,
anti-American demonstrations across China conveyed domestic outrage
and the government’s determination to stand up to the United States.
Popular anger also enables the government to play “good cop” to the often
xenophobic and racist voices in the street and on the Internet. When Japan’s
bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council gained momentum in
2005, anti-Japanese demonstrations showcased popular anger over Prime
Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine and helped China
make a principled case against Japan’s candidacy.
Yet China has repeatedly stifled popular nationalism when street protests
would have jeopardized the government’s efforts to improve diplomatic relations. During two crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China
Sea in the 1990s, China repressed anti-Japanese demonstrations. Although
China launched a patriotic education campaign to bolster the regime’s diminished legitimacy, nationalist propaganda did not translate into permission
for anti-Japanese protests. After the 2001 EP-3 incident, when a Chinese
fighter jet and American reconnaissance plane collided over the South
China Sea, China prevented anti-American street demonstrations. Seeking
to contain the damage to China’s fragile rapport with the new Bush administration, Chinese authorities instructed students to stay on campus and told
the media to tone down its coverage of the crisis.
Because nationalist protests are costly to repress and can spiral out of
control, triggering domestic or diplomatic instability, the choice of whether
to tolerate protests or not communicates the government’s vulnerability to
domestic sentiment and incentives to take a tough diplomatic stance. The
decision to stifle protests demonstrates the government’s willingness to

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

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spend domestic capital to restrain domestic voices that might reduce diplomatic flexibility and prevent cooperation. Provided that foreign observers
can tell the difference between sincere and manufactured protests, the
government conveys greater resolve when protests are allowed to erupt and
greater reassurance when protests are kept in check. During the EP-3 crisis,
for example, China’s efforts to repress protests helped send a signal of reassurance to the Bush administration as both sides negotiated a face-saving
compromise over the release of the American crew. As John Keefe, special
assistant to Ambassador Prueher, later recounted: “University students
wanted to hold demonstrations to vent their anger. The government forbade
them from taking such action [and] repeatedly stressed … that this event
should not be seen as a major affair in U.S.-China relations.” (Keefe, 2001,
p. 10).
“SECOND-IMAGE” APPROACHES
In contrast, most scholars of Chinese nationalism, public opinion, and diplomacy take a “second-image” approach: examining the impact of domestic
factors on international-level outcomes. Scholars who view Chinese nationalism as a largely grassroots, spontaneous, and sincere phenomenon tend to
give public opinion and nationalism the greatest weight (e.g., Gries, 2004;
Shirk, 2007). Particularly with the spread of the Internet, public opinion is
said to hinder the government’s ability to conduct diplomacy with discretion and flexibility (Wu, 2007, p. 185). Those who see Chinese nationalism as
more state-led also attribute substantial foreign policy influence to nationalist
sentiment, as leaders become constrained by nationalist rhetoric and mythmaking used to buttress their domestic legitimacy and rally the public (e.g.,
He, 2009; Zhao, 2004; Zheng, 1999). Other scholars suggest that the influence
of public opinion is greatest when elites are in conflict (e.g., Fewsmith and
Rosen, 2001; Reilly, 2012). At the same time, public mobilization may exacerbate elite conflict and thereby have a more direct effect on policy.5
These scholars rightly acknowledge that domestic constraints may reduce
the set of acceptable agreements, thus reducing the likelihood of cooperation
(Putnam, 1988). But a government may choose short-term delay or escalation
over cooperation on unfavorable terms. As the two-level games literature
points out, if the foreign negotiator understands that nationalist opinion has
reduced the government’s “win set,” the foreign negotiator is more likely to
offer concessions to salvage an agreement and avoid conflict. Demonstrating
that the government is unable or unwilling to make concessions helps shift
5. As Susan Shirk (2007, p. 48) notes: “Large protests increase the risk of a split by showing leaders
that a following is already in place … The danger is not a matter of the particular personalities in the Party
oligarchy at any one time, but is built into the structure of communist systems.”

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

the burden of compromise to the other party. If credibly revealed, domestic constraints can improve a government’s chances of achieving a favorable
outcome, even if the likelihood of bargaining failure is higher.
To be sure, others have suggested that playing the “nationalist card” may
be diplomatically advantageous.6 Another possibility is that conservative
elements in the government encourage protests to strengthen their own
position. Yet few have given the diplomatic consequences of nationalist
mobilization a central place in the Chinese government’s decision making. In suggesting that diplomatic objectives influence how authoritarian
governments manage nationalist sentiment and popular protest, I make a
“second-image reversed” argument, whereby the international environment
influences domestic choices. Although domestic factors are important
considerations, diplomatic incentives also warrant systematic attention.
Concluding that the Chinese government is strategic about its willingness
to tolerate anti-foreign protest may be cynical. But it is also important to
understanding why and when China will resist domestic demands to take a
tougher stance, despite the domestic costs of defying nationalist pressure.
Each time that nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations have erupted, as
after the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 and Japan’s
purchase of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea in 2012, scholars and
commentators have debated the role of domestic grievances and government machinations in fomenting nationalist protests. Yet focusing only on
cases where nationalist protests have erupted tends to bias our conclusions
about the impact of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy. Rather than
select the dependent variable, it is critical to look at the full range of how the
Chinese government has responded to nationalist sentiment and managed
anti-foreign demonstrations, including repression as well as acceptance. As
often as not, the Chinese government has circumscribed the influence of popular opinion by restraining and even preventing public displays of nationalist
anger.
FROM THE INSIDE OUT: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS
Government efforts to channel nationalism and thereby mitigate the danger
to the regime and diplomatic relations run a different risk: that nationalist opinions will be dismissed by foreign observers as manufactured. This
was one of the reminders of the 1999 Embassy bombing protests. In addition to damaging US diplomatic property, the highly orchestrated nature of
the protests on the second, third, and fourth day of the crisis drew bipartisan censure in the United States. Although the protests still communicated
6. See, for example, He (2009, p. 230) and Reilly, (2012, p, 46).

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

7

Chinese resolve to US negotiators, the contribution to Chinese negotiating
leverage was reduced by foreign skepticism.
Whether foreign negotiators expect Chinese leaders to be constrained by
domestic sentiments matters as much as whether nationalist sentiments are
actually spontaneous or state-led. Foreign perceptions of China’s domestic
motivations and constraints are critical. As Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth noted during a Senate hearing:
The nationalist card is being played … the hard question is, how much and
how permanent is it?7 If protests are seen as “safety valves,” releasing pent up
grievances and then subsiding with no impact on foreign policy, foreigners
have little inducement to offer concessions, because they can expect China’s
leaders to show flexibility soon thereafter.
Yet other observers are less skeptical. Many US officials share the belief that
Chinese leaders have become trapped by the popular nationalism that they
themselves have encouraged. As Condoleezza Rice writes: “Time and time
again we would see this. China would stir up nationalist sentiment in the
population through the state-controlled media, diminishing its own room
for maneuver as it reacted to the very passions it had created” (Rice, 2011,
pp. 46–47). So long as foreign negotiators believe that domestic pressures
reduce China’s diplomatic flexibility, the specter of nationalist mobilization is
credible, whether or not these sentiments are “real or induced,” in the words
of John Keefe (Keefe, 2001). Indeed, the Chinese government did not even
have to allow anti-American protests in 2001 to communicate their vulnerability to domestic nationalism. Online commentary and abortive attempts to
hold protests were sufficient reminders of the popular sentiments that China
worked hard to keep in check after the plane collision.
Why should foreign governments make concessions if the risks of nationalist mobilization are primarily borne by the Chinese government? Many external actors—from governments to multinational enterprises to international
investors—have a stake in the stability of the Chinese regime. To maintain
the status quo, foreign negotiators may be willing to make concessions to
prevent the toughening of Chinese policy. As Henry Kissinger writes, “A
prudent American leadership should balance the risks of stoking Chinese
nationalism against the gains from short-term pressures” (Kissinger, 2001).
By accommodating Chinese interests, foreign decision makers assuage
nationalist concerns in China and ease domestic pressures on the incumbent
leadership. Faced with a more hawkish alternative, foreign governments
may see concessions as a wise hedge against a worse fate. Often, it is the
“moderate autocrat” whom foreign governments seek to bolster against
conservative competitors who might gain influence with the eruption of
7. “U.S. Senator Craig Thomas holds hearing on U.S.-China relations,” May 27, 1999, FDCH Political
Transcripts.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

nationalist protests. For example, after Chinese students took to the streets
to protest Japan in 1985 and again in 1986 to protest official corruption
and lack of political freedom, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in deference to General Secertary Hu
Yaobang’s vulnerable position (Nakasone, 2006, p. 96). When divisions
within the government are apparent, foreign decision makers may show
lenience to support embattled moderates.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
EXPLORING SUBNATIONAL VARIATION IN CHINESE NATIONALISM
Many questions remain about the relative weight of domestic and international factors in shaping the pattern of nationalist protest in China. At
the national level, our empirical leverage is limited by the small number of
observations over time. The number of large-scale nationalist protests has
grown—including anti-Japanese protests in 2012 and anti-French protests
in 2008. But it remains challenging to discriminate among many different
explanations for the same handful of events. When multiple factors point in
the same direction, it is difficult to evaluate their relative weight.
Employing carefully paired comparisons can help isolate the effect of certain factors, such as two US-China crises that occurred within a relatively
short time frame: the 1999 embassy bombing and 2001 EP-3 incident (Weiss,
2013). And careful process tracing can get us much closer to identifying the
role of perceptions and anticipated reactions in government decision making, illuminated by official documents, party histories, policy analysis, and
interviews with officials and influential commentators. Yet it is impossible
to fully control for many variables when explaining such a small set of outcomes. In this regard, there are many advantages to expanding the number
of observations by turning to the subnational level, teasing out the domestic implications of international relations theories. Many of our theories and
intuitions about Chinese nationalism and protest have implications at the
local and individual level.
For example, new research into the 2012 anti-Japanese protests utilizes
cross-sectional variation at the city level to assess the impact of both state
and societal factors (Wallace and Weiss, 2013). A subnational and multivariate approach allows us to simultaneously examine factors such as
state-led patriotic education, the legacy of Japanese occupation, and the
concentration of “biographically available” populations such as students,
migrant workers, and unemployed graduates. Variation in the local political
opportunity structure, namely, local government insecurity and fears of
social unrest, has also played a key role. In determining whether protests

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

9

were allowed to occur, local officials interpret national-level windows of
opportunity and “stability maintenance” guidelines in the context of local
concerns. In this way, disaggregating the study of Chinese nationalism and
popular protest offers promising avenues of inquiry. Combined with close
qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, these sorts
of meso-level investigations—analyses above the level of the individual but
below the level of the state as a whole—can provide additional empirical
leverage on theories of popular protest.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
CIVIL SOCIETY: BRINGING NATIONALISM BACK IN
In much of the contemporary study of Chinese politics, a body of water
separates scholarship on nationalism and nationalist protest from studies
of state–society relations and political protest more generally. The exclusion
of nationalist, anti-foreign mobilization from general studies of social
contention is not limited to the China field. One of the most prominent
cross-national datasets used by political scientists to gauge domestic unrest
explicitly excludes protests against foreign targets (Banks, 2010).
Is the gulf between studies of nationalism and civil society in China
justified? Some scholars have pointed to the degree of government support
as evidence of a qualitative difference between nationalist mobilization and
other types of resistance. For example, in comparing China’s response to
the 1999 anti-American demonstrations with protests by members of Falun
Gong, laid-off workers, and impoverished farmers, Elizabeth Perry writes:
Nationalistically inspired student unrest is another story altogether, however.
In the case of the 1999 student protests against the bombing of China’s
Belgrade embassy, we find a considerable degree of overt central government
support—sanctioning the demonstrations on national television, providing
buses to take students to foreign embassies and consulates, and even supplying
the slogans that they should shout once they got there.
(Perry, 2001, pp. 168–169)

At the same time, even the heavy-handed stage management of protests
in 1999 reflected official fears that protests would otherwise get out of hand,
which Perry notes were particularly high before the tenth anniversary of June
4, 1989. Efforts to corral and ultimately curtail the anti-American demonstrations were not easy, as sociologist Dingxin Zhao has documented. Many
students refused to take university buses and became angry after being told
that the window of opportunity had closed (Zhao, 2003).

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Indeed, there is much more ambiguity and conflict between grassroots
nationalists and government authorities than may be apparent at first
glance. Nationalist mobilization is no exception to the uncertain and shifting
boundaries between state tolerance and repression (Stern and O’Brien,
2012), although the penalty for nationalist organizers tends to be lighter. In
interviews, nationalist activists talk candidly about the process by which
they discern and probe whether it is safe to organize activities. Many
forms of anti-Japanese mobilization have been met with state takeover and
suppression as well as cooptation (Xu & Pu, 2010).
Although nationalists may help the government demonstrate resolve and
gain diplomatic leverage, they are not reflexively pro-government, often
accusing the government of betraying the national interest. Nationalist
protest is also a form of “rightful resistance” (O’Brien, 1996), insofar as it
challenges the state to live up to its own rhetoric and ideals and defend the
nation’s sovereignty from foreign encroachments and insults. However, in
part because protesters can envelop themselves in the language of patriotism and cry, “patriotism is innocent,” the costs of suppressing anti-foreign
sentiment are often higher than protests that advance more particularistic
interests. Nationalists are also useful to the government, and they are rarely
treated as harshly as domestic dissidents.
For example, the Xiamen-based nationalist activist, Li Yiqiang, was
detained by authorities on June 3, 2007, after participating in protests
against the proposed construction of a paraxylene (PX) chemical plant.8 The
participation of a nationalist activist in a domestic protest suggests one of
the government’s greatest fears: linkage across aggrieved groups. Although
he was held for several days in the aftermath of the protests, by 2009 he
was again active in attempting to organize activities in Changsha.9 He and
his group were prevented from sailing to the islands during controversies
with Japan in 2010 and in 2012, but he has not been silenced, with even
mainstream media interviewing him.10
The government has dealt more harshly with anti-Japanese activists who
have strayed further across the bounds of the permissible, particularly those
who have directly challenged the central government’s legitimacy. In the
early 1990s, a Shanghai activist who had participated in the 1989 democracy movement, Bao Ge, was placed under house arrest after threatening a
hunger strike and self-immolation to demand an apology from the Japanese
8. Weiss, 2014.
9. http://bbs.china918.cn:81/showtopic.aspx?topicid=28156&page=end, last accessed March 12,
2011.
10. “Dalu Baodiaozhe bei gongan lanzu deng chuan,” BBC Chinese, September 12, 2010, accessed
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/09/100912_brief_china_japan_baodiao.shtml;
Guo Kai, “Mainland, Taiwan activists pull out of Diaoyu trip,” Global Times, August 15, 2012.

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

11

emperor.11 In 1994, Bao was sentenced to 3 years of reform through labor after
linking demands for compensation from Japan to sweeping political reform,
calling upon the National People’s Congress to hold a referendum on war
reparations.12 Bao had stated that a referendum would “open the way to a
constitutional democracy” in China.13
Given these potentially treacherous waters, many nationalists are quick
to proclaim their support for the central government. In 2003, for example,
the Patriots Alliance Network organized an Internet signature campaign
demanding Japanese compensation for victims of poison gas bombs left
near Qiqihar in northeastern China. In announcing the start of the petition
campaign, the official declaration read: “We firmly support the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ stern negotiations with Japan on August 8 and August
12 [and] hope that this campaign will help the government put pressure
on Japan.”14 Privately, however, activists were more willing to criticize the
government. As a leading nationalist activist acknowledged,
In Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese government overemphasizes
government-to-government relations and neglects the interests of individuals (geti liyi). The government doesn’t want the stories of the victims to
come out, because the government would look bad for having done nothing
so far. I’d like the government to adopt a more open-minded policy. The
public security bureau did not agree (meiyou tongyi) to the internet signature
campaign, but we did it anyway.15

More generally, the separation of domestic and foreign policy activism may
reflect self-censorship by activists concerned about the risk of linking nationalist to domestic demands. One QQ group, “Patriots,” used the following
tag line: “Sensitive topics that concern national politics or reactionary statements against the motherland are forbidden. Violators will be removed from
the group without exception.”16 As James Mulvenon notes, patriotic hackers
likewise self-police their activities, explicitly warning their members against
attacking domestic websites. At least part of their restraint appears to be tactical, not ideological, as they try to avoid giving the government cause for
repression (Mulvenon, 2009).

11. Kent Chen, “Activist to continue fight for apology,” South China Morning Post, November 5, 1992.
12. “Bao Ge released, brother of other Shanghai dissidents penalized,” Ming Pao, June 5, 1997.
13. “Activist bids for vote on war cash,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 1993.
14. http://bbs.1931-9-18.org/viewthread.php?tid=22454, last accessed March 16, 2011.
15. Interview with CFDD organizer, Beijing, July 27, 2006.
16. http://qun.qq.com/#search/cnum/0/st/0/c1/0/c2/0/c3/0/pg/1/tx/%E7%88%B1%E5%9B%
BD%E8%80%85, last accessed September 16, 2010.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Activists who cross between the nationalist and domestic spheres of civil
society may also be more likely to face suppression over time, feeding government paranoia of dissidents looking for any means to advance their aims.
As Yu Jie writes,
Even self-proclaimed ‘pursuers of democracy and liberty’ also take anti-Japan
thought as useful resources . . . . They tried to establish a democratic and constitutional government through nationalistic movements. This kind of thinking
will not lead anywhere, but will push China into further misery.17

Activists who do “too much”—challenging the government on multiple
fronts and providing the human capital that might potentially link up
disparate grievances—are more likely to be deemed sensitive and their
activities thwarted.
Together, state repression and self-censorship have winnowed out the population that vocally mobilizes on both sides of the domestic-foreign policy
divide. Despite this induced separation, it is important to acknowledge the
analytic similarities and linkages between the liberal and nationalist spheres
of civil society. Whether or not these connections have been driven underground or weeded out, as scholars it is critical that we problematize this
distribution of voices in civil society and how it has varied over time. Breaking down the divide between international relations and comparative politics
in the study of Chinese politics is both an analytical task and a substantive
one, with important implications for our understanding of popular protest
and China’s foreign relations.

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Christensen, T. J. (1996). Useful adversaries: Grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and
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Fewsmith, J., & Rosen, S. (2001). The domestic context of chinese foreign policy: Does
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security policy in the era of reform, 1978–2000. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
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Foot, R. (2013). Introduction. In R. Foot (Ed.), China across the divide: The domestic and
global in politics and society. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
17. Yu, Jie, “The Anti-Japanese Resistance War, Chinese Patriotism and Free Speech. How Can We
Forgive Japan?” July 16, 2007, Japan Focus, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-yu-jie/2654.

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Gallagher, M. E. (2005). Contagious capitalism: Globalization and the politics of labor in
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Gourevitch, P. (1978). 2nd image reversed: International sources of domestic politics.
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Keefe, J. (2001). Anatomy of the EP-3 Incident, April 2001. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation.
Kissinger, H. (2001). Does America need a foreign policy? Towards a diplomacy for the 21st
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Wallace, J, and JC Weiss. 2013. The political economy of nationalist protest in China: A subnational approach. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
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Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest
in China. International Organization, 67(01), 1–35.
Weiss, J. C. (2014). Powerful patriots: Nationalist protest in China’s foreign relations. New
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FURTHER READING
Christensen, T. J., Johnston, A. I., & Ross, R. S. (2006). Conclusions and future directions. In A. I. Johnston & R. S. Ross (Eds.), New directions in the study of China’s
foreign policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Downs, E. S., & Saunders, P. C. (1998). Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism:
China and the Diaoyu Islands. International Security, 23(3), 114–46.

JESSICA CHEN WEISS SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Jessica Chen Weiss is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and Research Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and
Area Studies. She is the author of Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in
China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014). The dissertation on
which it is based won the 2009 American Political Science Association Helen
Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in international relations, law, and
politics. Her research has appeared or is forthcoming in International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the China quarterly and has been
supported by the National Science Foundation, Princeton-Harvard China
& The World Program, Bradley Foundation, Fulbright-Hays program, and
the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
Before joining the Yale faculty, she founded FACES, the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford, while an undergraduate at Stanford
(BA, 2003). She teaches courses on international relations, Chinese foreign
policy, state-society relations in post-Mao China, and anti-Americanism in
world politics. Website: www.jessicachenweiss.com

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

15

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Popular Protest, Nationalism,
and Domestic-International
Linkages in Chinese Politics
JESSICA CHEN WEISS

Abstract
The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader
trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can be defended with
rigor. Yet many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two levels are connected and strategically linked. Nationalist, anti-foreign protest is a good example,
as Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or tolerate nationalist demonstrations based on domestic and international considerations. In turn, the decision to
allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy, constraining the government’s diplomatic options or enhancing
its flexibility. Ongoing research into the subnational patterns of Chinese nationalism
and popular protest offers a promising avenue of inquiry. Combined with close qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, meso-level investigations
can provide additional leverage in the study of Chinese nationalism. Future research
should aim to bring nationalism back into the mainstream study of state-society relations in China, bridging the gap between nationalism and other varieties of social
mobilization and political contestation.

INTRODUCTION
The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can
be defended with rigor. Whether rigor is defined by close process tracing or
well-identified quantitative tests, this trend has been described as the “hollowing out” of the China field, favoring small bore projects at the expense of
understanding the broader political system (O’Brien, 2011). Crossing subfield
and disciplinary boundaries is particularly difficult because audiences and
reviewers have different theoretical inclinations and evidentiary standards.
The attempt to do so is a high-risk gamble but one with high reward—not
only yielding insights and connections along paths less traveled but also
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

requiring the explorer to be potentially convincing to few and provocative
to many.
Crossing the domestic–international divide in Chinese politics is particularly challenging because it requires moving across traditional levels of
analysis, requiring scholars on both sides of the divide to yield explanatory power to factors they are not used to privileging. “Second image”
approaches, which look at how domestic factors influence foreign policy
choices and international outcomes, have long been recognized as an
important level of analysis (Waltz, 1979). But bringing domestic factors into
the study of China’s foreign relations is often empirically difficult because
the mechanisms are not formal. China’s leaders do not stand for election,
nor does the National People’s Congress take meaningful roll call votes.
Because the foreign policy process is so opaque, it is difficult to evaluate the
influence of bureaucratic, military, or factional interests on foreign policy in
a systematic way. Scholars of China’s international political economy may
have an advantage in this regard, because the variables of interest, such as
policies and patterns of foreign direct investment and trade, can often be
more easily disaggregated and observed than those of concern to security
scholars.
For those who study domestic phenomenon in Chinese politics, international factors are typically given a back seat to domestic variables. “Second
image-reversed” approaches (Gourevitch, 1978), which reverse the direction
of influence so that international factors influence domestic outcomes from
the outside in rather than inside out—are still relatively uncommon in
the study of Chinese politics.1 The study of Chinese political economy is
again an important exception, with many scholars showing that foreign
investment has altered local incentives and practices.2 In the security realm,
Tom Christensen cites international fears as crucial factors behind domestic
mobilization campaigns in China and the United States during the Cold
War (Christensen, 1996). But it is far more common in the China field to
view the relationship between domestic politics and international relations
as unidirectional, where domestic politics influence China’s foreign policy
choices, but not vice versa.
Many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two
levels are connected and strategically linked. As Rosemary Foot notes, “while
it remains valuable to study the role of domestic processes and domestic
interests in shaping policies toward the outside world, as liberal theorists
have long argued, it also has become essential to examine the reverse as well
as circular flows of influence” (Foot, 2013). Nationalist, anti-foreign protest
1. But see Ross (1986).
2. For example, see Gallagher (2005) and Wang (2015).

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

3

is a good example of the intersection of domestic and international politics. In Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, I argue
that it is important to consider international as well as domestic variables in
explaining the pattern of nationalist protest in China (Weiss, 2014). In confronting popular anger, Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or
tolerate nationalist demonstrations, considering both domestic and international consequences. In turn, the decision to allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy,
constraining the government’s diplomatic options or enhancing flexibility.
At the same time, the international perception and credibility of nationalist protests depends on their domestic character. Anti-foreign protests that
appear government-mobilized or insincere are likely to be dismissed by international observers as “cheap talk,” revealing more about the government’s
domestic insecurity than its foreign policy intentions. After presenting this
framework, I contrast it with other primarily “second-image” approaches to
the role of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Next, I suggest directions
for future research, pointing out opportunities to leverage subnational variation in Chinese nationalism to assess our intuitions and hypotheses more
systematically. I conclude by noting the importance of incorporating nationalism more fully into the study of state-society relations in China.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH: PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONALISM
IN CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS
It has become a truism among many scholars as well as officials that public opinion has become a powerful driver of Chinese diplomacy. Less discussed are the mechanisms that link public opinion to policy making and
the conditions under which public sentiments constrain Chinese foreign policy. I argue that popular nationalism, particularly in the form of anti-foreign
street protests, often constrains China’s diplomatic options. But the extent to
which domestic pressures shape foreign policy—and the credibility of such
claims—depends on whether nationalist protests are allowed or repressed.3
FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: A “SECOND-IMAGE REVERSED” APPROACH TO NATIONALIST PROTEST
My argument gives weight to international as well as domestic factors
in explaining China’s management of nationalist protest. Conventionally,
domestic factors have been preeminent, with the Chinese government balancing the risks of allowing protest against the costs of suppressing them.4
3. This section adapts the arguments and evidence developed in Weiss (2013, 2014).
4. Johnston & Stockmann, 2007, p. 194. On the concession-repression dilemma more generally, see Cai
(2008).

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Allowing protests may be beneficial as a “safety valve” for citizens to vent
their domestic grievances. However, tolerating protests is also risky, as these
same domestic grievances may seize the opportunity to mobilize under the
protective cloak of patriotism. Likewise, nipping protests in the bud may
benefit regime stability, avoiding the risks that accompany mobilization.
But repression is also costly, exacerbating resentment against the regime’s
high-handed suppression of patriotic sentiments. These trade-offs suggest
that domestic factors are important but often not decisive as the government
considers how to respond to nationalist mobilization. Given these domestic
dilemmas, the government’s diplomatic motivations—a desire to show
resolve or reassurance—may tip the scales toward allowing or preventing
nationalist protest.
Demonstrations of popular anger can be helpful when the leadership
seeks to signal resolve and demonstrate its commitment to defending
China’s sovereignty and national interests. After US planes mistakenly
bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo during NATO airstrikes in 1999,
anti-American demonstrations across China conveyed domestic outrage
and the government’s determination to stand up to the United States.
Popular anger also enables the government to play “good cop” to the often
xenophobic and racist voices in the street and on the Internet. When Japan’s
bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council gained momentum in
2005, anti-Japanese demonstrations showcased popular anger over Prime
Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine and helped China
make a principled case against Japan’s candidacy.
Yet China has repeatedly stifled popular nationalism when street protests
would have jeopardized the government’s efforts to improve diplomatic relations. During two crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China
Sea in the 1990s, China repressed anti-Japanese demonstrations. Although
China launched a patriotic education campaign to bolster the regime’s diminished legitimacy, nationalist propaganda did not translate into permission
for anti-Japanese protests. After the 2001 EP-3 incident, when a Chinese
fighter jet and American reconnaissance plane collided over the South
China Sea, China prevented anti-American street demonstrations. Seeking
to contain the damage to China’s fragile rapport with the new Bush administration, Chinese authorities instructed students to stay on campus and told
the media to tone down its coverage of the crisis.
Because nationalist protests are costly to repress and can spiral out of
control, triggering domestic or diplomatic instability, the choice of whether
to tolerate protests or not communicates the government’s vulnerability to
domestic sentiment and incentives to take a tough diplomatic stance. The
decision to stifle protests demonstrates the government’s willingness to

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

5

spend domestic capital to restrain domestic voices that might reduce diplomatic flexibility and prevent cooperation. Provided that foreign observers
can tell the difference between sincere and manufactured protests, the
government conveys greater resolve when protests are allowed to erupt and
greater reassurance when protests are kept in check. During the EP-3 crisis,
for example, China’s efforts to repress protests helped send a signal of reassurance to the Bush administration as both sides negotiated a face-saving
compromise over the release of the American crew. As John Keefe, special
assistant to Ambassador Prueher, later recounted: “University students
wanted to hold demonstrations to vent their anger. The government forbade
them from taking such action [and] repeatedly stressed … that this event
should not be seen as a major affair in U.S.-China relations.” (Keefe, 2001,
p. 10).
“SECOND-IMAGE” APPROACHES
In contrast, most scholars of Chinese nationalism, public opinion, and diplomacy take a “second-image” approach: examining the impact of domestic
factors on international-level outcomes. Scholars who view Chinese nationalism as a largely grassroots, spontaneous, and sincere phenomenon tend to
give public opinion and nationalism the greatest weight (e.g., Gries, 2004;
Shirk, 2007). Particularly with the spread of the Internet, public opinion is
said to hinder the government’s ability to conduct diplomacy with discretion and flexibility (Wu, 2007, p. 185). Those who see Chinese nationalism as
more state-led also attribute substantial foreign policy influence to nationalist
sentiment, as leaders become constrained by nationalist rhetoric and mythmaking used to buttress their domestic legitimacy and rally the public (e.g.,
He, 2009; Zhao, 2004; Zheng, 1999). Other scholars suggest that the influence
of public opinion is greatest when elites are in conflict (e.g., Fewsmith and
Rosen, 2001; Reilly, 2012). At the same time, public mobilization may exacerbate elite conflict and thereby have a more direct effect on policy.5
These scholars rightly acknowledge that domestic constraints may reduce
the set of acceptable agreements, thus reducing the likelihood of cooperation
(Putnam, 1988). But a government may choose short-term delay or escalation
over cooperation on unfavorable terms. As the two-level games literature
points out, if the foreign negotiator understands that nationalist opinion has
reduced the government’s “win set,” the foreign negotiator is more likely to
offer concessions to salvage an agreement and avoid conflict. Demonstrating
that the government is unable or unwilling to make concessions helps shift
5. As Susan Shirk (2007, p. 48) notes: “Large protests increase the risk of a split by showing leaders
that a following is already in place … The danger is not a matter of the particular personalities in the Party
oligarchy at any one time, but is built into the structure of communist systems.”

6

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

the burden of compromise to the other party. If credibly revealed, domestic constraints can improve a government’s chances of achieving a favorable
outcome, even if the likelihood of bargaining failure is higher.
To be sure, others have suggested that playing the “nationalist card” may
be diplomatically advantageous.6 Another possibility is that conservative
elements in the government encourage protests to strengthen their own
position. Yet few have given the diplomatic consequences of nationalist
mobilization a central place in the Chinese government’s decision making. In suggesting that diplomatic objectives influence how authoritarian
governments manage nationalist sentiment and popular protest, I make a
“second-image reversed” argument, whereby the international environment
influences domestic choices. Although domestic factors are important
considerations, diplomatic incentives also warrant systematic attention.
Concluding that the Chinese government is strategic about its willingness
to tolerate anti-foreign protest may be cynical. But it is also important to
understanding why and when China will resist domestic demands to take a
tougher stance, despite the domestic costs of defying nationalist pressure.
Each time that nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations have erupted, as
after the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 and Japan’s
purchase of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea in 2012, scholars and
commentators have debated the role of domestic grievances and government machinations in fomenting nationalist protests. Yet focusing only on
cases where nationalist protests have erupted tends to bias our conclusions
about the impact of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy. Rather than
select the dependent variable, it is critical to look at the full range of how the
Chinese government has responded to nationalist sentiment and managed
anti-foreign demonstrations, including repression as well as acceptance. As
often as not, the Chinese government has circumscribed the influence of popular opinion by restraining and even preventing public displays of nationalist
anger.
FROM THE INSIDE OUT: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS
Government efforts to channel nationalism and thereby mitigate the danger
to the regime and diplomatic relations run a different risk: that nationalist opinions will be dismissed by foreign observers as manufactured. This
was one of the reminders of the 1999 Embassy bombing protests. In addition to damaging US diplomatic property, the highly orchestrated nature of
the protests on the second, third, and fourth day of the crisis drew bipartisan censure in the United States. Although the protests still communicated
6. See, for example, He (2009, p. 230) and Reilly, (2012, p, 46).

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

7

Chinese resolve to US negotiators, the contribution to Chinese negotiating
leverage was reduced by foreign skepticism.
Whether foreign negotiators expect Chinese leaders to be constrained by
domestic sentiments matters as much as whether nationalist sentiments are
actually spontaneous or state-led. Foreign perceptions of China’s domestic
motivations and constraints are critical. As Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth noted during a Senate hearing:
The nationalist card is being played … the hard question is, how much and
how permanent is it?7 If protests are seen as “safety valves,” releasing pent up
grievances and then subsiding with no impact on foreign policy, foreigners
have little inducement to offer concessions, because they can expect China’s
leaders to show flexibility soon thereafter.
Yet other observers are less skeptical. Many US officials share the belief that
Chinese leaders have become trapped by the popular nationalism that they
themselves have encouraged. As Condoleezza Rice writes: “Time and time
again we would see this. China would stir up nationalist sentiment in the
population through the state-controlled media, diminishing its own room
for maneuver as it reacted to the very passions it had created” (Rice, 2011,
pp. 46–47). So long as foreign negotiators believe that domestic pressures
reduce China’s diplomatic flexibility, the specter of nationalist mobilization is
credible, whether or not these sentiments are “real or induced,” in the words
of John Keefe (Keefe, 2001). Indeed, the Chinese government did not even
have to allow anti-American protests in 2001 to communicate their vulnerability to domestic nationalism. Online commentary and abortive attempts to
hold protests were sufficient reminders of the popular sentiments that China
worked hard to keep in check after the plane collision.
Why should foreign governments make concessions if the risks of nationalist mobilization are primarily borne by the Chinese government? Many external actors—from governments to multinational enterprises to international
investors—have a stake in the stability of the Chinese regime. To maintain
the status quo, foreign negotiators may be willing to make concessions to
prevent the toughening of Chinese policy. As Henry Kissinger writes, “A
prudent American leadership should balance the risks of stoking Chinese
nationalism against the gains from short-term pressures” (Kissinger, 2001).
By accommodating Chinese interests, foreign decision makers assuage
nationalist concerns in China and ease domestic pressures on the incumbent
leadership. Faced with a more hawkish alternative, foreign governments
may see concessions as a wise hedge against a worse fate. Often, it is the
“moderate autocrat” whom foreign governments seek to bolster against
conservative competitors who might gain influence with the eruption of
7. “U.S. Senator Craig Thomas holds hearing on U.S.-China relations,” May 27, 1999, FDCH Political
Transcripts.

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

nationalist protests. For example, after Chinese students took to the streets
to protest Japan in 1985 and again in 1986 to protest official corruption
and lack of political freedom, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in deference to General Secertary Hu
Yaobang’s vulnerable position (Nakasone, 2006, p. 96). When divisions
within the government are apparent, foreign decision makers may show
lenience to support embattled moderates.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
EXPLORING SUBNATIONAL VARIATION IN CHINESE NATIONALISM
Many questions remain about the relative weight of domestic and international factors in shaping the pattern of nationalist protest in China. At
the national level, our empirical leverage is limited by the small number of
observations over time. The number of large-scale nationalist protests has
grown—including anti-Japanese protests in 2012 and anti-French protests
in 2008. But it remains challenging to discriminate among many different
explanations for the same handful of events. When multiple factors point in
the same direction, it is difficult to evaluate their relative weight.
Employing carefully paired comparisons can help isolate the effect of certain factors, such as two US-China crises that occurred within a relatively
short time frame: the 1999 embassy bombing and 2001 EP-3 incident (Weiss,
2013). And careful process tracing can get us much closer to identifying the
role of perceptions and anticipated reactions in government decision making, illuminated by official documents, party histories, policy analysis, and
interviews with officials and influential commentators. Yet it is impossible
to fully control for many variables when explaining such a small set of outcomes. In this regard, there are many advantages to expanding the number
of observations by turning to the subnational level, teasing out the domestic implications of international relations theories. Many of our theories and
intuitions about Chinese nationalism and protest have implications at the
local and individual level.
For example, new research into the 2012 anti-Japanese protests utilizes
cross-sectional variation at the city level to assess the impact of both state
and societal factors (Wallace and Weiss, 2013). A subnational and multivariate approach allows us to simultaneously examine factors such as
state-led patriotic education, the legacy of Japanese occupation, and the
concentration of “biographically available” populations such as students,
migrant workers, and unemployed graduates. Variation in the local political
opportunity structure, namely, local government insecurity and fears of
social unrest, has also played a key role. In determining whether protests

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

9

were allowed to occur, local officials interpret national-level windows of
opportunity and “stability maintenance” guidelines in the context of local
concerns. In this way, disaggregating the study of Chinese nationalism and
popular protest offers promising avenues of inquiry. Combined with close
qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, these sorts
of meso-level investigations—analyses above the level of the individual but
below the level of the state as a whole—can provide additional empirical
leverage on theories of popular protest.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
CIVIL SOCIETY: BRINGING NATIONALISM BACK IN
In much of the contemporary study of Chinese politics, a body of water
separates scholarship on nationalism and nationalist protest from studies
of state–society relations and political protest more generally. The exclusion
of nationalist, anti-foreign mobilization from general studies of social
contention is not limited to the China field. One of the most prominent
cross-national datasets used by political scientists to gauge domestic unrest
explicitly excludes protests against foreign targets (Banks, 2010).
Is the gulf between studies of nationalism and civil society in China
justified? Some scholars have pointed to the degree of government support
as evidence of a qualitative difference between nationalist mobilization and
other types of resistance. For example, in comparing China’s response to
the 1999 anti-American demonstrations with protests by members of Falun
Gong, laid-off workers, and impoverished farmers, Elizabeth Perry writes:
Nationalistically inspired student unrest is another story altogether, however.
In the case of the 1999 student protests against the bombing of China’s
Belgrade embassy, we find a considerable degree of overt central government
support—sanctioning the demonstrations on national television, providing
buses to take students to foreign embassies and consulates, and even supplying
the slogans that they should shout once they got there.
(Perry, 2001, pp. 168–169)

At the same time, even the heavy-handed stage management of protests
in 1999 reflected official fears that protests would otherwise get out of hand,
which Perry notes were particularly high before the tenth anniversary of June
4, 1989. Efforts to corral and ultimately curtail the anti-American demonstrations were not easy, as sociologist Dingxin Zhao has documented. Many
students refused to take university buses and became angry after being told
that the window of opportunity had closed (Zhao, 2003).

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Indeed, there is much more ambiguity and conflict between grassroots
nationalists and government authorities than may be apparent at first
glance. Nationalist mobilization is no exception to the uncertain and shifting
boundaries between state tolerance and repression (Stern and O’Brien,
2012), although the penalty for nationalist organizers tends to be lighter. In
interviews, nationalist activists talk candidly about the process by which
they discern and probe whether it is safe to organize activities. Many
forms of anti-Japanese mobilization have been met with state takeover and
suppression as well as cooptation (Xu & Pu, 2010).
Although nationalists may help the government demonstrate resolve and
gain diplomatic leverage, they are not reflexively pro-government, often
accusing the government of betraying the national interest. Nationalist
protest is also a form of “rightful resistance” (O’Brien, 1996), insofar as it
challenges the state to live up to its own rhetoric and ideals and defend the
nation’s sovereignty from foreign encroachments and insults. However, in
part because protesters can envelop themselves in the language of patriotism and cry, “patriotism is innocent,” the costs of suppressing anti-foreign
sentiment are often higher than protests that advance more particularistic
interests. Nationalists are also useful to the government, and they are rarely
treated as harshly as domestic dissidents.
For example, the Xiamen-based nationalist activist, Li Yiqiang, was
detained by authorities on June 3, 2007, after participating in protests
against the proposed construction of a paraxylene (PX) chemical plant.8 The
participation of a nationalist activist in a domestic protest suggests one of
the government’s greatest fears: linkage across aggrieved groups. Although
he was held for several days in the aftermath of the protests, by 2009 he
was again active in attempting to organize activities in Changsha.9 He and
his group were prevented from sailing to the islands during controversies
with Japan in 2010 and in 2012, but he has not been silenced, with even
mainstream media interviewing him.10
The government has dealt more harshly with anti-Japanese activists who
have strayed further across the bounds of the permissible, particularly those
who have directly challenged the central government’s legitimacy. In the
early 1990s, a Shanghai activist who had participated in the 1989 democracy movement, Bao Ge, was placed under house arrest after threatening a
hunger strike and self-immolation to demand an apology from the Japanese
8. Weiss, 2014.
9. http://bbs.china918.cn:81/showtopic.aspx?topicid=28156&page=end, last accessed March 12,
2011.
10. “Dalu Baodiaozhe bei gongan lanzu deng chuan,” BBC Chinese, September 12, 2010, accessed
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/09/100912_brief_china_japan_baodiao.shtml;
Guo Kai, “Mainland, Taiwan activists pull out of Diaoyu trip,” Global Times, August 15, 2012.

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

11

emperor.11 In 1994, Bao was sentenced to 3 years of reform through labor after
linking demands for compensation from Japan to sweeping political reform,
calling upon the National People’s Congress to hold a referendum on war
reparations.12 Bao had stated that a referendum would “open the way to a
constitutional democracy” in China.13
Given these potentially treacherous waters, many nationalists are quick
to proclaim their support for the central government. In 2003, for example,
the Patriots Alliance Network organized an Internet signature campaign
demanding Japanese compensation for victims of poison gas bombs left
near Qiqihar in northeastern China. In announcing the start of the petition
campaign, the official declaration read: “We firmly support the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ stern negotiations with Japan on August 8 and August
12 [and] hope that this campaign will help the government put pressure
on Japan.”14 Privately, however, activists were more willing to criticize the
government. As a leading nationalist activist acknowledged,
In Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese government overemphasizes
government-to-government relations and neglects the interests of individuals (geti liyi). The government doesn’t want the stories of the victims to
come out, because the government would look bad for having done nothing
so far. I’d like the government to adopt a more open-minded policy. The
public security bureau did not agree (meiyou tongyi) to the internet signature
campaign, but we did it anyway.15

More generally, the separation of domestic and foreign policy activism may
reflect self-censorship by activists concerned about the risk of linking nationalist to domestic demands. One QQ group, “Patriots,” used the following
tag line: “Sensitive topics that concern national politics or reactionary statements against the motherland are forbidden. Violators will be removed from
the group without exception.”16 As James Mulvenon notes, patriotic hackers
likewise self-police their activities, explicitly warning their members against
attacking domestic websites. At least part of their restraint appears to be tactical, not ideological, as they try to avoid giving the government cause for
repression (Mulvenon, 2009).

11. Kent Chen, “Activist to continue fight for apology,” South China Morning Post, November 5, 1992.
12. “Bao Ge released, brother of other Shanghai dissidents penalized,” Ming Pao, June 5, 1997.
13. “Activist bids for vote on war cash,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 1993.
14. http://bbs.1931-9-18.org/viewthread.php?tid=22454, last accessed March 16, 2011.
15. Interview with CFDD organizer, Beijing, July 27, 2006.
16. http://qun.qq.com/#search/cnum/0/st/0/c1/0/c2/0/c3/0/pg/1/tx/%E7%88%B1%E5%9B%
BD%E8%80%85, last accessed September 16, 2010.

12

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Activists who cross between the nationalist and domestic spheres of civil
society may also be more likely to face suppression over time, feeding government paranoia of dissidents looking for any means to advance their aims.
As Yu Jie writes,
Even self-proclaimed ‘pursuers of democracy and liberty’ also take anti-Japan
thought as useful resources . . . . They tried to establish a democratic and constitutional government through nationalistic movements. This kind of thinking
will not lead anywhere, but will push China into further misery.17

Activists who do “too much”—challenging the government on multiple
fronts and providing the human capital that might potentially link up
disparate grievances—are more likely to be deemed sensitive and their
activities thwarted.
Together, state repression and self-censorship have winnowed out the population that vocally mobilizes on both sides of the domestic-foreign policy
divide. Despite this induced separation, it is important to acknowledge the
analytic similarities and linkages between the liberal and nationalist spheres
of civil society. Whether or not these connections have been driven underground or weeded out, as scholars it is critical that we problematize this
distribution of voices in civil society and how it has varied over time. Breaking down the divide between international relations and comparative politics
in the study of Chinese politics is both an analytical task and a substantive
one, with important implications for our understanding of popular protest
and China’s foreign relations.

REFERENCES
Banks, A. S. (2010). Cross-National Time Series Archive. Jerusalem, Israel: Databanks
International.
Cai, Y. (2008). Power structure and regime resilience: Contentious politics in China.
British Journal of Political Science, 38(03), 411–32.
Christensen, T. J. (1996). Useful adversaries: Grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and
Sino-American conflict, 1947–1958. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fewsmith, J., & Rosen, S. (2001). The domestic context of chinese foreign policy: Does
‘Public Opinion’ matter?. In D. Lampton (Ed.), The making of Chinese foreign and
security policy in the era of reform, 1978–2000. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Foot, R. (2013). Introduction. In R. Foot (Ed.), China across the divide: The domestic and
global in politics and society. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
17. Yu, Jie, “The Anti-Japanese Resistance War, Chinese Patriotism and Free Speech. How Can We
Forgive Japan?” July 16, 2007, Japan Focus, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-yu-jie/2654.

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13

Gallagher, M. E. (2005). Contagious capitalism: Globalization and the politics of labor in
China. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gourevitch, P. (1978). 2nd image reversed: International sources of domestic politics.
International Organization, 32(4), 881–911.
Gries, P. H. (2004). China’s new nationalism: Pride, politics, and diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
He, Y. (2009). The search for reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish relations since
World War II. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Johnston, A. I., & Stockmann, D. (2007). Chinese attitudes toward the United States
and Americans. In P. J. Katzenstein & R. O. Keohane (Eds.), Anti-Americanisms in
world politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Keefe, J. (2001). Anatomy of the EP-3 Incident, April 2001. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation.
Kissinger, H. (2001). Does America need a foreign policy? Towards a diplomacy for the 21st
century. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
Mulvenon, J. (2009). PLA computer network operations: Scenarios, doctrine, organizations, and capability. In R. Kamphausen, D. Lai & A. Scobell (Eds.), Beyond the
strait: PLA missions other than Taiwan. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center.
Nakasone, Y. (2006). Meditations: On the nature of leadership (1st ed.). Tokyo, Japan:
PHP Institute, Inc..
O’Brien, K. J. (1996). Rightful resistance. World Politics, 49(1), 31–55.
O’Brien, K. J. (2011). Studying Chinese politics in an age of specialization. Journal of
Contemporary China, 20(71), 535–41.
Perry, E. J. (2001). Challenging the mandate of heaven: Popular protest in modern
China. Critical Asian Studies, 33(2), 163–80.
Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of 2-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–60.
Reilly, J. (2012). Strong society, smart state: The rise of public opinion in China’s Japan
policy. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Rice, C. (2011). No higher honor: A memoir of my years in Washington (1st ed.). New
York, NY: Crown Publishers.
Ross, R. S. (1986). International bargaining and domestic politics: Conflict in
U.S.-China relations since 1972. World Politics, 38(2), 255–287.
Shirk, S. L. (2007). China: Fragile superpower. Oxford, England: Oxford University
Press.
Stern, R. E., & O’Brien, K. J. (2012). Politics at the boundary mixed signals and the
Chinese state. Modern China, 38(2), 174–98.
Wallace, J, and JC Weiss. 2013. The political economy of nationalist protest in China: A subnational approach. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, March 30.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics (1st ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Wang, Y. (2015). Tying the autocrat’s hands: The rise of the rule of law in China. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest
in China. International Organization, 67(01), 1–35.
Weiss, J. C. (2014). Powerful patriots: Nationalist protest in China’s foreign relations. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Wu, X. (2007). Chinese cyber nationalism: Evolution, characteristics, and implications. Lanham, ML: Lexington Books.
Xu, B., & Pu, X. (2010). Dynamic statism and memory politics: A case analysis of the
Chinese war reparations movement. The China Quarterly, 201, 156–75.
Zhao, D. (2003). Nationalism and authoritarianism: Student-government conflicts
during the 1999 Beijing student protests after the Belgrade embassy bombing.
Asian Perspective, 27(1), 5–34.
Zhao, S. (2004). A nation-state by construction: Dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism.
Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
Zheng, Y. (1999). Discovering Chinese nationalism in China: Modernization, identity, and
international relations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

FURTHER READING
Christensen, T. J., Johnston, A. I., & Ross, R. S. (2006). Conclusions and future directions. In A. I. Johnston & R. S. Ross (Eds.), New directions in the study of China’s
foreign policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Downs, E. S., & Saunders, P. C. (1998). Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism:
China and the Diaoyu Islands. International Security, 23(3), 114–46.

JESSICA CHEN WEISS SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Jessica Chen Weiss is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and Research Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and
Area Studies. She is the author of Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in
China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014). The dissertation on
which it is based won the 2009 American Political Science Association Helen
Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in international relations, law, and
politics. Her research has appeared or is forthcoming in International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the China quarterly and has been
supported by the National Science Foundation, Princeton-Harvard China
& The World Program, Bradley Foundation, Fulbright-Hays program, and
the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
Before joining the Yale faculty, she founded FACES, the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford, while an undergraduate at Stanford
(BA, 2003). She teaches courses on international relations, Chinese foreign
policy, state-society relations in post-Mao China, and anti-Americanism in
world politics. Website: www.jessicachenweiss.com

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

15

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Popular Protest, Nationalism,
and Domestic-International
Linkages in Chinese Politics
JESSICA CHEN WEISS

Abstract
The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader
trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can be defended with
rigor. Yet many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two levels are connected and strategically linked. Nationalist, anti-foreign protest is a good example,
as Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or tolerate nationalist demonstrations based on domestic and international considerations. In turn, the decision to
allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy, constraining the government’s diplomatic options or enhancing
its flexibility. Ongoing research into the subnational patterns of Chinese nationalism
and popular protest offers a promising avenue of inquiry. Combined with close qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, meso-level investigations
can provide additional leverage in the study of Chinese nationalism. Future research
should aim to bring nationalism back into the mainstream study of state-society relations in China, bridging the gap between nationalism and other varieties of social
mobilization and political contestation.

INTRODUCTION
The study of Chinese politics has become increasingly specialized, reflecting broader trends in social science that favor islands of knowledge that can
be defended with rigor. Whether rigor is defined by close process tracing or
well-identified quantitative tests, this trend has been described as the “hollowing out” of the China field, favoring small bore projects at the expense of
understanding the broader political system (O’Brien, 2011). Crossing subfield
and disciplinary boundaries is particularly difficult because audiences and
reviewers have different theoretical inclinations and evidentiary standards.
The attempt to do so is a high-risk gamble but one with high reward—not
only yielding insights and connections along paths less traveled but also
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

requiring the explorer to be potentially convincing to few and provocative
to many.
Crossing the domestic–international divide in Chinese politics is particularly challenging because it requires moving across traditional levels of
analysis, requiring scholars on both sides of the divide to yield explanatory power to factors they are not used to privileging. “Second image”
approaches, which look at how domestic factors influence foreign policy
choices and international outcomes, have long been recognized as an
important level of analysis (Waltz, 1979). But bringing domestic factors into
the study of China’s foreign relations is often empirically difficult because
the mechanisms are not formal. China’s leaders do not stand for election,
nor does the National People’s Congress take meaningful roll call votes.
Because the foreign policy process is so opaque, it is difficult to evaluate the
influence of bureaucratic, military, or factional interests on foreign policy in
a systematic way. Scholars of China’s international political economy may
have an advantage in this regard, because the variables of interest, such as
policies and patterns of foreign direct investment and trade, can often be
more easily disaggregated and observed than those of concern to security
scholars.
For those who study domestic phenomenon in Chinese politics, international factors are typically given a back seat to domestic variables. “Second
image-reversed” approaches (Gourevitch, 1978), which reverse the direction
of influence so that international factors influence domestic outcomes from
the outside in rather than inside out—are still relatively uncommon in
the study of Chinese politics.1 The study of Chinese political economy is
again an important exception, with many scholars showing that foreign
investment has altered local incentives and practices.2 In the security realm,
Tom Christensen cites international fears as crucial factors behind domestic
mobilization campaigns in China and the United States during the Cold
War (Christensen, 1996). But it is far more common in the China field to
view the relationship between domestic politics and international relations
as unidirectional, where domestic politics influence China’s foreign policy
choices, but not vice versa.
Many phenomena of interest in Chinese politics are located at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations, where the two
levels are connected and strategically linked. As Rosemary Foot notes, “while
it remains valuable to study the role of domestic processes and domestic
interests in shaping policies toward the outside world, as liberal theorists
have long argued, it also has become essential to examine the reverse as well
as circular flows of influence” (Foot, 2013). Nationalist, anti-foreign protest
1. But see Ross (1986).
2. For example, see Gallagher (2005) and Wang (2015).

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

3

is a good example of the intersection of domestic and international politics. In Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, I argue
that it is important to consider international as well as domestic variables in
explaining the pattern of nationalist protest in China (Weiss, 2014). In confronting popular anger, Chinese officials must choose whether to repress or
tolerate nationalist demonstrations, considering both domestic and international consequences. In turn, the decision to allow or stifle street demonstrations affects the degree of popular influence on Chinese foreign policy,
constraining the government’s diplomatic options or enhancing flexibility.
At the same time, the international perception and credibility of nationalist protests depends on their domestic character. Anti-foreign protests that
appear government-mobilized or insincere are likely to be dismissed by international observers as “cheap talk,” revealing more about the government’s
domestic insecurity than its foreign policy intentions. After presenting this
framework, I contrast it with other primarily “second-image” approaches to
the role of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Next, I suggest directions
for future research, pointing out opportunities to leverage subnational variation in Chinese nationalism to assess our intuitions and hypotheses more
systematically. I conclude by noting the importance of incorporating nationalism more fully into the study of state-society relations in China.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH: PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONALISM
IN CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS
It has become a truism among many scholars as well as officials that public opinion has become a powerful driver of Chinese diplomacy. Less discussed are the mechanisms that link public opinion to policy making and
the conditions under which public sentiments constrain Chinese foreign policy. I argue that popular nationalism, particularly in the form of anti-foreign
street protests, often constrains China’s diplomatic options. But the extent to
which domestic pressures shape foreign policy—and the credibility of such
claims—depends on whether nationalist protests are allowed or repressed.3
FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: A “SECOND-IMAGE REVERSED” APPROACH TO NATIONALIST PROTEST
My argument gives weight to international as well as domestic factors
in explaining China’s management of nationalist protest. Conventionally,
domestic factors have been preeminent, with the Chinese government balancing the risks of allowing protest against the costs of suppressing them.4
3. This section adapts the arguments and evidence developed in Weiss (2013, 2014).
4. Johnston & Stockmann, 2007, p. 194. On the concession-repression dilemma more generally, see Cai
(2008).

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Allowing protests may be beneficial as a “safety valve” for citizens to vent
their domestic grievances. However, tolerating protests is also risky, as these
same domestic grievances may seize the opportunity to mobilize under the
protective cloak of patriotism. Likewise, nipping protests in the bud may
benefit regime stability, avoiding the risks that accompany mobilization.
But repression is also costly, exacerbating resentment against the regime’s
high-handed suppression of patriotic sentiments. These trade-offs suggest
that domestic factors are important but often not decisive as the government
considers how to respond to nationalist mobilization. Given these domestic
dilemmas, the government’s diplomatic motivations—a desire to show
resolve or reassurance—may tip the scales toward allowing or preventing
nationalist protest.
Demonstrations of popular anger can be helpful when the leadership
seeks to signal resolve and demonstrate its commitment to defending
China’s sovereignty and national interests. After US planes mistakenly
bombed the Chinese embassy in Kosovo during NATO airstrikes in 1999,
anti-American demonstrations across China conveyed domestic outrage
and the government’s determination to stand up to the United States.
Popular anger also enables the government to play “good cop” to the often
xenophobic and racist voices in the street and on the Internet. When Japan’s
bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council gained momentum in
2005, anti-Japanese demonstrations showcased popular anger over Prime
Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine and helped China
make a principled case against Japan’s candidacy.
Yet China has repeatedly stifled popular nationalism when street protests
would have jeopardized the government’s efforts to improve diplomatic relations. During two crises over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China
Sea in the 1990s, China repressed anti-Japanese demonstrations. Although
China launched a patriotic education campaign to bolster the regime’s diminished legitimacy, nationalist propaganda did not translate into permission
for anti-Japanese protests. After the 2001 EP-3 incident, when a Chinese
fighter jet and American reconnaissance plane collided over the South
China Sea, China prevented anti-American street demonstrations. Seeking
to contain the damage to China’s fragile rapport with the new Bush administration, Chinese authorities instructed students to stay on campus and told
the media to tone down its coverage of the crisis.
Because nationalist protests are costly to repress and can spiral out of
control, triggering domestic or diplomatic instability, the choice of whether
to tolerate protests or not communicates the government’s vulnerability to
domestic sentiment and incentives to take a tough diplomatic stance. The
decision to stifle protests demonstrates the government’s willingness to

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

5

spend domestic capital to restrain domestic voices that might reduce diplomatic flexibility and prevent cooperation. Provided that foreign observers
can tell the difference between sincere and manufactured protests, the
government conveys greater resolve when protests are allowed to erupt and
greater reassurance when protests are kept in check. During the EP-3 crisis,
for example, China’s efforts to repress protests helped send a signal of reassurance to the Bush administration as both sides negotiated a face-saving
compromise over the release of the American crew. As John Keefe, special
assistant to Ambassador Prueher, later recounted: “University students
wanted to hold demonstrations to vent their anger. The government forbade
them from taking such action [and] repeatedly stressed … that this event
should not be seen as a major affair in U.S.-China relations.” (Keefe, 2001,
p. 10).
“SECOND-IMAGE” APPROACHES
In contrast, most scholars of Chinese nationalism, public opinion, and diplomacy take a “second-image” approach: examining the impact of domestic
factors on international-level outcomes. Scholars who view Chinese nationalism as a largely grassroots, spontaneous, and sincere phenomenon tend to
give public opinion and nationalism the greatest weight (e.g., Gries, 2004;
Shirk, 2007). Particularly with the spread of the Internet, public opinion is
said to hinder the government’s ability to conduct diplomacy with discretion and flexibility (Wu, 2007, p. 185). Those who see Chinese nationalism as
more state-led also attribute substantial foreign policy influence to nationalist
sentiment, as leaders become constrained by nationalist rhetoric and mythmaking used to buttress their domestic legitimacy and rally the public (e.g.,
He, 2009; Zhao, 2004; Zheng, 1999). Other scholars suggest that the influence
of public opinion is greatest when elites are in conflict (e.g., Fewsmith and
Rosen, 2001; Reilly, 2012). At the same time, public mobilization may exacerbate elite conflict and thereby have a more direct effect on policy.5
These scholars rightly acknowledge that domestic constraints may reduce
the set of acceptable agreements, thus reducing the likelihood of cooperation
(Putnam, 1988). But a government may choose short-term delay or escalation
over cooperation on unfavorable terms. As the two-level games literature
points out, if the foreign negotiator understands that nationalist opinion has
reduced the government’s “win set,” the foreign negotiator is more likely to
offer concessions to salvage an agreement and avoid conflict. Demonstrating
that the government is unable or unwilling to make concessions helps shift
5. As Susan Shirk (2007, p. 48) notes: “Large protests increase the risk of a split by showing leaders
that a following is already in place … The danger is not a matter of the particular personalities in the Party
oligarchy at any one time, but is built into the structure of communist systems.”

6

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

the burden of compromise to the other party. If credibly revealed, domestic constraints can improve a government’s chances of achieving a favorable
outcome, even if the likelihood of bargaining failure is higher.
To be sure, others have suggested that playing the “nationalist card” may
be diplomatically advantageous.6 Another possibility is that conservative
elements in the government encourage protests to strengthen their own
position. Yet few have given the diplomatic consequences of nationalist
mobilization a central place in the Chinese government’s decision making. In suggesting that diplomatic objectives influence how authoritarian
governments manage nationalist sentiment and popular protest, I make a
“second-image reversed” argument, whereby the international environment
influences domestic choices. Although domestic factors are important
considerations, diplomatic incentives also warrant systematic attention.
Concluding that the Chinese government is strategic about its willingness
to tolerate anti-foreign protest may be cynical. But it is also important to
understanding why and when China will resist domestic demands to take a
tougher stance, despite the domestic costs of defying nationalist pressure.
Each time that nationalist, anti-foreign demonstrations have erupted, as
after the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999 and Japan’s
purchase of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea in 2012, scholars and
commentators have debated the role of domestic grievances and government machinations in fomenting nationalist protests. Yet focusing only on
cases where nationalist protests have erupted tends to bias our conclusions
about the impact of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy. Rather than
select the dependent variable, it is critical to look at the full range of how the
Chinese government has responded to nationalist sentiment and managed
anti-foreign demonstrations, including repression as well as acceptance. As
often as not, the Chinese government has circumscribed the influence of popular opinion by restraining and even preventing public displays of nationalist
anger.
FROM THE INSIDE OUT: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNALS
Government efforts to channel nationalism and thereby mitigate the danger
to the regime and diplomatic relations run a different risk: that nationalist opinions will be dismissed by foreign observers as manufactured. This
was one of the reminders of the 1999 Embassy bombing protests. In addition to damaging US diplomatic property, the highly orchestrated nature of
the protests on the second, third, and fourth day of the crisis drew bipartisan censure in the United States. Although the protests still communicated
6. See, for example, He (2009, p. 230) and Reilly, (2012, p, 46).

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

7

Chinese resolve to US negotiators, the contribution to Chinese negotiating
leverage was reduced by foreign skepticism.
Whether foreign negotiators expect Chinese leaders to be constrained by
domestic sentiments matters as much as whether nationalist sentiments are
actually spontaneous or state-led. Foreign perceptions of China’s domestic
motivations and constraints are critical. As Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth noted during a Senate hearing:
The nationalist card is being played … the hard question is, how much and
how permanent is it?7 If protests are seen as “safety valves,” releasing pent up
grievances and then subsiding with no impact on foreign policy, foreigners
have little inducement to offer concessions, because they can expect China’s
leaders to show flexibility soon thereafter.
Yet other observers are less skeptical. Many US officials share the belief that
Chinese leaders have become trapped by the popular nationalism that they
themselves have encouraged. As Condoleezza Rice writes: “Time and time
again we would see this. China would stir up nationalist sentiment in the
population through the state-controlled media, diminishing its own room
for maneuver as it reacted to the very passions it had created” (Rice, 2011,
pp. 46–47). So long as foreign negotiators believe that domestic pressures
reduce China’s diplomatic flexibility, the specter of nationalist mobilization is
credible, whether or not these sentiments are “real or induced,” in the words
of John Keefe (Keefe, 2001). Indeed, the Chinese government did not even
have to allow anti-American protests in 2001 to communicate their vulnerability to domestic nationalism. Online commentary and abortive attempts to
hold protests were sufficient reminders of the popular sentiments that China
worked hard to keep in check after the plane collision.
Why should foreign governments make concessions if the risks of nationalist mobilization are primarily borne by the Chinese government? Many external actors—from governments to multinational enterprises to international
investors—have a stake in the stability of the Chinese regime. To maintain
the status quo, foreign negotiators may be willing to make concessions to
prevent the toughening of Chinese policy. As Henry Kissinger writes, “A
prudent American leadership should balance the risks of stoking Chinese
nationalism against the gains from short-term pressures” (Kissinger, 2001).
By accommodating Chinese interests, foreign decision makers assuage
nationalist concerns in China and ease domestic pressures on the incumbent
leadership. Faced with a more hawkish alternative, foreign governments
may see concessions as a wise hedge against a worse fate. Often, it is the
“moderate autocrat” whom foreign governments seek to bolster against
conservative competitors who might gain influence with the eruption of
7. “U.S. Senator Craig Thomas holds hearing on U.S.-China relations,” May 27, 1999, FDCH Political
Transcripts.

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

nationalist protests. For example, after Chinese students took to the streets
to protest Japan in 1985 and again in 1986 to protest official corruption
and lack of political freedom, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
stopped visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in deference to General Secertary Hu
Yaobang’s vulnerable position (Nakasone, 2006, p. 96). When divisions
within the government are apparent, foreign decision makers may show
lenience to support embattled moderates.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
EXPLORING SUBNATIONAL VARIATION IN CHINESE NATIONALISM
Many questions remain about the relative weight of domestic and international factors in shaping the pattern of nationalist protest in China. At
the national level, our empirical leverage is limited by the small number of
observations over time. The number of large-scale nationalist protests has
grown—including anti-Japanese protests in 2012 and anti-French protests
in 2008. But it remains challenging to discriminate among many different
explanations for the same handful of events. When multiple factors point in
the same direction, it is difficult to evaluate their relative weight.
Employing carefully paired comparisons can help isolate the effect of certain factors, such as two US-China crises that occurred within a relatively
short time frame: the 1999 embassy bombing and 2001 EP-3 incident (Weiss,
2013). And careful process tracing can get us much closer to identifying the
role of perceptions and anticipated reactions in government decision making, illuminated by official documents, party histories, policy analysis, and
interviews with officials and influential commentators. Yet it is impossible
to fully control for many variables when explaining such a small set of outcomes. In this regard, there are many advantages to expanding the number
of observations by turning to the subnational level, teasing out the domestic implications of international relations theories. Many of our theories and
intuitions about Chinese nationalism and protest have implications at the
local and individual level.
For example, new research into the 2012 anti-Japanese protests utilizes
cross-sectional variation at the city level to assess the impact of both state
and societal factors (Wallace and Weiss, 2013). A subnational and multivariate approach allows us to simultaneously examine factors such as
state-led patriotic education, the legacy of Japanese occupation, and the
concentration of “biographically available” populations such as students,
migrant workers, and unemployed graduates. Variation in the local political
opportunity structure, namely, local government insecurity and fears of
social unrest, has also played a key role. In determining whether protests

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

9

were allowed to occur, local officials interpret national-level windows of
opportunity and “stability maintenance” guidelines in the context of local
concerns. In this way, disaggregating the study of Chinese nationalism and
popular protest offers promising avenues of inquiry. Combined with close
qualitative assessments to identify mechanisms and processes, these sorts
of meso-level investigations—analyses above the level of the individual but
below the level of the state as a whole—can provide additional empirical
leverage on theories of popular protest.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
CIVIL SOCIETY: BRINGING NATIONALISM BACK IN
In much of the contemporary study of Chinese politics, a body of water
separates scholarship on nationalism and nationalist protest from studies
of state–society relations and political protest more generally. The exclusion
of nationalist, anti-foreign mobilization from general studies of social
contention is not limited to the China field. One of the most prominent
cross-national datasets used by political scientists to gauge domestic unrest
explicitly excludes protests against foreign targets (Banks, 2010).
Is the gulf between studies of nationalism and civil society in China
justified? Some scholars have pointed to the degree of government support
as evidence of a qualitative difference between nationalist mobilization and
other types of resistance. For example, in comparing China’s response to
the 1999 anti-American demonstrations with protests by members of Falun
Gong, laid-off workers, and impoverished farmers, Elizabeth Perry writes:
Nationalistically inspired student unrest is another story altogether, however.
In the case of the 1999 student protests against the bombing of China’s
Belgrade embassy, we find a considerable degree of overt central government
support—sanctioning the demonstrations on national television, providing
buses to take students to foreign embassies and consulates, and even supplying
the slogans that they should shout once they got there.
(Perry, 2001, pp. 168–169)

At the same time, even the heavy-handed stage management of protests
in 1999 reflected official fears that protests would otherwise get out of hand,
which Perry notes were particularly high before the tenth anniversary of June
4, 1989. Efforts to corral and ultimately curtail the anti-American demonstrations were not easy, as sociologist Dingxin Zhao has documented. Many
students refused to take university buses and became angry after being told
that the window of opportunity had closed (Zhao, 2003).

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Indeed, there is much more ambiguity and conflict between grassroots
nationalists and government authorities than may be apparent at first
glance. Nationalist mobilization is no exception to the uncertain and shifting
boundaries between state tolerance and repression (Stern and O’Brien,
2012), although the penalty for nationalist organizers tends to be lighter. In
interviews, nationalist activists talk candidly about the process by which
they discern and probe whether it is safe to organize activities. Many
forms of anti-Japanese mobilization have been met with state takeover and
suppression as well as cooptation (Xu & Pu, 2010).
Although nationalists may help the government demonstrate resolve and
gain diplomatic leverage, they are not reflexively pro-government, often
accusing the government of betraying the national interest. Nationalist
protest is also a form of “rightful resistance” (O’Brien, 1996), insofar as it
challenges the state to live up to its own rhetoric and ideals and defend the
nation’s sovereignty from foreign encroachments and insults. However, in
part because protesters can envelop themselves in the language of patriotism and cry, “patriotism is innocent,” the costs of suppressing anti-foreign
sentiment are often higher than protests that advance more particularistic
interests. Nationalists are also useful to the government, and they are rarely
treated as harshly as domestic dissidents.
For example, the Xiamen-based nationalist activist, Li Yiqiang, was
detained by authorities on June 3, 2007, after participating in protests
against the proposed construction of a paraxylene (PX) chemical plant.8 The
participation of a nationalist activist in a domestic protest suggests one of
the government’s greatest fears: linkage across aggrieved groups. Although
he was held for several days in the aftermath of the protests, by 2009 he
was again active in attempting to organize activities in Changsha.9 He and
his group were prevented from sailing to the islands during controversies
with Japan in 2010 and in 2012, but he has not been silenced, with even
mainstream media interviewing him.10
The government has dealt more harshly with anti-Japanese activists who
have strayed further across the bounds of the permissible, particularly those
who have directly challenged the central government’s legitimacy. In the
early 1990s, a Shanghai activist who had participated in the 1989 democracy movement, Bao Ge, was placed under house arrest after threatening a
hunger strike and self-immolation to demand an apology from the Japanese
8. Weiss, 2014.
9. http://bbs.china918.cn:81/showtopic.aspx?topicid=28156&page=end, last accessed March 12,
2011.
10. “Dalu Baodiaozhe bei gongan lanzu deng chuan,” BBC Chinese, September 12, 2010, accessed
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/09/100912_brief_china_japan_baodiao.shtml;
Guo Kai, “Mainland, Taiwan activists pull out of Diaoyu trip,” Global Times, August 15, 2012.

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

11

emperor.11 In 1994, Bao was sentenced to 3 years of reform through labor after
linking demands for compensation from Japan to sweeping political reform,
calling upon the National People’s Congress to hold a referendum on war
reparations.12 Bao had stated that a referendum would “open the way to a
constitutional democracy” in China.13
Given these potentially treacherous waters, many nationalists are quick
to proclaim their support for the central government. In 2003, for example,
the Patriots Alliance Network organized an Internet signature campaign
demanding Japanese compensation for victims of poison gas bombs left
near Qiqihar in northeastern China. In announcing the start of the petition
campaign, the official declaration read: “We firmly support the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ stern negotiations with Japan on August 8 and August
12 [and] hope that this campaign will help the government put pressure
on Japan.”14 Privately, however, activists were more willing to criticize the
government. As a leading nationalist activist acknowledged,
In Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese government overemphasizes
government-to-government relations and neglects the interests of individuals (geti liyi). The government doesn’t want the stories of the victims to
come out, because the government would look bad for having done nothing
so far. I’d like the government to adopt a more open-minded policy. The
public security bureau did not agree (meiyou tongyi) to the internet signature
campaign, but we did it anyway.15

More generally, the separation of domestic and foreign policy activism may
reflect self-censorship by activists concerned about the risk of linking nationalist to domestic demands. One QQ group, “Patriots,” used the following
tag line: “Sensitive topics that concern national politics or reactionary statements against the motherland are forbidden. Violators will be removed from
the group without exception.”16 As James Mulvenon notes, patriotic hackers
likewise self-police their activities, explicitly warning their members against
attacking domestic websites. At least part of their restraint appears to be tactical, not ideological, as they try to avoid giving the government cause for
repression (Mulvenon, 2009).

11. Kent Chen, “Activist to continue fight for apology,” South China Morning Post, November 5, 1992.
12. “Bao Ge released, brother of other Shanghai dissidents penalized,” Ming Pao, June 5, 1997.
13. “Activist bids for vote on war cash,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 1993.
14. http://bbs.1931-9-18.org/viewthread.php?tid=22454, last accessed March 16, 2011.
15. Interview with CFDD organizer, Beijing, July 27, 2006.
16. http://qun.qq.com/#search/cnum/0/st/0/c1/0/c2/0/c3/0/pg/1/tx/%E7%88%B1%E5%9B%
BD%E8%80%85, last accessed September 16, 2010.

12

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Activists who cross between the nationalist and domestic spheres of civil
society may also be more likely to face suppression over time, feeding government paranoia of dissidents looking for any means to advance their aims.
As Yu Jie writes,
Even self-proclaimed ‘pursuers of democracy and liberty’ also take anti-Japan
thought as useful resources . . . . They tried to establish a democratic and constitutional government through nationalistic movements. This kind of thinking
will not lead anywhere, but will push China into further misery.17

Activists who do “too much”—challenging the government on multiple
fronts and providing the human capital that might potentially link up
disparate grievances—are more likely to be deemed sensitive and their
activities thwarted.
Together, state repression and self-censorship have winnowed out the population that vocally mobilizes on both sides of the domestic-foreign policy
divide. Despite this induced separation, it is important to acknowledge the
analytic similarities and linkages between the liberal and nationalist spheres
of civil society. Whether or not these connections have been driven underground or weeded out, as scholars it is critical that we problematize this
distribution of voices in civil society and how it has varied over time. Breaking down the divide between international relations and comparative politics
in the study of Chinese politics is both an analytical task and a substantive
one, with important implications for our understanding of popular protest
and China’s foreign relations.

REFERENCES
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Forgive Japan?” July 16, 2007, Japan Focus, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-yu-jie/2654.

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Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest
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FURTHER READING
Christensen, T. J., Johnston, A. I., & Ross, R. S. (2006). Conclusions and future directions. In A. I. Johnston & R. S. Ross (Eds.), New directions in the study of China’s
foreign policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Downs, E. S., & Saunders, P. C. (1998). Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism:
China and the Diaoyu Islands. International Security, 23(3), 114–46.

JESSICA CHEN WEISS SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Jessica Chen Weiss is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and Research Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and
Area Studies. She is the author of Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in
China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014). The dissertation on
which it is based won the 2009 American Political Science Association Helen
Dwight Reid Award for best dissertation in international relations, law, and
politics. Her research has appeared or is forthcoming in International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the China quarterly and has been
supported by the National Science Foundation, Princeton-Harvard China
& The World Program, Bradley Foundation, Fulbright-Hays program, and
the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
Before joining the Yale faculty, she founded FACES, the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford, while an undergraduate at Stanford
(BA, 2003). She teaches courses on international relations, Chinese foreign
policy, state-society relations in post-Mao China, and anti-Americanism in
world politics. Website: www.jessicachenweiss.com

Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in Chinese Politics

15

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