Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Stereotype Content

Item

Title

Stereotype Content

Author

Capestany, Beatrice H.

Harris, Lasana T.

Research Area

Social Interactions

Topic

Stereotypes

Abstract

Scholars have recently proposed a model that describes and systematically categorizes the content of stereotypes. This
stereotype content model
posits that groups are stereotyped along the dimensions of trait warmth (i.e., likeability and friendliness) and competence (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). Groups will typically be stereotyped into one of four clusters—low warmth and high competence, high warmth and low competence, high warmth and high competence, and lastly low warmth and low competence. The combination of positively and negatively valenced clusters creates ambivalent or mixed stereotype content that produces paternalistic (high warmth, low competence) or envious (low warmth, high competence) forms of prejudice. The model has generated interesting new results and insights about the nature of stereotypes and their impact on behaviors, including dehumanization.

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Identifier

etrds0320

extracted text

Stereotype Content
BEATRICE H. CAPESTANY and LASANA T. HARRIS

Abstract
Scholars have recently proposed a model that describes and systematically categorizes the content of stereotypes. This stereotype content model posits that groups are
stereotyped along the dimensions of trait warmth (i.e., likeability and friendliness)
and competence (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). Groups will typically be stereotyped into one of four clusters—low warmth and high competence, high warmth and
low competence, high warmth and high competence, and lastly low warmth and low
competence. The combination of positively and negatively valenced clusters creates
ambivalent or mixed stereotype content that produces paternalistic (high warmth,
low competence) or envious (low warmth, high competence) forms of prejudice. The
model has generated interesting new results and insights about the nature of stereotypes and their impact on behaviors, including dehumanization.

INTRODUCTION
Understanding the nature of stereotypes has long been a topic of interest to
social psychologists (Allport, 1954). Stereotypes can sometimes serve a useful function, creating easy ways for the brain to process a lot of information
about people who belong to different groups. But stereotypes can also result
in negative outcomes, producing false beliefs about an individual, a community, or even an entire population (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Stereotypes are an
inescapable part of our psychology and can lead to severe forms of prejudice
and discrimination. As a result, researchers have been interested in uncovering the motivations and psychological processes that lead to the formation
of stereotypes.
Psychologists at present largely agree that stereotypes consist of highly
automatic processes that lead to the categorization of people into social
groups (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Moreover,
stereotype processes are highly similar and systematic among individuals
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). More recently, researchers have become
interested in the content of stereotypes; that is, what characteristics or
features comprise a stereotype about a specific group? What are the actual
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

thoughts and feelings that people have when thinking about or encountering
a stereotyped person? For example, what do you think of when you see
the words, “slow, helpless, brittle, wise, Florida?” You most likely thought
of an elderly person. Stereotype content is defined as the attributes and
characteristics that comprise a generated categorization (Fiske et al., 2002).
Understanding the nature of stereotype content also advances our knowledge about stereotype processing in the brain. Typically, stereotypes are discussed as a form of social cognition, a way in which we understand the minds
of other human beings (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Stereotypes are viewed as a
heuristic—a mental shortcut—that enables us to quickly form impressions
of an individual or a group. Identifying a person without using stereotypes
relies on different cognitive machinery (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman,
1999). These opposing cognitive mechanisms provide a dual-process account
of the nature of stereotypes. In some models, person perception is described
along a continuum, from stereotypes, the initial information about a person,
to individualization, information specific to that person involving preferences and personality (Fiske, Xu, et al., 1999).
Traditional social cognition abilities evolved to facilitate social interaction
(Caporael, 1997). As such, social cognition enables us to discern which things
in the environment are targets of social interaction and the resulting morally
and socially normed behavior reserved for other people. This imbues people
with a certain “humanness” that depends exclusively on social cognitive processing (Harris & Fiske, 2009). But if stereotypes short-circuit regular social
cognitive processes that allow us to perceive a person as human, stereotypes
will involuntarily allow for some outgroups and outgroup members to be
denied their humanness. In other words, stereotype content will enable our
automatic mental processes to dehumanize others—not fully engaging social
cognitive abilities that are regularly engaged when interacting with other
people.
In the sections that follow, we begin by introducing the foundational
research on stereotype content. We then move on to cutting-edge research
that integrates social psychology and neuroscience to come up with a more
advanced picture of stereotype processes occurring at the level of the brain
and behavior. Finally, we discuss empirical evidence supporting the idea
that some stereotypes may be dehumanizing, short-circuiting typical social
cognitive processes.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Before delving into the specifics of stereotype content, a brief history of how
this research evolved is necessary. In 1946, social psychologist Solomon Asch
published a study that highlighted an important trend in how people form

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impressions of others. Asch instructed participants to form an impression of a
competent person who had been described as “assured,” “talkative,” “cold,”
“ironical,” “inquisitive,” and “persuasive”—all adjectives that described an
inherently competent person. In this scenario, most participants described an
individual who was not very pleasant to be around:
“A rather snobbish person who feels that his success and intelligence set him
apart from the run-of-the-mill individual. Calculating and unsympathetic.”

However when Asch changed the word “cold” in the list to the word
“warm,” he created a completely new impression for his participants—the
individual was portrayed as a much nicer person:
“A scientist performing experiments and persevering after many setbacks. He
is driven by the desire to accomplish something that would be of benefit.”

Strikingly, this drastic change in impression only occurred when the words
“warm” and “cold” were interchanged. Switching, for example, “warm” and
“cold” to “polite” and “blunt” produced no difference in impressions. Asch
discovered that the simple manipulation of the trait dimension warmth readily changed the perception of an individual. His research emphasized the
importance of the trait warmth in person perception and its impact on overall
impressions of people’s personality.
Asch’s preliminary finding that warmth was a necessary dimension for
impression formation only accounted for one dimension of personality, but
a person could be sociable and hardworking or sociable and lazy. Because
of this fact, researchers believed that impressions of others were most
likely multidimensional, representing different evaluative components of
an individual’s personality. By presenting lists of adjectives similar to those
Asch had used (but much more comprehensive) to participants who sorted
them into traits, researchers demonstrated that traits lie along two primary
dimensions: intellectual desirability (competence) and social desirability
(warmth; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968). These impression
formation studies were crucially important to develop a model of stereotype
content.
Also instrumental to the development of stereotype content research was
the realization that not all prejudices produce antipathy. That is, prejudice
did not have to be rigid and produce a fixed, decisively negative judgment.
As the impression formation researchers had already demonstrated, a person could be sociable (a positive trait) but lazy (a negative trait), producing
ambivalent judgments. Extending this framework from an individual perspective to a group perspective was essential for the study of stereotypes.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Studies demonstrated that cross-culturally stereotypes were typically comprised of traits associated with competence related attributes (i.e., respect,
intelligence) and social related attributes (i.e., empathic, trustworthy; Bales,
1950; Noseworthy & Lott, 1984). Furthermore, these studies demonstrated
that there is a functional aspect to the multidimensional qualities of person
perception. Sociability reflects the intended goal of the group (to help or to
hurt), while competence reflects the means to actualize those goals. Also,
consistent with the impression formation research, the relationship between
competence and warmth was usually orthogonal.
On the basis of identification of the primary dimensions of person perception in both the impression formation and prejudice literatures, social
psychologists uncovered two factors that likely contribute to the formation
of mixed or ambivalent stereotypes. The first factor was a group’s socioeconomic status, while the second factor was the level of interdependence of the
perceiver’s group with that group. By informing their study of stereotypes
with information and methods from the impression formation literature,
researchers posited a novel hypothesis and approach to the study stereotype
content. They hypothesized that status affects the perceived competence
of the group, and interdependence (cooperative or competitive) affects
the perceived warmth of the group. Therefore high-status groups (such
as rich people, Jews) are respected and envied because of their perceived
competence, but they are not liked, whereas low-status groups (people with
disabilities, the elderly) are often disrespected because of their perceived
incompetence but liked because they are not perceived as a threat. This produces ambivalent stereotype content that can be clustered into two specific
categories: competent but cold, and incompetent but warm (Fiske et al., 2002).
Researchers hypothesized that systematic principles could be applied to
the study of stereotype content. Although stereotype research had focused
greatly on the systematic processes by which stereotypes were produced,
researchers had not thought of stereotype content as something that could
also be systematic. And if stereotype content proved to be systematic, then
stereotype content could be predicted by the relationship between groups. To
first understand the inverse relationship between warmth and competence,
researchers had to ensure that real groups were clustering in the predicted
directions of competent but cold, and incompetent but warm. To do this,
participants were given a survey and asked to rate a list of groups (disabled
people, Asians, etc.) based on their competence and warmth. Participants
also had to indicate how likely a trait (helpful, hostile, etc.) would be associated with that group. Participants were instructed to make these ratings
based on how the groups are viewed by other people in their society, to
guard against socially desirability concerns, ensuring that current cultural
beliefs were responsible for eliciting responses, not personal biases. The data

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showed that the groups fell along a line with a negative slope (inversely correlated) in a competence X warmth two-dimensional space. Thus, a positive
stereotype on one dimension (high warmth or high competence) resulted in
an unfavorable stereotype on the other dimension (low competence or low
warmth; Fiske et al., 2002).
The ambivalent stereotypes thus produce different forms of prejudice.
High-warmth and low-competence outgroups produce paternalistic stereotypes, forming an impression of compliant subordinates. Elderly people, the
disabled, and the mentally retarded are often categorized into this group.
Groups in this cluster are typically perceived as nonthreatening and friendly,
evoking a sense of pity. Contrastingly, outgroups that are in the low-warmth
and high-competence cluster are stereotyped in a more envious nature, and
are typically perceived as cold but successful competitors. Nontraditional
women, Jews, and Asians generally fall into this category. Studies additionally confirmed that status predicts the perceived competence of a group, and
that competition predicts the perceived warmth of a group, creating these
mixed stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).
But stereotype content can also be nonambivalent. We typically consider
the group we belong to, our ingroup, as being both high in warmth and high
in competence. This category is typically reserved for students, Christians,
and the middle class (the representative populations from which samples
for these studies were collected) and elicits admiration and pride. However,
outgroups that are in the low-warmth and low-competence category elicit
the emotions disgust and contempt, such as poor people, the homeless, Hispanics, and welfare recipients.
Because stereotype content is linked to emotions, and emotions better predict behavior than beliefs (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008), this indicates
that there might also be a systematic pattern of discriminatory behaviors.
The behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map framework
was developed to explain the stereotyped behaviors produced by the four
clusters in the stereotype content model (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). The
BIAS model demonstrates that warmth stereotypes elicit active behaviors;
people will behave in ways that attenuate active harm and harassment, and
actively elicit facilitation, helping behaviors. Competence stereotypes however elicit passive behaviors; people will attenuate passive harmful behaviors
(e.g., neglect) and will elicit passive facilitation efforts (such as associating
with the group). Therefore, there are distinct behavioral tendencies toward
the four groups in the stereotype content model. Admired groups that are
high in warmth and high in competence will lead to both active and passive
facilitation behaviors. Groups that are in the disgust category and are both
low in warmth and low in competence will elicit both active and passive

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

harm behaviors. Because these two groups are either perceived as very positive or very negative, the behaviors associated with them follow the same
pattern. High-competence and low-warmth stereotypes, the envied groups,
will elicit passive facilitation but active harm behaviors. The other mixed
stereotype, low-competence and high-warmth pitied groups, will elicit active
facilitation but passive harm behaviors.
In conclusion, the stereotype content depends on two universal dimensions
of person perception, warmth and competence. These two dimensions create stereotype content that is clustered in one of four cells eliciting specific
emotions; low warmth and low competence (low–low) elicit disgust, high
warmth and high competence elicit pride, low warmth and high competence
elicit envy, and high warmth and low competence elicit pity. Stereotype content need not be purely negative; rather ambivalent stereotypes exist and are
predicted by the perceived status and competition of the group.
NEUROSCIENCE AND STEREOTYPE CONTENT
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows researchers to measure blood flow in the brain, which is associated with brain activity. With
this knowledge, researchers are able to correlate social cognition with relevant regions in the brain. The neuroscience research on stereotype content
has underscored the importance of the emotions associated with the four
clusters of the stereotype content model. Having brain data corresponding to
decisions made about individuals in stereotyped groups allows us to gain a
more integrative picture of the cognitive mechanisms involved in stereotype
content.
The stereotype content model posits that some groups will be viewed more
undesirably than others, but that not all groups will necessarily be viewed
negatively. Previous research has demonstrated that some outgroups are
perceived as less human than ingroups (Bar-Tal, 1989), and the stereotype
content model predicts feelings of disgust when thinking about the extreme
low-warmth and low-competence groups. Disgust is coincidentally the only
emotion predicted by the stereotype content model that can be targeted
to nonhuman entities (Harris & Fiske, 2009). Disgust is an emotion that
evolved to reject potential contaminants such as poisonous food items
but has evolved to encompass aversive events in the moral domain, such
as unfair treatment (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). This
suggests that social cognitive mechanisms in the brain may differentially
represent these extreme outgroups. Therefore, researchers sought to investigate how people from groups in the low-warmth, low-competence disgust
outgroup would be processed in the brain.

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7

Prior studies demonstrate medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) along
with temporal lobe regions including superior temporal sulcus (STS),
temporal-parietal junction, anterior temporal pole, together form a brain
network that is essential for social cognition (Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009). This network is active when looking at pictures of other people.
However, researchers discovered that all groups except for the low-warmth,
low-competence group activated parts of this network, suggesting that social
cognitive processes are not being fully engaged when viewing pictures of
people in the low–low group, such as drug addicts and the homeless (Harris
& Fiske, 2006). This extreme outgroup also elicits more activation in the
insula and amygdala—two brain regions that have been implicated with
disgust reactions. However, if participants were instructed to individualize
the person in the picture (e.g., think about food preferences), then activation
in the social cognition network increased for the low–low targets, suggesting
that thinking about the person’s preferences elevates the status of a person
beyond a category to a unique individual (Harris & Fiske, 2007). This notion
is consistent with the Continuum Model of Impression formation, which
suggests that people use stereotype content instead of personal characteristics when forming an impression of another person (Fiske & Neuberg,
1990).
In addition, neuroscience research has demonstrated that people are more
willing to sacrifice individuals who are low in warmth and competence
to save ingroup members (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010).
The decision to sacrifice another person in this hypothetical scenario is
a moral trade-off most people usually will not make. However, when
considering sacrificing extreme outgroup to save the ingroup members, the
brain responds in a way consistent with making a complex moral trade-off,
activating parts of the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex
implicated in cognitive control. This reinforces the idea of moral protection
when people are perceived as full human beings (Harris & Fiske, 2009).
Research integrating neuroscience and stereotype content has only recently
been exploring groups associated with the other emotions in the stereotype
content model. One such study demonstrates that participants who increased
activation in the insula while viewing high warmth, low competence pity targets experiencing positive events are more willing to harm these targets in
a later domain. Individuals with increased activation in the anterior insula
(which is a region associated with empathy) in response to positive events
are more willing to harm low warmth, high competence envied targets, and
are less willing to harm ingroup targets (Cikara & Fiske, 2011). These results
suggest that an increased empathic response may lead to a decreased aggressive response to certain stereotyped groups. Future research should continue

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

to address brain responses to outgroups with different stereotype contents to
understand how stereotype content changes social cognitive responses.
Neuroscience research provides an interesting new methodological
approach to understanding the nuances of stereotype content and its effect
on the brain and behavior. This kind of research can extend our knowledge
on the interplay between emotion and social cognitive processes during
stereotyping processes, and will allow future researchers to find ways to
mitigate the effects of stereotype behavior toward outgroups. Uncovering
the nuances between our brain’s responses to different types of stereotype
content will allow for refined psychological models and will accelerate the
progress toward understanding stereotypes.
KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
Stereotypes have been extensively studied in psychological research, starting
with studies that focused almost exclusively on racial and ethnic stereotypes
(Katz & Braly, 1935), followed by an interest in gender stereotypes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979). The emergence of these trends is not surprising
considering the cultural zeitgeist. Recently, however, the movement toward
understanding stereotype content has facilitated the understanding that
stereotypes take on different forms. It will be critical for future stereotype
researchers to investigate beyond the scope of traditionally stereotyped
groups to understand the complexities of stereotypes, as has already been
evidenced by the study of stereotype content.
Furthermore, although the stereotype content model predicts four emotions associated with each of the four clusters of stereotype content, future
research should investigate the role of other emotions in stereotype content.
There is already research that suggests that secondary emotions—emotions
that are reserved for people, such as admiration and contempt—are more easily associated with ingroup members rather than outgroup members (Leyens
et al., 2001, 2003). Moreover, studies have demonstrated that strong identification with an ingroup leads to negative behavioral tendencies toward an
outgroup as measured by threat-based emotions such as anger and contempt
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Pursuit of these two avenues of research will
be informative for understanding stereotype content as they enhance and
broaden the scope of stereotype research. However, a new conceptualization
may be in order for advancement and innovation of the field. Here, we discuss stereotype research in the context of what the aforementioned stereotype
content research has gleaned, which could redefine how we view stereotypes.
We first describe social perception and categorization along a continuum,
and then discuss how people categorize outgroups as infrahuman—that is,
less than human. Under these frameworks, we propose that stereotypes not

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9

only short-circuit social cognitive processes, but result in dehumanization of
everyday outgroup targets.
FROM CATEGORY, TO OBJECT, TO OUTGROUP
There are several paths through which individuals can use social cognitive processes to make judgments about others. The first is using a
category-based approach through a schema—an organized network of
concepts and their attributes, connected through associative links with other
attributes. Schemas provide a framework for processing information in
the world, and Asch’s (1946) study demonstrated how individuals might
be using schemas to represent the image of the mean, cold person versus
the nice, warm person. Using a schema to interpret information about an
unknown person allows the individual to form a quick impression, initiating
an automatic affective response. This can be a useful mental heuristic as
it allows perceivers to quickly extract useful categorical information about
the person, such as age, race, and gender (Fiske, 1998). Schemas are at the
root of stereotype processes as they provide easily accessible information
about a person during person perception or impression formation. In fact,
many founding fathers of social psychology informed our understanding of
schemas. Asch’s research (1946) is a cornerstone for the investigation of how
traits can serve to categorize an individual, and Allport’s (1954) seminal
prejudice research suggests that stereotypes arise from social categorization.
Tajfel (1969) delineates how using trait dimensions simplify categorizing
people into groups, and that these kinds of subjective classifications (i.e.,
“he is lazy”) would inescapably lead to comparative judgments.
The opposite of this cognitive approach has been described as individualized processing, in which the person is not treated as a mere example
or a trait, but has unique attributes that distinguish him or her (Fiske &
Pavelchak, 1986). In essence, many salient traits interact to create a unique
individual. Rather than thinking categorically of the person, one will recall
all of that person’s corresponding attributes that together make the person
unique (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie & Milberg, 1987). That personalized social
cognitive processing takes longer than stereotyping. In addition, individuals
have to be motivated to engage in this processing, and have access to
additional individualized information about the person (Fiske, Lin, et al.,
1999).
Because individuals can use either social cognitive method, Fiske and
Neuberg (1990) proposed a continuum model of person perception. Just
like the title suggests, the model proposes that person perception falls
along a continuum between these two social cognitive processes, with one
extreme being categorical and the other personalizing. The perceiver’s

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motivations or personal relevance determines whether the perceiver shifts
from a category-based impression to a more personal impression by focusing
attention to the attributes of the target. Similarly, Brewer (1988) proposed a
dual process model that hypothesized information processing as bottom-up
and category based, or top-down and person based. Both of these methods
access differing knowledge structures; one is vague and uses categories,
while the other is more specific and holds the person at its core.
There has long been the notion that perceivers can form category-based
or individual-based judgments using different social cognitive machinery.
Traditionally, this machinery has been considered social cognition instead of
simply cognition. For instance, it is possible to view a table, and not engage
social cognitive machinery. It is also possible to think about the mind of a
table—a social cognitive task—but not use social cognitive brain machinery to do so (Harris & Fiske, 2008). There is not a simple explanation to this
phenomenon, but social psychological research has investigated the role of
stereotyped judgments (Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000) on cognitive processing. Laboratory studies demonstrate that stereotypes serve a functional role
preserving cognitive processing resources (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen,
1994). This supports the idea that stereotyping indeed is a heuristic or shortcut, but it does not activate full person-centered social cognitive processing.
Stated differently, stereotypes, even positive ones, may be dehumanizing.
The dehumanization literature in social psychology implicitly supports
this revised notion of stereotyping. The process by which we categorize people into negative social groups leads to bad consequences. This concept was
first tagged delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989) and describes how categorizing
a group into a negative social category denies that group the normal moral
protections of an ingroup. Moreover, it allows for the active moral exclusion
of these negative groups, which in turn makes the outgroup fall outside the
boundary of widely accepted moral values and considerations (Opotow,
2010). Importantly, this does not only occur during conflicts, but can occur
in response to the tendency for ingroups to see themselves as superior
to the outgroup—a feeling that has come to be known as ethnocentrism.
Furthermore, outgroups are not seen as sharing the same qualities as
members of the ingroup. The labels that categorize social groups permit
perceivers to see them as possessing different “essences” than those shared
by the ingroup (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). The ease with which ingroups
perceive certain qualities to belong to their group allows for a less desirable
essence to characterize outgroups, and in fact these outgroups are perceived
as having less human—infrahuman—characteristics (Leyens et al., 2000).
More recent work has used the term dehumanization to describe the denial
of human characteristics to outgroups (Haslam, 2006).

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Dehumanization has also been linked to the phenomenon described
earlier, where the social cognition brain network is not as responsive to
low–low, disgusting targets (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In these cases, a perceiver’s social cognitive brain network becomes completely disengaged,
perhaps due to the peculiar effects of disgust. Dehumanization can also
occur in less extreme cases and with stereotype content that is associated
with more human emotions, suggesting different levels of stereotyping and
differential engagement of social cognitive processes. However, the concept
of dehumanization should be viewed as a spectrum, not just in the extreme.
CONCLUSION
In sum, social psychological research has demonstrated that stereotypes lead
to categorization of outgroups, which deny uniquely human qualities and
moral protections to the outgroup. fMRI studies have looked at stereotype
content in the brain, demonstrating that extreme low–low outgroups that
elicit an emotion not unique to humans are differentially processed within the
social cognitive brain network. The targets in these extreme outgroups automatically engage negative stereotypes, which may short-circuit our ability to
infer the mental states of others, think about them as individuals, and even
ascribe them full humanity. Because of this, stereotypes—especially about
extreme outgroups—might prohibit humans from engaging personalizing
social cognitive processes toward other human beings.
Under this new framework, stereotypes can be seen as dehumanizing—
denial of an individual’s human uniqueness. While not all stereotypes will
lead to the extreme cases described, stereotypes engage cognitive processes
that are automatic. These processes may deny a target full personalized
social cognitive processing. Using shortcuts and heuristics when we think
about stereotyped groups may be advantageous because it enables a quick
snapshot of what the target may be like—but this replaces the full variety
of their humanity obtained through social cognitive resources dedicated to
processing an individual. Future research will continue to address this question using established frameworks, integrating neuroscience approaches
(e.g., brain imaging) in order to discover the social cognitive mechanisms
underlying stereotype content.

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Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: behaviors from intergroup
affect and stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(4), 631.
Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T.
Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, 4th ed., pp. 357–411).
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition:
Warmth and competence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 77–83.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype
content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and
competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 878.
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 1.
Fiske, S. T., Lin, M., & Neuberg, S. L. (1999). The continuum model. In Dual-Process
Theories in Social Psychology (pp. 231–254). New York, NY: Guilford.
Fiske, S. T., Neuberg, S. L., Beattie, A. E., & Milberg, S. J. (1987). Category-based and
attribute-based reactions to others: Some informational conditions of stereotyping
and individuating processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 399–427.
Fiske, S. T., & Pavelchak, M. A. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-based affective responses: Developments in schema-triggered affect. In M. Sorrentino & E. T.
Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation & cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp.
167–203). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.

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Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. C., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis) respecting versus (dis) liking:
Status and interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and
warmth. Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 473–489.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low neuroimaging
responses to extreme out-groups. Psychological Science, 17(10), 847–853.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2007). Social groups that elicit disgust are differentially
processed in mPFC. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2(1), 45–51.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2008). The brooms in Fantasia: Neural correlates of anthropomorphizing objects. Social Cognition, 26(2), 210–223.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2009). Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised
perception. European Review of Social Psychology, 20, 192–231.
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 252–264.
Katz, D., & Braly, K. W. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 30(2), 175–193.
Leyens, J. P., Cortes, B., Demoulin, S., Dovidio, J. F., Fiske, S. T., Gaunt, R., … &
Vaes, J. (2003). Emotional prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism: The 2002 Tajfel
Lecture. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33(6), 703–717.
Leyens, J. P., Paladino, P. M., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., RodriguezPerez, A., & Gaunt, R. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of
secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 4(2), 186–197.
Leyens, J. P., Rodriguez-Perez, A., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M. P.,
Vaes, J., & Demoulin, S. (2001). Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 31(4), 395–411.
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining
offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 79(4), 602.
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically
about others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51(1), 93–120.
Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energysaving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 66(1), 37.
Noseworthy, C. M., & Lott, A. J. (1984). The cognitive organization of genderstereotypic categories. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10(3), 474–481.
Opotow, S. (2010). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal of Social
Issues, 46(1), 1–20.
Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional
approach to the structure of personality impressions. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 9(4), 283.
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view
social categories as natural kinds?. In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language,
interaction and social cognition (pp. 11–36). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

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Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Biosocial Science, 1(S1),
173–191.
Talaska, C. A., Fiske, S. T., & Chaiken, S. (2008). Legitimating racial discrimination:
A metaanalysis of the racial attitude-behavior literature shows that emotions, not
beliefs, best predict discrimination. Social Justice Research: Social Power in Action,
21, 263–296.
Van Overwalle, F., & Baetens, K. (2009). Understanding others’ actions and goals by
mirror and mentalizing systems: A meta-analysis. Neuroimage, 48(3), 564–584.

FURTHER READING
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition:
Warmth and competence. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(2), 77–83.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.

BEATRICE H. CAPESTANY SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Beatrice H. Capestany: Graduate student, Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Duke University. Ms. Capestany graduated from Vassar
College in 2009, with a BA in Neuroscience and Behavior. She is currently
studying as a graduate student with Dr. Lasana Harris in the Psychology
& Neuroscience Department at Duke University. She is interested in the
social cognitive mechanisms that lead to stereotyping behaviors, studying
topics such as dehumanization, legal decision making, and morality. Taking
a social neuroscience approach, she designs social psychological paradigms
with functional neuroimaging.
LASANA T. HARRIS SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Lasana T. Harris: Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, and the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University. Dr.
Harris received his BS in Psychology from Howard University in 2000 and his
MA and PhD degrees in Psychology from Princeton University in 2006 and
2007, respectively. He then spent three years as a postdoctoral researcher at
New York University. Research in his laboratory takes an interdisciplinary
approach to understanding social cognition, that is, how we figure out what
someone else is thinking. Recent research suggests that this basic human
ability is fungible and can be extended to agents that do not have minds,
resulting in anthropomorphism, or withheld from human beings with minds,
resulting in dehumanized perception. Social cognition is necessary for social
interaction, and anthropomorphism and dehumanized perception represent
boundary conditions for this important phenomenon.

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Stereotype Content
BEATRICE H. CAPESTANY and LASANA T. HARRIS

Abstract
Scholars have recently proposed a model that describes and systematically categorizes the content of stereotypes. This stereotype content model posits that groups are
stereotyped along the dimensions of trait warmth (i.e., likeability and friendliness)
and competence (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). Groups will typically be stereotyped into one of four clusters—low warmth and high competence, high warmth and
low competence, high warmth and high competence, and lastly low warmth and low
competence. The combination of positively and negatively valenced clusters creates
ambivalent or mixed stereotype content that produces paternalistic (high warmth,
low competence) or envious (low warmth, high competence) forms of prejudice. The
model has generated interesting new results and insights about the nature of stereotypes and their impact on behaviors, including dehumanization.

INTRODUCTION
Understanding the nature of stereotypes has long been a topic of interest to
social psychologists (Allport, 1954). Stereotypes can sometimes serve a useful function, creating easy ways for the brain to process a lot of information
about people who belong to different groups. But stereotypes can also result
in negative outcomes, producing false beliefs about an individual, a community, or even an entire population (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Stereotypes are an
inescapable part of our psychology and can lead to severe forms of prejudice
and discrimination. As a result, researchers have been interested in uncovering the motivations and psychological processes that lead to the formation
of stereotypes.
Psychologists at present largely agree that stereotypes consist of highly
automatic processes that lead to the categorization of people into social
groups (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Moreover,
stereotype processes are highly similar and systematic among individuals
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). More recently, researchers have become
interested in the content of stereotypes; that is, what characteristics or
features comprise a stereotype about a specific group? What are the actual
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

thoughts and feelings that people have when thinking about or encountering
a stereotyped person? For example, what do you think of when you see
the words, “slow, helpless, brittle, wise, Florida?” You most likely thought
of an elderly person. Stereotype content is defined as the attributes and
characteristics that comprise a generated categorization (Fiske et al., 2002).
Understanding the nature of stereotype content also advances our knowledge about stereotype processing in the brain. Typically, stereotypes are discussed as a form of social cognition, a way in which we understand the minds
of other human beings (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Stereotypes are viewed as a
heuristic—a mental shortcut—that enables us to quickly form impressions
of an individual or a group. Identifying a person without using stereotypes
relies on different cognitive machinery (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman,
1999). These opposing cognitive mechanisms provide a dual-process account
of the nature of stereotypes. In some models, person perception is described
along a continuum, from stereotypes, the initial information about a person,
to individualization, information specific to that person involving preferences and personality (Fiske, Xu, et al., 1999).
Traditional social cognition abilities evolved to facilitate social interaction
(Caporael, 1997). As such, social cognition enables us to discern which things
in the environment are targets of social interaction and the resulting morally
and socially normed behavior reserved for other people. This imbues people
with a certain “humanness” that depends exclusively on social cognitive processing (Harris & Fiske, 2009). But if stereotypes short-circuit regular social
cognitive processes that allow us to perceive a person as human, stereotypes
will involuntarily allow for some outgroups and outgroup members to be
denied their humanness. In other words, stereotype content will enable our
automatic mental processes to dehumanize others—not fully engaging social
cognitive abilities that are regularly engaged when interacting with other
people.
In the sections that follow, we begin by introducing the foundational
research on stereotype content. We then move on to cutting-edge research
that integrates social psychology and neuroscience to come up with a more
advanced picture of stereotype processes occurring at the level of the brain
and behavior. Finally, we discuss empirical evidence supporting the idea
that some stereotypes may be dehumanizing, short-circuiting typical social
cognitive processes.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Before delving into the specifics of stereotype content, a brief history of how
this research evolved is necessary. In 1946, social psychologist Solomon Asch
published a study that highlighted an important trend in how people form

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impressions of others. Asch instructed participants to form an impression of a
competent person who had been described as “assured,” “talkative,” “cold,”
“ironical,” “inquisitive,” and “persuasive”—all adjectives that described an
inherently competent person. In this scenario, most participants described an
individual who was not very pleasant to be around:
“A rather snobbish person who feels that his success and intelligence set him
apart from the run-of-the-mill individual. Calculating and unsympathetic.”

However when Asch changed the word “cold” in the list to the word
“warm,” he created a completely new impression for his participants—the
individual was portrayed as a much nicer person:
“A scientist performing experiments and persevering after many setbacks. He
is driven by the desire to accomplish something that would be of benefit.”

Strikingly, this drastic change in impression only occurred when the words
“warm” and “cold” were interchanged. Switching, for example, “warm” and
“cold” to “polite” and “blunt” produced no difference in impressions. Asch
discovered that the simple manipulation of the trait dimension warmth readily changed the perception of an individual. His research emphasized the
importance of the trait warmth in person perception and its impact on overall
impressions of people’s personality.
Asch’s preliminary finding that warmth was a necessary dimension for
impression formation only accounted for one dimension of personality, but
a person could be sociable and hardworking or sociable and lazy. Because
of this fact, researchers believed that impressions of others were most
likely multidimensional, representing different evaluative components of
an individual’s personality. By presenting lists of adjectives similar to those
Asch had used (but much more comprehensive) to participants who sorted
them into traits, researchers demonstrated that traits lie along two primary
dimensions: intellectual desirability (competence) and social desirability
(warmth; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968). These impression
formation studies were crucially important to develop a model of stereotype
content.
Also instrumental to the development of stereotype content research was
the realization that not all prejudices produce antipathy. That is, prejudice
did not have to be rigid and produce a fixed, decisively negative judgment.
As the impression formation researchers had already demonstrated, a person could be sociable (a positive trait) but lazy (a negative trait), producing
ambivalent judgments. Extending this framework from an individual perspective to a group perspective was essential for the study of stereotypes.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Studies demonstrated that cross-culturally stereotypes were typically comprised of traits associated with competence related attributes (i.e., respect,
intelligence) and social related attributes (i.e., empathic, trustworthy; Bales,
1950; Noseworthy & Lott, 1984). Furthermore, these studies demonstrated
that there is a functional aspect to the multidimensional qualities of person
perception. Sociability reflects the intended goal of the group (to help or to
hurt), while competence reflects the means to actualize those goals. Also,
consistent with the impression formation research, the relationship between
competence and warmth was usually orthogonal.
On the basis of identification of the primary dimensions of person perception in both the impression formation and prejudice literatures, social
psychologists uncovered two factors that likely contribute to the formation
of mixed or ambivalent stereotypes. The first factor was a group’s socioeconomic status, while the second factor was the level of interdependence of the
perceiver’s group with that group. By informing their study of stereotypes
with information and methods from the impression formation literature,
researchers posited a novel hypothesis and approach to the study stereotype
content. They hypothesized that status affects the perceived competence
of the group, and interdependence (cooperative or competitive) affects
the perceived warmth of the group. Therefore high-status groups (such
as rich people, Jews) are respected and envied because of their perceived
competence, but they are not liked, whereas low-status groups (people with
disabilities, the elderly) are often disrespected because of their perceived
incompetence but liked because they are not perceived as a threat. This produces ambivalent stereotype content that can be clustered into two specific
categories: competent but cold, and incompetent but warm (Fiske et al., 2002).
Researchers hypothesized that systematic principles could be applied to
the study of stereotype content. Although stereotype research had focused
greatly on the systematic processes by which stereotypes were produced,
researchers had not thought of stereotype content as something that could
also be systematic. And if stereotype content proved to be systematic, then
stereotype content could be predicted by the relationship between groups. To
first understand the inverse relationship between warmth and competence,
researchers had to ensure that real groups were clustering in the predicted
directions of competent but cold, and incompetent but warm. To do this,
participants were given a survey and asked to rate a list of groups (disabled
people, Asians, etc.) based on their competence and warmth. Participants
also had to indicate how likely a trait (helpful, hostile, etc.) would be associated with that group. Participants were instructed to make these ratings
based on how the groups are viewed by other people in their society, to
guard against socially desirability concerns, ensuring that current cultural
beliefs were responsible for eliciting responses, not personal biases. The data

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5

showed that the groups fell along a line with a negative slope (inversely correlated) in a competence X warmth two-dimensional space. Thus, a positive
stereotype on one dimension (high warmth or high competence) resulted in
an unfavorable stereotype on the other dimension (low competence or low
warmth; Fiske et al., 2002).
The ambivalent stereotypes thus produce different forms of prejudice.
High-warmth and low-competence outgroups produce paternalistic stereotypes, forming an impression of compliant subordinates. Elderly people, the
disabled, and the mentally retarded are often categorized into this group.
Groups in this cluster are typically perceived as nonthreatening and friendly,
evoking a sense of pity. Contrastingly, outgroups that are in the low-warmth
and high-competence cluster are stereotyped in a more envious nature, and
are typically perceived as cold but successful competitors. Nontraditional
women, Jews, and Asians generally fall into this category. Studies additionally confirmed that status predicts the perceived competence of a group, and
that competition predicts the perceived warmth of a group, creating these
mixed stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).
But stereotype content can also be nonambivalent. We typically consider
the group we belong to, our ingroup, as being both high in warmth and high
in competence. This category is typically reserved for students, Christians,
and the middle class (the representative populations from which samples
for these studies were collected) and elicits admiration and pride. However,
outgroups that are in the low-warmth and low-competence category elicit
the emotions disgust and contempt, such as poor people, the homeless, Hispanics, and welfare recipients.
Because stereotype content is linked to emotions, and emotions better predict behavior than beliefs (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008), this indicates
that there might also be a systematic pattern of discriminatory behaviors.
The behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map framework
was developed to explain the stereotyped behaviors produced by the four
clusters in the stereotype content model (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). The
BIAS model demonstrates that warmth stereotypes elicit active behaviors;
people will behave in ways that attenuate active harm and harassment, and
actively elicit facilitation, helping behaviors. Competence stereotypes however elicit passive behaviors; people will attenuate passive harmful behaviors
(e.g., neglect) and will elicit passive facilitation efforts (such as associating
with the group). Therefore, there are distinct behavioral tendencies toward
the four groups in the stereotype content model. Admired groups that are
high in warmth and high in competence will lead to both active and passive
facilitation behaviors. Groups that are in the disgust category and are both
low in warmth and low in competence will elicit both active and passive

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

harm behaviors. Because these two groups are either perceived as very positive or very negative, the behaviors associated with them follow the same
pattern. High-competence and low-warmth stereotypes, the envied groups,
will elicit passive facilitation but active harm behaviors. The other mixed
stereotype, low-competence and high-warmth pitied groups, will elicit active
facilitation but passive harm behaviors.
In conclusion, the stereotype content depends on two universal dimensions
of person perception, warmth and competence. These two dimensions create stereotype content that is clustered in one of four cells eliciting specific
emotions; low warmth and low competence (low–low) elicit disgust, high
warmth and high competence elicit pride, low warmth and high competence
elicit envy, and high warmth and low competence elicit pity. Stereotype content need not be purely negative; rather ambivalent stereotypes exist and are
predicted by the perceived status and competition of the group.
NEUROSCIENCE AND STEREOTYPE CONTENT
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows researchers to measure blood flow in the brain, which is associated with brain activity. With
this knowledge, researchers are able to correlate social cognition with relevant regions in the brain. The neuroscience research on stereotype content
has underscored the importance of the emotions associated with the four
clusters of the stereotype content model. Having brain data corresponding to
decisions made about individuals in stereotyped groups allows us to gain a
more integrative picture of the cognitive mechanisms involved in stereotype
content.
The stereotype content model posits that some groups will be viewed more
undesirably than others, but that not all groups will necessarily be viewed
negatively. Previous research has demonstrated that some outgroups are
perceived as less human than ingroups (Bar-Tal, 1989), and the stereotype
content model predicts feelings of disgust when thinking about the extreme
low-warmth and low-competence groups. Disgust is coincidentally the only
emotion predicted by the stereotype content model that can be targeted
to nonhuman entities (Harris & Fiske, 2009). Disgust is an emotion that
evolved to reject potential contaminants such as poisonous food items
but has evolved to encompass aversive events in the moral domain, such
as unfair treatment (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). This
suggests that social cognitive mechanisms in the brain may differentially
represent these extreme outgroups. Therefore, researchers sought to investigate how people from groups in the low-warmth, low-competence disgust
outgroup would be processed in the brain.

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Prior studies demonstrate medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) along
with temporal lobe regions including superior temporal sulcus (STS),
temporal-parietal junction, anterior temporal pole, together form a brain
network that is essential for social cognition (Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009). This network is active when looking at pictures of other people.
However, researchers discovered that all groups except for the low-warmth,
low-competence group activated parts of this network, suggesting that social
cognitive processes are not being fully engaged when viewing pictures of
people in the low–low group, such as drug addicts and the homeless (Harris
& Fiske, 2006). This extreme outgroup also elicits more activation in the
insula and amygdala—two brain regions that have been implicated with
disgust reactions. However, if participants were instructed to individualize
the person in the picture (e.g., think about food preferences), then activation
in the social cognition network increased for the low–low targets, suggesting
that thinking about the person’s preferences elevates the status of a person
beyond a category to a unique individual (Harris & Fiske, 2007). This notion
is consistent with the Continuum Model of Impression formation, which
suggests that people use stereotype content instead of personal characteristics when forming an impression of another person (Fiske & Neuberg,
1990).
In addition, neuroscience research has demonstrated that people are more
willing to sacrifice individuals who are low in warmth and competence
to save ingroup members (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010).
The decision to sacrifice another person in this hypothetical scenario is
a moral trade-off most people usually will not make. However, when
considering sacrificing extreme outgroup to save the ingroup members, the
brain responds in a way consistent with making a complex moral trade-off,
activating parts of the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex
implicated in cognitive control. This reinforces the idea of moral protection
when people are perceived as full human beings (Harris & Fiske, 2009).
Research integrating neuroscience and stereotype content has only recently
been exploring groups associated with the other emotions in the stereotype
content model. One such study demonstrates that participants who increased
activation in the insula while viewing high warmth, low competence pity targets experiencing positive events are more willing to harm these targets in
a later domain. Individuals with increased activation in the anterior insula
(which is a region associated with empathy) in response to positive events
are more willing to harm low warmth, high competence envied targets, and
are less willing to harm ingroup targets (Cikara & Fiske, 2011). These results
suggest that an increased empathic response may lead to a decreased aggressive response to certain stereotyped groups. Future research should continue

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

to address brain responses to outgroups with different stereotype contents to
understand how stereotype content changes social cognitive responses.
Neuroscience research provides an interesting new methodological
approach to understanding the nuances of stereotype content and its effect
on the brain and behavior. This kind of research can extend our knowledge
on the interplay between emotion and social cognitive processes during
stereotyping processes, and will allow future researchers to find ways to
mitigate the effects of stereotype behavior toward outgroups. Uncovering
the nuances between our brain’s responses to different types of stereotype
content will allow for refined psychological models and will accelerate the
progress toward understanding stereotypes.
KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
Stereotypes have been extensively studied in psychological research, starting
with studies that focused almost exclusively on racial and ethnic stereotypes
(Katz & Braly, 1935), followed by an interest in gender stereotypes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979). The emergence of these trends is not surprising
considering the cultural zeitgeist. Recently, however, the movement toward
understanding stereotype content has facilitated the understanding that
stereotypes take on different forms. It will be critical for future stereotype
researchers to investigate beyond the scope of traditionally stereotyped
groups to understand the complexities of stereotypes, as has already been
evidenced by the study of stereotype content.
Furthermore, although the stereotype content model predicts four emotions associated with each of the four clusters of stereotype content, future
research should investigate the role of other emotions in stereotype content.
There is already research that suggests that secondary emotions—emotions
that are reserved for people, such as admiration and contempt—are more easily associated with ingroup members rather than outgroup members (Leyens
et al., 2001, 2003). Moreover, studies have demonstrated that strong identification with an ingroup leads to negative behavioral tendencies toward an
outgroup as measured by threat-based emotions such as anger and contempt
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Pursuit of these two avenues of research will
be informative for understanding stereotype content as they enhance and
broaden the scope of stereotype research. However, a new conceptualization
may be in order for advancement and innovation of the field. Here, we discuss stereotype research in the context of what the aforementioned stereotype
content research has gleaned, which could redefine how we view stereotypes.
We first describe social perception and categorization along a continuum,
and then discuss how people categorize outgroups as infrahuman—that is,
less than human. Under these frameworks, we propose that stereotypes not

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9

only short-circuit social cognitive processes, but result in dehumanization of
everyday outgroup targets.
FROM CATEGORY, TO OBJECT, TO OUTGROUP
There are several paths through which individuals can use social cognitive processes to make judgments about others. The first is using a
category-based approach through a schema—an organized network of
concepts and their attributes, connected through associative links with other
attributes. Schemas provide a framework for processing information in
the world, and Asch’s (1946) study demonstrated how individuals might
be using schemas to represent the image of the mean, cold person versus
the nice, warm person. Using a schema to interpret information about an
unknown person allows the individual to form a quick impression, initiating
an automatic affective response. This can be a useful mental heuristic as
it allows perceivers to quickly extract useful categorical information about
the person, such as age, race, and gender (Fiske, 1998). Schemas are at the
root of stereotype processes as they provide easily accessible information
about a person during person perception or impression formation. In fact,
many founding fathers of social psychology informed our understanding of
schemas. Asch’s research (1946) is a cornerstone for the investigation of how
traits can serve to categorize an individual, and Allport’s (1954) seminal
prejudice research suggests that stereotypes arise from social categorization.
Tajfel (1969) delineates how using trait dimensions simplify categorizing
people into groups, and that these kinds of subjective classifications (i.e.,
“he is lazy”) would inescapably lead to comparative judgments.
The opposite of this cognitive approach has been described as individualized processing, in which the person is not treated as a mere example
or a trait, but has unique attributes that distinguish him or her (Fiske &
Pavelchak, 1986). In essence, many salient traits interact to create a unique
individual. Rather than thinking categorically of the person, one will recall
all of that person’s corresponding attributes that together make the person
unique (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie & Milberg, 1987). That personalized social
cognitive processing takes longer than stereotyping. In addition, individuals
have to be motivated to engage in this processing, and have access to
additional individualized information about the person (Fiske, Lin, et al.,
1999).
Because individuals can use either social cognitive method, Fiske and
Neuberg (1990) proposed a continuum model of person perception. Just
like the title suggests, the model proposes that person perception falls
along a continuum between these two social cognitive processes, with one
extreme being categorical and the other personalizing. The perceiver’s

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

motivations or personal relevance determines whether the perceiver shifts
from a category-based impression to a more personal impression by focusing
attention to the attributes of the target. Similarly, Brewer (1988) proposed a
dual process model that hypothesized information processing as bottom-up
and category based, or top-down and person based. Both of these methods
access differing knowledge structures; one is vague and uses categories,
while the other is more specific and holds the person at its core.
There has long been the notion that perceivers can form category-based
or individual-based judgments using different social cognitive machinery.
Traditionally, this machinery has been considered social cognition instead of
simply cognition. For instance, it is possible to view a table, and not engage
social cognitive machinery. It is also possible to think about the mind of a
table—a social cognitive task—but not use social cognitive brain machinery to do so (Harris & Fiske, 2008). There is not a simple explanation to this
phenomenon, but social psychological research has investigated the role of
stereotyped judgments (Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000) on cognitive processing. Laboratory studies demonstrate that stereotypes serve a functional role
preserving cognitive processing resources (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen,
1994). This supports the idea that stereotyping indeed is a heuristic or shortcut, but it does not activate full person-centered social cognitive processing.
Stated differently, stereotypes, even positive ones, may be dehumanizing.
The dehumanization literature in social psychology implicitly supports
this revised notion of stereotyping. The process by which we categorize people into negative social groups leads to bad consequences. This concept was
first tagged delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989) and describes how categorizing
a group into a negative social category denies that group the normal moral
protections of an ingroup. Moreover, it allows for the active moral exclusion
of these negative groups, which in turn makes the outgroup fall outside the
boundary of widely accepted moral values and considerations (Opotow,
2010). Importantly, this does not only occur during conflicts, but can occur
in response to the tendency for ingroups to see themselves as superior
to the outgroup—a feeling that has come to be known as ethnocentrism.
Furthermore, outgroups are not seen as sharing the same qualities as
members of the ingroup. The labels that categorize social groups permit
perceivers to see them as possessing different “essences” than those shared
by the ingroup (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). The ease with which ingroups
perceive certain qualities to belong to their group allows for a less desirable
essence to characterize outgroups, and in fact these outgroups are perceived
as having less human—infrahuman—characteristics (Leyens et al., 2000).
More recent work has used the term dehumanization to describe the denial
of human characteristics to outgroups (Haslam, 2006).

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Dehumanization has also been linked to the phenomenon described
earlier, where the social cognition brain network is not as responsive to
low–low, disgusting targets (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In these cases, a perceiver’s social cognitive brain network becomes completely disengaged,
perhaps due to the peculiar effects of disgust. Dehumanization can also
occur in less extreme cases and with stereotype content that is associated
with more human emotions, suggesting different levels of stereotyping and
differential engagement of social cognitive processes. However, the concept
of dehumanization should be viewed as a spectrum, not just in the extreme.
CONCLUSION
In sum, social psychological research has demonstrated that stereotypes lead
to categorization of outgroups, which deny uniquely human qualities and
moral protections to the outgroup. fMRI studies have looked at stereotype
content in the brain, demonstrating that extreme low–low outgroups that
elicit an emotion not unique to humans are differentially processed within the
social cognitive brain network. The targets in these extreme outgroups automatically engage negative stereotypes, which may short-circuit our ability to
infer the mental states of others, think about them as individuals, and even
ascribe them full humanity. Because of this, stereotypes—especially about
extreme outgroups—might prohibit humans from engaging personalizing
social cognitive processes toward other human beings.
Under this new framework, stereotypes can be seen as dehumanizing—
denial of an individual’s human uniqueness. While not all stereotypes will
lead to the extreme cases described, stereotypes engage cognitive processes
that are automatic. These processes may deny a target full personalized
social cognitive processing. Using shortcuts and heuristics when we think
about stereotyped groups may be advantageous because it enables a quick
snapshot of what the target may be like—but this replaces the full variety
of their humanity obtained through social cognitive resources dedicated to
processing an individual. Future research will continue to address this question using established frameworks, integrating neuroscience approaches
(e.g., brain imaging) in order to discover the social cognitive mechanisms
underlying stereotype content.

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Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. The Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 41(3), 258.

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Ashmore, R. D., & Boca, F. K. (1979). Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory: Toward a cognitive—social psychological conceptualization. Sex Roles, 5(2),
219–248.
Bales, R. F. (1950). A set of categories for the analysis of small group interaction.
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Bodenhausen, G. V., Macrae, C. N., & Sherman, J. S. (1999). On the dialectics of discrimination: Dual processes in social stereotyping. S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.),
Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 271–290). New York, NY: Guilford
Press.
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. Hillsdale, NJ:
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Caporael, L. R. (1997). The evolution of truly social cognition: The core configurations
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Chapman, H. A., Kim, D. A., Susskind, J. M., & Anderson, A. K. (2009). In bad taste:
Evidence for the oral origins of moral disgust. Science, 323(5918), 1222–1226.
Cikara, M., Farnsworth, R. A., Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2010). On the wrong side
of the trolley track: Neural correlates of relative social valuation. Social Cognitive
and Affective Neuroscience, 5(4), 404–413.
Cikara, M., & Fiske, S. T. (2011). Bounded empathy: Neural responses to outgroup
targets’ (mis) fortunes. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(12), 3791–3803.
Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: behaviors from intergroup
affect and stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(4), 631.
Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T.
Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, 4th ed., pp. 357–411).
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition:
Warmth and competence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 77–83.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype
content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and
competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 878.
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 1.
Fiske, S. T., Lin, M., & Neuberg, S. L. (1999). The continuum model. In Dual-Process
Theories in Social Psychology (pp. 231–254). New York, NY: Guilford.
Fiske, S. T., Neuberg, S. L., Beattie, A. E., & Milberg, S. J. (1987). Category-based and
attribute-based reactions to others: Some informational conditions of stereotyping
and individuating processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 399–427.
Fiske, S. T., & Pavelchak, M. A. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-based affective responses: Developments in schema-triggered affect. In M. Sorrentino & E. T.
Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation & cognition: Foundations of social behavior (pp.
167–203). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.

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Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. C., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis) respecting versus (dis) liking:
Status and interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and
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Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low neuroimaging
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Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2007). Social groups that elicit disgust are differentially
processed in mPFC. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2(1), 45–51.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2008). The brooms in Fantasia: Neural correlates of anthropomorphizing objects. Social Cognition, 26(2), 210–223.
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2009). Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised
perception. European Review of Social Psychology, 20, 192–231.
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 252–264.
Katz, D., & Braly, K. W. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 30(2), 175–193.
Leyens, J. P., Cortes, B., Demoulin, S., Dovidio, J. F., Fiske, S. T., Gaunt, R., … &
Vaes, J. (2003). Emotional prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism: The 2002 Tajfel
Lecture. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33(6), 703–717.
Leyens, J. P., Paladino, P. M., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., RodriguezPerez, A., & Gaunt, R. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of
secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 4(2), 186–197.
Leyens, J. P., Rodriguez-Perez, A., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M. P.,
Vaes, J., & Demoulin, S. (2001). Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 31(4), 395–411.
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining
offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 79(4), 602.
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically
about others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51(1), 93–120.
Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energysaving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 66(1), 37.
Noseworthy, C. M., & Lott, A. J. (1984). The cognitive organization of genderstereotypic categories. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10(3), 474–481.
Opotow, S. (2010). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal of Social
Issues, 46(1), 1–20.
Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional
approach to the structure of personality impressions. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 9(4), 283.
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view
social categories as natural kinds?. In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language,
interaction and social cognition (pp. 11–36). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

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Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Biosocial Science, 1(S1),
173–191.
Talaska, C. A., Fiske, S. T., & Chaiken, S. (2008). Legitimating racial discrimination:
A metaanalysis of the racial attitude-behavior literature shows that emotions, not
beliefs, best predict discrimination. Social Justice Research: Social Power in Action,
21, 263–296.
Van Overwalle, F., & Baetens, K. (2009). Understanding others’ actions and goals by
mirror and mentalizing systems: A meta-analysis. Neuroimage, 48(3), 564–584.

FURTHER READING
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition:
Warmth and competence. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(2), 77–83.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.

BEATRICE H. CAPESTANY SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Beatrice H. Capestany: Graduate student, Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Duke University. Ms. Capestany graduated from Vassar
College in 2009, with a BA in Neuroscience and Behavior. She is currently
studying as a graduate student with Dr. Lasana Harris in the Psychology
& Neuroscience Department at Duke University. She is interested in the
social cognitive mechanisms that lead to stereotyping behaviors, studying
topics such as dehumanization, legal decision making, and morality. Taking
a social neuroscience approach, she designs social psychological paradigms
with functional neuroimaging.
LASANA T. HARRIS SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Lasana T. Harris: Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, and the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University. Dr.
Harris received his BS in Psychology from Howard University in 2000 and his
MA and PhD degrees in Psychology from Princeton University in 2006 and
2007, respectively. He then spent three years as a postdoctoral researcher at
New York University. Research in his laboratory takes an interdisciplinary
approach to understanding social cognition, that is, how we figure out what
someone else is thinking. Recent research suggests that this basic human
ability is fungible and can be extended to agents that do not have minds,
resulting in anthropomorphism, or withheld from human beings with minds,
resulting in dehumanized perception. Social cognition is necessary for social
interaction, and anthropomorphism and dehumanized perception represent
boundary conditions for this important phenomenon.

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Stereotype Content
BEATRICE H. CAPESTANY and LASANA T. HARRIS

Abstract
Scholars have recently proposed a model that describes and systematically categorizes the content of stereotypes. This stereotype content model posits that groups are
stereotyped along the dimensions of trait warmth (i.e., likeability and friendliness)
and competence (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). Groups will typically be stereotyped into one of four clusters—low warmth and high competence, high warmth and
low competence, high warmth and high competence, and lastly low warmth and low
competence. The combination of positively and negatively valenced clusters creates
ambivalent or mixed stereotype content that produces paternalistic (high warmth,
low competence) or envious (low warmth, high competence) forms of prejudice. The
model has generated interesting new results and insights about the nature of stereotypes and their impact on behaviors, including dehumanization.

INTRODUCTION
Understanding the nature of stereotypes has long been a topic of interest to
social psychologists (Allport, 1954). Stereotypes can sometimes serve a useful function, creating easy ways for the brain to process a lot of information
about people who belong to different groups. But stereotypes can also result
in negative outcomes, producing false beliefs about an individual, a community, or even an entire population (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Stereotypes are an
inescapable part of our psychology and can lead to severe forms of prejudice
and discrimination. As a result, researchers have been interested in uncovering the motivations and psychological processes that lead to the formation
of stereotypes.
Psychologists at present largely agree that stereotypes consist of highly
automatic processes that lead to the categorization of people into social
groups (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Moreover,
stereotype processes are highly similar and systematic among individuals
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). More recently, researchers have become
interested in the content of stereotypes; that is, what characteristics or
features comprise a stereotype about a specific group? What are the actual
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

thoughts and feelings that people have when thinking about or encountering
a stereotyped person? For example, what do you think of when you see
the words, “slow, helpless, brittle, wise, Florida?” You most likely thought
of an elderly person. Stereotype content is defined as the attributes and
characteristics that comprise a generated categorization (Fiske et al., 2002).
Understanding the nature of stereotype content also advances our knowledge about stereotype processing in the brain. Typically, stereotypes are discussed as a form of social cognition, a way in which we understand the minds
of other human beings (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Stereotypes are viewed as a
heuristic—a mental shortcut—that enables us to quickly form impressions
of an individual or a group. Identifying a person without using stereotypes
relies on different cognitive machinery (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman,
1999). These opposing cognitive mechanisms provide a dual-process account
of the nature of stereotypes. In some models, person perception is described
along a continuum, from stereotypes, the initial information about a person,
to individualization, information specific to that person involving preferences and personality (Fiske, Xu, et al., 1999).
Traditional social cognition abilities evolved to facilitate social interaction
(Caporael, 1997). As such, social cognition enables us to discern which things
in the environment are targets of social interaction and the resulting morally
and socially normed behavior reserved for other people. This imbues people
with a certain “humanness” that depends exclusively on social cognitive processing (Harris & Fiske, 2009). But if stereotypes short-circuit regular social
cognitive processes that allow us to perceive a person as human, stereotypes
will involuntarily allow for some outgroups and outgroup members to be
denied their humanness. In other words, stereotype content will enable our
automatic mental processes to dehumanize others—not fully engaging social
cognitive abilities that are regularly engaged when interacting with other
people.
In the sections that follow, we begin by introducing the foundational
research on stereotype content. We then move on to cutting-edge research
that integrates social psychology and neuroscience to come up with a more
advanced picture of stereotype processes occurring at the level of the brain
and behavior. Finally, we discuss empirical evidence supporting the idea
that some stereotypes may be dehumanizing, short-circuiting typical social
cognitive processes.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Before delving into the specifics of stereotype content, a brief history of how
this research evolved is necessary. In 1946, social psychologist Solomon Asch
published a study that highlighted an important trend in how people form

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3

impressions of others. Asch instructed participants to form an impression of a
competent person who had been described as “assured,” “talkative,” “cold,”
“ironical,” “inquisitive,” and “persuasive”—all adjectives that described an
inherently competent person. In this scenario, most participants described an
individual who was not very pleasant to be around:
“A rather snobbish person who feels that his success and intelligence set him
apart from the run-of-the-mill individual. Calculating and unsympathetic.”

However when Asch changed the word “cold” in the list to the word
“warm,” he created a completely new impression for his participants—the
individual was portrayed as a much nicer person:
“A scientist performing experiments and persevering after many setbacks. He
is driven by the desire to accomplish something that would be of benefit.”

Strikingly, this drastic change in impression only occurred when the words
“warm” and “cold” were interchanged. Switching, for example, “warm” and
“cold” to “polite” and “blunt” produced no difference in impressions. Asch
discovered that the simple manipulation of the trait dimension warmth readily changed the perception of an individual. His research emphasized the
importance of the trait warmth in person perception and its impact on overall
impressions of people’s personality.
Asch’s preliminary finding that warmth was a necessary dimension for
impression formation only accounted for one dimension of personality, but
a person could be sociable and hardworking or sociable and lazy. Because
of this fact, researchers believed that impressions of others were most
likely multidimensional, representing different evaluative components of
an individual’s personality. By presenting lists of adjectives similar to those
Asch had used (but much more comprehensive) to participants who sorted
them into traits, researchers demonstrated that traits lie along two primary
dimensions: intellectual desirability (competence) and social desirability
(warmth; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968). These impression
formation studies were crucially important to develop a model of stereotype
content.
Also instrumental to the development of stereotype content research was
the realization that not all prejudices produce antipathy. That is, prejudice
did not have to be rigid and produce a fixed, decisively negative judgment.
As the impression formation researchers had already demonstrated, a person could be sociable (a positive trait) but lazy (a negative trait), producing
ambivalent judgments. Extending this framework from an individual perspective to a group perspective was essential for the study of stereotypes.

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Studies demonstrated that cross-culturally stereotypes were typically comprised of traits associated with competence related attributes (i.e., respect,
intelligence) and social related attributes (i.e., empathic, trustworthy; Bales,
1950; Noseworthy & Lott, 1984). Furthermore, these studies demonstrated
that there is a functional aspect to the multidimensional qualities of person
perception. Sociability reflects the intended goal of the group (to help or to
hurt), while competence reflects the means to actualize those goals. Also,
consistent with the impression formation research, the relationship between
competence and warmth was usually orthogonal.
On the basis of identification of the primary dimensions of person perception in both the impression formation and prejudice literatures, social
psychologists uncovered two factors that likely contribute to the formation
of mixed or ambivalent stereotypes. The first factor was a group’s socioeconomic status, while the second factor was the level of interdependence of the
perceiver’s group with that group. By informing their study of stereotypes
with information and methods from the impression formation literature,
researchers posited a novel hypothesis and approach to the study stereotype
content. They hypothesized that status affects the perceived competence
of the group, and interdependence (cooperative or competitive) affects
the perceived warmth of the group. Therefore high-status groups (such
as rich people, Jews) are respected and envied because of their perceived
competence, but they are not liked, whereas low-status groups (people with
disabilities, the elderly) are often disrespected because of their perceived
incompetence but liked because they are not perceived as a threat. This produces ambivalent stereotype content that can be clustered into two specific
categories: competent but cold, and incompetent but warm (Fiske et al., 2002).
Researchers hypothesized that systematic principles could be applied to
the study of stereotype content. Although stereotype research had focused
greatly on the systematic processes by which stereotypes were produced,
researchers had not thought of stereotype content as something that could
also be systematic. And if stereotype content proved to be systematic, then
stereotype content could be predicted by the relationship between groups. To
first understand the inverse relationship between warmth and competence,
researchers had to ensure that real groups were clustering in the predicted
directions of competent but cold, and incompetent but warm. To do this,
participants were given a survey and asked to rate a list of groups (disabled
people, Asians, etc.) based on their competence and warmth. Participants
also had to indicate how likely a trait (helpful, hostile, etc.) would be associated with that group. Participants were instructed to make these ratings
based on how the groups are viewed by other people in their society, to
guard against socially desirability concerns, ensuring that current cultural
beliefs were responsible for eliciting responses, not personal biases. The data

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5

showed that the groups fell along a line with a negative slope (inversely correlated) in a competence X warmth two-dimensional space. Thus, a positive
stereotype on one dimension (high warmth or high competence) resulted in
an unfavorable stereotype on the other dimension (low competence or low
warmth; Fiske et al., 2002).
The ambivalent stereotypes thus produce different forms of prejudice.
High-warmth and low-competence outgroups produce paternalistic stereotypes, forming an impression of compliant subordinates. Elderly people, the
disabled, and the mentally retarded are often categorized into this group.
Groups in this cluster are typically perceived as nonthreatening and friendly,
evoking a sense of pity. Contrastingly, outgroups that are in the low-warmth
and high-competence cluster are stereotyped in a more envious nature, and
are typically perceived as cold but successful competitors. Nontraditional
women, Jews, and Asians generally fall into this category. Studies additionally confirmed that status predicts the perceived competence of a group, and
that competition predicts the perceived warmth of a group, creating these
mixed stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).
But stereotype content can also be nonambivalent. We typically consider
the group we belong to, our ingroup, as being both high in warmth and high
in competence. This category is typically reserved for students, Christians,
and the middle class (the representative populations from which samples
for these studies were collected) and elicits admiration and pride. However,
outgroups that are in the low-warmth and low-competence category elicit
the emotions disgust and contempt, such as poor people, the homeless, Hispanics, and welfare recipients.
Because stereotype content is linked to emotions, and emotions better predict behavior than beliefs (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008), this indicates
that there might also be a systematic pattern of discriminatory behaviors.
The behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map framework
was developed to explain the stereotyped behaviors produced by the four
clusters in the stereotype content model (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). The
BIAS model demonstrates that warmth stereotypes elicit active behaviors;
people will behave in ways that attenuate active harm and harassment, and
actively elicit facilitation, helping behaviors. Competence stereotypes however elicit passive behaviors; people will attenuate passive harmful behaviors
(e.g., neglect) and will elicit passive facilitation efforts (such as associating
with the group). Therefore, there are distinct behavioral tendencies toward
the four groups in the stereotype content model. Admired groups that are
high in warmth and high in competence will lead to both active and passive
facilitation behaviors. Groups that are in the disgust category and are both
low in warmth and low in competence will elicit both active and passive

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harm behaviors. Because these two groups are either perceived as very positive or very negative, the behaviors associated with them follow the same
pattern. High-competence and low-warmth stereotypes, the envied groups,
will elicit passive facilitation but active harm behaviors. The other mixed
stereotype, low-competence and high-warmth pitied groups, will elicit active
facilitation but passive harm behaviors.
In conclusion, the stereotype content depends on two universal dimensions
of person perception, warmth and competence. These two dimensions create stereotype content that is clustered in one of four cells eliciting specific
emotions; low warmth and low competence (low–low) elicit disgust, high
warmth and high competence elicit pride, low warmth and high competence
elicit envy, and high warmth and low competence elicit pity. Stereotype content need not be purely negative; rather ambivalent stereotypes exist and are
predicted by the perceived status and competition of the group.
NEUROSCIENCE AND STEREOTYPE CONTENT
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allows researchers to measure blood flow in the brain, which is associated with brain activity. With
this knowledge, researchers are able to correlate social cognition with relevant regions in the brain. The neuroscience research on stereotype content
has underscored the importance of the emotions associated with the four
clusters of the stereotype content model. Having brain data corresponding to
decisions made about individuals in stereotyped groups allows us to gain a
more integrative picture of the cognitive mechanisms involved in stereotype
content.
The stereotype content model posits that some groups will be viewed more
undesirably than others, but that not all groups will necessarily be viewed
negatively. Previous research has demonstrated that some outgroups are
perceived as less human than ingroups (Bar-Tal, 1989), and the stereotype
content model predicts feelings of disgust when thinking about the extreme
low-warmth and low-competence groups. Disgust is coincidentally the only
emotion predicted by the stereotype content model that can be targeted
to nonhuman entities (Harris & Fiske, 2009). Disgust is an emotion that
evolved to reject potential contaminants such as poisonous food items
but has evolved to encompass aversive events in the moral domain, such
as unfair treatment (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009). This
suggests that social cognitive mechanisms in the brain may differentially
represent these extreme outgroups. Therefore, researchers sought to investigate how people from groups in the low-warmth, low-competence disgust
outgroup would be processed in the brain.

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7

Prior studies demonstrate medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) along
with temporal lobe regions including superior temporal sulcus (STS),
temporal-parietal junction, anterior temporal pole, together form a brain
network that is essential for social cognition (Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009). This network is active when looking at pictures of other people.
However, researchers discovered that all groups except for the low-warmth,
low-competence group activated parts of this network, suggesting that social
cognitive processes are not being fully engaged when viewing pictures of
people in the low–low group, such as drug addicts and the homeless (Harris
& Fiske, 2006). This extreme outgroup also elicits more activation in the
insula and amygdala—two brain regions that have been implicated with
disgust reactions. However, if participants were instructed to individualize
the person in the picture (e.g., think about food preferences), then activation
in the social cognition network increased for the low–low targets, suggesting
that thinking about the person’s preferences elevates the status of a person
beyond a category to a unique individual (Harris & Fiske, 2007). This notion
is consistent with the Continuum Model of Impression formation, which
suggests that people use stereotype content instead of personal characteristics when forming an impression of another person (Fiske & Neuberg,
1990).
In addition, neuroscience research has demonstrated that people are more
willing to sacrifice individuals who are low in warmth and competence
to save ingroup members (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010).
The decision to sacrifice another person in this hypothetical scenario is
a moral trade-off most people usually will not make. However, when
considering sacrificing extreme outgroup to save the ingroup members, the
brain responds in a way consistent with making a complex moral trade-off,
activating parts of the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex
implicated in cognitive control. This reinforces the idea of moral protection
when people are perceived as full human beings (Harris & Fiske, 2009).
Research integrating neuroscience and stereotype content has only recently
been exploring groups associated with the other emotions in the stereotype
content model. One such study demonstrates that participants who increased
activation in the insula while viewing high warmth, low competence pity targets experiencing positive events are more willing to harm these targets in
a later domain. Individuals with increased activation in the anterior insula
(which is a region associated with empathy) in response to positive events
are more willing to harm low warmth, high competence envied targets, and
are less willing to harm ingroup targets (Cikara & Fiske, 2011). These results
suggest that an increased empathic response may lead to a decreased aggressive response to certain stereotyped groups. Future research should continue

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

to address brain responses to outgroups with different stereotype contents to
understand how stereotype content changes social cognitive responses.
Neuroscience research provides an interesting new methodological
approach to understanding the nuances of stereotype content and its effect
on the brain and behavior. This kind of research can extend our knowledge
on the interplay between emotion and social cognitive processes during
stereotyping processes, and will allow future researchers to find ways to
mitigate the effects of stereotype behavior toward outgroups. Uncovering
the nuances between our brain’s responses to different types of stereotype
content will allow for refined psychological models and will accelerate the
progress toward understanding stereotypes.
KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
Stereotypes have been extensively studied in psychological research, starting
with studies that focused almost exclusively on racial and ethnic stereotypes
(Katz & Braly, 1935), followed by an interest in gender stereotypes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979). The emergence of these trends is not surprising
considering the cultural zeitgeist. Recently, however, the movement toward
understanding stereotype content has facilitated the understanding that
stereotypes take on different forms. It will be critical for future stereotype
researchers to investigate beyond the scope of traditionally stereotyped
groups to understand the complexities of stereotypes, as has already been
evidenced by the study of stereotype content.
Furthermore, although the stereotype content model predicts four emotions associated with each of the four clusters of stereotype content, future
research should investigate the role of other emotions in stereotype content.
There is already research that suggests that secondary emotions—emotions
that are reserved for people, such as admiration and contempt—are more easily associated with ingroup members rather than outgroup members (Leyens
et al., 2001, 2003). Moreover, studies have demonstrated that strong identification with an ingroup leads to negative behavioral tendencies toward an
outgroup as measured by threat-based emotions such as anger and contempt
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Pursuit of these two avenues of research will
be informative for understanding stereotype content as they enhance and
broaden the scope of stereotype research. However, a new conceptualization
may be in order for advancement and innovation of the field. Here, we discuss stereotype research in the context of what the aforementioned stereotype
content research has gleaned, which could redefine how we view stereotypes.
We first describe social perception and categorization along a continuum,
and then discuss how people categorize outgroups as infrahuman—that is,
less than human. Under these frameworks, we propose that stereotypes not

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9

only short-circuit social cognitive processes, but result in dehumanization of
everyday outgroup targets.
FROM CATEGORY, TO OBJECT, TO OUTGROUP
There are several paths through which individuals can use social cognitive processes to make judgments about others. The first is using a
category-based approach through a schema—an organized network of
concepts and their attributes, connected through associative links with other
attributes. Schemas provide a framework for processing information in
the world, and Asch’s (1946) study demonstrated how individuals might
be using schemas to represent the image of the mean, cold person versus
the nice, warm person. Using a schema to interpret information about an
unknown person allows the individual to form a quick impression, initiating
an automatic affective response. This can be a useful mental heuristic as
it allows perceivers to quickly extract useful categorical information about
the person, such as age, race, and gender (Fiske, 1998). Schemas are at the
root of stereotype processes as they provide easily accessible information
about a person during person perception or impression formation. In fact,
many founding fathers of social psychology informed our understanding of
schemas. Asch’s research (1946) is a cornerstone for the investigation of how
traits can serve to categorize an individual, and Allport’s (1954) seminal
prejudice research suggests that stereotypes arise from social categorization.
Tajfel (1969) delineates how using trait dimensions simplify categorizing
people into groups, and that these kinds of subjective classifications (i.e.,
“he is lazy”) would inescapably lead to comparative judgments.
The opposite of this cognitive approach has been described as individualized processing, in which the person is not treated as a mere example
or a trait, but has unique attributes that distinguish him or her (Fiske &
Pavelchak, 1986). In essence, many salient traits interact to create a unique
individual. Rather than thinking categorically of the person, one will recall
all of that person’s corresponding attributes that together make the person
unique (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie & Milberg, 1987). That personalized social
cognitive processing takes longer than stereotyping. In addition, individuals
have to be motivated to engage in this processing, and have access to
additional individualized information about the person (Fiske, Lin, et al.,
1999).
Because individuals can use either social cognitive method, Fiske and
Neuberg (1990) proposed a continuum model of person perception. Just
like the title suggests, the model proposes that person perception falls
along a continuum between these two social cognitive processes, with one
extreme being categorical and the other personalizing. The perceiver’s

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

motivations or personal relevance determines whether the perceiver shifts
from a category-based impression to a more personal impression by focusing
attention to the attributes of the target. Similarly, Brewer (1988) proposed a
dual process model that hypothesized information processing as bottom-up
and category based, or top-down and person based. Both of these methods
access differing knowledge structures; one is vague and uses categories,
while the other is more specific and holds the person at its core.
There has long been the notion that perceivers can form category-based
or individual-based judgments using different social cognitive machinery.
Traditionally, this machinery has been considered social cognition instead of
simply cognition. For instance, it is possible to view a table, and not engage
social cognitive machinery. It is also possible to think about the mind of a
table—a social cognitive task—but not use social cognitive brain machinery to do so (Harris & Fiske, 2008). There is not a simple explanation to this
phenomenon, but social psychological research has investigated the role of
stereotyped judgments (Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000) on cognitive processing. Laboratory studies demonstrate that stereotypes serve a functional role
preserving cognitive processing resources (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen,
1994). This supports the idea that stereotyping indeed is a heuristic or shortcut, but it does not activate full person-centered social cognitive processing.
Stated differently, stereotypes, even positive ones, may be dehumanizing.
The dehumanization literature in social psychology implicitly supports
this revised notion of stereotyping. The process by which we categorize people into negative social groups leads to bad consequences. This concept was
first tagged delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989) and describes how categorizing
a group into a negative social category denies that group the normal moral
protections of an ingroup. Moreover, it allows for the active moral exclusion
of these negative groups, which in turn makes the outgroup fall outside the
boundary of widely accepted moral values and considerations (Opotow,
2010). Importantly, this does not only occur during conflicts, but can occur
in response to the tendency for ingroups to see themselves as superior
to the outgroup—a feeling that has come to be known as ethnocentrism.
Furthermore, outgroups are not seen as sharing the same qualities as
members of the ingroup. The labels that categorize social groups permit
perceivers to see them as possessing different “essences” than those shared
by the ingroup (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). The ease with which ingroups
perceive certain qualities to belong to their group allows for a less desirable
essence to characterize outgroups, and in fact these outgroups are perceived
as having less human—infrahuman—characteristics (Leyens et al., 2000).
More recent work has used the term dehumanization to describe the denial
of human characteristics to outgroups (Haslam, 2006).

Stereotype Content

11

Dehumanization has also been linked to the phenomenon described
earlier, where the social cognition brain network is not as responsive to
low–low, disgusting targets (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In these cases, a perceiver’s social cognitive brain network becomes completely disengaged,
perhaps due to the peculiar effects of disgust. Dehumanization can also
occur in less extreme cases and with stereotype content that is associated
with more human emotions, suggesting different levels of stereotyping and
differential engagement of social cognitive processes. However, the concept
of dehumanization should be viewed as a spectrum, not just in the extreme.
CONCLUSION
In sum, social psychological research has demonstrated that stereotypes lead
to categorization of outgroups, which deny uniquely human qualities and
moral protections to the outgroup. fMRI studies have looked at stereotype
content in the brain, demonstrating that extreme low–low outgroups that
elicit an emotion not unique to humans are differentially processed within the
social cognitive brain network. The targets in these extreme outgroups automatically engage negative stereotypes, which may short-circuit our ability to
infer the mental states of others, think about them as individuals, and even
ascribe them full humanity. Because of this, stereotypes—especially about
extreme outgroups—might prohibit humans from engaging personalizing
social cognitive processes toward other human beings.
Under this new framework, stereotypes can be seen as dehumanizing—
denial of an individual’s human uniqueness. While not all stereotypes will
lead to the extreme cases described, stereotypes engage cognitive processes
that are automatic. These processes may deny a target full personalized
social cognitive processing. Using shortcuts and heuristics when we think
about stereotyped groups may be advantageous because it enables a quick
snapshot of what the target may be like—but this replaces the full variety
of their humanity obtained through social cognitive resources dedicated to
processing an individual. Future research will continue to address this question using established frameworks, integrating neuroscience approaches
(e.g., brain imaging) in order to discover the social cognitive mechanisms
underlying stereotype content.

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Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Biosocial Science, 1(S1),
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FURTHER READING
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition:
Warmth and competence. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(2), 77–83.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Social cognition: From brains to culture. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.

BEATRICE H. CAPESTANY SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Beatrice H. Capestany: Graduate student, Department of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Duke University. Ms. Capestany graduated from Vassar
College in 2009, with a BA in Neuroscience and Behavior. She is currently
studying as a graduate student with Dr. Lasana Harris in the Psychology
& Neuroscience Department at Duke University. She is interested in the
social cognitive mechanisms that lead to stereotyping behaviors, studying
topics such as dehumanization, legal decision making, and morality. Taking
a social neuroscience approach, she designs social psychological paradigms
with functional neuroimaging.
LASANA T. HARRIS SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Lasana T. Harris: Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, and the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University. Dr.
Harris received his BS in Psychology from Howard University in 2000 and his
MA and PhD degrees in Psychology from Princeton University in 2006 and
2007, respectively. He then spent three years as a postdoctoral researcher at
New York University. Research in his laboratory takes an interdisciplinary
approach to understanding social cognition, that is, how we figure out what
someone else is thinking. Recent research suggests that this basic human
ability is fungible and can be extended to agents that do not have minds,
resulting in anthropomorphism, or withheld from human beings with minds,
resulting in dehumanized perception. Social cognition is necessary for social
interaction, and anthropomorphism and dehumanized perception represent
boundary conditions for this important phenomenon.

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