Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
Media
Part of Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
- Title
- Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
- extracted text
-
Domestic Political Institutions
and Alliance Politics
MICHAELA MATTES
Abstract
Military alliances are one of the most important tools states can use to counter international threats, exert influence over other countries, and accomplish broad foreign
policy goals, including peace and stability in the international system. Alliance scholarship can provide valuable insights to policy-makers by answering questions such
as which states are likely to ally, when alliances will be upheld, and whether they
will be effective. Traditional alliance research focused on international considerations
rather than domestic politics as drivers of alliance politics. More recently, however,
scholars have shifted their attention to uncovering the ways in which domestic political institutions affect alliance behavior. The main questions underlying this research
include: Are states with similar regime types, especially democracies, more likely to
ally? Are democracies more reliable alliance partners? Do wartime coalitions involving democracies have a higher chance of victory? Do domestic institutional changes
affect alliance maintenance? While the literature has provided conclusive answers to
some of these questions, others are characterized by mixed findings. Recently published work has taken on unresolved issues and provided new and original insights.
Future research should take these efforts further by unpacking the concepts of “domestic politics” and “alliance politics”.
INTRODUCTION
The influence of domestic political institutions on alliance politics was long
neglected by international relations scholars. Military alliances occupy a central role in realist theories of international politics, and the realist paradigm
has traditionally emphasized the priority of international imperatives over
domestic political considerations. Alliances are typically understood as
resulting from the need to balance power (Waltz, 1979) or counter particular
adversaries (Walt, 1987). Alternatively, alliances may be viewed as a way to
increase a state’s autonomy to pursue particular policies (Morrow, 1991) or
to exert influence over an ally (Schroeder, 1976; Weitsman, 2004). While security, autonomy, and restraint motivations are certainly driving forces behind
states’ alliance choices, it is now well-understood that the consideration of
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.
1
2
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
domestic politics, in addition to international imperatives, can advance our
understanding of many aspects of alliance behavior. Since the early 1990s,
there has been a proliferation of studies that examine whether states with
similar regime type—especially democracies—are more likely to ally with
one another, whether democracies make for more reliable alliance partners,
whether democratic partners in war enhance the probability of victory,
and how domestic political changes affect the maintenance of alliances.
A report card for the research on domestic politics and military alliances
would point to both bad news and good news. The bad news is that existing
scholarship has not produced unequivocal answers. The good news is that
these disagreements have prompted increasingly sophisticated research and
suggest promising avenues for future contributions.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
It was the rise of the democratic peace research program that prompted
scholars to explore how domestic political institutions might affect different
aspects of alliance politics. If democracies show distinct patterns in their
conflict behavior, they may also display distinct patterns in their security
cooperation, including their alliances. Four particular areas of research
emerged.
The first area of scholarship tackles the question of whether democracies
are more likely to ally with one another. Siverson and Emmons (1991) propose that the lack of war between democracies may be the result of similar foreign policy preferences and that these shared interests should also be
reflected in a greater propensity of democracies to ally militarily. They find
that democratic states are indeed more likely to ally with other democracies, but that this pattern is observed mostly in the 1946–1965 period. Simon
and Gartzke (1996) corroborate this finding, but suggest that this particular time period is anomalous and that democracies’ incentives to ally during
this period derived from the bipolar structure of the international system
that pitted Western democracies against Eastern communist regimes. In line
with this interpretation, Lai and Reiter (2000) determine that countries with
similar political regimes generally have an increased propensity to be allied
after 1945 and that democracies do not stand out. There is a positive effect
of joint democracy on the likelihood of having a defense pact in Europe and
the Americas post-1945, but this finding is driven by a small set of multilateral alliances. Interestingly, in a replication of Lai and Reiter’s model using
the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds, Ritter,
Mitchell, & Long, 2002) rather than the Correlates of War (COW) alliance
data (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004), Leeds et al. (2002) uncover a propensity for
democracies to be allied in the earlier period of 1815–1944. However, Gibler
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
3
and Sarkees (2004) claim that this finding may also be the result of a small set
of multilateral alliances. Taking a slightly different tack by examining overall
alliance portfolios, that is, the total set of alliance partners a state has, rather
than the likelihood that a pair of democracies allies, Bueno de Mesquita and
Lalman (1992) show that democracies do not display more similar foreign
policy preferences than nondemocracies.
The democratic peace research program motivated not only research into
whether democracies’ shared interests may be reflected in an increased
propensity to ally, but also informed another branch of alliance research
by pointing to the distinctness and possible superiority of democratic
institutions. Extending arguments from the conflict literature, scholars have
argued that democracies may possess a “contracting advantage” as a result
of the key features of leader accountability, policy-making constraint, and
transparency (e.g., Fearon, 1994; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Lipson, 2003).
These features should enhance the credibility and steadfastness of democratic alliance commitments. A contrary view suggests that frequent leader
replacement and ever-changing public opinion make democracies particularly unreliable (e.g., De Tocqueville, [1835] 1994; Gartzke & Gleditsch,
2004). In order to arbitrate between these conflicting arguments regarding
democratic reliability scholars have looked both at the duration of alliances
and the propensity of democracies to honor their alliance commitments in
times of war. Findings regarding alliance duration almost uniformly show
that alliances between democracies last longer than other alliances (Bennett,
1997; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds & Savun, 2007; Reed, 1997). The findings regarding democratic reliability are less conclusive in studies of wartime behavior.
Werner and Lemke (1997), Reiter and Stam (2002), and Smith (1996) find that
democracies are not more likely to intervene on the side of their (democratic)
allies in times of war. One concern with these studies is that they do not
match what states do in war to what they promised to do in the alliance and
so they may be overstating alliance nonfulfillment (Leeds, Long, & Mitchell,
2000). Many alliances specify conditions for when they can be invoked,
including particular enemies, locations, number of adversaries, and actions
of the partner. If a conflict falls outside these parameters then an ally’s
failure to act should not be seen as a violation of the alliance. Using ATOP
data that allows her to determine whether the casus foederis was indeed
met, Leeds (2003) finds that democracies were more likely to uphold their
alliance commitments in the 1816–1944 period. Using a different research
design, however, Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) show that democracies were
less likely than nondemocracies to honor their alliance commitments in the
1816–1991 period.
Scholars have considered not only the effect of static domestic political institutions, but also the effect of change in regime type on alliance duration and
4
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
wartime behavior. Siverson and Starr (1994) find that states reshuffle their
alliance portfolios in reaction to regime changes. While Bennett (1997) cannot confirm that regime changes affect the duration of individual alliances,
Leeds and Savun (2007) find clear evidence that regime changes are associated with alliance abrogation. Leeds (2003) also shows that regime changes
after alliance formation increase the likelihood that a state will fail to honor
its obligations in times of war (Leeds, 2003).
A final area of research on the relationship between domestic political institutions and alliance politics examines whether democratic allies are superior
in their war-fighting effectiveness. Here findings are more conclusive. Studies show that states with democratic partners are indeed more likely to succeed in war (e.g., Choi, 2004; Pilster, 2011).
CURRENT RESEARCH
Scholars continue to provide new insights into some of the issues that earlier
work has failed to resolve. Regarding the relationship between regime type
and alliance formation, Gibler and Wolford (2006) and Gibler and Sewell
(2006) point out that while democracies appear to be no more likely to
ally, they are more likely to be allied. They suggest that the causal arrow is
reversed: it is not democracy that leads to alliances but alliances that lead to
democracy. This dynamic does not necessarily rely on specific policy efforts
of the alliance organization or member states to encourage democratization,
but results from the fact that alliances can remove territorial threats for
states, which in turn facilitates democratization. In another fresh take on
how domestic institutions affect alliance formation, Powell (2010) shows that
similarity in domestic legal systems is positively related to state decisions to
ally and also shapes alliance design choices.
On the question of democratic alliance reliability, scholars have pointed
out that inferences based on whether a country upholds its alliance commitments in times of war are subject to selection bias (Smith, 1996). Owing
to the transparency of the democratic political process, potential aggressors
are better able to identify and target unreliable alliances involving democracies (e.g., Werner & Lemke, 1997). This means that the democratic alliances
that are challenged are the ones that are likely to be unreliable and it is not
surprising that these do not hold up in war. However, this does not mean
that democratic alliances more generally are unreliable. Many of democratic
alliances are so reliable that they will not be targeted in the first place. To overcome selection bias, Leeds and Savun (2007) and Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel
(2009) consider alliance violations that occur in wartime or in times of peace
when a member ends an alliance in violation of its terms. Both studies find
that democracies are less likely to abrogate alliances prematurely. Leeds et al.
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
5
(2009) also examine more closely the argument that democracies may be less
reliable owing to frequent leadership turnover. It turns out that not all leadership changes but only those that coincide with a change in the domestic
groups the leader represents are associated with unlawful alliance termination; and this effect is observed only in nondemocracies.
Recent studies also move beyond the question of whether democracies are
reliable to examining how and when reliability is achieved. Mattes (2012a) proposes that democratic leaders guard against instability associated with leadership changes by “precommitting” successor governments through careful
alliance design. Domestic political considerations regarding whether it is necessary to bind successors to an ally can thus help explain the choice of specific alliance terms. Tago (2009) examines democratic withdrawals from the
“Coalition of the Willing” He finds that leaders were more likely to desert
the coalition before elections for fear of punishment by domestic audiences
strongly opposed to the War in Iraq. Contrary to Tago, Kreps (2010) finds
that democracies did not withdraw from the NATO Afghanistan mission
even in the face of unfavorable public opinion. Leaders were able to stay the
course because elite consensus surrounding the need to maintain international alliance commitments prevented opposition parties from embracing
anti-mission platforms. The difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is of
course that the former was not bolstered by a formal alliance, while the latter was. Taken together, these studies indicate that alliance commitments can
have powerful effects on the domestic politics of democratic member countries, binding not only governments but also opposition parties.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Recent scholarship on domestic political institutions and alliance politics has
opened up interesting avenues for future research. Key in going forward will
be a continued “unpacking” of the broad concepts of “domestic politics” and
“alliance politics” and the specific mechanisms underlying observed relationships.
Much of the research to date has focused on contrasting democracies and
non-democracies in their alliance formation behavior and their reliability.
Insights on whether democracies have a distinct and superior record in these
areas are important from a scholarly perspective and also for policy-makers
that contemplate the value of spreading democracy. At the same time, this
simple dichotomy obfuscates significant variation that exists within each
regime type. For instance, regarding democracies, Cowhey (1993) suggests
that presidential systems may be advantaged over parliamentary ones in
their cooperation behavior; this may bear on alliance politics as well. Even
more significant are likely the differences that exist among non-democratic
6
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
systems. A number of studies reveal distinct patterns of conflict behavior by
different authoritarian regime types (e.g., Lai & Slater, 2006; Peceny, Beer, &
Sanchez-Terry, 2002; Weeks, 2008, 2012). As is often the case, the literature on
international cooperation has lagged behind international conflict research,
but we are starting to see work on how different types of autocracies may differ in their cooperation aptitude (Chyzh, 2014; Mattes & Rodriguez, 2014). It
will be interesting to investigate cooperation behavior of autocracies specifically in the area of military alliances and such research can provide useful
information to policy-makers as to which authoritarian regimes may be
especially prone to ally and to uphold or violate their alliance commitments.
Differentiating among different types of non-democracies also addresses
concerns that studies that treat nondemocracies as a homogenous group bias
findings in favor of finding democratic similarity and distinctness in alliance
behavior (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2004). Once democracies are contrasted with
distinct authoritarian regime types their alliance behavior may be found not
to be all that different from that of some of these nondemocratic states.
A related, promising direction for future research would entail moving
beyond a focus on domestic political institutions to an examination of how
other aspects of the domestic political process affect alliance politics. Early
work by Barnett and Levy (1991) suggests that alliance choices may be
driven by domestic considerations such as the guns versus butter tradeoff
(see also Morrow, 1993), a leader’s incentive to obtain military and economic
goods to secure her power, and the protection against domestic threats. More
recently, Kimball (2010) tackled the guns versus butter trade-off and her
large N study provides support for the notion that alliance formation may
be driven by domestic demand for social policy over defense spending. Furthermore, Narizny (2003) suggests that British alignment choices 1905–1939
were heavily affected by which sectoral interests held political power and
Leeds et al. (2009) provide evidence that a change in domestic groups with
sway over the leader may affect alliance maintenance. Not only could
the links between domestic preferences and alliance formation, partners,
and maintenance be further explored, but the third area Barnett and Levy
point to—that of alliances as a means to counter domestic threat—deserves
additional investigation. Some alliance contracts explicitly refer to domestic
threats and entail commitments to refrain from aiding domestic opponents
or obligations to help against domestic enemies. The significance of this
line of research lies in its recasting of alliance politics as driven not only,
and maybe not even primarily, by traditional security threats by other state
actors. Foreign policy preferences of different domestic groups, incentives
to use military and economic aid tied to the alliance to pay off winning
coalitions, domestic challenges to a leader’s tenure, and possibly “new”
international threats in the form of terrorism may play a large role in alliance
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
7
politics. More research on these dynamics can supplement our understanding of which alliances form when and with whom and how long they last.
Such work can also illuminate the effects that alliances might have on the
domestic politics of member states. From a policy-making perspective, it is
important to determine not only whether alliances serve foreign policy goals
but also whether they might have beneficial or adverse domestic political
effects in partner countries.
In addition to broadening the conceptualization of domestic politics, scholars should also expand the scope of alliance behavior under investigation.
Few studies have attempted to explain alliance institutional design, despite
the fact that there is significant variation in the types of obligations, contingencies, expected duration, issue scope, and level of institutionalization
of military alliances. As studies by Mattes (2012a; 2012b) and Powell (2010)
show, domestic political institutions and government incentives might provide an inroad for tackling this understudied area of alliance politics. Such
work ties nicely into the research program on the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001) and a better scholarly
understanding of why alliances are designed in particular ways can provide
additional insight into what effects on state behavior we should expect from
different types of alliances.
Fortunately, continued research into different aspect of countries’ alliance
choices is facilitated by readily available data on military alliances for the
1815–2003 period. The COW alliance data (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004) and especially the ATOP data (Leeds et al., 2000; Leeds & Mattes, 2007), with its collection of dozens of variables regarding specific alliance provisions, are excellent
resources going forward. One challenge that is evident from a review of past
work is how one should deal with large multilateral alliances. Poast (2010)
proposes an approach that allows scholars to consider multilateral and bilateral alliances together, while at the same time evading the problems associated with disaggregating multilateral events into separate dyadic ones. His
approach thus minimizes the chance that findings are biased as the result of
the inclusion of many observations stemming from a small number of large
multilateral alliances.
Data on some aspects of domestic politics, such as democracy versus
non-democracy coding (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013), leadership
changes (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), and changes in sources
of leader support (Leeds et al., 2009), are also readily available for a long
time period. On the other hand, coding of different types of non-democratic
regime types is restricted to the post-1945 period (e.g., Cheibub, Gandhi, &
Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2012; Svolik, 2012). Furthermore,
a systematic investigation of other aspects of the domestic political process,
such as the specific alliance preferences of different domestic groups, the
8
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
existence of elite consensus, and the presence of domestic threats may
require a more original approach by researchers as well as new data collection. Qualitative work also has the potential to supplement quantitative
assessments and help scholars identify more precisely the underlying causal
mechanisms linking different aspects of the domestic political process to
alliance politics.
REFERENCES
Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic sources of alliances and alignments:
The case of Egypt, 1962–1973. International Organization, 45(3), 369–395.
Bennett, D. S. (1997). Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 1816–1984.
American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 846–878.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Lalman, D. (1992). War and reason: Domestic and international
imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 144(1–2), 67–101. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2
Choi, A. (2004). Democratic synergy and victory in war, 1816–1992. International Studies Quarterly, 48(3), 663–682. doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00319.x
Chyzh, O. (2014). Can you trust a dictator: A strategic model of authoritarian
regimes’ signing and compliance with international treaties. Conflict Management
and Peace Science, 31(1), 3–17. doi:10.1177/0738894213501132
Cowhey, P. F. (1993). Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States. International Organization, 47(2), 299–326.
doi:10.1017/S0020818300027958
De Tocqueville, A. [1835] (1994). Democracy in America. Garden City, NY: Anchor
Books.
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international
disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.
Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Regime type and commitment: Why democracies are actually less reliable allies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4),
775–795.
Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic states and commitment in international relations.
International Organization, 50(1), 109–139. doi:10.1017/S0020818300001685
Geddes, B., J. Wright and E. Frantz. (2012). Authoritarian regimes: A new data set.
Manuscript. Retrieved from http://dictators.la.psu.edu/.
Gibler, D. M., & Sarkees, M. R. (2004). Measuring alliances: The correlates of war formal interstate alliance dataset, 1816–2000. Journal of Peace Research, 41(2), 211–222.
doi:10.1177/0022343304041061
Gibler, D. M., & Sewell, J. A. (2006). External threat and democracy: The role of NATO
revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 43(4), 413–431. doi:10.1177/0022343306065115
Gibler, D. M., & Wolford, S. (2006). Alliances, then democracy. An examination of
the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 50(1), 129–153. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
9
Goemans, H. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Chiozza, G. (2009). Introducing archigos: A
data set of political leaders. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2), 269–283. doi:10.1177/
0022343308100719
Kimball, A. L. (2010). Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation.
Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 407–419. doi:10.1177/0022343310368346
Kreps, S. (2010). Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public
opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy
Analysis, 6(3), 191–215. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00108
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of institutions.
International Organization, 55(4), 761–799.
Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international
alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. doi:10.1177/
0022002700044002003
Lai, B., & Slater, D. (2006). Institutions on the offensive: Domestic sources of dispute
initiation in authoritarian regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political Science,
50(1), 113–126. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x
Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 979–1002.
Leeds, B. A. (2003). Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties. International Organization, 57, 801–827. doi:10.1017/
S0020818303574057
Leeds, B. A., Long, A. G., & Mitchell, S. M. (2000). Reevaluating alliance reliability: Specific threats, specific promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(5), 686–699.
doi:10.1177/0022002700044005006
Leeds, B. A., & Mattes, M. (2007). Alliance politics during the cold war: Aberration,
new world order, or continuation of history? Conflict Management and Peace Science,
24(3), 183–199. doi:10.1080/07388940701473054
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability
of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x
Leeds, B. A., Ritter, J. M., Mitchell, S. M., & Long, A. G. (2002). Alliance treaty
obligations and provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions, 28, 237–260.
doi:10.1080/03050620213653
Leeds, B. A., & Savun, B. (2007). Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements? Journal of Politics, 69(4), 1118–1132. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00612.x
Lipson, C. (2003). Reliable partners. How democracies have made a separate peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Marshall, M.G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2013). Polity IV Project: Political regime
characteristics and transitions, 1800–2012. Data Users’ Manual. Retrieved from
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf
Mattes, M. (2012a). Democratic reliability, precommitment of successor governments, and the choice of alliance commitment. International Organization, 66(1),
153–172. doi:10.1017/S0020818311000336
Mattes, M. (2012b). Reputation, symmetry, and alliance design. International Organization, 66(4), 679–707. doi:10.1017/S002081831200029X
10
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Mattes, M., & Rodiguez, M. (2014). Autocracies and international cooperation. International Studies Quarterly, 58(3), 527–538.
Morrow, J. D. (1991). Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability
aggregation model of alliances. American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 904–933.
Morrow, J. D. (1993). Arms vs. allies: Trade-offs in the search of security. International
Organization, 47(2), 207–233. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027922
Narizny, K. (2003). The political economy of alignment: Britain’s commitment to
Europe, 1905–1939. International Security, 27(4), 184–219.
Peceny, M., Beer, C. C., & Sanchez-Terry, S. (2002). Dictatorial Peace? American Political Science Review, 96(1), 15–26. doi:10.1017/S0003055402004203
Pilster, U. (2011). Are democracies the better allies? The impact of regime type
on military coalition operations. International Interactions, 37, 55–85. doi:10.1080/
03050629.2011.546259
Poast, P. (2010). (Mis)Using dyadic data to analyze multilateral events. Political Analysis, 18(4), 403–425. doi:10.1093/pan/mpq024
Powell, E. J. (2010). Negotiating military alliances: Legal systems and alliance formation. International Interactions, 36, 28–59. doi:10.1080/03050620903553855
Reed, W. (1997). Alliance duration and democracy: An extension and crossvalidation of ‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations’.
American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 1072–1078.
Reiter, D., & Stam, A. C. (2002). Democracies at war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schroeder, P. W. (1976). Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of power and tools of management. In K. Knorr (Ed.), Historical dimensions of national security problems (pp.
227–262). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Simon, M. W., & Gartzke, E. (1996). Political system similarity and the choice of allies.
Do democracies flock together, or do opposites attract? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4). doi:10.1177/0022002796040004005
Siverson, R. M., & Emmons, J. (1991). Birds of a feather. Democratic political systems
and alliance choices in the twentieth century. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(2),
285–306. doi:10.1177/0022002791035002007
Siverson, R., & Starr, H. (1994). Regime change and the restructuring of alliances.
American Journal of Political Sciences, 38(1), 145–161.
Smith, A. (1996). To intervene or not to intervene: A biased decision. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 40(1), 16–40.
Svolik, M. W. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Tago, A. (2009). When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal
of troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2),
219–234. doi:10.1177/0022343308100716
Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.
Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve.
International Organization, 62(1), 35–64. doi:10.1017/S0020818308080028
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
11
Weeks, J. L. (2012). Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 326–346.
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000111
Weitsman, P. A. (2004). Dangerous alliances: Proponents of peace, weapons of war. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Werner, S., & Lemke, D. (1997). Opposites do not attract: The impact of domestic
institutions, power, and prior commitments on alignment choices. International
Studies Quarterly, 41(3), 529–546. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00055
FURTHER READING
Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic sources of alliances and alignments:
The case of Egypt, 1962–1973. International Organization, 45(3), 369–395.
Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Regime type and commitment: Why democracies are actually less reliable allies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4),
775–795.
Gibler, D. M., & Wolford, S. (2006). Alliances, then democracy. An examination of
the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 50(1), 129–153. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360
Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international
alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. doi:10.1177/
0022002700044002003
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability
of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x
MICHAELA MATTES SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Michaela Mattes is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research focuses on the design and effects of
security cooperation, specifically conflict management agreements and military alliances. Her work seeks to answer questions regarding which types of
agreements work, why they are effective, when they are more or less likely to
succeed, and why they are designed the way they are. She has published articles on these topics in the American Journal of Politics, International Organization, Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Conflict Management
and Peace Science.
RELATED ESSAYS
Domestic Politics of Trade Policy (Political Science), Michaël Aklin et al.
Domestic Institutions and International Conflict (Political Science), Giacomo
Chiozza
12
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Migrant Networks (Sociology), Filiz Garip and Asad L. Asad
Interdependence, Development, and Interstate Conflict (Political Science),
Erik Gartzke
States and Nationalism (Anthropology), Michael Herzfeld
Reconciliation and Peace-Making: Insights from Studies on Nonhuman
Animals (Anthropology), Sonja E. Koski
Why Do States Sign Alliances? (Political Science), Brett Ashley Leeds
Emotion and Intergroup Relations (Psychology), Diane M. Mackie et al.
Political Psychology and International Conflict (Political Science), Rose
McDermott
Emerging Trends in Culture and Concepts (Psychology), Bethany Ojalehto
and Douglas Medin
Cultural Conflict (Sociology), Ian Mullins
Economics and Culture (Economics), Gérard Roland
Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries (Political Science), William R.
Thompson
Postsocialism (Anthropology), Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Katherine Verdery
Why Do States Pursue Nuclear Weapons (or Not) (Political Science), Wilfred
Wan and Etel Solingen
Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in
Chinese Politics (Political Science), Jessica Chen Weiss
Culture and Globalization (Sociology), Frederick F. Wherry
Constitutionalism (Political Science), Keith E. Whittington
-
Domestic Political Institutions
and Alliance Politics
MICHAELA MATTES
Abstract
Military alliances are one of the most important tools states can use to counter international threats, exert influence over other countries, and accomplish broad foreign
policy goals, including peace and stability in the international system. Alliance scholarship can provide valuable insights to policy-makers by answering questions such
as which states are likely to ally, when alliances will be upheld, and whether they
will be effective. Traditional alliance research focused on international considerations
rather than domestic politics as drivers of alliance politics. More recently, however,
scholars have shifted their attention to uncovering the ways in which domestic political institutions affect alliance behavior. The main questions underlying this research
include: Are states with similar regime types, especially democracies, more likely to
ally? Are democracies more reliable alliance partners? Do wartime coalitions involving democracies have a higher chance of victory? Do domestic institutional changes
affect alliance maintenance? While the literature has provided conclusive answers to
some of these questions, others are characterized by mixed findings. Recently published work has taken on unresolved issues and provided new and original insights.
Future research should take these efforts further by unpacking the concepts of “domestic politics” and “alliance politics”.
INTRODUCTION
The influence of domestic political institutions on alliance politics was long
neglected by international relations scholars. Military alliances occupy a central role in realist theories of international politics, and the realist paradigm
has traditionally emphasized the priority of international imperatives over
domestic political considerations. Alliances are typically understood as
resulting from the need to balance power (Waltz, 1979) or counter particular
adversaries (Walt, 1987). Alternatively, alliances may be viewed as a way to
increase a state’s autonomy to pursue particular policies (Morrow, 1991) or
to exert influence over an ally (Schroeder, 1976; Weitsman, 2004). While security, autonomy, and restraint motivations are certainly driving forces behind
states’ alliance choices, it is now well-understood that the consideration of
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.
1
2
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
domestic politics, in addition to international imperatives, can advance our
understanding of many aspects of alliance behavior. Since the early 1990s,
there has been a proliferation of studies that examine whether states with
similar regime type—especially democracies—are more likely to ally with
one another, whether democracies make for more reliable alliance partners,
whether democratic partners in war enhance the probability of victory,
and how domestic political changes affect the maintenance of alliances.
A report card for the research on domestic politics and military alliances
would point to both bad news and good news. The bad news is that existing
scholarship has not produced unequivocal answers. The good news is that
these disagreements have prompted increasingly sophisticated research and
suggest promising avenues for future contributions.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
It was the rise of the democratic peace research program that prompted
scholars to explore how domestic political institutions might affect different
aspects of alliance politics. If democracies show distinct patterns in their
conflict behavior, they may also display distinct patterns in their security
cooperation, including their alliances. Four particular areas of research
emerged.
The first area of scholarship tackles the question of whether democracies
are more likely to ally with one another. Siverson and Emmons (1991) propose that the lack of war between democracies may be the result of similar foreign policy preferences and that these shared interests should also be
reflected in a greater propensity of democracies to ally militarily. They find
that democratic states are indeed more likely to ally with other democracies, but that this pattern is observed mostly in the 1946–1965 period. Simon
and Gartzke (1996) corroborate this finding, but suggest that this particular time period is anomalous and that democracies’ incentives to ally during
this period derived from the bipolar structure of the international system
that pitted Western democracies against Eastern communist regimes. In line
with this interpretation, Lai and Reiter (2000) determine that countries with
similar political regimes generally have an increased propensity to be allied
after 1945 and that democracies do not stand out. There is a positive effect
of joint democracy on the likelihood of having a defense pact in Europe and
the Americas post-1945, but this finding is driven by a small set of multilateral alliances. Interestingly, in a replication of Lai and Reiter’s model using
the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds, Ritter,
Mitchell, & Long, 2002) rather than the Correlates of War (COW) alliance
data (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004), Leeds et al. (2002) uncover a propensity for
democracies to be allied in the earlier period of 1815–1944. However, Gibler
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
3
and Sarkees (2004) claim that this finding may also be the result of a small set
of multilateral alliances. Taking a slightly different tack by examining overall
alliance portfolios, that is, the total set of alliance partners a state has, rather
than the likelihood that a pair of democracies allies, Bueno de Mesquita and
Lalman (1992) show that democracies do not display more similar foreign
policy preferences than nondemocracies.
The democratic peace research program motivated not only research into
whether democracies’ shared interests may be reflected in an increased
propensity to ally, but also informed another branch of alliance research
by pointing to the distinctness and possible superiority of democratic
institutions. Extending arguments from the conflict literature, scholars have
argued that democracies may possess a “contracting advantage” as a result
of the key features of leader accountability, policy-making constraint, and
transparency (e.g., Fearon, 1994; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, 1999; Lipson, 2003).
These features should enhance the credibility and steadfastness of democratic alliance commitments. A contrary view suggests that frequent leader
replacement and ever-changing public opinion make democracies particularly unreliable (e.g., De Tocqueville, [1835] 1994; Gartzke & Gleditsch,
2004). In order to arbitrate between these conflicting arguments regarding
democratic reliability scholars have looked both at the duration of alliances
and the propensity of democracies to honor their alliance commitments in
times of war. Findings regarding alliance duration almost uniformly show
that alliances between democracies last longer than other alliances (Bennett,
1997; Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds & Savun, 2007; Reed, 1997). The findings regarding democratic reliability are less conclusive in studies of wartime behavior.
Werner and Lemke (1997), Reiter and Stam (2002), and Smith (1996) find that
democracies are not more likely to intervene on the side of their (democratic)
allies in times of war. One concern with these studies is that they do not
match what states do in war to what they promised to do in the alliance and
so they may be overstating alliance nonfulfillment (Leeds, Long, & Mitchell,
2000). Many alliances specify conditions for when they can be invoked,
including particular enemies, locations, number of adversaries, and actions
of the partner. If a conflict falls outside these parameters then an ally’s
failure to act should not be seen as a violation of the alliance. Using ATOP
data that allows her to determine whether the casus foederis was indeed
met, Leeds (2003) finds that democracies were more likely to uphold their
alliance commitments in the 1816–1944 period. Using a different research
design, however, Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) show that democracies were
less likely than nondemocracies to honor their alliance commitments in the
1816–1991 period.
Scholars have considered not only the effect of static domestic political institutions, but also the effect of change in regime type on alliance duration and
4
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
wartime behavior. Siverson and Starr (1994) find that states reshuffle their
alliance portfolios in reaction to regime changes. While Bennett (1997) cannot confirm that regime changes affect the duration of individual alliances,
Leeds and Savun (2007) find clear evidence that regime changes are associated with alliance abrogation. Leeds (2003) also shows that regime changes
after alliance formation increase the likelihood that a state will fail to honor
its obligations in times of war (Leeds, 2003).
A final area of research on the relationship between domestic political institutions and alliance politics examines whether democratic allies are superior
in their war-fighting effectiveness. Here findings are more conclusive. Studies show that states with democratic partners are indeed more likely to succeed in war (e.g., Choi, 2004; Pilster, 2011).
CURRENT RESEARCH
Scholars continue to provide new insights into some of the issues that earlier
work has failed to resolve. Regarding the relationship between regime type
and alliance formation, Gibler and Wolford (2006) and Gibler and Sewell
(2006) point out that while democracies appear to be no more likely to
ally, they are more likely to be allied. They suggest that the causal arrow is
reversed: it is not democracy that leads to alliances but alliances that lead to
democracy. This dynamic does not necessarily rely on specific policy efforts
of the alliance organization or member states to encourage democratization,
but results from the fact that alliances can remove territorial threats for
states, which in turn facilitates democratization. In another fresh take on
how domestic institutions affect alliance formation, Powell (2010) shows that
similarity in domestic legal systems is positively related to state decisions to
ally and also shapes alliance design choices.
On the question of democratic alliance reliability, scholars have pointed
out that inferences based on whether a country upholds its alliance commitments in times of war are subject to selection bias (Smith, 1996). Owing
to the transparency of the democratic political process, potential aggressors
are better able to identify and target unreliable alliances involving democracies (e.g., Werner & Lemke, 1997). This means that the democratic alliances
that are challenged are the ones that are likely to be unreliable and it is not
surprising that these do not hold up in war. However, this does not mean
that democratic alliances more generally are unreliable. Many of democratic
alliances are so reliable that they will not be targeted in the first place. To overcome selection bias, Leeds and Savun (2007) and Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel
(2009) consider alliance violations that occur in wartime or in times of peace
when a member ends an alliance in violation of its terms. Both studies find
that democracies are less likely to abrogate alliances prematurely. Leeds et al.
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
5
(2009) also examine more closely the argument that democracies may be less
reliable owing to frequent leadership turnover. It turns out that not all leadership changes but only those that coincide with a change in the domestic
groups the leader represents are associated with unlawful alliance termination; and this effect is observed only in nondemocracies.
Recent studies also move beyond the question of whether democracies are
reliable to examining how and when reliability is achieved. Mattes (2012a) proposes that democratic leaders guard against instability associated with leadership changes by “precommitting” successor governments through careful
alliance design. Domestic political considerations regarding whether it is necessary to bind successors to an ally can thus help explain the choice of specific alliance terms. Tago (2009) examines democratic withdrawals from the
“Coalition of the Willing” He finds that leaders were more likely to desert
the coalition before elections for fear of punishment by domestic audiences
strongly opposed to the War in Iraq. Contrary to Tago, Kreps (2010) finds
that democracies did not withdraw from the NATO Afghanistan mission
even in the face of unfavorable public opinion. Leaders were able to stay the
course because elite consensus surrounding the need to maintain international alliance commitments prevented opposition parties from embracing
anti-mission platforms. The difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is of
course that the former was not bolstered by a formal alliance, while the latter was. Taken together, these studies indicate that alliance commitments can
have powerful effects on the domestic politics of democratic member countries, binding not only governments but also opposition parties.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Recent scholarship on domestic political institutions and alliance politics has
opened up interesting avenues for future research. Key in going forward will
be a continued “unpacking” of the broad concepts of “domestic politics” and
“alliance politics” and the specific mechanisms underlying observed relationships.
Much of the research to date has focused on contrasting democracies and
non-democracies in their alliance formation behavior and their reliability.
Insights on whether democracies have a distinct and superior record in these
areas are important from a scholarly perspective and also for policy-makers
that contemplate the value of spreading democracy. At the same time, this
simple dichotomy obfuscates significant variation that exists within each
regime type. For instance, regarding democracies, Cowhey (1993) suggests
that presidential systems may be advantaged over parliamentary ones in
their cooperation behavior; this may bear on alliance politics as well. Even
more significant are likely the differences that exist among non-democratic
6
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
systems. A number of studies reveal distinct patterns of conflict behavior by
different authoritarian regime types (e.g., Lai & Slater, 2006; Peceny, Beer, &
Sanchez-Terry, 2002; Weeks, 2008, 2012). As is often the case, the literature on
international cooperation has lagged behind international conflict research,
but we are starting to see work on how different types of autocracies may differ in their cooperation aptitude (Chyzh, 2014; Mattes & Rodriguez, 2014). It
will be interesting to investigate cooperation behavior of autocracies specifically in the area of military alliances and such research can provide useful
information to policy-makers as to which authoritarian regimes may be
especially prone to ally and to uphold or violate their alliance commitments.
Differentiating among different types of non-democracies also addresses
concerns that studies that treat nondemocracies as a homogenous group bias
findings in favor of finding democratic similarity and distinctness in alliance
behavior (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2004). Once democracies are contrasted with
distinct authoritarian regime types their alliance behavior may be found not
to be all that different from that of some of these nondemocratic states.
A related, promising direction for future research would entail moving
beyond a focus on domestic political institutions to an examination of how
other aspects of the domestic political process affect alliance politics. Early
work by Barnett and Levy (1991) suggests that alliance choices may be
driven by domestic considerations such as the guns versus butter tradeoff
(see also Morrow, 1993), a leader’s incentive to obtain military and economic
goods to secure her power, and the protection against domestic threats. More
recently, Kimball (2010) tackled the guns versus butter trade-off and her
large N study provides support for the notion that alliance formation may
be driven by domestic demand for social policy over defense spending. Furthermore, Narizny (2003) suggests that British alignment choices 1905–1939
were heavily affected by which sectoral interests held political power and
Leeds et al. (2009) provide evidence that a change in domestic groups with
sway over the leader may affect alliance maintenance. Not only could
the links between domestic preferences and alliance formation, partners,
and maintenance be further explored, but the third area Barnett and Levy
point to—that of alliances as a means to counter domestic threat—deserves
additional investigation. Some alliance contracts explicitly refer to domestic
threats and entail commitments to refrain from aiding domestic opponents
or obligations to help against domestic enemies. The significance of this
line of research lies in its recasting of alliance politics as driven not only,
and maybe not even primarily, by traditional security threats by other state
actors. Foreign policy preferences of different domestic groups, incentives
to use military and economic aid tied to the alliance to pay off winning
coalitions, domestic challenges to a leader’s tenure, and possibly “new”
international threats in the form of terrorism may play a large role in alliance
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
7
politics. More research on these dynamics can supplement our understanding of which alliances form when and with whom and how long they last.
Such work can also illuminate the effects that alliances might have on the
domestic politics of member states. From a policy-making perspective, it is
important to determine not only whether alliances serve foreign policy goals
but also whether they might have beneficial or adverse domestic political
effects in partner countries.
In addition to broadening the conceptualization of domestic politics, scholars should also expand the scope of alliance behavior under investigation.
Few studies have attempted to explain alliance institutional design, despite
the fact that there is significant variation in the types of obligations, contingencies, expected duration, issue scope, and level of institutionalization
of military alliances. As studies by Mattes (2012a; 2012b) and Powell (2010)
show, domestic political institutions and government incentives might provide an inroad for tackling this understudied area of alliance politics. Such
work ties nicely into the research program on the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001) and a better scholarly
understanding of why alliances are designed in particular ways can provide
additional insight into what effects on state behavior we should expect from
different types of alliances.
Fortunately, continued research into different aspect of countries’ alliance
choices is facilitated by readily available data on military alliances for the
1815–2003 period. The COW alliance data (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004) and especially the ATOP data (Leeds et al., 2000; Leeds & Mattes, 2007), with its collection of dozens of variables regarding specific alliance provisions, are excellent
resources going forward. One challenge that is evident from a review of past
work is how one should deal with large multilateral alliances. Poast (2010)
proposes an approach that allows scholars to consider multilateral and bilateral alliances together, while at the same time evading the problems associated with disaggregating multilateral events into separate dyadic ones. His
approach thus minimizes the chance that findings are biased as the result of
the inclusion of many observations stemming from a small number of large
multilateral alliances.
Data on some aspects of domestic politics, such as democracy versus
non-democracy coding (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013), leadership
changes (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), and changes in sources
of leader support (Leeds et al., 2009), are also readily available for a long
time period. On the other hand, coding of different types of non-democratic
regime types is restricted to the post-1945 period (e.g., Cheibub, Gandhi, &
Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright, & Frantz, 2012; Svolik, 2012). Furthermore,
a systematic investigation of other aspects of the domestic political process,
such as the specific alliance preferences of different domestic groups, the
8
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
existence of elite consensus, and the presence of domestic threats may
require a more original approach by researchers as well as new data collection. Qualitative work also has the potential to supplement quantitative
assessments and help scholars identify more precisely the underlying causal
mechanisms linking different aspects of the domestic political process to
alliance politics.
REFERENCES
Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic sources of alliances and alignments:
The case of Egypt, 1962–1973. International Organization, 45(3), 369–395.
Bennett, D. S. (1997). Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 1816–1984.
American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 846–878.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Lalman, D. (1992). War and reason: Domestic and international
imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 144(1–2), 67–101. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2
Choi, A. (2004). Democratic synergy and victory in war, 1816–1992. International Studies Quarterly, 48(3), 663–682. doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00319.x
Chyzh, O. (2014). Can you trust a dictator: A strategic model of authoritarian
regimes’ signing and compliance with international treaties. Conflict Management
and Peace Science, 31(1), 3–17. doi:10.1177/0738894213501132
Cowhey, P. F. (1993). Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States. International Organization, 47(2), 299–326.
doi:10.1017/S0020818300027958
De Tocqueville, A. [1835] (1994). Democracy in America. Garden City, NY: Anchor
Books.
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international
disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.
Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Regime type and commitment: Why democracies are actually less reliable allies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4),
775–795.
Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic states and commitment in international relations.
International Organization, 50(1), 109–139. doi:10.1017/S0020818300001685
Geddes, B., J. Wright and E. Frantz. (2012). Authoritarian regimes: A new data set.
Manuscript. Retrieved from http://dictators.la.psu.edu/.
Gibler, D. M., & Sarkees, M. R. (2004). Measuring alliances: The correlates of war formal interstate alliance dataset, 1816–2000. Journal of Peace Research, 41(2), 211–222.
doi:10.1177/0022343304041061
Gibler, D. M., & Sewell, J. A. (2006). External threat and democracy: The role of NATO
revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 43(4), 413–431. doi:10.1177/0022343306065115
Gibler, D. M., & Wolford, S. (2006). Alliances, then democracy. An examination of
the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 50(1), 129–153. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
9
Goemans, H. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Chiozza, G. (2009). Introducing archigos: A
data set of political leaders. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2), 269–283. doi:10.1177/
0022343308100719
Kimball, A. L. (2010). Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation.
Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 407–419. doi:10.1177/0022343310368346
Kreps, S. (2010). Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public
opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy
Analysis, 6(3), 191–215. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00108
Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of institutions.
International Organization, 55(4), 761–799.
Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international
alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. doi:10.1177/
0022002700044002003
Lai, B., & Slater, D. (2006). Institutions on the offensive: Domestic sources of dispute
initiation in authoritarian regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political Science,
50(1), 113–126. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x
Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 979–1002.
Leeds, B. A. (2003). Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties. International Organization, 57, 801–827. doi:10.1017/
S0020818303574057
Leeds, B. A., Long, A. G., & Mitchell, S. M. (2000). Reevaluating alliance reliability: Specific threats, specific promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(5), 686–699.
doi:10.1177/0022002700044005006
Leeds, B. A., & Mattes, M. (2007). Alliance politics during the cold war: Aberration,
new world order, or continuation of history? Conflict Management and Peace Science,
24(3), 183–199. doi:10.1080/07388940701473054
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability
of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x
Leeds, B. A., Ritter, J. M., Mitchell, S. M., & Long, A. G. (2002). Alliance treaty
obligations and provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions, 28, 237–260.
doi:10.1080/03050620213653
Leeds, B. A., & Savun, B. (2007). Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements? Journal of Politics, 69(4), 1118–1132. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00612.x
Lipson, C. (2003). Reliable partners. How democracies have made a separate peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Marshall, M.G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2013). Polity IV Project: Political regime
characteristics and transitions, 1800–2012. Data Users’ Manual. Retrieved from
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf
Mattes, M. (2012a). Democratic reliability, precommitment of successor governments, and the choice of alliance commitment. International Organization, 66(1),
153–172. doi:10.1017/S0020818311000336
Mattes, M. (2012b). Reputation, symmetry, and alliance design. International Organization, 66(4), 679–707. doi:10.1017/S002081831200029X
10
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Mattes, M., & Rodiguez, M. (2014). Autocracies and international cooperation. International Studies Quarterly, 58(3), 527–538.
Morrow, J. D. (1991). Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability
aggregation model of alliances. American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 904–933.
Morrow, J. D. (1993). Arms vs. allies: Trade-offs in the search of security. International
Organization, 47(2), 207–233. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027922
Narizny, K. (2003). The political economy of alignment: Britain’s commitment to
Europe, 1905–1939. International Security, 27(4), 184–219.
Peceny, M., Beer, C. C., & Sanchez-Terry, S. (2002). Dictatorial Peace? American Political Science Review, 96(1), 15–26. doi:10.1017/S0003055402004203
Pilster, U. (2011). Are democracies the better allies? The impact of regime type
on military coalition operations. International Interactions, 37, 55–85. doi:10.1080/
03050629.2011.546259
Poast, P. (2010). (Mis)Using dyadic data to analyze multilateral events. Political Analysis, 18(4), 403–425. doi:10.1093/pan/mpq024
Powell, E. J. (2010). Negotiating military alliances: Legal systems and alliance formation. International Interactions, 36, 28–59. doi:10.1080/03050620903553855
Reed, W. (1997). Alliance duration and democracy: An extension and crossvalidation of ‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations’.
American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 1072–1078.
Reiter, D., & Stam, A. C. (2002). Democracies at war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schroeder, P. W. (1976). Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of power and tools of management. In K. Knorr (Ed.), Historical dimensions of national security problems (pp.
227–262). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Simon, M. W., & Gartzke, E. (1996). Political system similarity and the choice of allies.
Do democracies flock together, or do opposites attract? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4). doi:10.1177/0022002796040004005
Siverson, R. M., & Emmons, J. (1991). Birds of a feather. Democratic political systems
and alliance choices in the twentieth century. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(2),
285–306. doi:10.1177/0022002791035002007
Siverson, R., & Starr, H. (1994). Regime change and the restructuring of alliances.
American Journal of Political Sciences, 38(1), 145–161.
Smith, A. (1996). To intervene or not to intervene: A biased decision. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 40(1), 16–40.
Svolik, M. W. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Tago, A. (2009). When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal
of troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2),
219–234. doi:10.1177/0022343308100716
Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.
Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve.
International Organization, 62(1), 35–64. doi:10.1017/S0020818308080028
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
11
Weeks, J. L. (2012). Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 326–346.
doi:10.1017/S0003055412000111
Weitsman, P. A. (2004). Dangerous alliances: Proponents of peace, weapons of war. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Werner, S., & Lemke, D. (1997). Opposites do not attract: The impact of domestic
institutions, power, and prior commitments on alignment choices. International
Studies Quarterly, 41(3), 529–546. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00055
FURTHER READING
Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic sources of alliances and alignments:
The case of Egypt, 1962–1973. International Organization, 45(3), 369–395.
Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Regime type and commitment: Why democracies are actually less reliable allies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4),
775–795.
Gibler, D. M., & Wolford, S. (2006). Alliances, then democracy. An examination of
the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 50(1), 129–153. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360
Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international
alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. doi:10.1177/
0022002700044002003
Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability
of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476.
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x
MICHAELA MATTES SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Michaela Mattes is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research focuses on the design and effects of
security cooperation, specifically conflict management agreements and military alliances. Her work seeks to answer questions regarding which types of
agreements work, why they are effective, when they are more or less likely to
succeed, and why they are designed the way they are. She has published articles on these topics in the American Journal of Politics, International Organization, Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Conflict Management
and Peace Science.
RELATED ESSAYS
Domestic Politics of Trade Policy (Political Science), Michaël Aklin et al.
Domestic Institutions and International Conflict (Political Science), Giacomo
Chiozza
12
EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Migrant Networks (Sociology), Filiz Garip and Asad L. Asad
Interdependence, Development, and Interstate Conflict (Political Science),
Erik Gartzke
States and Nationalism (Anthropology), Michael Herzfeld
Reconciliation and Peace-Making: Insights from Studies on Nonhuman
Animals (Anthropology), Sonja E. Koski
Why Do States Sign Alliances? (Political Science), Brett Ashley Leeds
Emotion and Intergroup Relations (Psychology), Diane M. Mackie et al.
Political Psychology and International Conflict (Political Science), Rose
McDermott
Emerging Trends in Culture and Concepts (Psychology), Bethany Ojalehto
and Douglas Medin
Cultural Conflict (Sociology), Ian Mullins
Economics and Culture (Economics), Gérard Roland
Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries (Political Science), William R.
Thompson
Postsocialism (Anthropology), Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Katherine Verdery
Why Do States Pursue Nuclear Weapons (or Not) (Political Science), Wilfred
Wan and Etel Solingen
Popular Protest, Nationalism, and Domestic-International Linkages in
Chinese Politics (Political Science), Jessica Chen Weiss
Culture and Globalization (Sociology), Frederick F. Wherry
Constitutionalism (Political Science), Keith E. Whittington