Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
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Family Formation in Times of Labor
Market Insecurities
JOHANNES HUININK
Abstract
Family formation is still a major life goal for an overwhelming section of the population in contemporary societies. It is a major transition in the individual life course
because bringing up children in modern societies is a challenging and costly task.
Men and women are increasingly aware of this fact. That is why family formation is
no longer taken for granted as an obligatory marker of the transition to adulthood. It
is increasingly a matter of conscious decision making—at least in modern societies.
One would expect economic uncertainty to be a major issue in this decision. Labor
market insecurity in particular should prevent couples from realizing family formation and impact the timing of childbirth or the likelihood of remaining childless.
There are plenty of historical examples showing that in times of economic crisis and
major societal instability birthrates decline considerably. However, more recent studies in various countries show mixed evidence in regard to the impact of economic
uncertainty and labor market insecurity on family formation. The puzzle of these
partially seemingly contradictory findings has not yet been solved. Obviously, the
relationship between labor market insecurity and family formation is more complex
than has been assumed. It is the result of a complex interplay between historical factors and traditions, current socioeconomic conditions of the lives of men and women,
and their personal ways of dealing with risks and uncertainties.
INTRODUCTION
Family formation has considerable consequences for the life course of men
and women. Raising children in modern societies is a challenging and costly
task. As it is no longer an obligatory experience in the life course of men and
women, it is more and more a matter of conscious decision making. Couples
weigh up the pros and cons of having a child under the given and expected
circumstance of their lives. Before taking responsibility for a child they want
to be confident that they can count on sound and stable economic conditions
in the future. There are two major reasons for this: Individuals or couples
want to meet their aspirations in regard to bringing up their children. Gainful employment as the primary source of household income is needed to bear
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
the costs of parenting. At the same time, parents want to continue pursuing
other personal life goals after family formation. Among others these include
the desire of fathers and mothers to stay gainfully employed and further their
career. A stable job and an opportune labor market definitely lower the risk
of economic hardship. Good prospects for both partners in the labor market
are perceived as an important prerequisite for having children. Therefore, the
general hypothesis is that economic insecurity prevents couples from realizing family formation. Consequently, it should at least impact the timing of
childbirth. Economic insecurity can affect the likelihood of having a child if
prospects in the labor market are uncertain for a longer period of time and
family formation would imply too high risks in the future life course.
However, it could also be the other way round. Economic uncertainty over
the life course could motivate family formation because it can be a kind of
strategy to establish a stable social context with clear responsibilities and
duties. Women with low-level qualifications are hit particularly hard by economic crises and high risks of unemployment. They might find more and
strong fulfillments in caring for a family instead of facing an insecure and
unsatisfactory work life.
Obviously, the relationship between labor market insecurity and family
formation is complex. Its manifestation in fertility behavior is the result of
the interplay between historical factors and cultural traditions, the level of
social security provided by welfare states, current socioeconomic conditions
of the life course, gender, family-related preferences, and the individual way
of dealing with risks and uncertainties. Simple answers cannot be expected.
It is said that in times of globalization and weak social policy regimes, people have to cope with steady changes in the labor market, implying more
instability and an increasing need for flexibility and mobility. At the same
time, the ability of the welfare state to protect its citizens against the risks
of economic insecurity and poverty is diminishing. That is why the question
of how labor market insecurity affects family formation is highly relevant.
This is particularly true because we can expect that in spite of or even as
a reaction to these trends, the need for stable family relationships will not
diminish. Therefore, we are faced with a paradox: Economic insecurity makes
long-term commitment to a family more risky, but at the same time it amplifies the need for a family that provides authentic relationships.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Economic living conditions, labor market insecurity, and unemployment
risks are assumed to have an impact on family planning over the life course.
But empirical analyses show that this is not true under all circumstances
and the most significant effects identified have been those on the timing
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
3
of family formation. Theories on the mechanisms that could explain the
relevance of economic and labor market conditions for individual fertility
behavior have so far not provided a general and valid framework. Things
are obviously far more complex than has been assumed.
An inspection of long-term levels of aggregated fertility shows that in historical periods of severe economic or social crises a drop in period-specific
fertility rates can be observed in many countries. Even though this
coincidence does not always emerge, or at least not to the same extent, it is
reasonable to assume a causal link between economic development, labor
market dynamics, and family formation. However, historical and internationally comparative studies show mixed evidence in detail (Sobotka,
Skirbekk, & Philipov, 2011).
A prime example of an economic crisis, which has been investigated extensively in regard to its consequences for fertility and family formation, is the
Great Depression of the early 1930s. The Great Depression led to unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty in many countries of the world.
In the United States, the decline in fertility rates during this historical time
was considerable. Most scholars of demography agree that low birth rates
were related to economic hardship and experiences of unemployment suffered by huge sections of the population (Rindfuss, Morgan, & Swicegood,
1988). In European countries such as Germany and Sweden, the decrease
in fertility rates was also significant, whereas in France, which was hit less
strongly by the crisis, hardly any drop in fertility rates was observed (Kreyenfeld, Andersson, & Pailhé, 2012).
Compared to the Great Depression, the years at the end of or immediately
after the two World Wars in the twentieth century are less intensively investigated. These periods stand for societal catastrophes that affected the whole
social system and were also accompanied by severe economic hardship. In
Germany, fertility rates dropped sharply immediately after the end of World
War I and II, but recovered quickly. The same is true for France, but at the end
of World War II only on a moderate level. Research on the consequences of the
economic crisis in the early 1970s (oil price shock) brought no clear evidence
for causal effects on family formation. Even though in the United States, for
example, fertility rates deviated negatively from the long-term trend, more
detailed studies do not support the assumption that the crisis had a decisive
impact (Butz & Ward, 1979).
Research also shows an interdependence of fertility with the business cycle,
which is characterized by changing labor market opportunities, differently
high unemployment rates and different degrees of job insecurity. In times
when the compatibility of family and employment was a more critical issue
for women than it is today, studies found evidence of a counter-cyclical relationship between the business cycle and fertility (Butz & Ward, 1979). Better
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
prospects in the labor market that women could also profit from led to higher
opportunity cost of caring for children. Between the 1960s and the 1990s the
relationship between female labor force participation and fertility changed in
many countries. If the conditions for reconciling work and family are good,
fertility and the business cycle are related in a procyclical way. In Sweden, for
example, the economic recession and increasing labor market insecurity in
the 1990s—as well as cuts in family-related benefits by the Swedish state—led
to a decline in family formation. After recovering from the recession, Swedish
fertility rates went up again (Andersson, 2000). That the absence of labor market insecurity in combination with good conditions for reconciling work and
family favors early family formation is also supported by the fact that in the
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as with the GDR, the age at family formation was unprecedentedly low (Huinink & Kreyenfeld, 2006).
In general, it is a difficult task to disentangle the effects of economic and
labor market insecurity on birth rates from the long-term trend of declining
fertility in developed countries. It is not clear to what extent these trends are
driven by cultural or economic factors. One strand of research argues that this
trend toward a secular decline in fertility in developed countries since the late
1960s can be explained by changing and globalizing economies which introduce more insecurity in labor markets and increase demands for flexibility
and mobility that particularly hit young adults (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, &
Kurz, 2005). Another strand of research emphasizes the role of noneconomic
factors, such as value change and the changing roles of women in societies
(Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 2004).
Obviously, economic insecurity may lead to different reactions according
to family formation. But some typical patterns have been identified quite
clearly. The usual case seems to be that men and women postpone births during a period of economic uncertainty. Fertility is recuperated in later years to
a degree that depends on the age individuals are confronted at with existential insecurity. This can be observed, for instance, in the case of the societal
transformation in Eastern Europe. Here, a rapid postponement of childbirth
took place. This was the major reason for a sharp drop in fertility rates. However, obviously some couples decided against family formation or extension
at all, which resulted in a lower mean number of children born over the life
course and higher rates of childlessness (Huinink & Kreyenfeld, 2006).
Another well-proven finding is that labor market insecurity hinders men
in particular from having children. Lower educated and economically disadvantaged men also marry at an older age and stay unmarried at a higher rate.
They are not regarded as attractive because they cannot and are not expected
to guarantee a satisfactory standard of living. This was particularly true at
times when the male breadwinner model was the dominant pattern of the
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
5
couples’ household production. The baby boom after World War II, therefore, was mainly due to the fact that the economic prospects for young men
were promising: It was a time of economic prosperity and they could expect
a lifelong stable occupational career. The decision to start a family could be
made relatively early in the life course (Morgan, 1996).
To sum up: We learn from previous research that economic insecurity had
a different impact on fertility in different countries in times of societal or economic crises, that men and women are affected differently, and that the age
at which individuals are affected by periodical shocks makes a difference in
regard to their short-term family formation behavior and long-term fertility. There is clear evidence that severe economic insecurity accompanied by
deep economic crises or societal “catastrophes” leads to a significant postponement of births. Evidence is also strong that from the era of the male
breadwinner system as the model for the family’s household production until
today particularly men suffer from economic disadvantages. One important
question is, however, what the effects of destabilizing of occupational careers
in globalizing economies on fertility are. Another question is to which extent
women, who are also increasingly integrated in the labor market and are supposed to stay employed after childbirth, are affected by this trend. Current
research shows a quite mixed picture in this regard.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
Recent studies have focused on several issues: Firstly, from a methodological point of view, they analyze the impact of economic uncertainty in general and labor market insecurity in particular on fertility as an integrated
part of individual life courses. They use individual-level data and apply longitudinal multivariate methods of analysis. Secondly, from the substantive
point of view, studies have mainly dealt with the impact of male and female
unemployment or perceived job insecurity on family formation or—more
generally—with effects of subjectively perceived economic uncertainty on
transition rates to first birth. Thirdly, as women’s labor market participation
has expanded and the dual career pattern becomes more and more common,
the effects of labor market insecurity on women and not only on men have
gained more attention. Fourthly, studies have focused on certain geographical regions: Of particular interest were Central and Eastern Europe, where
the transformation of the former communist countries caused not only major
sociopolitical discontinuities but also an economic downturn, high unemployment rates, and a weakening of state support systems (Sobotka et al.,
2011). Another focus was put on Southern Europe where high levels of youth
unemployment and the precarious paths of entry into an occupational career
impact the transition to adulthood (Adserà, 2011). Finally, initial analyses
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
investigating the effects of the most recent economic crisis starting in 2008
in the United States and in Europe have been published (Sobotka et al., 2011).
Comparing different countries, one gains a diverse picture of the impact
of labor market insecurity on family formation (Adserà, 2011; Kreyenfeld
et al., 2012; Sobotka et al., 2011). Contradictory results have been obtained
regarding the effects of unemployment on men and women. While the
evidence is still rather consistent for men, the effects of unemployment for
women vary quite strongly. Obviously, they depend heavily on women’s
qualification level, the labor market structure, historical and cultural
peculiarities, and the family and welfare policies in the various countries
investigated (Kreyenfeld, 2010; Lundström & Andersson, 2012; Pailhé &
Solaz, 2012; Schmitt, 2012). Low fertility rates and postponement of family
formation in Southern Europe are at least partially caused by the poor job
prospects and nonstandard employment contracts of young adults in these
countries (Adserà, 2011; Vignoli, Drefahl, & De Santis, 2012).
Findings on the effects of the subjective perception of economic uncertainty
on the timing and incidence of family formation also seem to be contradictory. The results depend on the respective measure applied. This unsatisfactory fact can be illustrated by a look at recent studies of the German case:
Some of them hardly find any effects of perceived job insecurity (Kreyenfeld,
2010). Other studies present a negative effect of the perceived probability of
unemployment on family formation of women (Bhaumik & Nugent, 2011;
Hofmann & Hofmeyer, 2013).
One reason for the inconsistent findings of recent studies dealing with different countries or regions might be that individual perceptions of insecurity
are different. An illustrative example gives a comparison between West and
East Germany showing that individual values und life plans matter systematically for the degree to which economic uncertainty affects the timing of
family formation (Bernardi, Klärner, & von der Lippe, 2008).
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There is evidence that labor market insecurity and unemployment risks as
consequences of economic crisis or individual deprivation have an impact on
family formation over the life course. However, it is hard to find a conclusive
explanation and the mechanisms are not fully understood. Many theoretical and empirical questions are still not answered. Before we address some
methodological challenges of the empirical analysis more precisely, we first
reconsider some theoretical assumptions.
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
7
THEORETICAL ISSUES
Anthropological and historical research shows that in the history of mankind
the timing and number of births has always been regulated according to
the available resources for bringing up offspring in one or the other way.
However, the question of what has been perceived as a sufficient level of
resources needed for satisfactory household production has been answered
very differently.
In today’s modern or—as it is often phrased—post-modern societies family formation is no longer taken for granted as an obligatory step in the life
course and it is increasingly a matter of conscious decision making. Sexuality
has been disconnected from fertility and the availability of safe contraception
empowered couples to plan the “whether” and “when” of childbirth. Couples can consider whether it is opportune to have a child at all and when
to take responsibility for a child under the given circumstances of their life
course. Many couples decide on family formation—and are expected to do
so by their social environment—only after they are convinced that they can
draw on sufficiently sound and stable economic conditions in the future to
enable them to bring up their children properly and to continue pursuing
their other life goals.
The male breadwinner model has lost relevance. However, it has become
obligatory for spouses to remain in paid employment and to be economically
independent of their partner. The relevance of the man’s income has not deteriorated. Because couples with children often still adopt a traditional pattern
of household production, the income of the male partner is considered to be
particularly important and the timing of family formation corresponds to the
economic prospects of the man as the main provider of the material basis for
the family household. However, it is an open question how long this relative
dominance of the male income will remain valid because as women attain
better qualifications and have improved prospects in the labor market, the
balance between the sexes changes in this regard also.
This development has several consequences. First, a further postponement
of family formation can be expected because two employment careers have to
be synchronized. Second, the costs of a family household increase, because
daycare for children has to be paid for and the household production has
to be organized in a more efficient way by purchasing more services rather
than self-producing them. Third, two incomes mean that the burden on men
to achieve a secure work and income situation might be lower because the
female partner could step in. This would lower the effects of economic insecurity on family formation because the woman could take on the role of the
main provider of income, at least for a while.
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
From these assumptions quite a number of factors emerge, which have to
be looked at to understand whether and how economic hardship, labor market insecurity, and income risks impact decisions about family formation.
These factors encompass a mixture of objective conditions of the labor market and the socioeconomic background of individuals, the couple’s internal
organization of the household production and division of domestic work,
the individuals’ subjective perceptions of life course risks, and their subjective demands in regard to the different issues of family life and life outside
the family. If we want to obtain a complete picture of the impact of labor
market insecurity on family formation, we have to consider all these objective and subjective factors and identify the mechanisms leading to different
outcomes. Let us discuss a few examples.
A similar objective situation in regard to labor market insecurity might lead
to different behavior depending on the subjective perception of risks. One
has to assume that men and women show a different level of risk aversion.
They stick more or less strongly to the conviction that gainful and stable
employment of both partners, as the primary source of household income,
is necessary to bear the costs of parenting and other activities.
Child-related aspirations might be differently high. They influence the extent
to which economic insecurity is seen as a hazard for a satisfying family development. For example, high aspirations in regard to parenting and the standard of living of a family can lower their propensity to have a child because
they assume that they cannot meet these requirements. For these couples,
employment insecurity should be more relevant for family planning than in
a case where economic uncertainty is not perceived as a relevant menace for
satisfactory parenting. In addition to the precarious employment situation of
young adults, this seems partly to explain the low fertility rates in Southern
Europe because the aspirations in regard to the prerequisites of family formation in these familialistic countries are particularly high. Whether couples
just postpone family formation in case of an economic crisis or give up their
intention to have children depends on the expected duration of this kind of
insecurity, the impression that things will not change for the better, and that
the future in terms of economic welfare is uncertain (Ranjan, 1999).
Individuals’ aspirations in regard to extrafamilial activities, their engagement
in other life domains and their standard of living impact the readiness to
invest in children and also depend on the expected economic security over
the life course (Easterlin, 1976). If the goal of having a family is not that strong
and a couple does not want to give up its extrafamilial engagement or reduce
the demands from other life goals, the primary intention might be to preserve
the ability to pursue these interest as far as possible before starting a family.
An important question is of how strongly couples fear that their future occupational career is menaced by the formation of a family. This does not so
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
9
much concern the effects on potential family life but the question of whether,
in an economically difficult situation, a family augments the restrictions on
following personal interests in other life domains, particularly as far as their
career and standard of living are concerned.
In these three examples, a favorable labor market should be supportive to
family formation because it means lower risks of experiencing unemployment and economic hardship.
(4) We already mentioned that economic uncertainty over the life course
could motivate family formation because a family could be a kind of tool
to reduce future uncertainties in regard to deciding on the next steps in the
life course (uncertainty reduction). Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa argue
that this could particularly apply to women with low levels of qualification (Friedman, Hechter, & Kanazawa, 1994). Economic insecurity leads to
compensatory action by these women: They have a child and their family
becomes a fulfilling field of engagement and a source of certainty in regard to
future decision making. In some cases, teenage motherhood can be explained
by this phenomenon.
(5) The drop in fertility rates in Eastern European countries during the
period of political and economic transformation was very pronounced. There
are several possible reasons for this: The decline in fertility could be the result
of (i) a process of assimilation to the Western pattern of family formation, (ii)
a general perception of preliminary societal uncertainty regarding the future
and an increasing reluctance in regard to family formation or (iii) a perceived
increasing labor market insecurity owing to the changing structure of the
economy.
If we want to understand the effects of labor market insecurity on family formation, we need to know much more about the issues mentioned in
the previous examples. In particular, the subjective perceptions of economic
development and risks by men and women are crucial.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The theoretical considerations illustrate main aspects of a methodological
program. As the subjective factor is so important for disentangling the complex relationship between economic conditions, labor market insecurity, and
uncertain future, we need more detailed research investigating the causal factors at the individual level. This means that we need long-term studies allowing life course and cohort analyses with subjective indicators. They have to
cover a considerable time span because it can be expected that the age at
the onset and the duration of periods of insecure employment play a major
role. To analyze the impact of economic uncertainty requires to study the full
range of determinants of fertility behavior and not only to consider single
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
life course events and objective living conditions. It is necessary to include
measures of salience and intentions in regard to goal pursuit in different
life domains. It also means to control for personal characteristics such as
risk aversion. Retrospective data collection is of limited value in this case
because the subjective information has to be recorded on time to avoid memory biases. Various household panels in the United States and in Europe as
well as the “pairfam” study in Germany provide data that allow these kinds
of analyses to a certain extent. However, as the review of current research
has shown, more specialized studies that focus on the respective questions
in more detail are needed.
Another lesson can be learned from the cutting-edge research. Not only are
analyses with standardized data of value but qualitative research could also
add to a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms leading to the
(non)effects of labor market insecurity on family formation and other aspects
of the individual life course.
Finally, a comparative perspective is also of great importance. This means
conducting more comparisons than previously over time and cohorts and
between regions or countries. Such studies could show whether individuals
in the past dealt with uncertainties and insecurity differently in comparison
with today. Such studies could also show how perceptions of and strategies
for coping with insecurity differ between countries with different social and
institutional structures.
SUMMARY/CONCLUDING COMMENTS
As the occupational lives of men and women are increasingly characterized
by instabilities and insecurity, and as this particularly applies to the phase
of transition to adulthood, the question of the impact of labor market insecurity on fertility is highly relevant. Only if this interrelation is well understood
is it possible to find adequate measures and tools to reduce possible hazardous consequences for family formation. It seems obvious that those consequences are apparent, but do not occur under all circumstances. Evidence
shows that the relationship between labor market insecurity and family formation is rather complex. Even cutting-edge research using sophisticated
data and methods of analysis has so far not shed so much light on it that the
mechanisms are well understood. One important reason may be that both the
occupational career and the family career are embedded in an interdependent
life course. Another reason is that the individuals’ subjective perceptions of
insecurity and its expected consequences for the life course have not been
looked at sufficiently detailed. It seems to be important that current studies
based on data from large panel studies are supplemented by more specific
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
11
and detailed research in which quantitative and qualitative analyses are combined in a productive way.
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Blossfeld, H.-P., Klijzing, E., Mills, M., & Kurz, K. (2005). Globalization, uncertainty and
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Easterlin, R. A. (1976). The conflict between aspirations and resources. Population and
Development Review, 2, 417–425.
Butz, W. P., & Ward, M. P. (1979). The emergence of countercyclical U.S. fertility. The
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Friedman, D., Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1994). A theory of the value of children.
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Hofmann, B., & Hofmeyer, K. (2013). Perceived economic uncertainty and fertility:
Evidence from a labor market reform. Journal of Marriage and Family, 75, 503–521.
doi:10.1111/jomf.12011
Huinink, J., & Kreyenfeld, M. (2006). Family formation in times of abrupt social and
economic change. In M. Diewald, A. Goedicke & K. U. Mayer (Eds.), After the fall
of the wall: Life courses in the transformation of East Germany (pp. 170–190). Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Kreyenfeld, M. (2010). Uncertainties in female employment careers and the postponement of parenthood in Germany. European Sociological Review, 26, 351–366.
doi:10.1093/esr/jcp026
Kreyenfeld, M., Andersson, G., & Pailhé, A. (2012). Economic uncertainty and family dynamics in Europe. Demographic Research, 27, 835–852. doi:10.4054/DemRes.
2012.27.28
Lundström, K., & Andersson, G. (2012). Labor market status, migrant status, and
first childbearing in Sweden. Demographic Research, 27, 719–742. doi:10.4054/
DemRes.2012.27.25
Morgan, S. P. (1996). Characteristic features of modern American fertility. Population
and Development Review, 22, 19–63.
Pailhé, A., & Solaz, A. (2012). The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France: A tempo or quantum effect? Demographic Research, 26, 1–40.
Ranjan, P. (1999). Fertility behaviour under income uncertainty. European Journal of
Population, 15, 25–43.
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Rindfuss, R. F., Morgan, S. P., & Swicegood, G. (1988). First births in America: Changes
in the timing of parenthood. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schmitt, C. (2012). Labour market integration, occupational uncertainties, and fertility choices in Germany and the UK. Demographic Research, 26, 253–292.
Sobotka, T., Skirbekk, V., & Philipov, D. (2011). Economic recession and fertility in the developed world. Population and Development Review, 37, 267–306.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00411.x
Surkyn, J., & Lesthaghe, R. (2004). Value orientations and the second demographic
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FURTHER READING
Kreyenfeld, M., Andersson, G. & Pailhé A. (2012). Economic uncertainty and family
dynamics in Europe. Demographic Research, Special Collection 12.
Sobotka, T., Skirbekk, V., & Philipov, D. (2011). Economic recession and fertility in the developed world. Population and Development Review, 37, 267–306.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00411.x
JOHANNES HUININK SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Professional Experience
Since 2003 Full professor for Sociology, Institute of Sociology (Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of Social Structure), University of Bremen
1999–2003 Full professor for Sociology (Population and Family), Institute
of Sociology, University of Rostock
1994–1999 Full Professor for Sociology (Comparative Studies of Modern
Societies), Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig
1986–1994 Research Assistant at Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin
1986 Doctoral Thesis (Dr.rer. Soc), Sociological Faculty, University of Bielefeld
1982–1986 Research Assistant at the Institute for Population Research and
Social Policy, University of Bielefeld
1980–1982 Academic Assistant at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Mathematisation, University of Bielefeld
Research Interests
Johannes Huinink’s interests lie in the fields of theoretical model building
and empirical research in Sociology. Research fields are family dynamics,
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
13
internal migration, occupational careers, and social mobility. Combining the
life course approach and sociological model building, he also is working on
an action theoretic based approach of life course theory.
For supplementary information see: http://www.tess.uni-bremen.de/
index.php?id=484&L=1
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Family Income Composition (Economics), Kristin E. Smith
Social Neuroendocrine Approaches to Relationships (Anthropology), Sari M.
van Anders and Peter B. Gray
Transnational Work Careers (Sociology), Roland Verwiebe
Recent Demographic Trends and the Family (Sociology), Lawrence L. Wu
-
Family Formation in Times of Labor
Market Insecurities
JOHANNES HUININK
Abstract
Family formation is still a major life goal for an overwhelming section of the population in contemporary societies. It is a major transition in the individual life course
because bringing up children in modern societies is a challenging and costly task.
Men and women are increasingly aware of this fact. That is why family formation is
no longer taken for granted as an obligatory marker of the transition to adulthood. It
is increasingly a matter of conscious decision making—at least in modern societies.
One would expect economic uncertainty to be a major issue in this decision. Labor
market insecurity in particular should prevent couples from realizing family formation and impact the timing of childbirth or the likelihood of remaining childless.
There are plenty of historical examples showing that in times of economic crisis and
major societal instability birthrates decline considerably. However, more recent studies in various countries show mixed evidence in regard to the impact of economic
uncertainty and labor market insecurity on family formation. The puzzle of these
partially seemingly contradictory findings has not yet been solved. Obviously, the
relationship between labor market insecurity and family formation is more complex
than has been assumed. It is the result of a complex interplay between historical factors and traditions, current socioeconomic conditions of the lives of men and women,
and their personal ways of dealing with risks and uncertainties.
INTRODUCTION
Family formation has considerable consequences for the life course of men
and women. Raising children in modern societies is a challenging and costly
task. As it is no longer an obligatory experience in the life course of men and
women, it is more and more a matter of conscious decision making. Couples
weigh up the pros and cons of having a child under the given and expected
circumstance of their lives. Before taking responsibility for a child they want
to be confident that they can count on sound and stable economic conditions
in the future. There are two major reasons for this: Individuals or couples
want to meet their aspirations in regard to bringing up their children. Gainful employment as the primary source of household income is needed to bear
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.
1
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EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
the costs of parenting. At the same time, parents want to continue pursuing
other personal life goals after family formation. Among others these include
the desire of fathers and mothers to stay gainfully employed and further their
career. A stable job and an opportune labor market definitely lower the risk
of economic hardship. Good prospects for both partners in the labor market
are perceived as an important prerequisite for having children. Therefore, the
general hypothesis is that economic insecurity prevents couples from realizing family formation. Consequently, it should at least impact the timing of
childbirth. Economic insecurity can affect the likelihood of having a child if
prospects in the labor market are uncertain for a longer period of time and
family formation would imply too high risks in the future life course.
However, it could also be the other way round. Economic uncertainty over
the life course could motivate family formation because it can be a kind of
strategy to establish a stable social context with clear responsibilities and
duties. Women with low-level qualifications are hit particularly hard by economic crises and high risks of unemployment. They might find more and
strong fulfillments in caring for a family instead of facing an insecure and
unsatisfactory work life.
Obviously, the relationship between labor market insecurity and family
formation is complex. Its manifestation in fertility behavior is the result of
the interplay between historical factors and cultural traditions, the level of
social security provided by welfare states, current socioeconomic conditions
of the life course, gender, family-related preferences, and the individual way
of dealing with risks and uncertainties. Simple answers cannot be expected.
It is said that in times of globalization and weak social policy regimes, people have to cope with steady changes in the labor market, implying more
instability and an increasing need for flexibility and mobility. At the same
time, the ability of the welfare state to protect its citizens against the risks
of economic insecurity and poverty is diminishing. That is why the question
of how labor market insecurity affects family formation is highly relevant.
This is particularly true because we can expect that in spite of or even as
a reaction to these trends, the need for stable family relationships will not
diminish. Therefore, we are faced with a paradox: Economic insecurity makes
long-term commitment to a family more risky, but at the same time it amplifies the need for a family that provides authentic relationships.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Economic living conditions, labor market insecurity, and unemployment
risks are assumed to have an impact on family planning over the life course.
But empirical analyses show that this is not true under all circumstances
and the most significant effects identified have been those on the timing
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
3
of family formation. Theories on the mechanisms that could explain the
relevance of economic and labor market conditions for individual fertility
behavior have so far not provided a general and valid framework. Things
are obviously far more complex than has been assumed.
An inspection of long-term levels of aggregated fertility shows that in historical periods of severe economic or social crises a drop in period-specific
fertility rates can be observed in many countries. Even though this
coincidence does not always emerge, or at least not to the same extent, it is
reasonable to assume a causal link between economic development, labor
market dynamics, and family formation. However, historical and internationally comparative studies show mixed evidence in detail (Sobotka,
Skirbekk, & Philipov, 2011).
A prime example of an economic crisis, which has been investigated extensively in regard to its consequences for fertility and family formation, is the
Great Depression of the early 1930s. The Great Depression led to unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty in many countries of the world.
In the United States, the decline in fertility rates during this historical time
was considerable. Most scholars of demography agree that low birth rates
were related to economic hardship and experiences of unemployment suffered by huge sections of the population (Rindfuss, Morgan, & Swicegood,
1988). In European countries such as Germany and Sweden, the decrease
in fertility rates was also significant, whereas in France, which was hit less
strongly by the crisis, hardly any drop in fertility rates was observed (Kreyenfeld, Andersson, & Pailhé, 2012).
Compared to the Great Depression, the years at the end of or immediately
after the two World Wars in the twentieth century are less intensively investigated. These periods stand for societal catastrophes that affected the whole
social system and were also accompanied by severe economic hardship. In
Germany, fertility rates dropped sharply immediately after the end of World
War I and II, but recovered quickly. The same is true for France, but at the end
of World War II only on a moderate level. Research on the consequences of the
economic crisis in the early 1970s (oil price shock) brought no clear evidence
for causal effects on family formation. Even though in the United States, for
example, fertility rates deviated negatively from the long-term trend, more
detailed studies do not support the assumption that the crisis had a decisive
impact (Butz & Ward, 1979).
Research also shows an interdependence of fertility with the business cycle,
which is characterized by changing labor market opportunities, differently
high unemployment rates and different degrees of job insecurity. In times
when the compatibility of family and employment was a more critical issue
for women than it is today, studies found evidence of a counter-cyclical relationship between the business cycle and fertility (Butz & Ward, 1979). Better
4
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
prospects in the labor market that women could also profit from led to higher
opportunity cost of caring for children. Between the 1960s and the 1990s the
relationship between female labor force participation and fertility changed in
many countries. If the conditions for reconciling work and family are good,
fertility and the business cycle are related in a procyclical way. In Sweden, for
example, the economic recession and increasing labor market insecurity in
the 1990s—as well as cuts in family-related benefits by the Swedish state—led
to a decline in family formation. After recovering from the recession, Swedish
fertility rates went up again (Andersson, 2000). That the absence of labor market insecurity in combination with good conditions for reconciling work and
family favors early family formation is also supported by the fact that in the
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as with the GDR, the age at family formation was unprecedentedly low (Huinink & Kreyenfeld, 2006).
In general, it is a difficult task to disentangle the effects of economic and
labor market insecurity on birth rates from the long-term trend of declining
fertility in developed countries. It is not clear to what extent these trends are
driven by cultural or economic factors. One strand of research argues that this
trend toward a secular decline in fertility in developed countries since the late
1960s can be explained by changing and globalizing economies which introduce more insecurity in labor markets and increase demands for flexibility
and mobility that particularly hit young adults (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, &
Kurz, 2005). Another strand of research emphasizes the role of noneconomic
factors, such as value change and the changing roles of women in societies
(Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 2004).
Obviously, economic insecurity may lead to different reactions according
to family formation. But some typical patterns have been identified quite
clearly. The usual case seems to be that men and women postpone births during a period of economic uncertainty. Fertility is recuperated in later years to
a degree that depends on the age individuals are confronted at with existential insecurity. This can be observed, for instance, in the case of the societal
transformation in Eastern Europe. Here, a rapid postponement of childbirth
took place. This was the major reason for a sharp drop in fertility rates. However, obviously some couples decided against family formation or extension
at all, which resulted in a lower mean number of children born over the life
course and higher rates of childlessness (Huinink & Kreyenfeld, 2006).
Another well-proven finding is that labor market insecurity hinders men
in particular from having children. Lower educated and economically disadvantaged men also marry at an older age and stay unmarried at a higher rate.
They are not regarded as attractive because they cannot and are not expected
to guarantee a satisfactory standard of living. This was particularly true at
times when the male breadwinner model was the dominant pattern of the
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
5
couples’ household production. The baby boom after World War II, therefore, was mainly due to the fact that the economic prospects for young men
were promising: It was a time of economic prosperity and they could expect
a lifelong stable occupational career. The decision to start a family could be
made relatively early in the life course (Morgan, 1996).
To sum up: We learn from previous research that economic insecurity had
a different impact on fertility in different countries in times of societal or economic crises, that men and women are affected differently, and that the age
at which individuals are affected by periodical shocks makes a difference in
regard to their short-term family formation behavior and long-term fertility. There is clear evidence that severe economic insecurity accompanied by
deep economic crises or societal “catastrophes” leads to a significant postponement of births. Evidence is also strong that from the era of the male
breadwinner system as the model for the family’s household production until
today particularly men suffer from economic disadvantages. One important
question is, however, what the effects of destabilizing of occupational careers
in globalizing economies on fertility are. Another question is to which extent
women, who are also increasingly integrated in the labor market and are supposed to stay employed after childbirth, are affected by this trend. Current
research shows a quite mixed picture in this regard.
CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
Recent studies have focused on several issues: Firstly, from a methodological point of view, they analyze the impact of economic uncertainty in general and labor market insecurity in particular on fertility as an integrated
part of individual life courses. They use individual-level data and apply longitudinal multivariate methods of analysis. Secondly, from the substantive
point of view, studies have mainly dealt with the impact of male and female
unemployment or perceived job insecurity on family formation or—more
generally—with effects of subjectively perceived economic uncertainty on
transition rates to first birth. Thirdly, as women’s labor market participation
has expanded and the dual career pattern becomes more and more common,
the effects of labor market insecurity on women and not only on men have
gained more attention. Fourthly, studies have focused on certain geographical regions: Of particular interest were Central and Eastern Europe, where
the transformation of the former communist countries caused not only major
sociopolitical discontinuities but also an economic downturn, high unemployment rates, and a weakening of state support systems (Sobotka et al.,
2011). Another focus was put on Southern Europe where high levels of youth
unemployment and the precarious paths of entry into an occupational career
impact the transition to adulthood (Adserà, 2011). Finally, initial analyses
6
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
investigating the effects of the most recent economic crisis starting in 2008
in the United States and in Europe have been published (Sobotka et al., 2011).
Comparing different countries, one gains a diverse picture of the impact
of labor market insecurity on family formation (Adserà, 2011; Kreyenfeld
et al., 2012; Sobotka et al., 2011). Contradictory results have been obtained
regarding the effects of unemployment on men and women. While the
evidence is still rather consistent for men, the effects of unemployment for
women vary quite strongly. Obviously, they depend heavily on women’s
qualification level, the labor market structure, historical and cultural
peculiarities, and the family and welfare policies in the various countries
investigated (Kreyenfeld, 2010; Lundström & Andersson, 2012; Pailhé &
Solaz, 2012; Schmitt, 2012). Low fertility rates and postponement of family
formation in Southern Europe are at least partially caused by the poor job
prospects and nonstandard employment contracts of young adults in these
countries (Adserà, 2011; Vignoli, Drefahl, & De Santis, 2012).
Findings on the effects of the subjective perception of economic uncertainty
on the timing and incidence of family formation also seem to be contradictory. The results depend on the respective measure applied. This unsatisfactory fact can be illustrated by a look at recent studies of the German case:
Some of them hardly find any effects of perceived job insecurity (Kreyenfeld,
2010). Other studies present a negative effect of the perceived probability of
unemployment on family formation of women (Bhaumik & Nugent, 2011;
Hofmann & Hofmeyer, 2013).
One reason for the inconsistent findings of recent studies dealing with different countries or regions might be that individual perceptions of insecurity
are different. An illustrative example gives a comparison between West and
East Germany showing that individual values und life plans matter systematically for the degree to which economic uncertainty affects the timing of
family formation (Bernardi, Klärner, & von der Lippe, 2008).
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There is evidence that labor market insecurity and unemployment risks as
consequences of economic crisis or individual deprivation have an impact on
family formation over the life course. However, it is hard to find a conclusive
explanation and the mechanisms are not fully understood. Many theoretical and empirical questions are still not answered. Before we address some
methodological challenges of the empirical analysis more precisely, we first
reconsider some theoretical assumptions.
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
7
THEORETICAL ISSUES
Anthropological and historical research shows that in the history of mankind
the timing and number of births has always been regulated according to
the available resources for bringing up offspring in one or the other way.
However, the question of what has been perceived as a sufficient level of
resources needed for satisfactory household production has been answered
very differently.
In today’s modern or—as it is often phrased—post-modern societies family formation is no longer taken for granted as an obligatory step in the life
course and it is increasingly a matter of conscious decision making. Sexuality
has been disconnected from fertility and the availability of safe contraception
empowered couples to plan the “whether” and “when” of childbirth. Couples can consider whether it is opportune to have a child at all and when
to take responsibility for a child under the given circumstances of their life
course. Many couples decide on family formation—and are expected to do
so by their social environment—only after they are convinced that they can
draw on sufficiently sound and stable economic conditions in the future to
enable them to bring up their children properly and to continue pursuing
their other life goals.
The male breadwinner model has lost relevance. However, it has become
obligatory for spouses to remain in paid employment and to be economically
independent of their partner. The relevance of the man’s income has not deteriorated. Because couples with children often still adopt a traditional pattern
of household production, the income of the male partner is considered to be
particularly important and the timing of family formation corresponds to the
economic prospects of the man as the main provider of the material basis for
the family household. However, it is an open question how long this relative
dominance of the male income will remain valid because as women attain
better qualifications and have improved prospects in the labor market, the
balance between the sexes changes in this regard also.
This development has several consequences. First, a further postponement
of family formation can be expected because two employment careers have to
be synchronized. Second, the costs of a family household increase, because
daycare for children has to be paid for and the household production has
to be organized in a more efficient way by purchasing more services rather
than self-producing them. Third, two incomes mean that the burden on men
to achieve a secure work and income situation might be lower because the
female partner could step in. This would lower the effects of economic insecurity on family formation because the woman could take on the role of the
main provider of income, at least for a while.
8
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
From these assumptions quite a number of factors emerge, which have to
be looked at to understand whether and how economic hardship, labor market insecurity, and income risks impact decisions about family formation.
These factors encompass a mixture of objective conditions of the labor market and the socioeconomic background of individuals, the couple’s internal
organization of the household production and division of domestic work,
the individuals’ subjective perceptions of life course risks, and their subjective demands in regard to the different issues of family life and life outside
the family. If we want to obtain a complete picture of the impact of labor
market insecurity on family formation, we have to consider all these objective and subjective factors and identify the mechanisms leading to different
outcomes. Let us discuss a few examples.
A similar objective situation in regard to labor market insecurity might lead
to different behavior depending on the subjective perception of risks. One
has to assume that men and women show a different level of risk aversion.
They stick more or less strongly to the conviction that gainful and stable
employment of both partners, as the primary source of household income,
is necessary to bear the costs of parenting and other activities.
Child-related aspirations might be differently high. They influence the extent
to which economic insecurity is seen as a hazard for a satisfying family development. For example, high aspirations in regard to parenting and the standard of living of a family can lower their propensity to have a child because
they assume that they cannot meet these requirements. For these couples,
employment insecurity should be more relevant for family planning than in
a case where economic uncertainty is not perceived as a relevant menace for
satisfactory parenting. In addition to the precarious employment situation of
young adults, this seems partly to explain the low fertility rates in Southern
Europe because the aspirations in regard to the prerequisites of family formation in these familialistic countries are particularly high. Whether couples
just postpone family formation in case of an economic crisis or give up their
intention to have children depends on the expected duration of this kind of
insecurity, the impression that things will not change for the better, and that
the future in terms of economic welfare is uncertain (Ranjan, 1999).
Individuals’ aspirations in regard to extrafamilial activities, their engagement
in other life domains and their standard of living impact the readiness to
invest in children and also depend on the expected economic security over
the life course (Easterlin, 1976). If the goal of having a family is not that strong
and a couple does not want to give up its extrafamilial engagement or reduce
the demands from other life goals, the primary intention might be to preserve
the ability to pursue these interest as far as possible before starting a family.
An important question is of how strongly couples fear that their future occupational career is menaced by the formation of a family. This does not so
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
9
much concern the effects on potential family life but the question of whether,
in an economically difficult situation, a family augments the restrictions on
following personal interests in other life domains, particularly as far as their
career and standard of living are concerned.
In these three examples, a favorable labor market should be supportive to
family formation because it means lower risks of experiencing unemployment and economic hardship.
(4) We already mentioned that economic uncertainty over the life course
could motivate family formation because a family could be a kind of tool
to reduce future uncertainties in regard to deciding on the next steps in the
life course (uncertainty reduction). Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa argue
that this could particularly apply to women with low levels of qualification (Friedman, Hechter, & Kanazawa, 1994). Economic insecurity leads to
compensatory action by these women: They have a child and their family
becomes a fulfilling field of engagement and a source of certainty in regard to
future decision making. In some cases, teenage motherhood can be explained
by this phenomenon.
(5) The drop in fertility rates in Eastern European countries during the
period of political and economic transformation was very pronounced. There
are several possible reasons for this: The decline in fertility could be the result
of (i) a process of assimilation to the Western pattern of family formation, (ii)
a general perception of preliminary societal uncertainty regarding the future
and an increasing reluctance in regard to family formation or (iii) a perceived
increasing labor market insecurity owing to the changing structure of the
economy.
If we want to understand the effects of labor market insecurity on family formation, we need to know much more about the issues mentioned in
the previous examples. In particular, the subjective perceptions of economic
development and risks by men and women are crucial.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The theoretical considerations illustrate main aspects of a methodological
program. As the subjective factor is so important for disentangling the complex relationship between economic conditions, labor market insecurity, and
uncertain future, we need more detailed research investigating the causal factors at the individual level. This means that we need long-term studies allowing life course and cohort analyses with subjective indicators. They have to
cover a considerable time span because it can be expected that the age at
the onset and the duration of periods of insecure employment play a major
role. To analyze the impact of economic uncertainty requires to study the full
range of determinants of fertility behavior and not only to consider single
10
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
life course events and objective living conditions. It is necessary to include
measures of salience and intentions in regard to goal pursuit in different
life domains. It also means to control for personal characteristics such as
risk aversion. Retrospective data collection is of limited value in this case
because the subjective information has to be recorded on time to avoid memory biases. Various household panels in the United States and in Europe as
well as the “pairfam” study in Germany provide data that allow these kinds
of analyses to a certain extent. However, as the review of current research
has shown, more specialized studies that focus on the respective questions
in more detail are needed.
Another lesson can be learned from the cutting-edge research. Not only are
analyses with standardized data of value but qualitative research could also
add to a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms leading to the
(non)effects of labor market insecurity on family formation and other aspects
of the individual life course.
Finally, a comparative perspective is also of great importance. This means
conducting more comparisons than previously over time and cohorts and
between regions or countries. Such studies could show whether individuals
in the past dealt with uncertainties and insecurity differently in comparison
with today. Such studies could also show how perceptions of and strategies
for coping with insecurity differ between countries with different social and
institutional structures.
SUMMARY/CONCLUDING COMMENTS
As the occupational lives of men and women are increasingly characterized
by instabilities and insecurity, and as this particularly applies to the phase
of transition to adulthood, the question of the impact of labor market insecurity on fertility is highly relevant. Only if this interrelation is well understood
is it possible to find adequate measures and tools to reduce possible hazardous consequences for family formation. It seems obvious that those consequences are apparent, but do not occur under all circumstances. Evidence
shows that the relationship between labor market insecurity and family formation is rather complex. Even cutting-edge research using sophisticated
data and methods of analysis has so far not shed so much light on it that the
mechanisms are well understood. One important reason may be that both the
occupational career and the family career are embedded in an interdependent
life course. Another reason is that the individuals’ subjective perceptions of
insecurity and its expected consequences for the life course have not been
looked at sufficiently detailed. It seems to be important that current studies
based on data from large panel studies are supplemented by more specific
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
11
and detailed research in which quantitative and qualitative analyses are combined in a productive way.
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Easterlin, R. A. (1976). The conflict between aspirations and resources. Population and
Development Review, 2, 417–425.
Butz, W. P., & Ward, M. P. (1979). The emergence of countercyclical U.S. fertility. The
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Evidence from a labor market reform. Journal of Marriage and Family, 75, 503–521.
doi:10.1111/jomf.12011
Huinink, J., & Kreyenfeld, M. (2006). Family formation in times of abrupt social and
economic change. In M. Diewald, A. Goedicke & K. U. Mayer (Eds.), After the fall
of the wall: Life courses in the transformation of East Germany (pp. 170–190). Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Kreyenfeld, M. (2010). Uncertainties in female employment careers and the postponement of parenthood in Germany. European Sociological Review, 26, 351–366.
doi:10.1093/esr/jcp026
Kreyenfeld, M., Andersson, G., & Pailhé, A. (2012). Economic uncertainty and family dynamics in Europe. Demographic Research, 27, 835–852. doi:10.4054/DemRes.
2012.27.28
Lundström, K., & Andersson, G. (2012). Labor market status, migrant status, and
first childbearing in Sweden. Demographic Research, 27, 719–742. doi:10.4054/
DemRes.2012.27.25
Morgan, S. P. (1996). Characteristic features of modern American fertility. Population
and Development Review, 22, 19–63.
Pailhé, A., & Solaz, A. (2012). The influence of employment uncertainty on childbearing in France: A tempo or quantum effect? Demographic Research, 26, 1–40.
Ranjan, P. (1999). Fertility behaviour under income uncertainty. European Journal of
Population, 15, 25–43.
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Rindfuss, R. F., Morgan, S. P., & Swicegood, G. (1988). First births in America: Changes
in the timing of parenthood. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schmitt, C. (2012). Labour market integration, occupational uncertainties, and fertility choices in Germany and the UK. Demographic Research, 26, 253–292.
Sobotka, T., Skirbekk, V., & Philipov, D. (2011). Economic recession and fertility in the developed world. Population and Development Review, 37, 267–306.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00411.x
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FURTHER READING
Kreyenfeld, M., Andersson, G. & Pailhé A. (2012). Economic uncertainty and family
dynamics in Europe. Demographic Research, Special Collection 12.
Sobotka, T., Skirbekk, V., & Philipov, D. (2011). Economic recession and fertility in the developed world. Population and Development Review, 37, 267–306.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00411.x
JOHANNES HUININK SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Professional Experience
Since 2003 Full professor for Sociology, Institute of Sociology (Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of Social Structure), University of Bremen
1999–2003 Full professor for Sociology (Population and Family), Institute
of Sociology, University of Rostock
1994–1999 Full Professor for Sociology (Comparative Studies of Modern
Societies), Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig
1986–1994 Research Assistant at Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin
1986 Doctoral Thesis (Dr.rer. Soc), Sociological Faculty, University of Bielefeld
1982–1986 Research Assistant at the Institute for Population Research and
Social Policy, University of Bielefeld
1980–1982 Academic Assistant at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Mathematisation, University of Bielefeld
Research Interests
Johannes Huinink’s interests lie in the fields of theoretical model building
and empirical research in Sociology. Research fields are family dynamics,
Family Formation in Times of Labor Market Insecurities
13
internal migration, occupational careers, and social mobility. Combining the
life course approach and sociological model building, he also is working on
an action theoretic based approach of life course theory.
For supplementary information see: http://www.tess.uni-bremen.de/
index.php?id=484&L=1
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Intergenerational Mobility: A Cross-National Comparison (Economics),
Bhashkar Mazumder
The Future of Marriage (Sociology), Elizabeth Aura McClintock
Family Income Composition (Economics), Kristin E. Smith
Social Neuroendocrine Approaches to Relationships (Anthropology), Sari M.
van Anders and Peter B. Gray
Transnational Work Careers (Sociology), Roland Verwiebe
Recent Demographic Trends and the Family (Sociology), Lawrence L. Wu