Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Motivation Science

Item

Title

Motivation Science

Author

Kruglanski, Arie W.

Chernikova, Marina

Kopetz, Catalina

Research Area

Cognition and Emotions

Topic

Motivation

Abstract

Traditionally, research on the psychology of motivation has addressed two separate questions: the What of motivation and the How of motivation. The former concerns the nature of the various motives that propel human behavior, and the latter the general process whereby any motive exerts its effects. This essay reviews historical and contemporary research in each of the foregoing categories. We highlight cutting edge concepts and findings in motivation science and identify emerging trends and future challenges.

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Identifier

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extracted text

Motivation Science
ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, MARINA CHERNIKOVA, and CATALINA KOPETZ

Abstract
Traditionally, research on the psychology of motivation has addressed two separate
questions: the What of motivation and the How of motivation. The former concerns
the nature of the various motives that propel human behavior, and the latter the general process whereby any motive exerts its effects. This essay reviews historical and
contemporary research in each of the foregoing categories. We highlight cutting edge
concepts and findings in motivation science and identify emerging trends and future
challenges.

INTRODUCTION
Following a relative lull during the 1970s and 1980s (Higgins, 2012) research
on motivation appears once again to be commanding attention from psychological researchers. Traditionally, the topic of motivation has been a mainstay
of the science of psychology. It has played a major role in early dynamic models of the mind (including psychoanalytic theory), and it was fundamental
to behaviorist theories of learning and action. The advent of the cognitive
revolution in the 1960s and 1970s largely eclipsed the emphasis on motivation, but in the past two decades, motivational research has been making
a forceful comeback. These days, motivational analyses of affect, cognition,
and behavior are ubiquitous across various psychological literatures. Motivational research not only has conceptual implications for understanding
mind and behavior, but also has direct and pragmatic implications for daily
self-regulation, addiction, substance abuse, mental health, life at home and
the workplace, consumer behavior, and other areas of application as well.
Motivation is not just a “passing fancy” on the contemporary scene; rather,
it is firmly entrenched as a foundational issue in scientific psychology.
THE WHAT AND THE HOW OF MOTIVATION
Generally speaking, motivational research in psychology has been of two
general kinds, addressing what one might call the What and the How of
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

motivation. Research in the What category concerns the contents of motivation, including taxonomies of basic motives or needs and investigations
focused on singular motives/needs of particular interest. In contrast, the
How of motivation addresses general processes and structures that apply to
any motive whatsoever, irrespective of contents.
HISTORIC WORK
THE “WHAT” OF MOTIVATION
The prototypical sense in which people in general understand the problem
of “motivation” concerns the “What” category. Raising the question of motivation (why did X commit Y?) inquires essentially into what specific motive
accounts for a given behavior. In this vein, widely known are Freud’s (1920)
distinction between the life (eros) and death (thanatos) drives, McDougall’s
(1932) list of 18 instincts, Murray’s (1938) list of 24 psychogenic needs, and
Maslow’s (1943) need hierarchy.
Beyond general taxonomies, a variety of specific needs singled out by
psychological researchers also belong in the motivational “What” category. Historically, the most extensively researched needs have been the
three highlighted in the work of McClelland (1961): the need for achievement (Atkinson, 1964), for power (McClelland, 1961), and for affiliation
(McClelland, 1961).
THE “HOW” OF MOTIVATION
In contrast to the emphasis on motivational contents, a great deal of research
effort was invested in clarifying the workings of motives in general—defining
the How of motivation. In this vein, McDougall (1932) saw any instinct as
having three fundamental components (perceptual, behavioral, and emotional),
and Freud (1938) viewed “instincts” or “drives” as innate, universal, and constantly felt. Similarly, Murray described a need as a “potentiality or readiness
to respond in a certain way under given conditions” (1938, p. 61).
Theoretical and empirical work on the How of motivation has been carried
out by theorists of the neo-behaviorist school, in particular Hull (1951)
and Spence (1937, 1956). The two central motivational constructs within
the Hull-Spence approach were Drive and Incentive. Primary drives were
assumed to originate in physiological needs and secondary drives were
assumed to derive from primary drives through conditioning. Incentives
were assumed to be environmental stimuli (e.g., food in the goal box)
capable of contributing to motivational readiness.

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The Hull-Spence formulation was articulated as a multiplicative model in
which habit (H) multiplies drive (D) and incentive (K) to produce the readiness to act. Tolman (1955) in an early anticipation of the cognitive revolution
in psychology, has implied that the history of reinforcement (i.e., habit) actually represents an expectancy that a given behavior will result in drive satisfaction. In this interpretation, then, “habit” acquires a strictly motivational
flavor. The expectancy construct figured prominently in the work of Atkinson (1964); he too put forth a multiplicative model (Tr,g = Mg × Er,g × Ig ), in
which Tr,g is a tendency to enact the response aimed attaining a goal, Mg is a
stable motive to attain goals in a given class, and Er,g is the expectancy that a
response will lead to goal attainment.
Neobehaviorist theorists assumed that motivations ultimately derive from
physiological needs (which represent primary drives) and their derivatives acquired via conditioning (representing secondary drives, such as
conditioned fear); McClelland (1987), Atkinson (1964), and their colleagues
postulated purely psychogenic needs, universal across the human species;
Lewin (1938), on the other hand, postulated an open array of quasi-needs
that could be specific to a given psychological situation. Within his topographic approach to personality Lewin (1938) further postulated that a need
gives rise to a state of tension that could spill over to neighboring regions
of one’s life space (e.g., a hungry person may also experience a degree of
thirst).
CONTEMPORARY MOTIVATIONAL RESEARCH
The distinction between the What and the How of motivation is represented
also in contemporary motivational research. In the What category belong
general classifications of basic motives proposed by Deci and Ryan (2000),
Fiske (2003), and Higgins (2012). A variety of singular needs or motives
also fall into this category, including the need for cognition (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1982) the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), the need
for closure (Kruglanski, 2004), mortality salience (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991), promotion and prevention orientations (Higgins, 2012),
and locomotion and assessment modes (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, &
Higgins, 2013).
Work on the How of motivation includes research on goal-activation (see
Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, for review), on the structure of goal-means
relations (Kruglanski et al., 2002), and on motivational energetics and the
dynamics of effort expenditure (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Brehm & Self,
1989; Wright, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2012). We now briefly touch on cutting
edge research in each of these categories.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

THE “WHAT” OF MOTIVATION: GENERAL TAXONOMIES
A BUCET of Fundamental Motives. Fiske’s (2003) BUCET classification of
social motives (Belonging, Understanding, Controlling, Enhancing, and
Trusting) is a classification that covers most, if not all, of the social motives
that psychologists have found of interest. It seems plausible to view the
BUCET classification as a universally relevant taxonomy reflecting the way
motivational functions of social significance are hard wired in humans
across time and culture. For that reason the BUCET taxonomy has been
influential, and has been cited often in the work of motivational theorists
(e.g., Hogg, 2000).
Truth, Value, and Control. Another motivational taxonomy with a universalistic intent is Higgins’ (2012) classification of basic human needs into those
for Truth, Value, and Control. The Truth motivation has to do with the desire to
have an accurate grasp on reality, the motivation for Value—with the quest for
good outcomes, and that for Control—with feeling personally effective, being
the “origin” of one’s attainments. A unique feature of Higgins’ (2012) work
is the discussion of how Truth, Value, and Control motivations interact. First,
activation can spread from one element in the truth-value-control structure to
the remaining elements. Second, separate elements in this overarching structure can support one another; for example, truth can be changed to support
value and control, and value can be changed to support truth. Finally, the
truth-value-control framework allows individuals to place varying levels of
emphasis (either low or high) on each of these three motives. As such, there
is much potential here for future research to examine how these three ways
of “being effective” (Higgins, 2012, p. 47) combine to create motivational patterns that are more than the sums of their parts.
Self Determination Theory. Of the different classifications of social motives,
Deci and Ryan’s (2000) Self Determination Theory (SDT) has engendered
the greatest amount of empirical research. The SDT identifies three primary
human needs: autonomy, competence and relatedness. Three cutting edge
research domains in which recent SDT work has been carried out are: (i)
work on autonomy and mindfulness, demonstrating that various defensive
effects do not apply to people who are mindful and autonomous (e.g.,
Niemiec et al., 2010), (ii) differentiation between eudaimonic (based in satisfaction of the three fundamental motives) and hedonic (pleasure-oriented)
well-being, showing that the former is more conducive to welfare and
happiness (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008), and (iii) cross-cultural research on the
three SDT motives, demonstrating their universality (e.g., Chirkov, Ryan,
Kim, & Kaplan, 2003).

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THE “WHAT” OF MOTIVATION: SPECIFIC MOTIVATIONS
Beyond general taxonomies, considerable motivational research has focused
on specific motivations.
Regulatory Focus. Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between a promotion focus (concerned with advancement, growth, and accomplishment) and
a prevention focus (concerned with responsibility, safety, and security); these
concerns can stem from chronic individual differences or can be situationally
induced (Higgins, 1998).
Regulatory Mode. Two general orientations toward actions referred to as regulatory modes have received appreciable amount of research attention in the
last decade (see Kruglanski et al., 2013, for a review). Locomotion is the tendency to move in the psychological sense, and assessment the tendency to
carefully evaluate the importance of specific goals and means.
Specific Needs. The following specific needs have received considerable
amount of research attention: (i) Need for Closure (Kruglanski, 2004), (ii) Need
for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), (iii) Need to Belong
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and (iv) Fear of Death (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991).
THE “HOW” OF MOTIVATION
Recently, burgeoning research on the How of motivation has been proceeding apace at numerous psychological laboratories. Cutting-edge work of this
kind has been carried out on phenomena of (i) goal activation, (ii) self-control,
(iii) the neuroscience of motivation, (iv) the structure of motivation, (v) motivationally relevant mindsets, and (vi) issues of energy and effort.
Goal Activation. About quarter of a century ago (cf. Bargh, 1990), a fresh
movement changed researchers’ approach to motivation and goal-directed
behavior. This movement emphasized the cognitive perspective on motivation, whereby goals are mental representations of desirable end states that
can be consciously or unconsciously activated from memory (Bargh, 1990;
Kruglanski, 1996).
Self-Control. The idea that goals can be unconsciously activated and pursued challenges the notion of free will and voluntary control of behavior.

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

The latter issue, the ability to resist sacrificing superordinate concerns
for momentary temptations, has defined the recently thriving domain of
self-control research. The underlying principle is that of limited resources.
Thus, the greater the investment in pursuing a given goal, the fewer
resources should be available for alternative goals or means (Gailliot et al.,
2007; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).
Baumeister and Vohs (2007) suggest that ego depletion results from effortful
attempts to exercise self-control, with detrimental consequences for subsequent cognitive activities. Recent research has investigated how such
depletion is affected by factors ranging from autonomy of choice to implicit
theories of willpower (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Moller, Deci, & Ryan,
2006). From the perspective of Cognitive Energetics Theory (Kruglanski et al.,
2012) resource depletion may be counteracted by increased goal importance.
However, if resources are completely depleted, no amount of motivation
can improve performance (cf. Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012).
To deal with a limited resource pool, individuals have to allocate resources
strategically, in proportion to goal saliency and importance (Kopetz, Faber,
Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2011). Negative consequences of privileging
momentary temptation at expense of more important goals may prompt
people to develop strategies to refrain from doing so. Specifically, individuals
may learn to automatically activate higher order goals (e.g., keeping a healthy
diet) in the presence of momentary allurements (e.g., the sight of an appetizing chocolate cake; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). They may
attempt to find multifinal means capable of satisfying multiple goals simultaneously (Kopetz et al., 2011), and may learn how to harmoniously integrate
their multiple goals (Belanger, Lafreniere, Vallerand, & Kruglanski, 2013).
Structural Effects: The Architecture of Goal Systems. The cognitive approach
to motivational phenomena views goals as mentally represented schemes
including configurations of goals linked to their means of attainment as well
as other goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Fundamental goal-means configurations are those of equifinality, in which a single goal is connected to several
means, and multifinality, in which a single means is connected to several goals
(Kopetz et al., 2011).
Of interest also is the relation between the number of links between goals
and means and their strength. Zhang, Fishbach, and Kruglanski (2007) proposed the dilution model, whereby the reduced link strength in multifinal
(containing multiple links) versus unifinal structures is construed as lowered instrumentality of each means with respect to the goal. A similar dilution effect was demonstrated in equifinal structures, in which the number of

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means to the goal was negatively related to each means’ perceived instrumentality. Relatedly, the number of means to a goal was negatively related
to the commitment of the actor to each of those means (Kruglanski, Pierro, &
Sheveland, 2011).
The Neuroscience of Motivation. Affective neuroscience has played a growing
role in recent motivational research, shedding light on many areas of interest
to the scientific study of motivation. These have including research on the
difference between wanting versus liking (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge,
2009) and on the difference between value and motivation (Roesch & Olson,
2004).
Researchers have come to believe that dopamine, a neurotransmitter in
the catecholamine and phenethylamine families, is critical to motivated
behavior (e.g., Wickens, Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007; Di Chiara &
Bassareo, 2007). In this domain, Wise (2004) distinguishes between “reinforcement” as a retroactive effect on learning and “reward” (or incentive) as
a proactive drive-like effect on behavior. Dopamine presumably plays a role
in reinforcement-based learning, but not in reward-based learning.
Mindsets. Dweck’s (2006, 2012) work on fixed versus growth mindsets has
inspired considerable motivational research in recent years. A fixed mindset
entails believing that things are as they are because of their immutable
essence. A growth mindset, in contrast, is premised on the assumption
that things are malleable and capable of amelioration. In general terms, a
growth mindset (but not a fixed mindset) induces an expectancy that a goal
of improvement can be attained, thus augmenting the motivation to strive
for desired outcomes.
Action Phases and Implementation Intentions. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer (1987)
proposed an influential model of action phases. These include the deliberation phase, in which goals are decided and prioritized, and the implementation
phase, in which goals are actually pursued. The latter phase gave rise to a
fruitful research program on implementation intentions. An implementation
intention is an if-then plan which specifies when, where, and how an individual
will strive toward a particular goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). Forming implementation intentions has been shown to increase rates of goal achievement (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006); much of the emerging research on implementation
intentions has focused on how that effect may be moderated by other variables. For instance, individual differences in perfectionism have been shown
to lessen the effect of implementation intentions on goal progress (Powers,

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Koestner, & Topciu, 2005). The strength of the goal in question matters as
well: implementation intentions benefit goal attainment more when the goal
strength is high (as compared to low; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005).
Finally, the formation of implementation intentions can help overcome the
effects of ego depletion (Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
Energy and Effort. Another emerging trend in motivation research is the
emphasis on energy and effort as variables of motivational significance.
Two conceptual contributions in this arena have been Motivation Intensity
Theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and Cognitive Energetics Theory (Kruglanski
et al., 2012). Both theories identify factors which impact the mobilization of
resources toward motivated behavior.
Motivation Intensity Theory (MIT). Brehm and Self’s (1989) MIT distinguishes
between potential and actual motivation. Potential motivation concerns the
amount of effort, determined by motive strength, that an individual is prepared to exert in service of that motive. Actual motivation describes the actual
amount of effort expended by an individual in order to attain a goal. Degree
of effort expenditure is determined by the difficulty of the behavior necessary to satisfy the motive, but only as long as success is viewed as both
possible and worth the difficulty involved. Predictions from the MIT have
led to empirical findings on the relationship between effort (operationalized
as cardiovascular reactivity), task difficulty, and the justifiability of effort (cf.
Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012).
Cognitive Energetics Theory (CET). The CET (Kruglanski et al., 2012) is
a force-field theory of motivated cognition which, similar to the MIT,
describes the distinction between potential and actual motivation. In
the CET, purposeful cognitive activity is propelled by a driving force and
opposed by a restraining force. The potential driving force is a product of goal
importance and the pool of available mental resources. The restraining force
(that must be matched by the effective driving force) is an additive function
of the individual’s general tendency to conserve cognitive resources, the
energy demands of the activity, and possible competing goals. To keep an
activity going, an increase in the restraining force (e.g., task demands) must
be met by a proportionate increase in the driving force (for instance, resource
availability or goal importance). CET’s predictions have received support
in recent research on motivated reasoning (Belanger, Kruglanski, Chen, &
Orehek, 2014) and retrieval induced forgetting (Pica, Pierro, & Kruglanski,
2014).

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MOVING FORWARD IN MOTIVATION SCIENCE:
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
The resurgence of motivational research over the last decades is impressive
and encouraging; the range of motivational topics investigated attest to its
vitality and holds promise of exciting discoveries in motivation science in
years to come. In the last section of this review we identify issues and challenges that motivation science may encounter going forward. Specifically, we
suggest that advances in the field may be afforded via a series of integrations
that lend focus and coherence to the free-wheeling and unwieldy manner of
inquiry that has characterized the field of motivation science to date.
INTEGRATION OF MOTIVATIONAL TAXONOMIES
Concerning the “What” of motivation, it would seem advantageous to
integrate the various taxonomies of fundamental motivations (e.g., Deci
& Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2003; Higgins, 2012). Possibly, a broad analysis of
the different measures may lead to arrival at a consensual structure of
basic human motives analogous to the way in which a similar effort in
the field of personality yielded the broadly agreed on Big Five Personality
Factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It would also be helpful to have a thorough
discussion of the origin of fundamental human motivations, addressing the
issue of their universality and cross-cultural applicability.
INTEGRATION WITH HISTORIC MOTIVATION RESEARCH
As noted earlier, contemporary motivational research in the “How” category has been predominantly guided by local, mid-range theoretical frameworks. Yet important broad formulations in this domain of study have been
elaborated by past motivational theorists such as Lewin (1951), Hull (1951),
Atkinson (1964), McClelland (1987), and others. To avoid “rediscovering the
wheel” in motivation science, it would be useful to re-examine those past
formulations in light of the vast number of motivational findings produced
in the last several decades. A cardinal aim of science is the theoretical integration of disparate results; the question, therefore, is how contemporary
findings fit within classic motivational frameworks—and whether novel theoretical integrations may be in order (for an attempt at such an integration,
see Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Kopetz, 2014).
INTEGRATION ACROSS APPROACHES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
Various subdomains of psychology have approached the study of motivation in different ways; others have largely neglected motivational concepts

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

altogether and omitted them from their analyses. In regards to the latter,
major psychological analyses eschewed the consideration of motivation and
went on to assume that people in general exhibit certain invariant tendencies
and behavior patterns (e.g., are risk-averse for gains, and risk-seeking for
losses; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), or tend to commit statistical errors and
neglect base rates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). It now appears, however,
that people’s behavior in these domains may vary in accordance with their
motivational states. For instance, recent evidence (Zou, Scholer, & Higgins,
2014) suggests that risks are generally undertaken to advance the satisfaction
of a dominant motivation (e.g., regulatory focus) which may differ across persons and situations. In the same vein, it has been demonstrated that the use
of heuristics isn’t universal, but rather depends on motivational states such
as the need for cognitive closure (Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2005). To reiterate, cognition and behavior are motivated, and motivations vary. No universal generalizations concerning what “people in general”
think or do, without considering the motivational states they are in, seem
warranted.
INTEGRATION ACROSS DISCIPLINES
Motivational concepts are of considerable relevance to a variety of social
science disciplines, not only to psychology and neuroscience, but also to
economics, business, political science and social philosophy, among others.
Behavioral economists, for example, study individuals’ decisions and their
rationality given the actors’ objectives, as well as the effects of framing and
the impact of incentives. Political scientists are interested in the behavior
of political actors, including insurgents and terrorists. Philosophers study
the very concept of motivation (Peters, 1958) and its role in the explanation of
social phenomena. Thus, motivation defines a general theme that cuts across
diverse fields of inquiry in the social and behavioral sciences. It would seem
useful to create channels of communication through which those various
disciplines could interact and stimulate each other. A recent initiative has
been launched to create such mechanisms: the Society for the Study of
Motivation (SSM) was established in 2000, and its intent is to broaden the
scope of motivational research by reaching out to other disciplines with
a motivational interest. In that vein, the Society has recently launched an
annual publication, Advances in Motivation Science, and a quarterly journal,
Motivation Science, whose policy aims are interdisciplinary in nature. These
constitute potentially significant developments in advancing the science
of Motivation and recognizing its crucial role in understanding human
action.

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ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Arie W. Kruglanski is a Distinguished University Professor at the University
of Maryland, College Park. He is recipient of the National Institute of Mental
Health Research Scientist Award, the Senior Humboldt Award, the Donald
Campbell Award for Oustanding Contributions to Social Psychology from

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the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, The University of Maryland Regents Award for Scholarship and Creativity, and the Distinguished
Scientific Contribution Award from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, and is recipient of the Regesz Chair at the University of Amsterdam. He was Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral
Sciences, and is Fellow of the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychological Society. He has served as editor of the Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition, editor of the
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and associate editor of the American
Psychologist. His interests have been in the domains of human judgment and
decision making, the motivation-cognition interface, group and intergroup
processes, and the psychology of human goals. His work has been disseminated in over 300 articles, chapters and books and has been continuously
supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Mental Health, Deutsche Forschungs Gemeineschaft, and the Ford Foundation. He has recently served as member of the National Academy of Science
panels on counterterrorism, and educational paradigms in homeland security. Kruglanski has been a founding co-PI of START (National Center for
the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism), at the University of
Maryland, and is now a PI on 5-year MINERVA grant to study radicalization
and deradicalization in the Middle East and in South and South East Asia.
He also is the President Elect of the Society for the Study of Motivation.
MARINA CHERNIKOVA SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Marina Chernikova graduated from St. John’s College, Annapolis, in 2011
with a bachelor’s in the history of philosophy and literature. She is now
a doctoral student in social psychology at the University of Maryland
College Park. She works with Arie Kruglanski on research in motivation,
self-regulation, and goal systems.
CATALINA KOPETZ SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Catalina Kopetz is an Assistant Professor at Wayne State University. Her
research focuses on basic mechanisms of motivation and self-regulation
and their implication for risk behavior. Her work has been published in
several prestigious journals in social psychology (e.g., Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Review), clinical
psychology (Prevention Science; Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology), and high impact Journals that span both domains (Perspectives
in Psychological Science; Behavioral and Brain Sciences). She co-authored
several book chapters in major handbooks on self-regulation and self-control

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

as well as recent theoretical papers in the highly prestigious Psychological
Review. Her research has been funded by the National Institutes of Health.
RELATED ESSAYS
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Helbig
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Resilience (Psychology), Erica D. Diminich and George A. Bonanno
Migrant Networks (Sociology), Filiz Garip and Asad L. Asad
Setting One’s Mind on Action: Planning Out Goal Striving in Advance
(Psychology), Peter M. Gollwitzer
Regulatory Focus Theory (Psychology), E. Tory Higgins
From Individual Rationality to Socially Embedded Self-Regulation (Sociology), Siegwart Lindenberg
Culture as Situated Cognition (Psychology), Daphna Oyserman
Identity-Based Motivation (Psychology), Daphna Oyserman
Effortful Control (Psychology), Tracy L. Spinrad and Nancy Eisenberg



Motivation Science
ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, MARINA CHERNIKOVA, and CATALINA KOPETZ

Abstract
Traditionally, research on the psychology of motivation has addressed two separate
questions: the What of motivation and the How of motivation. The former concerns
the nature of the various motives that propel human behavior, and the latter the general process whereby any motive exerts its effects. This essay reviews historical and
contemporary research in each of the foregoing categories. We highlight cutting edge
concepts and findings in motivation science and identify emerging trends and future
challenges.

INTRODUCTION
Following a relative lull during the 1970s and 1980s (Higgins, 2012) research
on motivation appears once again to be commanding attention from psychological researchers. Traditionally, the topic of motivation has been a mainstay
of the science of psychology. It has played a major role in early dynamic models of the mind (including psychoanalytic theory), and it was fundamental
to behaviorist theories of learning and action. The advent of the cognitive
revolution in the 1960s and 1970s largely eclipsed the emphasis on motivation, but in the past two decades, motivational research has been making
a forceful comeback. These days, motivational analyses of affect, cognition,
and behavior are ubiquitous across various psychological literatures. Motivational research not only has conceptual implications for understanding
mind and behavior, but also has direct and pragmatic implications for daily
self-regulation, addiction, substance abuse, mental health, life at home and
the workplace, consumer behavior, and other areas of application as well.
Motivation is not just a “passing fancy” on the contemporary scene; rather,
it is firmly entrenched as a foundational issue in scientific psychology.
THE WHAT AND THE HOW OF MOTIVATION
Generally speaking, motivational research in psychology has been of two
general kinds, addressing what one might call the What and the How of
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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motivation. Research in the What category concerns the contents of motivation, including taxonomies of basic motives or needs and investigations
focused on singular motives/needs of particular interest. In contrast, the
How of motivation addresses general processes and structures that apply to
any motive whatsoever, irrespective of contents.
HISTORIC WORK
THE “WHAT” OF MOTIVATION
The prototypical sense in which people in general understand the problem
of “motivation” concerns the “What” category. Raising the question of motivation (why did X commit Y?) inquires essentially into what specific motive
accounts for a given behavior. In this vein, widely known are Freud’s (1920)
distinction between the life (eros) and death (thanatos) drives, McDougall’s
(1932) list of 18 instincts, Murray’s (1938) list of 24 psychogenic needs, and
Maslow’s (1943) need hierarchy.
Beyond general taxonomies, a variety of specific needs singled out by
psychological researchers also belong in the motivational “What” category. Historically, the most extensively researched needs have been the
three highlighted in the work of McClelland (1961): the need for achievement (Atkinson, 1964), for power (McClelland, 1961), and for affiliation
(McClelland, 1961).
THE “HOW” OF MOTIVATION
In contrast to the emphasis on motivational contents, a great deal of research
effort was invested in clarifying the workings of motives in general—defining
the How of motivation. In this vein, McDougall (1932) saw any instinct as
having three fundamental components (perceptual, behavioral, and emotional),
and Freud (1938) viewed “instincts” or “drives” as innate, universal, and constantly felt. Similarly, Murray described a need as a “potentiality or readiness
to respond in a certain way under given conditions” (1938, p. 61).
Theoretical and empirical work on the How of motivation has been carried
out by theorists of the neo-behaviorist school, in particular Hull (1951)
and Spence (1937, 1956). The two central motivational constructs within
the Hull-Spence approach were Drive and Incentive. Primary drives were
assumed to originate in physiological needs and secondary drives were
assumed to derive from primary drives through conditioning. Incentives
were assumed to be environmental stimuli (e.g., food in the goal box)
capable of contributing to motivational readiness.

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The Hull-Spence formulation was articulated as a multiplicative model in
which habit (H) multiplies drive (D) and incentive (K) to produce the readiness to act. Tolman (1955) in an early anticipation of the cognitive revolution
in psychology, has implied that the history of reinforcement (i.e., habit) actually represents an expectancy that a given behavior will result in drive satisfaction. In this interpretation, then, “habit” acquires a strictly motivational
flavor. The expectancy construct figured prominently in the work of Atkinson (1964); he too put forth a multiplicative model (Tr,g = Mg × Er,g × Ig ), in
which Tr,g is a tendency to enact the response aimed attaining a goal, Mg is a
stable motive to attain goals in a given class, and Er,g is the expectancy that a
response will lead to goal attainment.
Neobehaviorist theorists assumed that motivations ultimately derive from
physiological needs (which represent primary drives) and their derivatives acquired via conditioning (representing secondary drives, such as
conditioned fear); McClelland (1987), Atkinson (1964), and their colleagues
postulated purely psychogenic needs, universal across the human species;
Lewin (1938), on the other hand, postulated an open array of quasi-needs
that could be specific to a given psychological situation. Within his topographic approach to personality Lewin (1938) further postulated that a need
gives rise to a state of tension that could spill over to neighboring regions
of one’s life space (e.g., a hungry person may also experience a degree of
thirst).
CONTEMPORARY MOTIVATIONAL RESEARCH
The distinction between the What and the How of motivation is represented
also in contemporary motivational research. In the What category belong
general classifications of basic motives proposed by Deci and Ryan (2000),
Fiske (2003), and Higgins (2012). A variety of singular needs or motives
also fall into this category, including the need for cognition (Cacioppo
& Petty, 1982) the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), the need
for closure (Kruglanski, 2004), mortality salience (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991), promotion and prevention orientations (Higgins, 2012),
and locomotion and assessment modes (Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, &
Higgins, 2013).
Work on the How of motivation includes research on goal-activation (see
Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007, for review), on the structure of goal-means
relations (Kruglanski et al., 2002), and on motivational energetics and the
dynamics of effort expenditure (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Brehm & Self,
1989; Wright, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2012). We now briefly touch on cutting
edge research in each of these categories.

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THE “WHAT” OF MOTIVATION: GENERAL TAXONOMIES
A BUCET of Fundamental Motives. Fiske’s (2003) BUCET classification of
social motives (Belonging, Understanding, Controlling, Enhancing, and
Trusting) is a classification that covers most, if not all, of the social motives
that psychologists have found of interest. It seems plausible to view the
BUCET classification as a universally relevant taxonomy reflecting the way
motivational functions of social significance are hard wired in humans
across time and culture. For that reason the BUCET taxonomy has been
influential, and has been cited often in the work of motivational theorists
(e.g., Hogg, 2000).
Truth, Value, and Control. Another motivational taxonomy with a universalistic intent is Higgins’ (2012) classification of basic human needs into those
for Truth, Value, and Control. The Truth motivation has to do with the desire to
have an accurate grasp on reality, the motivation for Value—with the quest for
good outcomes, and that for Control—with feeling personally effective, being
the “origin” of one’s attainments. A unique feature of Higgins’ (2012) work
is the discussion of how Truth, Value, and Control motivations interact. First,
activation can spread from one element in the truth-value-control structure to
the remaining elements. Second, separate elements in this overarching structure can support one another; for example, truth can be changed to support
value and control, and value can be changed to support truth. Finally, the
truth-value-control framework allows individuals to place varying levels of
emphasis (either low or high) on each of these three motives. As such, there
is much potential here for future research to examine how these three ways
of “being effective” (Higgins, 2012, p. 47) combine to create motivational patterns that are more than the sums of their parts.
Self Determination Theory. Of the different classifications of social motives,
Deci and Ryan’s (2000) Self Determination Theory (SDT) has engendered
the greatest amount of empirical research. The SDT identifies three primary
human needs: autonomy, competence and relatedness. Three cutting edge
research domains in which recent SDT work has been carried out are: (i)
work on autonomy and mindfulness, demonstrating that various defensive
effects do not apply to people who are mindful and autonomous (e.g.,
Niemiec et al., 2010), (ii) differentiation between eudaimonic (based in satisfaction of the three fundamental motives) and hedonic (pleasure-oriented)
well-being, showing that the former is more conducive to welfare and
happiness (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008), and (iii) cross-cultural research on the
three SDT motives, demonstrating their universality (e.g., Chirkov, Ryan,
Kim, & Kaplan, 2003).

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THE “WHAT” OF MOTIVATION: SPECIFIC MOTIVATIONS
Beyond general taxonomies, considerable motivational research has focused
on specific motivations.
Regulatory Focus. Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between a promotion focus (concerned with advancement, growth, and accomplishment) and
a prevention focus (concerned with responsibility, safety, and security); these
concerns can stem from chronic individual differences or can be situationally
induced (Higgins, 1998).
Regulatory Mode. Two general orientations toward actions referred to as regulatory modes have received appreciable amount of research attention in the
last decade (see Kruglanski et al., 2013, for a review). Locomotion is the tendency to move in the psychological sense, and assessment the tendency to
carefully evaluate the importance of specific goals and means.
Specific Needs. The following specific needs have received considerable
amount of research attention: (i) Need for Closure (Kruglanski, 2004), (ii) Need
for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), (iii) Need to Belong
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and (iv) Fear of Death (Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991).
THE “HOW” OF MOTIVATION
Recently, burgeoning research on the How of motivation has been proceeding apace at numerous psychological laboratories. Cutting-edge work of this
kind has been carried out on phenomena of (i) goal activation, (ii) self-control,
(iii) the neuroscience of motivation, (iv) the structure of motivation, (v) motivationally relevant mindsets, and (vi) issues of energy and effort.
Goal Activation. About quarter of a century ago (cf. Bargh, 1990), a fresh
movement changed researchers’ approach to motivation and goal-directed
behavior. This movement emphasized the cognitive perspective on motivation, whereby goals are mental representations of desirable end states that
can be consciously or unconsciously activated from memory (Bargh, 1990;
Kruglanski, 1996).
Self-Control. The idea that goals can be unconsciously activated and pursued challenges the notion of free will and voluntary control of behavior.

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The latter issue, the ability to resist sacrificing superordinate concerns
for momentary temptations, has defined the recently thriving domain of
self-control research. The underlying principle is that of limited resources.
Thus, the greater the investment in pursuing a given goal, the fewer
resources should be available for alternative goals or means (Gailliot et al.,
2007; Kruglanski et al., 2012; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).
Baumeister and Vohs (2007) suggest that ego depletion results from effortful
attempts to exercise self-control, with detrimental consequences for subsequent cognitive activities. Recent research has investigated how such
depletion is affected by factors ranging from autonomy of choice to implicit
theories of willpower (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; Moller, Deci, & Ryan,
2006). From the perspective of Cognitive Energetics Theory (Kruglanski et al.,
2012) resource depletion may be counteracted by increased goal importance.
However, if resources are completely depleted, no amount of motivation
can improve performance (cf. Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012).
To deal with a limited resource pool, individuals have to allocate resources
strategically, in proportion to goal saliency and importance (Kopetz, Faber,
Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2011). Negative consequences of privileging
momentary temptation at expense of more important goals may prompt
people to develop strategies to refrain from doing so. Specifically, individuals
may learn to automatically activate higher order goals (e.g., keeping a healthy
diet) in the presence of momentary allurements (e.g., the sight of an appetizing chocolate cake; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). They may
attempt to find multifinal means capable of satisfying multiple goals simultaneously (Kopetz et al., 2011), and may learn how to harmoniously integrate
their multiple goals (Belanger, Lafreniere, Vallerand, & Kruglanski, 2013).
Structural Effects: The Architecture of Goal Systems. The cognitive approach
to motivational phenomena views goals as mentally represented schemes
including configurations of goals linked to their means of attainment as well
as other goals (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Fundamental goal-means configurations are those of equifinality, in which a single goal is connected to several
means, and multifinality, in which a single means is connected to several goals
(Kopetz et al., 2011).
Of interest also is the relation between the number of links between goals
and means and their strength. Zhang, Fishbach, and Kruglanski (2007) proposed the dilution model, whereby the reduced link strength in multifinal
(containing multiple links) versus unifinal structures is construed as lowered instrumentality of each means with respect to the goal. A similar dilution effect was demonstrated in equifinal structures, in which the number of

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means to the goal was negatively related to each means’ perceived instrumentality. Relatedly, the number of means to a goal was negatively related
to the commitment of the actor to each of those means (Kruglanski, Pierro, &
Sheveland, 2011).
The Neuroscience of Motivation. Affective neuroscience has played a growing
role in recent motivational research, shedding light on many areas of interest
to the scientific study of motivation. These have including research on the
difference between wanting versus liking (Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge,
2009) and on the difference between value and motivation (Roesch & Olson,
2004).
Researchers have come to believe that dopamine, a neurotransmitter in
the catecholamine and phenethylamine families, is critical to motivated
behavior (e.g., Wickens, Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007; Di Chiara &
Bassareo, 2007). In this domain, Wise (2004) distinguishes between “reinforcement” as a retroactive effect on learning and “reward” (or incentive) as
a proactive drive-like effect on behavior. Dopamine presumably plays a role
in reinforcement-based learning, but not in reward-based learning.
Mindsets. Dweck’s (2006, 2012) work on fixed versus growth mindsets has
inspired considerable motivational research in recent years. A fixed mindset
entails believing that things are as they are because of their immutable
essence. A growth mindset, in contrast, is premised on the assumption
that things are malleable and capable of amelioration. In general terms, a
growth mindset (but not a fixed mindset) induces an expectancy that a goal
of improvement can be attained, thus augmenting the motivation to strive
for desired outcomes.
Action Phases and Implementation Intentions. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer (1987)
proposed an influential model of action phases. These include the deliberation phase, in which goals are decided and prioritized, and the implementation
phase, in which goals are actually pursued. The latter phase gave rise to a
fruitful research program on implementation intentions. An implementation
intention is an if-then plan which specifies when, where, and how an individual
will strive toward a particular goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). Forming implementation intentions has been shown to increase rates of goal achievement (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006); much of the emerging research on implementation
intentions has focused on how that effect may be moderated by other variables. For instance, individual differences in perfectionism have been shown
to lessen the effect of implementation intentions on goal progress (Powers,

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Koestner, & Topciu, 2005). The strength of the goal in question matters as
well: implementation intentions benefit goal attainment more when the goal
strength is high (as compared to low; Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005).
Finally, the formation of implementation intentions can help overcome the
effects of ego depletion (Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
Energy and Effort. Another emerging trend in motivation research is the
emphasis on energy and effort as variables of motivational significance.
Two conceptual contributions in this arena have been Motivation Intensity
Theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and Cognitive Energetics Theory (Kruglanski
et al., 2012). Both theories identify factors which impact the mobilization of
resources toward motivated behavior.
Motivation Intensity Theory (MIT). Brehm and Self’s (1989) MIT distinguishes
between potential and actual motivation. Potential motivation concerns the
amount of effort, determined by motive strength, that an individual is prepared to exert in service of that motive. Actual motivation describes the actual
amount of effort expended by an individual in order to attain a goal. Degree
of effort expenditure is determined by the difficulty of the behavior necessary to satisfy the motive, but only as long as success is viewed as both
possible and worth the difficulty involved. Predictions from the MIT have
led to empirical findings on the relationship between effort (operationalized
as cardiovascular reactivity), task difficulty, and the justifiability of effort (cf.
Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012).
Cognitive Energetics Theory (CET). The CET (Kruglanski et al., 2012) is
a force-field theory of motivated cognition which, similar to the MIT,
describes the distinction between potential and actual motivation. In
the CET, purposeful cognitive activity is propelled by a driving force and
opposed by a restraining force. The potential driving force is a product of goal
importance and the pool of available mental resources. The restraining force
(that must be matched by the effective driving force) is an additive function
of the individual’s general tendency to conserve cognitive resources, the
energy demands of the activity, and possible competing goals. To keep an
activity going, an increase in the restraining force (e.g., task demands) must
be met by a proportionate increase in the driving force (for instance, resource
availability or goal importance). CET’s predictions have received support
in recent research on motivated reasoning (Belanger, Kruglanski, Chen, &
Orehek, 2014) and retrieval induced forgetting (Pica, Pierro, & Kruglanski,
2014).

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MOVING FORWARD IN MOTIVATION SCIENCE:
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
The resurgence of motivational research over the last decades is impressive
and encouraging; the range of motivational topics investigated attest to its
vitality and holds promise of exciting discoveries in motivation science in
years to come. In the last section of this review we identify issues and challenges that motivation science may encounter going forward. Specifically, we
suggest that advances in the field may be afforded via a series of integrations
that lend focus and coherence to the free-wheeling and unwieldy manner of
inquiry that has characterized the field of motivation science to date.
INTEGRATION OF MOTIVATIONAL TAXONOMIES
Concerning the “What” of motivation, it would seem advantageous to
integrate the various taxonomies of fundamental motivations (e.g., Deci
& Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2003; Higgins, 2012). Possibly, a broad analysis of
the different measures may lead to arrival at a consensual structure of
basic human motives analogous to the way in which a similar effort in
the field of personality yielded the broadly agreed on Big Five Personality
Factors (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It would also be helpful to have a thorough
discussion of the origin of fundamental human motivations, addressing the
issue of their universality and cross-cultural applicability.
INTEGRATION WITH HISTORIC MOTIVATION RESEARCH
As noted earlier, contemporary motivational research in the “How” category has been predominantly guided by local, mid-range theoretical frameworks. Yet important broad formulations in this domain of study have been
elaborated by past motivational theorists such as Lewin (1951), Hull (1951),
Atkinson (1964), McClelland (1987), and others. To avoid “rediscovering the
wheel” in motivation science, it would be useful to re-examine those past
formulations in light of the vast number of motivational findings produced
in the last several decades. A cardinal aim of science is the theoretical integration of disparate results; the question, therefore, is how contemporary
findings fit within classic motivational frameworks—and whether novel theoretical integrations may be in order (for an attempt at such an integration,
see Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Kopetz, 2014).
INTEGRATION ACROSS APPROACHES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
Various subdomains of psychology have approached the study of motivation in different ways; others have largely neglected motivational concepts

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

altogether and omitted them from their analyses. In regards to the latter,
major psychological analyses eschewed the consideration of motivation and
went on to assume that people in general exhibit certain invariant tendencies
and behavior patterns (e.g., are risk-averse for gains, and risk-seeking for
losses; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), or tend to commit statistical errors and
neglect base rates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). It now appears, however,
that people’s behavior in these domains may vary in accordance with their
motivational states. For instance, recent evidence (Zou, Scholer, & Higgins,
2014) suggests that risks are generally undertaken to advance the satisfaction
of a dominant motivation (e.g., regulatory focus) which may differ across persons and situations. In the same vein, it has been demonstrated that the use
of heuristics isn’t universal, but rather depends on motivational states such
as the need for cognitive closure (Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2005). To reiterate, cognition and behavior are motivated, and motivations vary. No universal generalizations concerning what “people in general”
think or do, without considering the motivational states they are in, seem
warranted.
INTEGRATION ACROSS DISCIPLINES
Motivational concepts are of considerable relevance to a variety of social
science disciplines, not only to psychology and neuroscience, but also to
economics, business, political science and social philosophy, among others.
Behavioral economists, for example, study individuals’ decisions and their
rationality given the actors’ objectives, as well as the effects of framing and
the impact of incentives. Political scientists are interested in the behavior
of political actors, including insurgents and terrorists. Philosophers study
the very concept of motivation (Peters, 1958) and its role in the explanation of
social phenomena. Thus, motivation defines a general theme that cuts across
diverse fields of inquiry in the social and behavioral sciences. It would seem
useful to create channels of communication through which those various
disciplines could interact and stimulate each other. A recent initiative has
been launched to create such mechanisms: the Society for the Study of
Motivation (SSM) was established in 2000, and its intent is to broaden the
scope of motivational research by reaching out to other disciplines with
a motivational interest. In that vein, the Society has recently launched an
annual publication, Advances in Motivation Science, and a quarterly journal,
Motivation Science, whose policy aims are interdisciplinary in nature. These
constitute potentially significant developments in advancing the science
of Motivation and recognizing its crucial role in understanding human
action.

Motivation Science

11

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ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Arie W. Kruglanski is a Distinguished University Professor at the University
of Maryland, College Park. He is recipient of the National Institute of Mental
Health Research Scientist Award, the Senior Humboldt Award, the Donald
Campbell Award for Oustanding Contributions to Social Psychology from

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the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, The University of Maryland Regents Award for Scholarship and Creativity, and the Distinguished
Scientific Contribution Award from the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, and is recipient of the Regesz Chair at the University of Amsterdam. He was Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral
Sciences, and is Fellow of the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychological Society. He has served as editor of the Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition, editor of the
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and associate editor of the American
Psychologist. His interests have been in the domains of human judgment and
decision making, the motivation-cognition interface, group and intergroup
processes, and the psychology of human goals. His work has been disseminated in over 300 articles, chapters and books and has been continuously
supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Mental Health, Deutsche Forschungs Gemeineschaft, and the Ford Foundation. He has recently served as member of the National Academy of Science
panels on counterterrorism, and educational paradigms in homeland security. Kruglanski has been a founding co-PI of START (National Center for
the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism), at the University of
Maryland, and is now a PI on 5-year MINERVA grant to study radicalization
and deradicalization in the Middle East and in South and South East Asia.
He also is the President Elect of the Society for the Study of Motivation.
MARINA CHERNIKOVA SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Marina Chernikova graduated from St. John’s College, Annapolis, in 2011
with a bachelor’s in the history of philosophy and literature. She is now
a doctoral student in social psychology at the University of Maryland
College Park. She works with Arie Kruglanski on research in motivation,
self-regulation, and goal systems.
CATALINA KOPETZ SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Catalina Kopetz is an Assistant Professor at Wayne State University. Her
research focuses on basic mechanisms of motivation and self-regulation
and their implication for risk behavior. Her work has been published in
several prestigious journals in social psychology (e.g., Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Review), clinical
psychology (Prevention Science; Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology), and high impact Journals that span both domains (Perspectives
in Psychological Science; Behavioral and Brain Sciences). She co-authored
several book chapters in major handbooks on self-regulation and self-control

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

as well as recent theoretical papers in the highly prestigious Psychological
Review. Her research has been funded by the National Institutes of Health.
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