Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Moral Identity

Media

Part of Moral Identity

Title

Moral Identity

extracted text

Moral Identity
SAM A. HARDY and GUSTAVO CARLO

Abstract
This essay reviews theory and research on moral identity. The construct emerged
roughly three decades ago in moral psychology as a possible motivational factor that
could link moral judgments to moral actions. Moral identity is, generally speaking,
the extent to which being a moral person is important to a person’s identity. However,
it has been conceptualized and measured in various ways. In this essay, conceptualizations of moral identity, as well as foundational empirical research on moral
identity development and links between moral identity and behavior, are reviewed.
Little is known about moral identity development, but moral identity has fairly consistently been found predictive of moral action using a variety of research methods.
In addition, cutting-edge research on new areas of theory is highlighted, and promising directions for future research are outlined. Cutting-edge work deals with new
ways to conceptualize and measure moral identity, mechanisms of influence, links
to broader outcomes, situational variation in moral identity, and implicit aspects of
moral identity. Promising future directions are expanding on these emerging directions, as well as looking at developmental processes, cultural variability, and the role
of relationships.

INTRODUCTION
Scholarly work on the psychology and development of human morality
began with the pioneering work of Kohlberg (1969) on cognitive developmental theory. However, this theory and research focused largely on
deliberative moral judgment processes (conscious thought processes by
which people determine whether or not a particular course of action is
moral), with less emphasis on precursors of moral action. Reviews have
discovered that links between moral judgment and action, although consistently found in empirical studies, are somewhat weak (Blasi, 1980).
Thus began the search for factors that might bridge the so-called moral
judgment-action gap (Walker, 2004), and that might help to explain better
the commitment and motivation of “moral exemplars” (Colby & Damon,
1992. Since then, much of the work on moral motivation has focused on the
construct of moral identity. Broadly speaking, moral identity is about the
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

2

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

extent to which being a moral person is important to an individual’s identity
(Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). The purpose of this essay is to present various
conceptualizations of moral identity, review prior work on moral identity,
highlight cutting-edge directions in moral identity theory and research, and
point to promising future directions.
FOUNDATIONAL THEORY AND RESEARCH
Theory and research on moral identity is entering its fourth decade. Since the
pioneering work of Blasi (1983), Rest (1983), Colby and Damon (1992) and
others, interest in moral identity has grown. Varying perspectives on moral
identity are emerging, and the construct is being studied using a multitude
of research methods. We will first review conceptualization of moral identity
and then empirical research on moral identity.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF MORAL IDENTITY
The notion of moral identity in psychology largely started with the work of
developmental psychologist Blasi (1983), (2004a). He proposed that moral
identity might aid moral judgments in more reliability-yielding moral
actions. For a moral judgment to have motivating power, we must first judge
ourselves responsible to act on it. Whether we feel responsible depends to
a large extent on the degree to which morality is important to our identity.
Then, if we judge ourselves responsible to act on a moral judgment based
on the centrality of morality to our identity, this generates motivation to act
morally because people are driven to behave consistent with their identity
(i.e., self-consistency). For instance, if I understand that I should stop and
offer assistance to an injured stranger on the sidewalk, I am more likely to
actually do so if it is important to me to be a moral person who helps others,
and thus I feel I must help the stranger or risk betraying myself.
To Blasi, it is also important to understand the structure of identity in order
to better grasp its role in morality (Blasi, 2004a, 2004b). Identity structure is
the organization, maturity, and phenomenological experience of one’s identity, and thus has to perform with the ways in which people subjectively
experience their identity. Identity contents, on the other hand, are the issues
around which people base their identity. According to Blasi, for moral identity to play an important role in moral action, people must have a mature
sense of identity (e.g., they have hierarchically organized their identity by
choosing certain contents to be more central than others), and must position moral contents (e.g., moral personality traits or moral values) as central
to their identity. In other words, a person with a mature identity centered
on amoral or immoral identity contents (e.g., being wealthy) will be highly

Moral Identity

3

driven, but not necessarily in the moral direction, whereas a person who sees
morality as important to them but who has an immature identity will have
less at stake in living (or not living) morally. Recent evidence supports this
notion of the interaction of structure and content in linking moral identity to
action (Hardy et al., 2013).
Building on Blasi’s ideas, Colby and Damon (1992) focused on moral identity as the unity of self and moral goals or commitments. Their qualitative
study of moral exemplars (people who exhibit exemplary levels of moral
commitment) found them to integrate self and morality such that their own
personal interests and desires were aligned with their sense of what was
morally right. In other words, what they wanted to do and what they felt
or knew they should do were the same. They invested a lot of time, energy,
and resources in moral causes because they personally wanted to; they felt
little inner conflict about it, such as knowing they should do something but
not wanting to do it.
Others have similarly argued that moral identity emerges from the
integration of the moral and self-systems (Bergman, 2004). The formation
of morality and self may be largely separate developmental systems that
can come together beginning in adolescence and young adulthood when
both systems become more interpersonal and ideological (e.g., based on
relationships and ideals; Moshman, 2011). Variation in moral identity, then,
reflects individual differences in the extent to which the sense of morality
and sense of identity are integrated. Frimer and Walker (2009) more systematically examined this idea using Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex model
of universal values. Schwartz’s model positions communal (universalism
and benevolence) and agentic (power and achievement) value orientations
as diametrically opposed. However, Frimer and Walker found that the
degree to which communal and agentic value orientations co-occurred
in self-narratives was predictive of moral action. Thus, when people are
personally invested in and actively pursuing commitments of a moral
nature, they might be said to have a stronger moral identity, and hence
greater moral motivation. In other words, when what we want most for us
and what might benefit others is one and the same, it seems to generate
powerful moral motivation.
In the recent past, some have drawn from social cognitive theory and
research to further elaborate on moral identity (Aquino, Freeman, Reed,
Lim, & Felps, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Monin & Jordan, 2009). These
approaches see schemas as the underlying mechanisms of moral identity.
Schemas are hypothesized knowledge structures in the mind that represent
various aspects of ourselves, our relationships, and our experiences (Fiske,
2000). Moral identity may entail having morally relevant schemas readily
accessible for processing social information (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Narvaez,

4

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Underlying moral ideals and characteristics
that people see as important to their sense of identity may be a network of
such moral schemas (Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004. In fact, it
may be that ideals and characteristics seen as most important to us are also
the ones pertaining to schemas that are most readily available for processing
information in social situations Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; see also Bizer &
Kroznick, 2001). There are various types of morally relevant schemas. One
example is our mental image of what it means to be a moral person (Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Stets & Carter, 2006). Further, being a moral person may be
a social identity we use to represent ourselves to others (Hart, 2005a). In
addition, moral identity may entail schemas that are mental representations
of ourselves engaged in moral actions (Reimer, 2003). For instance, the more
I have a clear image in my head of what it means to be a moral person, and
the more it is important for me to be such a person, the more likely that
mental representation of moral personhood will be involved in decisions I
make regarding whether or not, and in what ways, I help others.
Although the above-mentioned conceptualizations of moral identity are the
most prevalent, new approaches are continuing to emerge that draw on other
areas of social sciences literature. While these new ideas may not fully capture moral identity, they seem to highlight potentially important facets of
moral identity. For example, it may be that an important aspect of moral identity is the extent to which our personal life narratives are moral (i.e., they evidence identification with and commitment to moral living; McAdams, 2009;
Pratt, Arnold, & Lawford, 2009). Another potentially salient facet of moral
identity may be the extent to which a person’s ideal self is moral (Hardy
et al., 2014). Each of us can envision the type of person we want to be, and
commitment to that image pulls us toward that goal. Thus, part of moral
identity may be the extent to which we are committed to being a person who
is moral.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON MORAL IDENTITY
Little is known about processes and predictors of moral identity development (for a more thorough review, see Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). Again,
moral identity may involve the merging of the moral and self systems,
and it may involve the formation and increasing accessibility of morally
relevant schemas. Krettenauer (2013) has also argued that moral identity
formation entails increasingly mature forms of taking ownership or personal
responsibility for one’s morality. However, a few studies have examined
these developmental processes. Nevertheless, some have sought to outline
ways in which precursors to moral identity (such as moral evaluations of self
in childhood; Kochanska, 2002) are linked to later moral identity formation

Moral Identity

5

(Thompson, 2009). Further, there is some evidence that maturity in identity
formation and moral understanding may be prerequisites for moral identity
development (Matsuba & Walker, 2004). Lastly, involvement in community
service (Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Alisat, 2003) and religious activities
(Hart & Atkins, 2004), as well as having authoritative parents (Hardy,
Bhattacharjee, Aquino, & Reed, 2010; Pratt et al., 2003), may be contexts
facilitative of moral identity development.
More commonly, studies of moral identity have focused on examining links
to possible outcomes of moral identity. A variety of research designs and
measures have been used to fairly consistently demonstrate links between
moral identity and various outcomes (e.g., positive and negative behaviors;
see Hardy & Carlo, 2011b for a more extensive review). For example,
in-depth studies of moral exemplars show that adult exemplars experience
extensive integration of self and moral goals Colby & Damon, 1992 and
adolescent moral exemplars tend to describe their self-concept using moral
terms more so than comparison youth (Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer, 2003;
Reimer, DeWitt Goudelock, & Walker, 2009). In narrative research (Pratt,
Arnold, & Lawford, 2009), the salience of moral identity themes (as indicated
by factors such as concern for the needs and rights of others) in life narratives
is predictive of community service involvement and generative concern
(a person’s desires, commitments, and actions directed toward making a
difference in the world). Correlational studies using quantitative measures
of moral identity have found associations between moral identity and moral
actions (e.g., donating money to charities and altruistic helping; Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006), moral emotions (e.g., guilt following behavior
inconsistent with one’s sense of morality; Stets & Carter, 2006), and concern
for out-group members (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy et al., 2013). Such links
are consistently found, and range in strength from small to large.
The nature of these links between moral identity and action is unclear.
Moral identity may motivate moral action; moral action may lead people
to see themselves in moral terms, or there may be some dynamic process
by which both are involved. To more strongly infer causality, scholars have
demonstrated effects of priming moral identity (by having participants write
brief stories about themselves using moral trait terms) on moral emotions
and behaviors (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Aquino et al., 2009).
However, there is not sufficient longitudinal data on the matter to sort out
developmental sequences of moral identity and action.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
There are a number of emerging lines of research on moral identity that
we find particularly intriguing and important. First, there is work aimed

6

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

at proposing new conceptualizations of moral identity as well as novel
ways of measuring moral identity. One example is Frimer and Walker (2009)
reconciliation model of moral identity (described earlier), which posits
moral identity and the integration of agentic and communion values such
that values people have personally invested in are also beneficial to others.
They have not only articulated a compelling model but have developed
an innovating coding system for identifying co-occurrences of agentic and
communion values in open-ended responses. Another example is the work
by Pratt and colleagues (Pratt et al., 2009) to examine the degree to which
moral identity is salient in life narratives (as a facet of narrative identity).
Drawing on McAdams’ (2009) work, they have developed a system for
coding moral themes in life narratives. A final example is the effort of Hardy
et al. (2014) to conceptualize and measure moral identity in terms of the
extent to which moral characteristics are central to a person’s ideal self (the
type of person they are committed to becoming).
Second, some scholars are seeking to explicate the processes by which
moral identity might motivate positive behaviors and dissuade negative
behaviors. A number of possible mechanisms of influence have been proposed in the last few decades, including self-consistency (e.g., Blasi, 2004a),
goal integration (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992, moral schemas (e.g., Lapsley
& Narvaez, 2004), and self-narratives (e.g., Reimer, 2003). However, a few
empirical studies have sought to investigate such processes. An exception is
a recent study which found evidence that adolescents’ moral identity might
be linked to actions indirectly by way of promoting purpose and social
responsibility (Hardy et al., 2014).
Third, investigators are broadening their search for outcomes to which
moral identity might be linked. Most prior research has looked at the role of
moral identity in moral outcomes such as prosocial behaviors (e.g., Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006; Reimer, 2003). However, more recent studies are
showing links to broader outcomes not explicitly “moral.” For example,
one study of adolescents found that those higher in moral identity are more
likely to be engaged at school and involved in environmental behaviors and
less likely to report symptoms of internalizing and externalizing (Hardy
et al., 2014). Similarly, in another study college students higher in moral
identity were also higher in self-esteem and meaning in life, but lower in
sexual risk-taking, hazardous alcohol use, depression, and anxiety (Hardy
et al., 2013).
Fourth, much of the research on moral identity seems to assume it is a relatively stable, trait-like aspect of personality (Blasi, 2004a; Colby & Damon,
1992; Moshman, 2011; for a critique of this notion, see Hart, 2005b). However,
trait notions of personality have been heavily criticized by social cognitive
theorists for their inability to adequately account for situational variability

Moral Identity

7

(Cervone & Tripathi, 2009). In line with this, new research is examining situational variation in moral identity and finding that, although the importance
of morality to a person’s identity may be relatively stable, some facets of
moral identity may be more dynamically constructed “moment-to-moment”
(Monin & Jordan, 2009), and may be more or less likely to be activated in
particular situations (Aquino et al., 2009; Stets & Carter, 2006). Examples of
facets of moral identity that may vary situationally are moral evaluations of
self (How moral am I?).
Fifth, moral identity is also often described as being primarily deliberative
(Blasi, 2004a; Colby & Damon, 1992; Moshman, 2005), something about
which we are consciously aware. However, it is unclear whether the primary
mechanisms of moral identity involve such deliberative processes (such
as wanting to live consistent with one’s identity; Blasi, 1983). Part of the
goal of social cognitive approaches to moral identity is the need to better
understand the role of schemas and other implicit or automatic processes in
moral identity (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). A particularly intriguing study
on these implicit processes found that explicit moral identity (self-reports
of moral personality characteristics such as honesty) predicted deliberative
moral action (responses to moral dilemmas), whereas implicit moral identity
(assessed using an implicit associations test with moral-immoral as the
target category and me-others as the paired category) predicted automatic
moral actions (whether individuals returned “extra” research participation
compensation; Perugini & Leone, 2009).
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
It is exciting to see how theory and research on moral identity has grown and
expanded since the construct emerged in the social sciences roughly three
decades ago. As this work moves forward, there are a number of areas that
seem particularly critical and promising. For starters, all of the cutting-edge
research directions outlined earlier should continue to be pursued. These
lines of work address some fundamental questions about moral identity
and have important theoretical, methodological, and applied implications.
In addition, there are other areas for future research that have not yet
been taken up to our knowledge. First, although as noted earlier there
are some ideas out there regarding the developmental processes of moral
identity, very little empirical work has addressed the issue. In particular,
there are very few longitudinal studies of moral identity (for exceptions,
see Krettenauer, 2011; Pratt et al., 2003), and these have been somewhat
limited methodologically (e.g., short-term and not multi-method). Thus,
long-term and sophisticated developmental research is needed. Ideally
such work will span multiple phases of the lifespan, utilize multiple and

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

more rigorous measures of moral identity, and be designed to unravel the
complex dynamics of moral identity development. Second, work thus far
on moral identity has largely ignored issues of culture. Most theoretical
discussions of moral identity render little attention to possible cultural
variation, and most studies involve primarily Caucasian samples drawn
from United States and Canada. In fact, no research has even explored
ethnic differences in North American samples. This is unfortunate given
the substantial evidence suggesting cultural variation in various aspects of
personality, such as identity (Heine & Buchtel, 2009). There are arguments
emerging in anthropology, however, suggesting that lay conceptions of self
and morality may be intertwined (Hickman, 2013). Specifically, people in
different cultures have varying ways of viewing personhood, and these
likely undergird variations in notions of morality. This raises concerns
regarding measurement equivalence of moral identity measures and their
validity to use across different cultural groups.
Third, most work on moral identity has described it as something individuals have within them, an intrapersonal cognitive-affective entity of sorts
(e.g., Blasi, 2004a; Moshman, 2011). Our identity then is influenced by others through relationships in sort of a “billiard ball” manner (i.e., separate
entities impacting each other). However, this view of identity and the role of
relationships in identity is not universally held; rather, it is a Western (Heine
& Buchtel, 2009), individualist, and abstractionist (Slife, 2004) worldview of
identity. Alternatively, relationships may be a part of what makes up our
identity in the sense that we are not first and foremost separate and independent people who interact with other people, but we are fundamentally in
relation to others. This is more congruent with collectivist and Eastern worldviews of self (Heine & Buchtel, 2009). Future work should more carefully
examine the role of relationships in moral identity.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, moral identity is a new concept in the social sciences of morality
that generally entails the degree to which being a moral person is important
to our identity. A number of approaches have been taken for conceptualizing
and measuring moral identity. As we continue to expand on and evaluate
these approaches, and study moral identity using a multitude of research
methods (quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods), our understanding of the phenomena will undoubtedly deepen. While it is fairly clear that
moral identity is at least moderately related to other aspects of human functioning, and is perhaps causally related to such other aspects, there is still
much to be done to understand the processes involved, how moral identity
develops, the dynamics of how moral identity plays out in everyday life, and

Moral Identity

9

how moral identity may vary across people of different gender, ethnicity, and
cultural groups. As progress is made in these areas, our understanding of
human moral functioning and how to best foster and encourage moral living
will grow.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors appreciate Ryan Woodbury for his comments on an earlier draft
of this essay as well as help with the references.
REFERENCES
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., II, Lim, V. K. G., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a social
cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and
moral identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 123–141.
doi:10.1037/a0015406
Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II, (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1423–1440. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1423
Aquino, K., Reed, A., II, Thau, S., & Freeman, D. (2007). A grotesque and dark beauty:
How moral identity and mechanisms of moral disengagement influence cognitive and emotional reactions to war. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43,
385–392.
Bergman, R. (2004). Identity as motivation: Toward a theory of the moral self. In D.
K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 21–46).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bizer, G. Y., & Kroznick, J. A. (2001). Exploring the structure of strength-related
attitude features: The relation between attitude importance and attitude accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 566–586. doi:10.1037//00223514.81.4.566
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the
literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1–45. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.88.1.1
Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. Developmental Review, 3, 178–210. doi:10.1016/0273-2297(83)90029-1
Blasi, A. (2004a). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K.
Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 335–347).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Blasi, A. (2004b). Neither personality nor cognition: An alternative approach to the
nature of the self. In C. Lightfoot, C. Lalonde, & M. Chandler (Eds.), Changing
conceptions of psychological life (pp. 3–25). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cervone, D., & Tripathi, R. (2009). The moral functioning of the person as a whole:
On moral psychology and personality science. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.),
Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 30–51). New
York: Cambridge University Press.

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: contemporary lives of moral commitment.
New York: Free Press.
Fiske, S. T. (2000). Schema. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (Vol. 7,
pp. 158–160). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical
model of moral centrality development. Developmental Psychology, 45, 1669–1681.
doi:10.1037/a0017418
Hardy, S. A. (2006). Identity, reasoning, and emotion: An empirical comparison of
three sources of moral motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 30, 207–215.
Hardy, S. A., Bhattacharjee, A., Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II, (2010). Moral identity
and psychological distance: The case of adolescent parental socialization. Journal
of Adolescence, 33, 111–123. doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.04.008
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011a). Moral identity: What is it, how does it develop,
and is it linked to moral action? Child Development Perspectives, 5, 212–218.
doi:10.1111/j.1750-8606.2011.00189.x
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011b). Moral identity. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L.
Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 495–513). New York:
Springer.
Hardy, S. A., Francis, S. W., Zamboanga, B. L., Kim, S. Y., Anderson, S. G., & Forthun,
L. F. (2013). The roles of identity formation and moral identity in college student
mental health, health risk behaviors, and psychological well-being. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 69, 364–382. doi:10.1002/jclp.21913
Hardy, S. A., Walker, L. J., Woodbury, R. D., Olsen, J. A., & Hickman, J. R. (2014).
Moral identity as moral ideal self: Links to adolescent outcomes. Developmental Psychology, 50, 45–57.
Hart, D. (2005a). The development of moral identity. In G. Carlo & C. P. Edwards
(Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Moral development through the lifespan:
Theory, research, and application (pp. 165–196). Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
Hart, D. (2005b). Adding identity to the moral domain. Human Development, 48,
257–261. doi:10.1159/000086860
Hart, D., & Atkins, R. (2004). Religious participation and the development of moral
identity in adolescence. In T. A. Thorkildsen & H. J. Walberg (Eds.), Nurturing
morality (pp. 157–172). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Hart, D., & Fegley, S. (1995). Prosocial behavior and caring in adolescence: Relations
to self-understanding and social judgment. Child Development, 66, 1346–1359.
Heine, S. J., & Buchtel, E. E. (2009). Personality: The universal and the culturally specific. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 369–394. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.
60.110707.163655
Hickman, J. R. (2013). Ancestral personhood and moral justification. Unpublished
manuscript.
Kochanska, G. (2002). Committed compliance, moral self, and internalization: A
mediational model. Developmental Psychology, 38, 339–351.

Moral Identity

11

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive developmental approach to
socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp.
347–480). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Krettenauer, T. (2011). The dual moral self: Moral centrality and intrinsic moral
motivation. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 172, 309–328. doi:10.1080/00221325.
2010.538451
Krettenauer, T. (2013). Revisiting the moral self construct: Developmental perspectives on moral selfhood. In B. Sokol, U. F. Grouzet, & U. Müller (Eds.), Selfregulation and autonomy (pp. 115–140). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lapsley, D. K., & Lasky, B. (2001). Prototypic moral character. Identity, 1, 345–363.
Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A social-cognitive approach to the moral personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity
(pp. 189–212). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Matsuba, M. K., & Walker, L. J. (2004). Extraordinary moral commitment: Young
adults involved in social organizations. Journal of Personality, 72, 413–436. doi:
10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00267.x
McAdams, D. P. (2009). The moral personality. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.),
Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 11–29). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Monin, B., & Jordan, A. H. (2009). The dynamic moral self: A social psychological
perspective. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character:
Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 341–354). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Moshman, D. (2005). Adolescent psychological development: Rationality, morality, and
identity (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Moshman, D. (2011). Adolescent rationality and development: Cognition, morality, and
identity (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Narvaez, D., Lapsley, D. K., Hagele, S., & Lasky, B. (2006). Moral chronicity and social
information processing: Tests of a social cognitive approach to moral personality.
Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 966–985. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2005.10.003
Perugini, M., & Leone, L. (2009). Implicit self-concept and moral action. Journal of
Research in Personality, 43, 747–754. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.03.015
Pratt, M. W., Arnold, M. L., & Lawford, H. (2009). Growing towards care: A narrative
approach to prosocial moral identity and generativity of personality in emerging
adulthood. In D. Narvaez & D. K. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character:
Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 295–315). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Pratt, M. W., Hunsberger, B., Pancer, S. M., & Alisat, S. (2003). A longitudinal analysis
of personal values socialization: Correlates of a moral self-ideal in late adolescence. Social Development, 12, 563–585. doi:10.1111/1467-9507.00249
Reimer, K. (2003). Committed to caring: Transformation in adolescent moral identity.
Applied Developmental Science, 7, 129–137. doi:10.1207/S1532480XADS0703_3
Reimer, K., Dewitt, G. B. M., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Developing conceptions of moral
maturity: Traits and identity in adolescent personality. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 372–388.

12

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Rest, J. R. (1983). Morality. In P. Mussen (Series Ed.) & J. Flavell & E. Markman
(Vol. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Cognitive development (4th ed., pp.
556–628). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 25, 1–65. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6
Slife, B. D. (2004). Taking practice seriously: Toward a relational ontology. Journal of
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, 155–178. doi:10.1037/h0091239
Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2006). The moral identity: A principle level identity. In
K. A. McClelland & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), Purpose, meaning, and action: Control system
theories in sociology (pp. 293–316). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
Thompson, R. A. (2009). Early foundations: Conscience and the development of
moral character. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 159–184). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Walker, L. J. (2004). Gus in the gap: Bridging the judgment-action gap in moral functioning. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity.
(pp. 1–20). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

FURTHER READING
Blasi, A. (2004). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K.
Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 335–347).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: contemporary lives of moral commitment.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical
model of moral centrality development. Developmental Psychology, 45, 1669–1681.
doi:10.1037/a0017418
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011). Moral identity. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L.
Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 495–513). New York,
NY: Springer.
Hart, D. (2005). The development of moral identity. In G. Carlo & C. P. Edwards
(Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation: Moral development through the lifespan:
Theory, research, and application (pp. 165–196). Lincoln, OR: University of Nebraska
Press.
Krettenauer, T. (2013). Revisiting the moral self construct: Developmental perspectives on moral selfhood. In B. Sokol, U. F. Grouzet & U. Müller (Eds.), Self-regulation
and autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lapsley, D. K. (2008). Moral self-identity as the aim of education. In L. P. Nucci & D.
Narvaez (Eds.), Handbook of moral and character education (pp. 30–52). New York,
NY: Routledge.
Lapsley, D. K., & Hill, P. L. (2009). The development of the moral personality. In
D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in
moral psychology (pp. 185–213). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Moral Identity

13

Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A social-cognitive approach to the moral personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity
(pp. 189–212). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Shao, R., Aquino, K., & Freeman, D. (2008). Beyond moral reasoning: A review of
moral identity research and its implications for business ethics. Business Ethics
Quarterly, 18, 513–540.
Thompson, R. A. (2009). Early foundations: Conscience and the development of
moral character. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 159–184). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Walker, L. J. (2004). Gus in the gap: Bridging the judgment-action gap in moral functioning. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity.
(pp. 1–20). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

SAM A. HARDY SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Sam A. Hardy is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at
Brigham Young University. He completed his BS in Human Development at
BYU, and his MA and PhD in Developmental Psychology at the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln, working under Drs. Marcela Raffaelli and Gustavo
Carlo. Following graduate school he worked for 2 years as a postdoctoral
research fellow in Longitudinal Data Analysis and Lifespan Development
with Dr. John Nesselroade at the University of Virginia. His research
overlaps developmental and personality psychology, and is specifically
focused on investigating the ways in which morality, identity, and religiosity
develop, interrelate, and motivate behavior. He has published numerous
journal articles and book chapters on these issues, and is currently on the
editorial boards of four scientific journals in developmental psychology.
GUSTAVO CARLO SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Gustavo Carlo is the Millsap Professor of Diversity and Multicultural Studies in the Department of Human Development and Family Studies at the
University of Missouri, Columbia. He earned his BA at Florida International
University and completed his MA and PhD studies at Arizona State University. His main research interests are in the roles of culture, personality,
and parenting on prosocial and moral development. He has several books,
book chapters, and research publications to his credit, and has received grant
funding from NICHD, NSF, and several private foundations. Dr. Carlo is
also Associate Editor of the journal of Developmental Psychology and serves
on the editorial board of several other journals. At MU, he is the founder and
Co-Director of the Center for Children and Families Across Cultures.

14

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

RELATED ESSAYS
Lived Religion (Sociology), Nancy T. Ammerman
Identity Fusion (Psychology), Michael D. Burhmester and William B. Swann
Jr.
Understanding the Adaptive Functions of Morality from a Cognitive Psychological Perspective (Psychology), James Dungan and Liane Young
Micro-Cultures (Sociology), Gary Alan Fine
Regulatory Focus Theory (Psychology), E. Tory Higgins
Social Aspects of Memory (Psychology), William Hirst and Charles B. Stone
Group Identity and Political Cohesion (Political Science), Leonie Huddy
The Development of Social Trust (Psychology), Vikram K. Jaswal and Marissa
B. Drell
Cultural Neuroscience: Connecting Culture, Brain, and Genes (Psychology),
Shinobu Kitayama and Sarah Huff
Civic Engagement (Sociology), Peter Levine
Media and the development of Identity (Psychology), Adriana M. Manago
Identity-Based Motivation (Psychology), Daphna Oyserman
The Sociology of Religious Experience (Sociology), Douglas Porpora



Moral Identity
SAM A. HARDY and GUSTAVO CARLO

Abstract
This essay reviews theory and research on moral identity. The construct emerged
roughly three decades ago in moral psychology as a possible motivational factor that
could link moral judgments to moral actions. Moral identity is, generally speaking,
the extent to which being a moral person is important to a person’s identity. However,
it has been conceptualized and measured in various ways. In this essay, conceptualizations of moral identity, as well as foundational empirical research on moral
identity development and links between moral identity and behavior, are reviewed.
Little is known about moral identity development, but moral identity has fairly consistently been found predictive of moral action using a variety of research methods.
In addition, cutting-edge research on new areas of theory is highlighted, and promising directions for future research are outlined. Cutting-edge work deals with new
ways to conceptualize and measure moral identity, mechanisms of influence, links
to broader outcomes, situational variation in moral identity, and implicit aspects of
moral identity. Promising future directions are expanding on these emerging directions, as well as looking at developmental processes, cultural variability, and the role
of relationships.

INTRODUCTION
Scholarly work on the psychology and development of human morality
began with the pioneering work of Kohlberg (1969) on cognitive developmental theory. However, this theory and research focused largely on
deliberative moral judgment processes (conscious thought processes by
which people determine whether or not a particular course of action is
moral), with less emphasis on precursors of moral action. Reviews have
discovered that links between moral judgment and action, although consistently found in empirical studies, are somewhat weak (Blasi, 1980).
Thus began the search for factors that might bridge the so-called moral
judgment-action gap (Walker, 2004), and that might help to explain better
the commitment and motivation of “moral exemplars” (Colby & Damon,
1992. Since then, much of the work on moral motivation has focused on the
construct of moral identity. Broadly speaking, moral identity is about the
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

1

2

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

extent to which being a moral person is important to an individual’s identity
(Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). The purpose of this essay is to present various
conceptualizations of moral identity, review prior work on moral identity,
highlight cutting-edge directions in moral identity theory and research, and
point to promising future directions.
FOUNDATIONAL THEORY AND RESEARCH
Theory and research on moral identity is entering its fourth decade. Since the
pioneering work of Blasi (1983), Rest (1983), Colby and Damon (1992) and
others, interest in moral identity has grown. Varying perspectives on moral
identity are emerging, and the construct is being studied using a multitude
of research methods. We will first review conceptualization of moral identity
and then empirical research on moral identity.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF MORAL IDENTITY
The notion of moral identity in psychology largely started with the work of
developmental psychologist Blasi (1983), (2004a). He proposed that moral
identity might aid moral judgments in more reliability-yielding moral
actions. For a moral judgment to have motivating power, we must first judge
ourselves responsible to act on it. Whether we feel responsible depends to
a large extent on the degree to which morality is important to our identity.
Then, if we judge ourselves responsible to act on a moral judgment based
on the centrality of morality to our identity, this generates motivation to act
morally because people are driven to behave consistent with their identity
(i.e., self-consistency). For instance, if I understand that I should stop and
offer assistance to an injured stranger on the sidewalk, I am more likely to
actually do so if it is important to me to be a moral person who helps others,
and thus I feel I must help the stranger or risk betraying myself.
To Blasi, it is also important to understand the structure of identity in order
to better grasp its role in morality (Blasi, 2004a, 2004b). Identity structure is
the organization, maturity, and phenomenological experience of one’s identity, and thus has to perform with the ways in which people subjectively
experience their identity. Identity contents, on the other hand, are the issues
around which people base their identity. According to Blasi, for moral identity to play an important role in moral action, people must have a mature
sense of identity (e.g., they have hierarchically organized their identity by
choosing certain contents to be more central than others), and must position moral contents (e.g., moral personality traits or moral values) as central
to their identity. In other words, a person with a mature identity centered
on amoral or immoral identity contents (e.g., being wealthy) will be highly

Moral Identity

3

driven, but not necessarily in the moral direction, whereas a person who sees
morality as important to them but who has an immature identity will have
less at stake in living (or not living) morally. Recent evidence supports this
notion of the interaction of structure and content in linking moral identity to
action (Hardy et al., 2013).
Building on Blasi’s ideas, Colby and Damon (1992) focused on moral identity as the unity of self and moral goals or commitments. Their qualitative
study of moral exemplars (people who exhibit exemplary levels of moral
commitment) found them to integrate self and morality such that their own
personal interests and desires were aligned with their sense of what was
morally right. In other words, what they wanted to do and what they felt
or knew they should do were the same. They invested a lot of time, energy,
and resources in moral causes because they personally wanted to; they felt
little inner conflict about it, such as knowing they should do something but
not wanting to do it.
Others have similarly argued that moral identity emerges from the
integration of the moral and self-systems (Bergman, 2004). The formation
of morality and self may be largely separate developmental systems that
can come together beginning in adolescence and young adulthood when
both systems become more interpersonal and ideological (e.g., based on
relationships and ideals; Moshman, 2011). Variation in moral identity, then,
reflects individual differences in the extent to which the sense of morality
and sense of identity are integrated. Frimer and Walker (2009) more systematically examined this idea using Schwartz’s (1992) circumplex model
of universal values. Schwartz’s model positions communal (universalism
and benevolence) and agentic (power and achievement) value orientations
as diametrically opposed. However, Frimer and Walker found that the
degree to which communal and agentic value orientations co-occurred
in self-narratives was predictive of moral action. Thus, when people are
personally invested in and actively pursuing commitments of a moral
nature, they might be said to have a stronger moral identity, and hence
greater moral motivation. In other words, when what we want most for us
and what might benefit others is one and the same, it seems to generate
powerful moral motivation.
In the recent past, some have drawn from social cognitive theory and
research to further elaborate on moral identity (Aquino, Freeman, Reed,
Lim, & Felps, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Monin & Jordan, 2009). These
approaches see schemas as the underlying mechanisms of moral identity.
Schemas are hypothesized knowledge structures in the mind that represent
various aspects of ourselves, our relationships, and our experiences (Fiske,
2000). Moral identity may entail having morally relevant schemas readily
accessible for processing social information (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Narvaez,

4

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Underlying moral ideals and characteristics
that people see as important to their sense of identity may be a network of
such moral schemas (Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004. In fact, it
may be that ideals and characteristics seen as most important to us are also
the ones pertaining to schemas that are most readily available for processing
information in social situations Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; see also Bizer &
Kroznick, 2001). There are various types of morally relevant schemas. One
example is our mental image of what it means to be a moral person (Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Stets & Carter, 2006). Further, being a moral person may be
a social identity we use to represent ourselves to others (Hart, 2005a). In
addition, moral identity may entail schemas that are mental representations
of ourselves engaged in moral actions (Reimer, 2003). For instance, the more
I have a clear image in my head of what it means to be a moral person, and
the more it is important for me to be such a person, the more likely that
mental representation of moral personhood will be involved in decisions I
make regarding whether or not, and in what ways, I help others.
Although the above-mentioned conceptualizations of moral identity are the
most prevalent, new approaches are continuing to emerge that draw on other
areas of social sciences literature. While these new ideas may not fully capture moral identity, they seem to highlight potentially important facets of
moral identity. For example, it may be that an important aspect of moral identity is the extent to which our personal life narratives are moral (i.e., they evidence identification with and commitment to moral living; McAdams, 2009;
Pratt, Arnold, & Lawford, 2009). Another potentially salient facet of moral
identity may be the extent to which a person’s ideal self is moral (Hardy
et al., 2014). Each of us can envision the type of person we want to be, and
commitment to that image pulls us toward that goal. Thus, part of moral
identity may be the extent to which we are committed to being a person who
is moral.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON MORAL IDENTITY
Little is known about processes and predictors of moral identity development (for a more thorough review, see Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). Again,
moral identity may involve the merging of the moral and self systems,
and it may involve the formation and increasing accessibility of morally
relevant schemas. Krettenauer (2013) has also argued that moral identity
formation entails increasingly mature forms of taking ownership or personal
responsibility for one’s morality. However, a few studies have examined
these developmental processes. Nevertheless, some have sought to outline
ways in which precursors to moral identity (such as moral evaluations of self
in childhood; Kochanska, 2002) are linked to later moral identity formation

Moral Identity

5

(Thompson, 2009). Further, there is some evidence that maturity in identity
formation and moral understanding may be prerequisites for moral identity
development (Matsuba & Walker, 2004). Lastly, involvement in community
service (Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Alisat, 2003) and religious activities
(Hart & Atkins, 2004), as well as having authoritative parents (Hardy,
Bhattacharjee, Aquino, & Reed, 2010; Pratt et al., 2003), may be contexts
facilitative of moral identity development.
More commonly, studies of moral identity have focused on examining links
to possible outcomes of moral identity. A variety of research designs and
measures have been used to fairly consistently demonstrate links between
moral identity and various outcomes (e.g., positive and negative behaviors;
see Hardy & Carlo, 2011b for a more extensive review). For example,
in-depth studies of moral exemplars show that adult exemplars experience
extensive integration of self and moral goals Colby & Damon, 1992 and
adolescent moral exemplars tend to describe their self-concept using moral
terms more so than comparison youth (Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer, 2003;
Reimer, DeWitt Goudelock, & Walker, 2009). In narrative research (Pratt,
Arnold, & Lawford, 2009), the salience of moral identity themes (as indicated
by factors such as concern for the needs and rights of others) in life narratives
is predictive of community service involvement and generative concern
(a person’s desires, commitments, and actions directed toward making a
difference in the world). Correlational studies using quantitative measures
of moral identity have found associations between moral identity and moral
actions (e.g., donating money to charities and altruistic helping; Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006), moral emotions (e.g., guilt following behavior
inconsistent with one’s sense of morality; Stets & Carter, 2006), and concern
for out-group members (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy et al., 2013). Such links
are consistently found, and range in strength from small to large.
The nature of these links between moral identity and action is unclear.
Moral identity may motivate moral action; moral action may lead people
to see themselves in moral terms, or there may be some dynamic process
by which both are involved. To more strongly infer causality, scholars have
demonstrated effects of priming moral identity (by having participants write
brief stories about themselves using moral trait terms) on moral emotions
and behaviors (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Aquino et al., 2009).
However, there is not sufficient longitudinal data on the matter to sort out
developmental sequences of moral identity and action.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
There are a number of emerging lines of research on moral identity that
we find particularly intriguing and important. First, there is work aimed

6

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

at proposing new conceptualizations of moral identity as well as novel
ways of measuring moral identity. One example is Frimer and Walker (2009)
reconciliation model of moral identity (described earlier), which posits
moral identity and the integration of agentic and communion values such
that values people have personally invested in are also beneficial to others.
They have not only articulated a compelling model but have developed
an innovating coding system for identifying co-occurrences of agentic and
communion values in open-ended responses. Another example is the work
by Pratt and colleagues (Pratt et al., 2009) to examine the degree to which
moral identity is salient in life narratives (as a facet of narrative identity).
Drawing on McAdams’ (2009) work, they have developed a system for
coding moral themes in life narratives. A final example is the effort of Hardy
et al. (2014) to conceptualize and measure moral identity in terms of the
extent to which moral characteristics are central to a person’s ideal self (the
type of person they are committed to becoming).
Second, some scholars are seeking to explicate the processes by which
moral identity might motivate positive behaviors and dissuade negative
behaviors. A number of possible mechanisms of influence have been proposed in the last few decades, including self-consistency (e.g., Blasi, 2004a),
goal integration (e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992, moral schemas (e.g., Lapsley
& Narvaez, 2004), and self-narratives (e.g., Reimer, 2003). However, a few
empirical studies have sought to investigate such processes. An exception is
a recent study which found evidence that adolescents’ moral identity might
be linked to actions indirectly by way of promoting purpose and social
responsibility (Hardy et al., 2014).
Third, investigators are broadening their search for outcomes to which
moral identity might be linked. Most prior research has looked at the role of
moral identity in moral outcomes such as prosocial behaviors (e.g., Aquino
& Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006; Reimer, 2003). However, more recent studies are
showing links to broader outcomes not explicitly “moral.” For example,
one study of adolescents found that those higher in moral identity are more
likely to be engaged at school and involved in environmental behaviors and
less likely to report symptoms of internalizing and externalizing (Hardy
et al., 2014). Similarly, in another study college students higher in moral
identity were also higher in self-esteem and meaning in life, but lower in
sexual risk-taking, hazardous alcohol use, depression, and anxiety (Hardy
et al., 2013).
Fourth, much of the research on moral identity seems to assume it is a relatively stable, trait-like aspect of personality (Blasi, 2004a; Colby & Damon,
1992; Moshman, 2011; for a critique of this notion, see Hart, 2005b). However,
trait notions of personality have been heavily criticized by social cognitive
theorists for their inability to adequately account for situational variability

Moral Identity

7

(Cervone & Tripathi, 2009). In line with this, new research is examining situational variation in moral identity and finding that, although the importance
of morality to a person’s identity may be relatively stable, some facets of
moral identity may be more dynamically constructed “moment-to-moment”
(Monin & Jordan, 2009), and may be more or less likely to be activated in
particular situations (Aquino et al., 2009; Stets & Carter, 2006). Examples of
facets of moral identity that may vary situationally are moral evaluations of
self (How moral am I?).
Fifth, moral identity is also often described as being primarily deliberative
(Blasi, 2004a; Colby & Damon, 1992; Moshman, 2005), something about
which we are consciously aware. However, it is unclear whether the primary
mechanisms of moral identity involve such deliberative processes (such
as wanting to live consistent with one’s identity; Blasi, 1983). Part of the
goal of social cognitive approaches to moral identity is the need to better
understand the role of schemas and other implicit or automatic processes in
moral identity (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). A particularly intriguing study
on these implicit processes found that explicit moral identity (self-reports
of moral personality characteristics such as honesty) predicted deliberative
moral action (responses to moral dilemmas), whereas implicit moral identity
(assessed using an implicit associations test with moral-immoral as the
target category and me-others as the paired category) predicted automatic
moral actions (whether individuals returned “extra” research participation
compensation; Perugini & Leone, 2009).
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
It is exciting to see how theory and research on moral identity has grown and
expanded since the construct emerged in the social sciences roughly three
decades ago. As this work moves forward, there are a number of areas that
seem particularly critical and promising. For starters, all of the cutting-edge
research directions outlined earlier should continue to be pursued. These
lines of work address some fundamental questions about moral identity
and have important theoretical, methodological, and applied implications.
In addition, there are other areas for future research that have not yet
been taken up to our knowledge. First, although as noted earlier there
are some ideas out there regarding the developmental processes of moral
identity, very little empirical work has addressed the issue. In particular,
there are very few longitudinal studies of moral identity (for exceptions,
see Krettenauer, 2011; Pratt et al., 2003), and these have been somewhat
limited methodologically (e.g., short-term and not multi-method). Thus,
long-term and sophisticated developmental research is needed. Ideally
such work will span multiple phases of the lifespan, utilize multiple and

8

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

more rigorous measures of moral identity, and be designed to unravel the
complex dynamics of moral identity development. Second, work thus far
on moral identity has largely ignored issues of culture. Most theoretical
discussions of moral identity render little attention to possible cultural
variation, and most studies involve primarily Caucasian samples drawn
from United States and Canada. In fact, no research has even explored
ethnic differences in North American samples. This is unfortunate given
the substantial evidence suggesting cultural variation in various aspects of
personality, such as identity (Heine & Buchtel, 2009). There are arguments
emerging in anthropology, however, suggesting that lay conceptions of self
and morality may be intertwined (Hickman, 2013). Specifically, people in
different cultures have varying ways of viewing personhood, and these
likely undergird variations in notions of morality. This raises concerns
regarding measurement equivalence of moral identity measures and their
validity to use across different cultural groups.
Third, most work on moral identity has described it as something individuals have within them, an intrapersonal cognitive-affective entity of sorts
(e.g., Blasi, 2004a; Moshman, 2011). Our identity then is influenced by others through relationships in sort of a “billiard ball” manner (i.e., separate
entities impacting each other). However, this view of identity and the role of
relationships in identity is not universally held; rather, it is a Western (Heine
& Buchtel, 2009), individualist, and abstractionist (Slife, 2004) worldview of
identity. Alternatively, relationships may be a part of what makes up our
identity in the sense that we are not first and foremost separate and independent people who interact with other people, but we are fundamentally in
relation to others. This is more congruent with collectivist and Eastern worldviews of self (Heine & Buchtel, 2009). Future work should more carefully
examine the role of relationships in moral identity.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, moral identity is a new concept in the social sciences of morality
that generally entails the degree to which being a moral person is important
to our identity. A number of approaches have been taken for conceptualizing
and measuring moral identity. As we continue to expand on and evaluate
these approaches, and study moral identity using a multitude of research
methods (quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods), our understanding of the phenomena will undoubtedly deepen. While it is fairly clear that
moral identity is at least moderately related to other aspects of human functioning, and is perhaps causally related to such other aspects, there is still
much to be done to understand the processes involved, how moral identity
develops, the dynamics of how moral identity plays out in everyday life, and

Moral Identity

9

how moral identity may vary across people of different gender, ethnicity, and
cultural groups. As progress is made in these areas, our understanding of
human moral functioning and how to best foster and encourage moral living
will grow.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors appreciate Ryan Woodbury for his comments on an earlier draft
of this essay as well as help with the references.
REFERENCES
Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., II, Lim, V. K. G., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a social
cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and
moral identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 123–141.
doi:10.1037/a0015406
Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II, (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1423–1440. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1423
Aquino, K., Reed, A., II, Thau, S., & Freeman, D. (2007). A grotesque and dark beauty:
How moral identity and mechanisms of moral disengagement influence cognitive and emotional reactions to war. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43,
385–392.
Bergman, R. (2004). Identity as motivation: Toward a theory of the moral self. In D.
K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 21–46).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bizer, G. Y., & Kroznick, J. A. (2001). Exploring the structure of strength-related
attitude features: The relation between attitude importance and attitude accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 566–586. doi:10.1037//00223514.81.4.566
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the
literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1–45. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.88.1.1
Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. Developmental Review, 3, 178–210. doi:10.1016/0273-2297(83)90029-1
Blasi, A. (2004a). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K.
Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 335–347).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Blasi, A. (2004b). Neither personality nor cognition: An alternative approach to the
nature of the self. In C. Lightfoot, C. Lalonde, & M. Chandler (Eds.), Changing
conceptions of psychological life (pp. 3–25). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cervone, D., & Tripathi, R. (2009). The moral functioning of the person as a whole:
On moral psychology and personality science. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.),
Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 30–51). New
York: Cambridge University Press.

10

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: contemporary lives of moral commitment.
New York: Free Press.
Fiske, S. T. (2000). Schema. In A. E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (Vol. 7,
pp. 158–160). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical
model of moral centrality development. Developmental Psychology, 45, 1669–1681.
doi:10.1037/a0017418
Hardy, S. A. (2006). Identity, reasoning, and emotion: An empirical comparison of
three sources of moral motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 30, 207–215.
Hardy, S. A., Bhattacharjee, A., Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II, (2010). Moral identity
and psychological distance: The case of adolescent parental socialization. Journal
of Adolescence, 33, 111–123. doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.04.008
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011a). Moral identity: What is it, how does it develop,
and is it linked to moral action? Child Development Perspectives, 5, 212–218.
doi:10.1111/j.1750-8606.2011.00189.x
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011b). Moral identity. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L.
Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 495–513). New York:
Springer.
Hardy, S. A., Francis, S. W., Zamboanga, B. L., Kim, S. Y., Anderson, S. G., & Forthun,
L. F. (2013). The roles of identity formation and moral identity in college student
mental health, health risk behaviors, and psychological well-being. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 69, 364–382. doi:10.1002/jclp.21913
Hardy, S. A., Walker, L. J., Woodbury, R. D., Olsen, J. A., & Hickman, J. R. (2014).
Moral identity as moral ideal self: Links to adolescent outcomes. Developmental Psychology, 50, 45–57.
Hart, D. (2005a). The development of moral identity. In G. Carlo & C. P. Edwards
(Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Moral development through the lifespan:
Theory, research, and application (pp. 165–196). Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
Hart, D. (2005b). Adding identity to the moral domain. Human Development, 48,
257–261. doi:10.1159/000086860
Hart, D., & Atkins, R. (2004). Religious participation and the development of moral
identity in adolescence. In T. A. Thorkildsen & H. J. Walberg (Eds.), Nurturing
morality (pp. 157–172). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Hart, D., & Fegley, S. (1995). Prosocial behavior and caring in adolescence: Relations
to self-understanding and social judgment. Child Development, 66, 1346–1359.
Heine, S. J., & Buchtel, E. E. (2009). Personality: The universal and the culturally specific. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 369–394. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.
60.110707.163655
Hickman, J. R. (2013). Ancestral personhood and moral justification. Unpublished
manuscript.
Kochanska, G. (2002). Committed compliance, moral self, and internalization: A
mediational model. Developmental Psychology, 38, 339–351.

Moral Identity

11

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive developmental approach to
socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp.
347–480). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Krettenauer, T. (2011). The dual moral self: Moral centrality and intrinsic moral
motivation. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 172, 309–328. doi:10.1080/00221325.
2010.538451
Krettenauer, T. (2013). Revisiting the moral self construct: Developmental perspectives on moral selfhood. In B. Sokol, U. F. Grouzet, & U. Müller (Eds.), Selfregulation and autonomy (pp. 115–140). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lapsley, D. K., & Lasky, B. (2001). Prototypic moral character. Identity, 1, 345–363.
Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A social-cognitive approach to the moral personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity
(pp. 189–212). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Matsuba, M. K., & Walker, L. J. (2004). Extraordinary moral commitment: Young
adults involved in social organizations. Journal of Personality, 72, 413–436. doi:
10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00267.x
McAdams, D. P. (2009). The moral personality. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.),
Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 11–29). New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Monin, B., & Jordan, A. H. (2009). The dynamic moral self: A social psychological
perspective. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character:
Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 341–354). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Moshman, D. (2005). Adolescent psychological development: Rationality, morality, and
identity (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Moshman, D. (2011). Adolescent rationality and development: Cognition, morality, and
identity (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Narvaez, D., Lapsley, D. K., Hagele, S., & Lasky, B. (2006). Moral chronicity and social
information processing: Tests of a social cognitive approach to moral personality.
Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 966–985. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2005.10.003
Perugini, M., & Leone, L. (2009). Implicit self-concept and moral action. Journal of
Research in Personality, 43, 747–754. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.03.015
Pratt, M. W., Arnold, M. L., & Lawford, H. (2009). Growing towards care: A narrative
approach to prosocial moral identity and generativity of personality in emerging
adulthood. In D. Narvaez & D. K. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character:
Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 295–315). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Pratt, M. W., Hunsberger, B., Pancer, S. M., & Alisat, S. (2003). A longitudinal analysis
of personal values socialization: Correlates of a moral self-ideal in late adolescence. Social Development, 12, 563–585. doi:10.1111/1467-9507.00249
Reimer, K. (2003). Committed to caring: Transformation in adolescent moral identity.
Applied Developmental Science, 7, 129–137. doi:10.1207/S1532480XADS0703_3
Reimer, K., Dewitt, G. B. M., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Developing conceptions of moral
maturity: Traits and identity in adolescent personality. Journal of Positive Psychology, 4, 372–388.

12

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Rest, J. R. (1983). Morality. In P. Mussen (Series Ed.) & J. Flavell & E. Markman
(Vol. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 3. Cognitive development (4th ed., pp.
556–628). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 25, 1–65. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6
Slife, B. D. (2004). Taking practice seriously: Toward a relational ontology. Journal of
Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24, 155–178. doi:10.1037/h0091239
Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2006). The moral identity: A principle level identity. In
K. A. McClelland & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), Purpose, meaning, and action: Control system
theories in sociology (pp. 293–316). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
Thompson, R. A. (2009). Early foundations: Conscience and the development of
moral character. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 159–184). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Walker, L. J. (2004). Gus in the gap: Bridging the judgment-action gap in moral functioning. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity.
(pp. 1–20). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

FURTHER READING
Blasi, A. (2004). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K.
Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 335–347).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: contemporary lives of moral commitment.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical
model of moral centrality development. Developmental Psychology, 45, 1669–1681.
doi:10.1037/a0017418
Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011). Moral identity. S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L.
Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 495–513). New York,
NY: Springer.
Hart, D. (2005). The development of moral identity. In G. Carlo & C. P. Edwards
(Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation: Moral development through the lifespan:
Theory, research, and application (pp. 165–196). Lincoln, OR: University of Nebraska
Press.
Krettenauer, T. (2013). Revisiting the moral self construct: Developmental perspectives on moral selfhood. In B. Sokol, U. F. Grouzet & U. Müller (Eds.), Self-regulation
and autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lapsley, D. K. (2008). Moral self-identity as the aim of education. In L. P. Nucci & D.
Narvaez (Eds.), Handbook of moral and character education (pp. 30–52). New York,
NY: Routledge.
Lapsley, D. K., & Hill, P. L. (2009). The development of the moral personality. In
D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in
moral psychology (pp. 185–213). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Moral Identity

13

Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A social-cognitive approach to the moral personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity
(pp. 189–212). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Shao, R., Aquino, K., & Freeman, D. (2008). Beyond moral reasoning: A review of
moral identity research and its implications for business ethics. Business Ethics
Quarterly, 18, 513–540.
Thompson, R. A. (2009). Early foundations: Conscience and the development of
moral character. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 159–184). New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Walker, L. J. (2004). Gus in the gap: Bridging the judgment-action gap in moral functioning. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity.
(pp. 1–20). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

SAM A. HARDY SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Sam A. Hardy is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at
Brigham Young University. He completed his BS in Human Development at
BYU, and his MA and PhD in Developmental Psychology at the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln, working under Drs. Marcela Raffaelli and Gustavo
Carlo. Following graduate school he worked for 2 years as a postdoctoral
research fellow in Longitudinal Data Analysis and Lifespan Development
with Dr. John Nesselroade at the University of Virginia. His research
overlaps developmental and personality psychology, and is specifically
focused on investigating the ways in which morality, identity, and religiosity
develop, interrelate, and motivate behavior. He has published numerous
journal articles and book chapters on these issues, and is currently on the
editorial boards of four scientific journals in developmental psychology.
GUSTAVO CARLO SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Gustavo Carlo is the Millsap Professor of Diversity and Multicultural Studies in the Department of Human Development and Family Studies at the
University of Missouri, Columbia. He earned his BA at Florida International
University and completed his MA and PhD studies at Arizona State University. His main research interests are in the roles of culture, personality,
and parenting on prosocial and moral development. He has several books,
book chapters, and research publications to his credit, and has received grant
funding from NICHD, NSF, and several private foundations. Dr. Carlo is
also Associate Editor of the journal of Developmental Psychology and serves
on the editorial board of several other journals. At MU, he is the founder and
Co-Director of the Center for Children and Families Across Cultures.

14

EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

RELATED ESSAYS
Lived Religion (Sociology), Nancy T. Ammerman
Identity Fusion (Psychology), Michael D. Burhmester and William B. Swann
Jr.
Understanding the Adaptive Functions of Morality from a Cognitive Psychological Perspective (Psychology), James Dungan and Liane Young
Micro-Cultures (Sociology), Gary Alan Fine
Regulatory Focus Theory (Psychology), E. Tory Higgins
Social Aspects of Memory (Psychology), William Hirst and Charles B. Stone
Group Identity and Political Cohesion (Political Science), Leonie Huddy
The Development of Social Trust (Psychology), Vikram K. Jaswal and Marissa
B. Drell
Cultural Neuroscience: Connecting Culture, Brain, and Genes (Psychology),
Shinobu Kitayama and Sarah Huff
Civic Engagement (Sociology), Peter Levine
Media and the development of Identity (Psychology), Adriana M. Manago
Identity-Based Motivation (Psychology), Daphna Oyserman
The Sociology of Religious Experience (Sociology), Douglas Porpora