Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Globalization Backlash

Item

Title

Globalization Backlash

Author

Berezin, Mabel

Research Area

Social Processes

Topic

Globalization

Abstract

Backlash against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade of the twenty‐first century, from the Seattle riots in fall 1999 to the recent riots and strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures. The global financial crisis has exacerbated nascent backlash and contributed to its spread. Backlash against globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning defense of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations and disruption; the right variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist political parties and electoral systems. The right and the left share a mutual animus toward globalization and progress narratives. The left variant receives more media attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within national political systems. Scholars acknowledge “globalization backlash.” Yet, the phenomenon has been under‐theorized as well as under‐empiricized and covers a range of disparate issues. A first step in a research agenda vis‐a‐vis the concept would be to establish the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action might we attribute to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of globalization, and which actions have other causes? The second issue is to identify the differences between institutional and extra‐institutional backlashes. The former is potentially more enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public violence.

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Identifier

etrds0151

extracted text

Globalization Backlash
MABEL BEREZIN

Abstract
Backlash against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade
of the twenty-first century, from the Seattle riots in fall 1999 to the recent riots
and strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures. The global
financial crisis has exacerbated nascent backlash and contributed to its spread.
Backlash against globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a
left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning
defense of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard
political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental
organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations and
disruption; the right variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist
political parties and electoral systems. The right and the left share a mutual animus
toward globalization and progress narratives. The left variant receives more media
attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within national political
systems. Scholars acknowledge “globalization backlash.” Yet, the phenomenon has
been under-theorized as well as under-empiricized and covers a range of disparate
issues. A first step in a research agenda vis-a-vis the concept would be to establish
the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action might we attribute
to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of globalization, and which
actions have other causes? The second issue is to identify the differences between
institutional and extra-institutional backlashes. The former is potentially more
enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public violence.

INTRODUCTION
Globalization describes a process that began as early as the 1300s when
traders left their native lands and set sail in search of tea and spices [for an
overview, see Osterhammel and Petersson (2005)]. The hallmarks of a modern globalization, trans-border flow of capital, goods, persons, and at a later
stage information began in the “Age of Capital (Hobsbawm, 1975)”—the
period between 1848 and 1875, when improvements in transportation and
communication made global exchange possible and relatively efficient.
The activities that constitute globalization have deep and broad historical

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

antecedents. Globalization as a discursive frame for discussing global trade
and commerce has gained currency relatively recently. Sociologists (Fiss &
Hirsch, 2005; Guillen, 2001) have documented that a public “discourse”
around globalization emerged in the mid-1980s and accelerated in the late
1990s, as evidenced by an increase in the number of media mentions as well
as academic articles and monographs.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Scholars, particularly economists, viewed globalization as a correlate of
democracy and by extension as a public good (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2008).
By the 1990s, positive discussion of globalization declined and negative
discussion dramatically increased (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005, p. 41). Guillen (2001)
identified five recurrent themes in the academic literature on globalization.
All themes were in the form of questions, such as, is globalization “really
happening”; producing “convergence”; creating “global culture.” Answers
were inconclusive with committed academic partisans on both sides. Among
these themes (Guillen, 2001), the question as to whether globalization “undermines the authority of the nation-state” is most germane to issues of
backlash. Citizens view their national states as guarantors of social, political,
physical, and cultural security. Whether globalization threatens the markers
of collective security—borders, labor markets, social welfare, physical safety,
and identity—is subject to continual academic debate. Among ordinary
citizens, the perception that globalization is a threat is wide spread and
generates varieties of conflict.
Globalization’s entry into the popular vernacular coincides with the
beginning of a backlash against globalization that took multiple forms. From
the Seattle riots in fall 1999 that protested the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO’s) annual meeting to 2011s Occupy Wall Street, to the recent riots and
strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures, backlash
against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade of
the twenty-first century. The global financial crisis has exacerbated nascent
backlash and contributed to its spread.
During the millennium period (from the late 1990s to the early 2000s),
economists (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2002) and legal scholars (Chua, 2003)
began to identify the downside or “discontents” of globalization. Rodrik
(1997) asked Has Globalization Gone Too Far? and warned that “social disintegration” is a potential cost of global “economic integration.” Globalization
backlash in the developing world, of the sort that occupies Stiglitz and
Chua, manifests itself in anti-Western sentiment and random acts of violence
rather than through formal organization. James (2008) identifies religious
fundamentalism as a core dimension of backlash. Huntington’s (1998) “clash

Globalization Backlash

3

of civilization” between the West and the non-Protestant rest, even though
it has global and economic components, remains more fully articulated
on the local and cultural levels. The spectacular carnage of September 11,
2001 when eight transnational actors destroyed the World Trade Center, the
quintessential symbol of global capitalism, focused global public attention
on the collateral cultural, as well as political and economic, risks attendant on globalization (Keohane, 2002). September 11, despite its horror,
remains an outlier. If we look across the contemporary Middle East, fragile
political institutions, rather than economic institutions, encourage religious
fundamentalism (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
In contrast to the developing world and the Middle East, backlash against
globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning defense
of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental
organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations
and disruption (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998); the right
variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist political parties
and electoral systems (Berezin, 2009, 2012, 2013). The right and the left view
themselves as worlds apart ideologically, yet they have a surprising convergence in their animus toward globalization and contemporary progress
narratives. The left variant is arguably more colorful and tends to receive
more media attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within
national political systems.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
MOBILIZING AGAINST CAPITALISM
The extra-institutional push against globalization began dramatically in
Seattle, Washington in 1999 when a coalition of labor and social justice
activists staged multi-city protests against the WTO’s annual ministerial
meeting. The violence and police riots that ensued, labeled as the “Battle
of Seattle,” focused international media attention on the antiglobalization movement (Tarrow, 2005, pp. 170–171). Canadian journalist, Naomi
Klein’s 1999 book NO Logo became a seminal document for the nascent
antiglobalization movement.
In June 1998, in Paris, Bernard Cassen, editor of the French Le Monde Diplomatique and an assortment of trade unionists, intellectuals, and human rights
activists, founded ATTAC (Action pour une taxe Tobin d’aide aux citoyens)
(Berezin, 2009, pp. 120–121). ATTAC was an organizational response to an
appeal published in Le Monde Diplomatique to “disarm the markets.” The

4

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Tobin Tax, named after James Tobin, the Noble Prize-winning American
economist, proposed to tax international monetary transactions to moderate the effects of exchange speculation. ATTAC named its weekly email
newsletter Sand in the Wheels after Tobin’s metaphor that an international
finance tax would, like sand in the wheels of a car, slow the advance of
global capitalism. Initially, less noticed than the events of Seattle, ATTAC
became active in Paris in the late 1990s and soon spread throughout Europe
and beyond [see essays in Della Porta and Tarrow (2005)].
By the year 2000, ATTAC began to organize public protest events (Berezin,
2009, pp. 136–138). Its first large mobilization occurred in December 2000 in
Nice at the meeting of the European Council of Ministers. ATTAC’s target
was the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, an addendum to
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty, known as the Treaty of Nice.
The European Council unveiled the Charter of Fundamental Rights at its biannual meeting in December 2000 at Nice, France. ATTAC mobilized 50,000
persons to travel to Nice to engage in 3 days of public protest against the
Charter. ATTAC described the mobilization as a euromanifestation. The Nice
mobilization consisted of 2 days of conferences, forums, and marches. It was
an extra-parliamentary attack on the expanding process of Europeanization
that the left and right populists viewed as a form of globalization.
ATTAC campaigned against the Charter with the slogan, “Another Europe
Is Possible.” It described the European Union as a “motor of liberal globalization,” which de-personalized and de-socialized capital transactions. ATTAC
argued that the new Charter, while it protected individuals against the abuses
that are constitutive of unbridled market forces, was fundamentally antilabor, antisocial, and antinational. The weakening of social rights was among
ATTAC’s principal concerns—specifically Article 15 that ensured the right to
look for work, not the right to work, which the 1961 European Social Charter,
as well as its 1996 amended version, guaranteed.
ATTAC’s impact and presence began to dissipate in the mid-2000s although
it still exists as an activist social network (http://www.attac.org/en). The
principle legacy of ATTAC is the World Social Forum (WSF), held annually
at the same time as the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. The first WSF
was held in 2001 in Porto Allegro, Brazil. As a left counterpoint to the WEF,
the WSF’s annual meeting travels from one developing world location to
another and is a relatively enduring annual moment that advocates for global
social justice. “Occupy Wall Street” movement bears a kinship relation to
these earlier movements. While antiglobalization movements have provided
grist for the academic social movements mill, their targets, global capitalism
and financial markets, are too broad for these movements to be efficacious.
Their main value is expressive. Left antiglobalization movements generate

Globalization Backlash

5

a mood of discontent that other more narrowly goal-oriented groups may
capitalize on for good or bad.
PROTECTING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The electoral salience of right wing and nationalist political parties in Western and Eastern Europe has provided a more enduring and institutionally
embedded instance of backlash against globalization. Up until the early
1970s, Western Europe was prosperous and democratic in spirit as well
as political practice. Post-war Europe had managed to combine sustained
economic growth with broad social welfare programs. Eichengreen (2007)
provides the most cogent account of this much told history from the perspective of political development and economy. In the 1970s, the post-war
social contract began to break down as the effects of the first oil crisis began
to diffuse globally. European economic stagnation soon followed.
By the early 1980s, European leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in England
and France’s first socialist president Francois Mitterrand began to feel the
economic effects of lack of national competitiveness in now globalizing markets. Both leaders privatized and de-nationalized former state businesses
in an attempt to remain economically competitive. The beginning of what
is now termed neo-liberalism in Europe was a response to global market
pressures. The second big trans-European response was the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty designed to further consolidate European economic integration in
an attempt to remain competitive and prosperous. The culmination of the
integration project was the introduction of the common currency, the euro,
in 2002. The acceleration of European integration in the 1990s was Europe’s
attempt to confront the challenges of globalization. Despite the occasional
national referenda, Europeanization was an elite-driven top-down process
that became synonymous in the popular imagination with globalization.
Rodrik (1997, pp. 41–45) recounts the public opposition to and strikes against
the Maastricht in France, which squeaked to ratification with a popular vote
of 51%.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the communist left and terrorist groups
such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof (Red Army Faction)
in Germany posed political threats to national security as they battled
post-war European capitalism and capitalists. The European terrorist left
was gradually subdued by the end of the 1980s just as left political parties
were beginning to lose electoral salience. It was at that historical moment
that the European right began to emerge as a political force. The French
National Front founded in 1972 had its first electoral breakthrough in the
first round of the Parliamentary election in 1986 when it attained 9.8% of
the vote. The French right initially targeted immigrants, not capitalism, as

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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

a problem. The right grew sporadically within different countries across
Europe and political scientists have mapped its progress.
Standard analysis of the emergent European right that focused upon
the early right’s initial anti-immigrant positions missed two important
developments: first, during the 1990s, the right was becoming a voice of
nationalism against Europeanization; and second, the right was also developing a respectable and broadly appealing platform that was increasingly
anti-Europe and antiglobalization. Berezin (2009, 2013) documents this
progression. The rejection of the proposed European constitution in both
France and the Netherlands crystallized the anti-Europe and the antiglobal
sentiments that were simmering just below the surface of European national
politics. In France, the coalition against the European constitution consisted
of ATTAC, the declining French Communist Party, and the National Front.
While these three groups did not act in concert as they were in theory
ideologically opposed to one another, they shared the same position on the
European constitution that they viewed as locking in the new neo-liberal,
market-driven European polity. A principal propaganda trope of the anticonstitution groups was the claim that “Polish plumbers” would migrate
into France and take way high paying jobs from the French. The “Polish
plumber” argument derived from the service clause in the European draft
constitution. Known as the Bolkestein directive, the clause liberalized labor
mobility for low level service employees (Grossman & Woll, 2011). The
mobilization against the European constitution in France solidified the
antiglobalization coalition that supported national labor forces and national
production and made “protectionism” part of the European economic
vocabulary.
The antipathy to Europe with its focus upon global economic competition
was becoming increasingly salient as the first decade of the new century
progressed. The European sovereign debt crisis that gained momentum
beginning in spring 2010 with the failure of the Greek economy was
the tipping point in the trans-European backlash against globalization
(Berezin, 2012). In the few years that have elapsed since the spring of
2010, European national politics have exhibited volatility, and austerity
riots have become the norm in Mediterranean Europe. The 2009 European Parliamentary elections revealed a center right in ascendance and a
breakthrough for the anti-Europe far right (http://www.euractiv.com/euelections/2009-2014-centre-right-european-linksdossier-188510). Since the
spring of 2010, there have been 12 Parliamentary elections in the former
Western Europe, the core of the eurozone. Volatility and anti-Europe backlash
as evidenced by the electoral surge of right parties characterized these Parliamentary elections (Election figures at http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview).
For example, in June 2010, the right wing, Party of Freedom, came in third

Globalization Backlash

7

place in the Dutch parliamentary elections. Four days later, a Flemish
nationalist and secessionist party captured a large portion of votes in a
Belgian parliamentary election. Three months later, a Swedish right populist
party, the Swedish Democrats, received 5.7% of the vote and became eligible
for a seat in the Congress. In Finland, the populist and anti-Europe party
True Finns received 19% of the vote, an increase of 15% from what they had
received in the 2007 Parliamentary election.
The French Presidential election and the Greek Parliamentary elections
in spring 2012 represent the apex of the anti-Europe and antiglobalization
backlash in Europe. François Hollande, a Socialist, was elected President
but France’s anti-Europe right and left extremes carried the first round
of the election. Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, France’s and
Europe’s most enduring right parties came in third place with 17.9% of
the vote. She based her campaign France exiting the eurozone, europhobia,
and protecting French industry and workers. Le Pen captured a larger
portion of the vote than Jean-Luc Melénchon’s hastily assembled Left Front
coalition, which was no friendlier to the eurozone than the extreme right.
Taken together, the two candidates from the left and right extremes of the
French political spectrum received the same percentage of votes as the two
leading presidential candidates who were both committed to solving the
European debt crisis.
During the same period as the French elections and campaign, Greece
was waiting for a European bailout from its national debt crisis and struggling with its version of austerity. By the day of the May 5 election, the
major question in Greece was whether the Socialist party would oust the
austerity-focused/Germany-friendly center-right ruling party. The Greek
elections defied all expectations. The extreme left Syriza party, and the
avowedly neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, outperformed the traditional left
and center-right parties. The Golden Dawn party with its harsh Neo-Nazi
symbols and violent anti-immigrant and anti-Europe agenda even managed
to oust Laos—the long-standing Greek right party.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Until the sovereign debt crisis is solved, Europe remains the site of the most
active backlash against globalization. The European form of backlash taints
the spirit if not the practice of democracy in Europe and is insidious because
it occurs at the ballot box as well as in the streets. The left mobilization against
globalization tends toward the idealistic and utopian and focuses on social
justice and workers’ rights. Its vagueness in programmatic terms is also problematic as it leaves lacunae for all sorts of political idea and programs to enter.

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Scholars discuss “globalization backlash” and acknowledge its existence.
Yet, the phenomenon has been under-theorized as well as under-empiricized
and covers a range of disparate issues (Westaway, 2012). A first step toward
establishing a research agenda vis-a-vis the concept would be to establish
the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action do we
wish to attribute to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of
globalization, and which actions have other causes? For example, while
globalization makes international terrorism possible, do we really want
to attribute religious fundamentalism and extremism to globalization?
The second issue that is important is to identify the differences between
institutional and extra-institutional backlashes. The former is potentially
more enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public
violence.
As Guillen (2001) demonstrates measuring the effects of globalization, let
alone backlash to globalization, is both difficult and ambiguous. Yet, as backlash often challenges democratic practices and sentiments, it is important
to think about calibrating it. One method would be to target groups both
within and outside of institutional frameworks who point to globalization as
a source of grievance and to examine the specific contexts within which their
claims occur. This would require a more on the ground approach to thinking
about globalization instead of the reliance upon broad macroeconomic indicators that frequently make up the corpus of evidence in these discussions.
Backlash to globalization, whether inside or outside of institutions, is a constitutive feature of what I (Berezin, 2009, 2013) have described elsewhere as a
“post-security” polity. This is a new political space in which the territorial
bases of security—political, cultural, economic, and environmental—have
eroded, if not ended. Social scientists need to take a hard look at where global
actors might find new forms of security. Backlash, paradoxically, is a place to
begin.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity,
and poverty. New York, NY: Crown Business.
Berezin, M. (2013). The normalization of the right in post-security Europe. In A.
Schaefer & W. Streeck (Eds.), Politics in the age of austerity (pp. 239–261). Cambridge,
England: Polity Press.
Berezin, M. (2012). Sovereign debt and nationalism: Normalizing the European right.
States, Power and Societies: Newsletter of the Political Sociology Section of the American
Sociological Association, 17(1), 5–6.
Berezin, M. (2009). Illiberal politics in neoliberal times: Culture, security, and populism in
the New Europe. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Globalization Backlash

9

Chua, A. (2003). World on fire: How exporting free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred
and global instability. New York, NY: Random House.
Della Porta, D., & Tarrow, S. (Eds.) (2005). Transnational protest and global activism.
London, England: Rowman and Littlefield.
Eichengreen, B. J. (2007). The European economy since 1945: Coordinated capitalism and
beyond. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Eichengreen, B., & Leblang, D. (2008). Democracy and globalization. Economics and
Politics, 20(November), 289–334.
Fiss, P. C., & Hirsch, P. M. (2005). The discourse of globalization: Framing and sensemaking of an emerging concept. American Sociological Review, 70(1), 29–52.
Grossman, E., & Woll, C. (2011). The French debate over the Bolkestein directive.
Comparative European Politics, 9(3), 344–366.
Guillen, M. F. (2001). Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? A critique of
five key debates in the social science literature. Annual Review of Sociology, 27,
235–260.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1975). The age of capital 1848–1875. London, England: Penguin.
Huntington, S. P. (1998). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New
York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
James, H. (2008). Globalization, empire and natural law. International Affairs, 84(3),
421–436.
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. New York, NY: Cornell.
Keohane, R. O. (2002). The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’. In C. Calhoun, P. Price & A. Timmer (Eds.),
Understanding September 11 (pp. 92–105). New York, NY: The New Press.
Osterhammel, J., & Petersson, N. P. (2005). Globalization: A short history. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and
Co.
Tarrow, S. (2005). The new transnational activisim. Cambridge: New York, NY.
Westaway, J. (2012). Globalization, sovereignty and social unrest. Journal of Politics
and Law, 5(2), 132–139.

FURTHER READING
Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell.
Maier, C. S. (1987). The politics of productivity: Foundations of American international economic policy after World War II. In C. Maier (Ed.), In Search of Stability
(pp. 121–152). Cambridge: New York, NY.
Milward, A. S. (2000). The European rescue of the nation-state (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Sassen, S. (2006). Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Slaughter, A.-M. (2004). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Williamson, J. G. (1996). Globalization, convergence, and history. Journal of Economic
History, 56, 2.

MABEL BEREZIN SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Mabel Berezin earned her PhD in Sociology at Harvard. She is Professor
of Sociology at Cornell University. Her work explores the intersection
of political and cultural institutions with an emphasis on modern and
contemporary Europe. She is the author of Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times:
Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe (Cambridge, 2009) and
Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Inter-war Italy (Cornell, 1997),
which was awarded the J. David Greenstone Prize for Best Book of 1996–1997
in “Politics and History” by the American Political Science Association and
named an “Outstanding Academic Book of 1997,” by Choice. In addition to
numerous articles, review essays, and contributions to edited volumes, she
has edited two collaborative volumes: Democratic Culture: Ethnos and Demos
in Global Perspective (with Jeffrey Alexander) and Europe Without Borders:
Re-mapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age (with
Martin Schain) (Johns Hopkins, 2004). She has been awarded fellowships
from the European University Institute, the Leverhulme Trust, ASA Fund
for Advancement of the Discipline and German Marshall Fund of the United
States. http://www.soc.cornell.edu/faculty/berezin.html

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Globalization Backlash

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Globalization Backlash
MABEL BEREZIN

Abstract
Backlash against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade
of the twenty-first century, from the Seattle riots in fall 1999 to the recent riots
and strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures. The global
financial crisis has exacerbated nascent backlash and contributed to its spread.
Backlash against globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a
left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning
defense of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard
political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental
organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations and
disruption; the right variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist
political parties and electoral systems. The right and the left share a mutual animus
toward globalization and progress narratives. The left variant receives more media
attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within national political
systems. Scholars acknowledge “globalization backlash.” Yet, the phenomenon has
been under-theorized as well as under-empiricized and covers a range of disparate
issues. A first step in a research agenda vis-a-vis the concept would be to establish
the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action might we attribute
to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of globalization, and which
actions have other causes? The second issue is to identify the differences between
institutional and extra-institutional backlashes. The former is potentially more
enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public violence.

INTRODUCTION
Globalization describes a process that began as early as the 1300s when
traders left their native lands and set sail in search of tea and spices [for an
overview, see Osterhammel and Petersson (2005)]. The hallmarks of a modern globalization, trans-border flow of capital, goods, persons, and at a later
stage information began in the “Age of Capital (Hobsbawm, 1975)”—the
period between 1848 and 1875, when improvements in transportation and
communication made global exchange possible and relatively efficient.
The activities that constitute globalization have deep and broad historical

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

2

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

antecedents. Globalization as a discursive frame for discussing global trade
and commerce has gained currency relatively recently. Sociologists (Fiss &
Hirsch, 2005; Guillen, 2001) have documented that a public “discourse”
around globalization emerged in the mid-1980s and accelerated in the late
1990s, as evidenced by an increase in the number of media mentions as well
as academic articles and monographs.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Scholars, particularly economists, viewed globalization as a correlate of
democracy and by extension as a public good (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2008).
By the 1990s, positive discussion of globalization declined and negative
discussion dramatically increased (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005, p. 41). Guillen (2001)
identified five recurrent themes in the academic literature on globalization.
All themes were in the form of questions, such as, is globalization “really
happening”; producing “convergence”; creating “global culture.” Answers
were inconclusive with committed academic partisans on both sides. Among
these themes (Guillen, 2001), the question as to whether globalization “undermines the authority of the nation-state” is most germane to issues of
backlash. Citizens view their national states as guarantors of social, political,
physical, and cultural security. Whether globalization threatens the markers
of collective security—borders, labor markets, social welfare, physical safety,
and identity—is subject to continual academic debate. Among ordinary
citizens, the perception that globalization is a threat is wide spread and
generates varieties of conflict.
Globalization’s entry into the popular vernacular coincides with the
beginning of a backlash against globalization that took multiple forms. From
the Seattle riots in fall 1999 that protested the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO’s) annual meeting to 2011s Occupy Wall Street, to the recent riots and
strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures, backlash
against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade of
the twenty-first century. The global financial crisis has exacerbated nascent
backlash and contributed to its spread.
During the millennium period (from the late 1990s to the early 2000s),
economists (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2002) and legal scholars (Chua, 2003)
began to identify the downside or “discontents” of globalization. Rodrik
(1997) asked Has Globalization Gone Too Far? and warned that “social disintegration” is a potential cost of global “economic integration.” Globalization
backlash in the developing world, of the sort that occupies Stiglitz and
Chua, manifests itself in anti-Western sentiment and random acts of violence
rather than through formal organization. James (2008) identifies religious
fundamentalism as a core dimension of backlash. Huntington’s (1998) “clash

Globalization Backlash

3

of civilization” between the West and the non-Protestant rest, even though
it has global and economic components, remains more fully articulated
on the local and cultural levels. The spectacular carnage of September 11,
2001 when eight transnational actors destroyed the World Trade Center, the
quintessential symbol of global capitalism, focused global public attention
on the collateral cultural, as well as political and economic, risks attendant on globalization (Keohane, 2002). September 11, despite its horror,
remains an outlier. If we look across the contemporary Middle East, fragile
political institutions, rather than economic institutions, encourage religious
fundamentalism (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
In contrast to the developing world and the Middle East, backlash against
globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning defense
of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental
organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations
and disruption (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998); the right
variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist political parties
and electoral systems (Berezin, 2009, 2012, 2013). The right and the left view
themselves as worlds apart ideologically, yet they have a surprising convergence in their animus toward globalization and contemporary progress
narratives. The left variant is arguably more colorful and tends to receive
more media attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within
national political systems.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
MOBILIZING AGAINST CAPITALISM
The extra-institutional push against globalization began dramatically in
Seattle, Washington in 1999 when a coalition of labor and social justice
activists staged multi-city protests against the WTO’s annual ministerial
meeting. The violence and police riots that ensued, labeled as the “Battle
of Seattle,” focused international media attention on the antiglobalization movement (Tarrow, 2005, pp. 170–171). Canadian journalist, Naomi
Klein’s 1999 book NO Logo became a seminal document for the nascent
antiglobalization movement.
In June 1998, in Paris, Bernard Cassen, editor of the French Le Monde Diplomatique and an assortment of trade unionists, intellectuals, and human rights
activists, founded ATTAC (Action pour une taxe Tobin d’aide aux citoyens)
(Berezin, 2009, pp. 120–121). ATTAC was an organizational response to an
appeal published in Le Monde Diplomatique to “disarm the markets.” The

4

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Tobin Tax, named after James Tobin, the Noble Prize-winning American
economist, proposed to tax international monetary transactions to moderate the effects of exchange speculation. ATTAC named its weekly email
newsletter Sand in the Wheels after Tobin’s metaphor that an international
finance tax would, like sand in the wheels of a car, slow the advance of
global capitalism. Initially, less noticed than the events of Seattle, ATTAC
became active in Paris in the late 1990s and soon spread throughout Europe
and beyond [see essays in Della Porta and Tarrow (2005)].
By the year 2000, ATTAC began to organize public protest events (Berezin,
2009, pp. 136–138). Its first large mobilization occurred in December 2000 in
Nice at the meeting of the European Council of Ministers. ATTAC’s target
was the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, an addendum to
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty, known as the Treaty of Nice.
The European Council unveiled the Charter of Fundamental Rights at its biannual meeting in December 2000 at Nice, France. ATTAC mobilized 50,000
persons to travel to Nice to engage in 3 days of public protest against the
Charter. ATTAC described the mobilization as a euromanifestation. The Nice
mobilization consisted of 2 days of conferences, forums, and marches. It was
an extra-parliamentary attack on the expanding process of Europeanization
that the left and right populists viewed as a form of globalization.
ATTAC campaigned against the Charter with the slogan, “Another Europe
Is Possible.” It described the European Union as a “motor of liberal globalization,” which de-personalized and de-socialized capital transactions. ATTAC
argued that the new Charter, while it protected individuals against the abuses
that are constitutive of unbridled market forces, was fundamentally antilabor, antisocial, and antinational. The weakening of social rights was among
ATTAC’s principal concerns—specifically Article 15 that ensured the right to
look for work, not the right to work, which the 1961 European Social Charter,
as well as its 1996 amended version, guaranteed.
ATTAC’s impact and presence began to dissipate in the mid-2000s although
it still exists as an activist social network (http://www.attac.org/en). The
principle legacy of ATTAC is the World Social Forum (WSF), held annually
at the same time as the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. The first WSF
was held in 2001 in Porto Allegro, Brazil. As a left counterpoint to the WEF,
the WSF’s annual meeting travels from one developing world location to
another and is a relatively enduring annual moment that advocates for global
social justice. “Occupy Wall Street” movement bears a kinship relation to
these earlier movements. While antiglobalization movements have provided
grist for the academic social movements mill, their targets, global capitalism
and financial markets, are too broad for these movements to be efficacious.
Their main value is expressive. Left antiglobalization movements generate

Globalization Backlash

5

a mood of discontent that other more narrowly goal-oriented groups may
capitalize on for good or bad.
PROTECTING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The electoral salience of right wing and nationalist political parties in Western and Eastern Europe has provided a more enduring and institutionally
embedded instance of backlash against globalization. Up until the early
1970s, Western Europe was prosperous and democratic in spirit as well
as political practice. Post-war Europe had managed to combine sustained
economic growth with broad social welfare programs. Eichengreen (2007)
provides the most cogent account of this much told history from the perspective of political development and economy. In the 1970s, the post-war
social contract began to break down as the effects of the first oil crisis began
to diffuse globally. European economic stagnation soon followed.
By the early 1980s, European leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in England
and France’s first socialist president Francois Mitterrand began to feel the
economic effects of lack of national competitiveness in now globalizing markets. Both leaders privatized and de-nationalized former state businesses
in an attempt to remain economically competitive. The beginning of what
is now termed neo-liberalism in Europe was a response to global market
pressures. The second big trans-European response was the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty designed to further consolidate European economic integration in
an attempt to remain competitive and prosperous. The culmination of the
integration project was the introduction of the common currency, the euro,
in 2002. The acceleration of European integration in the 1990s was Europe’s
attempt to confront the challenges of globalization. Despite the occasional
national referenda, Europeanization was an elite-driven top-down process
that became synonymous in the popular imagination with globalization.
Rodrik (1997, pp. 41–45) recounts the public opposition to and strikes against
the Maastricht in France, which squeaked to ratification with a popular vote
of 51%.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the communist left and terrorist groups
such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof (Red Army Faction)
in Germany posed political threats to national security as they battled
post-war European capitalism and capitalists. The European terrorist left
was gradually subdued by the end of the 1980s just as left political parties
were beginning to lose electoral salience. It was at that historical moment
that the European right began to emerge as a political force. The French
National Front founded in 1972 had its first electoral breakthrough in the
first round of the Parliamentary election in 1986 when it attained 9.8% of
the vote. The French right initially targeted immigrants, not capitalism, as

6

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

a problem. The right grew sporadically within different countries across
Europe and political scientists have mapped its progress.
Standard analysis of the emergent European right that focused upon
the early right’s initial anti-immigrant positions missed two important
developments: first, during the 1990s, the right was becoming a voice of
nationalism against Europeanization; and second, the right was also developing a respectable and broadly appealing platform that was increasingly
anti-Europe and antiglobalization. Berezin (2009, 2013) documents this
progression. The rejection of the proposed European constitution in both
France and the Netherlands crystallized the anti-Europe and the antiglobal
sentiments that were simmering just below the surface of European national
politics. In France, the coalition against the European constitution consisted
of ATTAC, the declining French Communist Party, and the National Front.
While these three groups did not act in concert as they were in theory
ideologically opposed to one another, they shared the same position on the
European constitution that they viewed as locking in the new neo-liberal,
market-driven European polity. A principal propaganda trope of the anticonstitution groups was the claim that “Polish plumbers” would migrate
into France and take way high paying jobs from the French. The “Polish
plumber” argument derived from the service clause in the European draft
constitution. Known as the Bolkestein directive, the clause liberalized labor
mobility for low level service employees (Grossman & Woll, 2011). The
mobilization against the European constitution in France solidified the
antiglobalization coalition that supported national labor forces and national
production and made “protectionism” part of the European economic
vocabulary.
The antipathy to Europe with its focus upon global economic competition
was becoming increasingly salient as the first decade of the new century
progressed. The European sovereign debt crisis that gained momentum
beginning in spring 2010 with the failure of the Greek economy was
the tipping point in the trans-European backlash against globalization
(Berezin, 2012). In the few years that have elapsed since the spring of
2010, European national politics have exhibited volatility, and austerity
riots have become the norm in Mediterranean Europe. The 2009 European Parliamentary elections revealed a center right in ascendance and a
breakthrough for the anti-Europe far right (http://www.euractiv.com/euelections/2009-2014-centre-right-european-linksdossier-188510). Since the
spring of 2010, there have been 12 Parliamentary elections in the former
Western Europe, the core of the eurozone. Volatility and anti-Europe backlash
as evidenced by the electoral surge of right parties characterized these Parliamentary elections (Election figures at http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview).
For example, in June 2010, the right wing, Party of Freedom, came in third

Globalization Backlash

7

place in the Dutch parliamentary elections. Four days later, a Flemish
nationalist and secessionist party captured a large portion of votes in a
Belgian parliamentary election. Three months later, a Swedish right populist
party, the Swedish Democrats, received 5.7% of the vote and became eligible
for a seat in the Congress. In Finland, the populist and anti-Europe party
True Finns received 19% of the vote, an increase of 15% from what they had
received in the 2007 Parliamentary election.
The French Presidential election and the Greek Parliamentary elections
in spring 2012 represent the apex of the anti-Europe and antiglobalization
backlash in Europe. François Hollande, a Socialist, was elected President
but France’s anti-Europe right and left extremes carried the first round
of the election. Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, France’s and
Europe’s most enduring right parties came in third place with 17.9% of
the vote. She based her campaign France exiting the eurozone, europhobia,
and protecting French industry and workers. Le Pen captured a larger
portion of the vote than Jean-Luc Melénchon’s hastily assembled Left Front
coalition, which was no friendlier to the eurozone than the extreme right.
Taken together, the two candidates from the left and right extremes of the
French political spectrum received the same percentage of votes as the two
leading presidential candidates who were both committed to solving the
European debt crisis.
During the same period as the French elections and campaign, Greece
was waiting for a European bailout from its national debt crisis and struggling with its version of austerity. By the day of the May 5 election, the
major question in Greece was whether the Socialist party would oust the
austerity-focused/Germany-friendly center-right ruling party. The Greek
elections defied all expectations. The extreme left Syriza party, and the
avowedly neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, outperformed the traditional left
and center-right parties. The Golden Dawn party with its harsh Neo-Nazi
symbols and violent anti-immigrant and anti-Europe agenda even managed
to oust Laos—the long-standing Greek right party.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Until the sovereign debt crisis is solved, Europe remains the site of the most
active backlash against globalization. The European form of backlash taints
the spirit if not the practice of democracy in Europe and is insidious because
it occurs at the ballot box as well as in the streets. The left mobilization against
globalization tends toward the idealistic and utopian and focuses on social
justice and workers’ rights. Its vagueness in programmatic terms is also problematic as it leaves lacunae for all sorts of political idea and programs to enter.

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Scholars discuss “globalization backlash” and acknowledge its existence.
Yet, the phenomenon has been under-theorized as well as under-empiricized
and covers a range of disparate issues (Westaway, 2012). A first step toward
establishing a research agenda vis-a-vis the concept would be to establish
the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action do we
wish to attribute to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of
globalization, and which actions have other causes? For example, while
globalization makes international terrorism possible, do we really want
to attribute religious fundamentalism and extremism to globalization?
The second issue that is important is to identify the differences between
institutional and extra-institutional backlashes. The former is potentially
more enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public
violence.
As Guillen (2001) demonstrates measuring the effects of globalization, let
alone backlash to globalization, is both difficult and ambiguous. Yet, as backlash often challenges democratic practices and sentiments, it is important
to think about calibrating it. One method would be to target groups both
within and outside of institutional frameworks who point to globalization as
a source of grievance and to examine the specific contexts within which their
claims occur. This would require a more on the ground approach to thinking
about globalization instead of the reliance upon broad macroeconomic indicators that frequently make up the corpus of evidence in these discussions.
Backlash to globalization, whether inside or outside of institutions, is a constitutive feature of what I (Berezin, 2009, 2013) have described elsewhere as a
“post-security” polity. This is a new political space in which the territorial
bases of security—political, cultural, economic, and environmental—have
eroded, if not ended. Social scientists need to take a hard look at where global
actors might find new forms of security. Backlash, paradoxically, is a place to
begin.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity,
and poverty. New York, NY: Crown Business.
Berezin, M. (2013). The normalization of the right in post-security Europe. In A.
Schaefer & W. Streeck (Eds.), Politics in the age of austerity (pp. 239–261). Cambridge,
England: Polity Press.
Berezin, M. (2012). Sovereign debt and nationalism: Normalizing the European right.
States, Power and Societies: Newsletter of the Political Sociology Section of the American
Sociological Association, 17(1), 5–6.
Berezin, M. (2009). Illiberal politics in neoliberal times: Culture, security, and populism in
the New Europe. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Globalization Backlash

9

Chua, A. (2003). World on fire: How exporting free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred
and global instability. New York, NY: Random House.
Della Porta, D., & Tarrow, S. (Eds.) (2005). Transnational protest and global activism.
London, England: Rowman and Littlefield.
Eichengreen, B. J. (2007). The European economy since 1945: Coordinated capitalism and
beyond. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Eichengreen, B., & Leblang, D. (2008). Democracy and globalization. Economics and
Politics, 20(November), 289–334.
Fiss, P. C., & Hirsch, P. M. (2005). The discourse of globalization: Framing and sensemaking of an emerging concept. American Sociological Review, 70(1), 29–52.
Grossman, E., & Woll, C. (2011). The French debate over the Bolkestein directive.
Comparative European Politics, 9(3), 344–366.
Guillen, M. F. (2001). Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? A critique of
five key debates in the social science literature. Annual Review of Sociology, 27,
235–260.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1975). The age of capital 1848–1875. London, England: Penguin.
Huntington, S. P. (1998). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New
York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
James, H. (2008). Globalization, empire and natural law. International Affairs, 84(3),
421–436.
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. New York, NY: Cornell.
Keohane, R. O. (2002). The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’. In C. Calhoun, P. Price & A. Timmer (Eds.),
Understanding September 11 (pp. 92–105). New York, NY: The New Press.
Osterhammel, J., & Petersson, N. P. (2005). Globalization: A short history. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and
Co.
Tarrow, S. (2005). The new transnational activisim. Cambridge: New York, NY.
Westaway, J. (2012). Globalization, sovereignty and social unrest. Journal of Politics
and Law, 5(2), 132–139.

FURTHER READING
Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell.
Maier, C. S. (1987). The politics of productivity: Foundations of American international economic policy after World War II. In C. Maier (Ed.), In Search of Stability
(pp. 121–152). Cambridge: New York, NY.
Milward, A. S. (2000). The European rescue of the nation-state (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Sassen, S. (2006). Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Slaughter, A.-M. (2004). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Williamson, J. G. (1996). Globalization, convergence, and history. Journal of Economic
History, 56, 2.

MABEL BEREZIN SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Mabel Berezin earned her PhD in Sociology at Harvard. She is Professor
of Sociology at Cornell University. Her work explores the intersection
of political and cultural institutions with an emphasis on modern and
contemporary Europe. She is the author of Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times:
Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe (Cambridge, 2009) and
Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Inter-war Italy (Cornell, 1997),
which was awarded the J. David Greenstone Prize for Best Book of 1996–1997
in “Politics and History” by the American Political Science Association and
named an “Outstanding Academic Book of 1997,” by Choice. In addition to
numerous articles, review essays, and contributions to edited volumes, she
has edited two collaborative volumes: Democratic Culture: Ethnos and Demos
in Global Perspective (with Jeffrey Alexander) and Europe Without Borders:
Re-mapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age (with
Martin Schain) (Johns Hopkins, 2004). She has been awarded fellowships
from the European University Institute, the Leverhulme Trust, ASA Fund
for Advancement of the Discipline and German Marshall Fund of the United
States. http://www.soc.cornell.edu/faculty/berezin.html

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Globalization Backlash

11

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Globalization Backlash
MABEL BEREZIN

Abstract
Backlash against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade
of the twenty-first century, from the Seattle riots in fall 1999 to the recent riots
and strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures. The global
financial crisis has exacerbated nascent backlash and contributed to its spread.
Backlash against globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a
left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning
defense of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard
political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental
organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations and
disruption; the right variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist
political parties and electoral systems. The right and the left share a mutual animus
toward globalization and progress narratives. The left variant receives more media
attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within national political
systems. Scholars acknowledge “globalization backlash.” Yet, the phenomenon has
been under-theorized as well as under-empiricized and covers a range of disparate
issues. A first step in a research agenda vis-a-vis the concept would be to establish
the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action might we attribute
to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of globalization, and which
actions have other causes? The second issue is to identify the differences between
institutional and extra-institutional backlashes. The former is potentially more
enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public violence.

INTRODUCTION
Globalization describes a process that began as early as the 1300s when
traders left their native lands and set sail in search of tea and spices [for an
overview, see Osterhammel and Petersson (2005)]. The hallmarks of a modern globalization, trans-border flow of capital, goods, persons, and at a later
stage information began in the “Age of Capital (Hobsbawm, 1975)”—the
period between 1848 and 1875, when improvements in transportation and
communication made global exchange possible and relatively efficient.
The activities that constitute globalization have deep and broad historical

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

2

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

antecedents. Globalization as a discursive frame for discussing global trade
and commerce has gained currency relatively recently. Sociologists (Fiss &
Hirsch, 2005; Guillen, 2001) have documented that a public “discourse”
around globalization emerged in the mid-1980s and accelerated in the late
1990s, as evidenced by an increase in the number of media mentions as well
as academic articles and monographs.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Scholars, particularly economists, viewed globalization as a correlate of
democracy and by extension as a public good (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2008).
By the 1990s, positive discussion of globalization declined and negative
discussion dramatically increased (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005, p. 41). Guillen (2001)
identified five recurrent themes in the academic literature on globalization.
All themes were in the form of questions, such as, is globalization “really
happening”; producing “convergence”; creating “global culture.” Answers
were inconclusive with committed academic partisans on both sides. Among
these themes (Guillen, 2001), the question as to whether globalization “undermines the authority of the nation-state” is most germane to issues of
backlash. Citizens view their national states as guarantors of social, political,
physical, and cultural security. Whether globalization threatens the markers
of collective security—borders, labor markets, social welfare, physical safety,
and identity—is subject to continual academic debate. Among ordinary
citizens, the perception that globalization is a threat is wide spread and
generates varieties of conflict.
Globalization’s entry into the popular vernacular coincides with the
beginning of a backlash against globalization that took multiple forms. From
the Seattle riots in fall 1999 that protested the World Trade Organization’s
(WTO’s) annual meeting to 2011s Occupy Wall Street, to the recent riots and
strikes within Europe to protest government austerity measures, backlash
against globalization has become a defining feature of the first decade of
the twenty-first century. The global financial crisis has exacerbated nascent
backlash and contributed to its spread.
During the millennium period (from the late 1990s to the early 2000s),
economists (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2002) and legal scholars (Chua, 2003)
began to identify the downside or “discontents” of globalization. Rodrik
(1997) asked Has Globalization Gone Too Far? and warned that “social disintegration” is a potential cost of global “economic integration.” Globalization
backlash in the developing world, of the sort that occupies Stiglitz and
Chua, manifests itself in anti-Western sentiment and random acts of violence
rather than through formal organization. James (2008) identifies religious
fundamentalism as a core dimension of backlash. Huntington’s (1998) “clash

Globalization Backlash

3

of civilization” between the West and the non-Protestant rest, even though
it has global and economic components, remains more fully articulated
on the local and cultural levels. The spectacular carnage of September 11,
2001 when eight transnational actors destroyed the World Trade Center, the
quintessential symbol of global capitalism, focused global public attention
on the collateral cultural, as well as political and economic, risks attendant on globalization (Keohane, 2002). September 11, despite its horror,
remains an outlier. If we look across the contemporary Middle East, fragile
political institutions, rather than economic institutions, encourage religious
fundamentalism (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
In contrast to the developing world and the Middle East, backlash against
globalization within global power centers takes two forms: a left leaning collective public protest against global capitalism and a right leaning defense
of national sovereignty. The left variation occurs outside of standard political institutions, which is often, but not exclusively, NGO (nongovernmental
organization) driven and usually involves expressive public demonstrations
and disruption (Della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1998); the right
variant occurs within institutions, particularly nationalist political parties
and electoral systems (Berezin, 2009, 2012, 2013). The right and the left view
themselves as worlds apart ideologically, yet they have a surprising convergence in their animus toward globalization and contemporary progress
narratives. The left variant is arguably more colorful and tends to receive
more media attention; the right is more durable as it is embedded within
national political systems.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
MOBILIZING AGAINST CAPITALISM
The extra-institutional push against globalization began dramatically in
Seattle, Washington in 1999 when a coalition of labor and social justice
activists staged multi-city protests against the WTO’s annual ministerial
meeting. The violence and police riots that ensued, labeled as the “Battle
of Seattle,” focused international media attention on the antiglobalization movement (Tarrow, 2005, pp. 170–171). Canadian journalist, Naomi
Klein’s 1999 book NO Logo became a seminal document for the nascent
antiglobalization movement.
In June 1998, in Paris, Bernard Cassen, editor of the French Le Monde Diplomatique and an assortment of trade unionists, intellectuals, and human rights
activists, founded ATTAC (Action pour une taxe Tobin d’aide aux citoyens)
(Berezin, 2009, pp. 120–121). ATTAC was an organizational response to an
appeal published in Le Monde Diplomatique to “disarm the markets.” The

4

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Tobin Tax, named after James Tobin, the Noble Prize-winning American
economist, proposed to tax international monetary transactions to moderate the effects of exchange speculation. ATTAC named its weekly email
newsletter Sand in the Wheels after Tobin’s metaphor that an international
finance tax would, like sand in the wheels of a car, slow the advance of
global capitalism. Initially, less noticed than the events of Seattle, ATTAC
became active in Paris in the late 1990s and soon spread throughout Europe
and beyond [see essays in Della Porta and Tarrow (2005)].
By the year 2000, ATTAC began to organize public protest events (Berezin,
2009, pp. 136–138). Its first large mobilization occurred in December 2000 in
Nice at the meeting of the European Council of Ministers. ATTAC’s target
was the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, an addendum to
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty, known as the Treaty of Nice.
The European Council unveiled the Charter of Fundamental Rights at its biannual meeting in December 2000 at Nice, France. ATTAC mobilized 50,000
persons to travel to Nice to engage in 3 days of public protest against the
Charter. ATTAC described the mobilization as a euromanifestation. The Nice
mobilization consisted of 2 days of conferences, forums, and marches. It was
an extra-parliamentary attack on the expanding process of Europeanization
that the left and right populists viewed as a form of globalization.
ATTAC campaigned against the Charter with the slogan, “Another Europe
Is Possible.” It described the European Union as a “motor of liberal globalization,” which de-personalized and de-socialized capital transactions. ATTAC
argued that the new Charter, while it protected individuals against the abuses
that are constitutive of unbridled market forces, was fundamentally antilabor, antisocial, and antinational. The weakening of social rights was among
ATTAC’s principal concerns—specifically Article 15 that ensured the right to
look for work, not the right to work, which the 1961 European Social Charter,
as well as its 1996 amended version, guaranteed.
ATTAC’s impact and presence began to dissipate in the mid-2000s although
it still exists as an activist social network (http://www.attac.org/en). The
principle legacy of ATTAC is the World Social Forum (WSF), held annually
at the same time as the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. The first WSF
was held in 2001 in Porto Allegro, Brazil. As a left counterpoint to the WEF,
the WSF’s annual meeting travels from one developing world location to
another and is a relatively enduring annual moment that advocates for global
social justice. “Occupy Wall Street” movement bears a kinship relation to
these earlier movements. While antiglobalization movements have provided
grist for the academic social movements mill, their targets, global capitalism
and financial markets, are too broad for these movements to be efficacious.
Their main value is expressive. Left antiglobalization movements generate

Globalization Backlash

5

a mood of discontent that other more narrowly goal-oriented groups may
capitalize on for good or bad.
PROTECTING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The electoral salience of right wing and nationalist political parties in Western and Eastern Europe has provided a more enduring and institutionally
embedded instance of backlash against globalization. Up until the early
1970s, Western Europe was prosperous and democratic in spirit as well
as political practice. Post-war Europe had managed to combine sustained
economic growth with broad social welfare programs. Eichengreen (2007)
provides the most cogent account of this much told history from the perspective of political development and economy. In the 1970s, the post-war
social contract began to break down as the effects of the first oil crisis began
to diffuse globally. European economic stagnation soon followed.
By the early 1980s, European leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in England
and France’s first socialist president Francois Mitterrand began to feel the
economic effects of lack of national competitiveness in now globalizing markets. Both leaders privatized and de-nationalized former state businesses
in an attempt to remain economically competitive. The beginning of what
is now termed neo-liberalism in Europe was a response to global market
pressures. The second big trans-European response was the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty designed to further consolidate European economic integration in
an attempt to remain competitive and prosperous. The culmination of the
integration project was the introduction of the common currency, the euro,
in 2002. The acceleration of European integration in the 1990s was Europe’s
attempt to confront the challenges of globalization. Despite the occasional
national referenda, Europeanization was an elite-driven top-down process
that became synonymous in the popular imagination with globalization.
Rodrik (1997, pp. 41–45) recounts the public opposition to and strikes against
the Maastricht in France, which squeaked to ratification with a popular vote
of 51%.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the communist left and terrorist groups
such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-Meinhof (Red Army Faction)
in Germany posed political threats to national security as they battled
post-war European capitalism and capitalists. The European terrorist left
was gradually subdued by the end of the 1980s just as left political parties
were beginning to lose electoral salience. It was at that historical moment
that the European right began to emerge as a political force. The French
National Front founded in 1972 had its first electoral breakthrough in the
first round of the Parliamentary election in 1986 when it attained 9.8% of
the vote. The French right initially targeted immigrants, not capitalism, as

6

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

a problem. The right grew sporadically within different countries across
Europe and political scientists have mapped its progress.
Standard analysis of the emergent European right that focused upon
the early right’s initial anti-immigrant positions missed two important
developments: first, during the 1990s, the right was becoming a voice of
nationalism against Europeanization; and second, the right was also developing a respectable and broadly appealing platform that was increasingly
anti-Europe and antiglobalization. Berezin (2009, 2013) documents this
progression. The rejection of the proposed European constitution in both
France and the Netherlands crystallized the anti-Europe and the antiglobal
sentiments that were simmering just below the surface of European national
politics. In France, the coalition against the European constitution consisted
of ATTAC, the declining French Communist Party, and the National Front.
While these three groups did not act in concert as they were in theory
ideologically opposed to one another, they shared the same position on the
European constitution that they viewed as locking in the new neo-liberal,
market-driven European polity. A principal propaganda trope of the anticonstitution groups was the claim that “Polish plumbers” would migrate
into France and take way high paying jobs from the French. The “Polish
plumber” argument derived from the service clause in the European draft
constitution. Known as the Bolkestein directive, the clause liberalized labor
mobility for low level service employees (Grossman & Woll, 2011). The
mobilization against the European constitution in France solidified the
antiglobalization coalition that supported national labor forces and national
production and made “protectionism” part of the European economic
vocabulary.
The antipathy to Europe with its focus upon global economic competition
was becoming increasingly salient as the first decade of the new century
progressed. The European sovereign debt crisis that gained momentum
beginning in spring 2010 with the failure of the Greek economy was
the tipping point in the trans-European backlash against globalization
(Berezin, 2012). In the few years that have elapsed since the spring of
2010, European national politics have exhibited volatility, and austerity
riots have become the norm in Mediterranean Europe. The 2009 European Parliamentary elections revealed a center right in ascendance and a
breakthrough for the anti-Europe far right (http://www.euractiv.com/euelections/2009-2014-centre-right-european-linksdossier-188510). Since the
spring of 2010, there have been 12 Parliamentary elections in the former
Western Europe, the core of the eurozone. Volatility and anti-Europe backlash
as evidenced by the electoral surge of right parties characterized these Parliamentary elections (Election figures at http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview).
For example, in June 2010, the right wing, Party of Freedom, came in third

Globalization Backlash

7

place in the Dutch parliamentary elections. Four days later, a Flemish
nationalist and secessionist party captured a large portion of votes in a
Belgian parliamentary election. Three months later, a Swedish right populist
party, the Swedish Democrats, received 5.7% of the vote and became eligible
for a seat in the Congress. In Finland, the populist and anti-Europe party
True Finns received 19% of the vote, an increase of 15% from what they had
received in the 2007 Parliamentary election.
The French Presidential election and the Greek Parliamentary elections
in spring 2012 represent the apex of the anti-Europe and antiglobalization
backlash in Europe. François Hollande, a Socialist, was elected President
but France’s anti-Europe right and left extremes carried the first round
of the election. Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Front, France’s and
Europe’s most enduring right parties came in third place with 17.9% of
the vote. She based her campaign France exiting the eurozone, europhobia,
and protecting French industry and workers. Le Pen captured a larger
portion of the vote than Jean-Luc Melénchon’s hastily assembled Left Front
coalition, which was no friendlier to the eurozone than the extreme right.
Taken together, the two candidates from the left and right extremes of the
French political spectrum received the same percentage of votes as the two
leading presidential candidates who were both committed to solving the
European debt crisis.
During the same period as the French elections and campaign, Greece
was waiting for a European bailout from its national debt crisis and struggling with its version of austerity. By the day of the May 5 election, the
major question in Greece was whether the Socialist party would oust the
austerity-focused/Germany-friendly center-right ruling party. The Greek
elections defied all expectations. The extreme left Syriza party, and the
avowedly neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, outperformed the traditional left
and center-right parties. The Golden Dawn party with its harsh Neo-Nazi
symbols and violent anti-immigrant and anti-Europe agenda even managed
to oust Laos—the long-standing Greek right party.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Until the sovereign debt crisis is solved, Europe remains the site of the most
active backlash against globalization. The European form of backlash taints
the spirit if not the practice of democracy in Europe and is insidious because
it occurs at the ballot box as well as in the streets. The left mobilization against
globalization tends toward the idealistic and utopian and focuses on social
justice and workers’ rights. Its vagueness in programmatic terms is also problematic as it leaves lacunae for all sorts of political idea and programs to enter.

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Scholars discuss “globalization backlash” and acknowledge its existence.
Yet, the phenomenon has been under-theorized as well as under-empiricized
and covers a range of disparate issues (Westaway, 2012). A first step toward
establishing a research agenda vis-a-vis the concept would be to establish
the parameters of the phenomenon. What forms of social action do we
wish to attribute to the cultural, social, economic, and political forces of
globalization, and which actions have other causes? For example, while
globalization makes international terrorism possible, do we really want
to attribute religious fundamentalism and extremism to globalization?
The second issue that is important is to identify the differences between
institutional and extra-institutional backlashes. The former is potentially
more enduring, whereas the latter opens the door to iterations of public
violence.
As Guillen (2001) demonstrates measuring the effects of globalization, let
alone backlash to globalization, is both difficult and ambiguous. Yet, as backlash often challenges democratic practices and sentiments, it is important
to think about calibrating it. One method would be to target groups both
within and outside of institutional frameworks who point to globalization as
a source of grievance and to examine the specific contexts within which their
claims occur. This would require a more on the ground approach to thinking
about globalization instead of the reliance upon broad macroeconomic indicators that frequently make up the corpus of evidence in these discussions.
Backlash to globalization, whether inside or outside of institutions, is a constitutive feature of what I (Berezin, 2009, 2013) have described elsewhere as a
“post-security” polity. This is a new political space in which the territorial
bases of security—political, cultural, economic, and environmental—have
eroded, if not ended. Social scientists need to take a hard look at where global
actors might find new forms of security. Backlash, paradoxically, is a place to
begin.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity,
and poverty. New York, NY: Crown Business.
Berezin, M. (2013). The normalization of the right in post-security Europe. In A.
Schaefer & W. Streeck (Eds.), Politics in the age of austerity (pp. 239–261). Cambridge,
England: Polity Press.
Berezin, M. (2012). Sovereign debt and nationalism: Normalizing the European right.
States, Power and Societies: Newsletter of the Political Sociology Section of the American
Sociological Association, 17(1), 5–6.
Berezin, M. (2009). Illiberal politics in neoliberal times: Culture, security, and populism in
the New Europe. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Globalization Backlash

9

Chua, A. (2003). World on fire: How exporting free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred
and global instability. New York, NY: Random House.
Della Porta, D., & Tarrow, S. (Eds.) (2005). Transnational protest and global activism.
London, England: Rowman and Littlefield.
Eichengreen, B. J. (2007). The European economy since 1945: Coordinated capitalism and
beyond. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Eichengreen, B., & Leblang, D. (2008). Democracy and globalization. Economics and
Politics, 20(November), 289–334.
Fiss, P. C., & Hirsch, P. M. (2005). The discourse of globalization: Framing and sensemaking of an emerging concept. American Sociological Review, 70(1), 29–52.
Grossman, E., & Woll, C. (2011). The French debate over the Bolkestein directive.
Comparative European Politics, 9(3), 344–366.
Guillen, M. F. (2001). Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? A critique of
five key debates in the social science literature. Annual Review of Sociology, 27,
235–260.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1975). The age of capital 1848–1875. London, England: Penguin.
Huntington, S. P. (1998). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New
York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
James, H. (2008). Globalization, empire and natural law. International Affairs, 84(3),
421–436.
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. New York, NY: Cornell.
Keohane, R. O. (2002). The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’. In C. Calhoun, P. Price & A. Timmer (Eds.),
Understanding September 11 (pp. 92–105). New York, NY: The New Press.
Osterhammel, J., & Petersson, N. P. (2005). Globalization: A short history. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has globalization gone too far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and
Co.
Tarrow, S. (2005). The new transnational activisim. Cambridge: New York, NY.
Westaway, J. (2012). Globalization, sovereignty and social unrest. Journal of Politics
and Law, 5(2), 132–139.

FURTHER READING
Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell.
Maier, C. S. (1987). The politics of productivity: Foundations of American international economic policy after World War II. In C. Maier (Ed.), In Search of Stability
(pp. 121–152). Cambridge: New York, NY.
Milward, A. S. (2000). The European rescue of the nation-state (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Sassen, S. (2006). Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Slaughter, A.-M. (2004). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Williamson, J. G. (1996). Globalization, convergence, and history. Journal of Economic
History, 56, 2.

MABEL BEREZIN SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Mabel Berezin earned her PhD in Sociology at Harvard. She is Professor
of Sociology at Cornell University. Her work explores the intersection
of political and cultural institutions with an emphasis on modern and
contemporary Europe. She is the author of Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times:
Culture, Security, and Populism in the New Europe (Cambridge, 2009) and
Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Inter-war Italy (Cornell, 1997),
which was awarded the J. David Greenstone Prize for Best Book of 1996–1997
in “Politics and History” by the American Political Science Association and
named an “Outstanding Academic Book of 1997,” by Choice. In addition to
numerous articles, review essays, and contributions to edited volumes, she
has edited two collaborative volumes: Democratic Culture: Ethnos and Demos
in Global Perspective (with Jeffrey Alexander) and Europe Without Borders:
Re-mapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age (with
Martin Schain) (Johns Hopkins, 2004). She has been awarded fellowships
from the European University Institute, the Leverhulme Trust, ASA Fund
for Advancement of the Discipline and German Marshall Fund of the United
States. http://www.soc.cornell.edu/faculty/berezin.html

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