Emerging Trends in The Social and Behavioral Sciences

Memory Gaps and Memory Errors

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Memory Gaps and Memory Errors

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Memory Gaps and Memory Errors
JEFFREY S. NEUSCHATZ, STACY A. WETMORE, and SCOTT D. GRONLUND

Abstract
Memory is a reconstructive process, relying on pre-existing shared knowledge to
help us comprehend and interpret what we experience. A reliance on prior knowledge is a vital aid to communication and comprehension, but, as a consequence,
results in the modification of some details in an event, the addition of other details,
or even the fabrication of entire new events. We review classic research that first
demonstrated the phenomenon of reconstructive memory and the capability of
prior knowledge to influence what people remember. We next discuss cutting-edge
research involving memory gaps and memory errors, including autobiographical
memories, distinguishing true from false memories, memory conformity, and
potential adaptive reasons for memory errors. Finally, we point to directions for the
future research.

INTRODUCTION
A generally accepted theory of memory was introduced by Neisser (1967)
and has been reworked and refined over the last half-century (e.g., Loftus,
1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Schacter, 1995). However, the basic tenets of
the theory remain similar to those originally described; people are active
information processors, encoding and sometimes altering information as it
is perceived. In other words, memory is not like a passive recording device
(e.g., video camera or DVR). Instead, people encode bits and pieces of information or details they experience, and these details are then integrated with
other sources of information. Thereafter, memories continue to be acted upon
and influenced by preexisting knowledge and newly learned information.
Memories are fluid entities that change, sometimes dramatically. Every time
a person thinks about an event—revisits his or her memory—the memory
has the potential to change. Such changes take many forms. For instance,
information that is consistent with the person’s beliefs about what must have
happened can be integrated into the memory to fill in gaps, or information
not originally encoded can be subsequently added. These beliefs about what

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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may have happened arise as a result of top-down processing. That is, people make inferences from what they know is likely to occur in a situation,
and these inferences can become part of the memory. Often time, inferences
accurately reflect what occurred; however, at other times inferences can lead
to errors. In addition, details that do not seem to fit a coherent story of what
happened can be stripped away.
The current state of a memory can be quite different from the memory
that an individual originally encoded. For example, Neisser reported
remembering listening to a baseball game on the radio when the program
was interrupted to announce the attack on Pearl Harbor. He later recounted
that this was impossible because baseball is not played in December, when
the attack occurred (Neuschatz, Lampinen, Toglia, Payne, & Cisneros, 2007).
Thus, memory is constructive (or reconstructive) and often incomplete,
compelling a person to fill gaps in memory with what can be inferred
from past experiences as well as new information collected from other
sources (e.g., suggestions). This entry examines the seminal research that
ignited interest in memory gaps and errors, identifies promising lines of
investigation, and recognizes key questions that remain to be investigated.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
The genesis of research on memory errors and gaps can be traced back to
Sir Fredric Bartlett (1932), who is generally credited as the founder of the
reconstructive memory approach. Bartlett had Cambridge University students read and remember the Native American folktale, “The War of the
Ghosts.” Bartlett then repeatedly tested participants’ memory for the folktale. He found that participants frequently filled in the gaps of their memories
with information that was not actually in the folktale. The students generally
added information that made the story conform to their own individual experiences and expectations through addition, modification, and elimination.
The changes made the stories more consistent with what the Cambridge students had learned to expect despite the inaccuracy introduced by the changes
to the actual tale.
Research regarding memory errors was relatively dormant in the ensuing
years (but see Deese, 1959; Underwood, 1965). However, in the early
1970s, researchers studying sentence memory also found evidence for
constructive memory errors. Bransford and Franks (1971) had participants
study short propositions that could be combined to form longer, more
complex sentences. These sentences generally conformed to a short story or
theme. For example, the thematic sentence, “The girl who lived next door
broke the large window on the porch,” could be broken down into several
propositions: “The girl lived next door; The girl broke the large window; The

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girl who lived next door broke the large window,” and so on. The complex
sentence that contained all four propositions was never presented during
study. Nevertheless, Bransford and Franks found that participants were not
only more likely to say that the complex sentence was presented, but that
they were more confident about this than the sentences that were actually
studied.
At around the same time, Loftus and colleagues (Loftus, 1979; Loftus
& Greene, 1980; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) developed the misleading
postevent information (MPI) paradigm. In the typical procedure, participants witness some event and are then asked questions that are either true
or false about the event. For example, participants might watch a videotape
of an office scene in which a Diet Coke can was seen on the desk in the
office. Participants then answer a questionnaire about the event. Some
participants received only neutral information about the scene (e.g., there
was a soda can on the desk), whereas other participants were exposed
to misleading information (e.g., the can on the desk was a 7-up). On the
ensuing recognition memory test, participants who were misled are more
likely to indicate that the original can was a 7-up than those who received
neutral information. Loftus and colleagues found that participants not
only update their memories with misleading information but also change
their memory depending on the information. For instance, participant will
remember broken glass from an automobile accident when in fact there
was no broken glass, based on being questioned using the word “smashed”
(Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
Loftus and colleagues suggested that the memory trace for the original
information (e.g., Diet Coke in the previous example) was altered and
replaced by the misinformation (e.g., 7-up). They argued that a memory
error occurred because there was no way to retrieve the original information
once the trace had been altered. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) criticized
the trace alteration position by contending that the standard procedure
used by Loftus produced a bias toward the misinformation. They argued
that there were inherent demand characteristics pointing to the misleading
information because the misleading information was more recent, and
was provided by a source with more knowledge of the event (i.e., the
experimenter). Using an alternative test that reduced experimenter bias,
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985; Bekerian and Bowers, 1983) demonstrated
that the original memory trace was still accessible. Although an incorrect
memory might compete with rather than replace the original memory, the
end result is the same, a false report.
In the 1980s, psychologists started examining more naturalistic events
and again found evidence for constructive memory errors. Memory for
naturalistic events relies on schemas or mental models of what typically

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happens in a particular situation. These retrieval structures guide encoding
and retrieval processes (Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, & Toglia,
2002). However, the reliance on schemas can lead to the reporting of information that is typical of a scene even if the information was never presented. In
other words, schemas fill in gaps. Brewer and Treyens (1981) demonstrated
that participants who were seated in a graduate student’s office later falsely
recalled and recognized objects (e.g., a stapler) that were consistent with
an office schema but were not present. Similarly, Nakamura, Graesser,
Zimmerman, and Riha (1985) had students view a lecture by a speaker
who performed relevant (e.g., underlining a word on the blackboard) or
irrelevant (e.g., sipping coffee) actions. They found that participants falsely
remembered relevant actions that were never actually performed by the
lecturer.
More recently, the Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995, DRM)
paradigm has become a popular tool for investigating memory errors. In the
DRM paradigm, participants are presented with lists of words (e.g., bed, rest,
nap) that are semantically related to a single nonpresented critical lure (e.g.,
sleep). This procedure results in high rates of false recognition and recall of
the critical lure (Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Payne et al., 2009;
Read, 1996). Participants also report these critical lures with high confidence.
We will return to the DRM paradigm below; the ease with which false memories can be created makes it widely used.
This abbreviated history of the study of memory and its errors elucidates
some consistent patterns. Memory is not a verbatim copy of what we experience, despite what most lay people believe (Simons & Chabris, 2011). In
order to compensate for our imperfect memories, gaps are often filled with
information that is plausible, given the context in which the event occurred.
A common feature of these memory error phenomena is that they rely on
the contribution of top-down knowledge. This might seem disquieting, but
a reliance on top-down knowledge is crucial in everyday cognition. For
example, it facilitates communication due to shared knowledge. If I invite
someone over for dinner, I do not have to tell my guest not to eat in advance.
When I go for lunch at a restaurant, I know not to walk into the kitchen to
grab what I want. But given how readily, and necessarily, we fill in unstated,
but expected, information, it is no surprise that it can be tricky to keep
separate what actually happened from what typically happened or what I
inferred should have happened. But where has the field gone since these
seminal early studies on reconstructive memory? We turn next to emerging
areas in reconstructive memory research.

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CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
The last 15 years has seen an explosion of research on the constructive
nature of memory as it relates to autobiographical memory errors and false
memories. The dramatic growth has been fueled, in part, by media accounts
of repressed/recovered memories in high-profile court cases (e.g., George
Franklin and Paul Ingram; Franklin v. Duncan, 1995; State of Washington v.
Ingram, 1988) and DNA exonerations involving (primarily) faulty eyewitness identifications (e.g., Junkin & Bloodsworth, 2004; Thompson-Cannino,
Cotton, & Torneo, 2009). The interest in memory errors also has spurred study
of these false memories in neuroscience. Researchers have started using
neuroimaging techniques to understand underlying structures and processing, as well as the role sleep plays in reinforcing true versus false memories.
In addition, researchers have begun examining whether neuroimaging
techniques can be used to distinguish true from false memories.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY ERRORS AND FALSE MEMORIES
Many researchers have explored a powerful laboratory paradigm known as
the familial informant false narrative procedure, or, more colloquially, the “lost in
the mall” technique to study false memories (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade,
& Garry, 2004; Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Davis, 2006; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).
In this paradigm, participants are asked to recall several events from their
childhood. The experimenter concocts one false event from true details the
participant provided and creates an event like, being lost in the mall at age
5. After the initial interview, participants attempt to recall more details about
the true and false events (perhaps through writing in a journal), which is
then followed by repeated interviews. On the final interview, participants are
asked to recall all the events. As many as 30% of the participants “remember”
specific details about the false event and report them as actually occurring
(Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Lindsay et al., 2004; Loftus & Pickrell,
1995; Pezdek & Hodge, 1999). These estimates vary with the plausibility of
the events. It is harder to implant memories for implausible events such as
having a rectal enema (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997) than more plausible
scenarios such as spilling a punch bowl (Hyman & Pentland, 1996). However,
it is not impossible (Sharman & Scoboria, 2009).
SLEEP
False memories and memory errors, whether plausible or implausible, also
can be affected by sleep (Diekelmann, Buchel, Born, & Rasch, 2011; Dieklemann, Landolt, Lahl, Born, & Wagner, 2008; Payne, 2011). Sleep is known
best for its contribution to consolidation—a process that transforms newly

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encoded memories into a more stable representation to be integrated into preexisting long-term memories. But there is currently some debate as to what
phase of sleep is best for consolidation [e.g., rapid-eye movement (REM) or
slow-wave sleep], and how exactly these phases of sleep affect memory. To
investigate the effects of slow-wave sleep on memory and memory errors,
Payne et al. (2009) had participants complete a DRM task (discussed earlier). Participants were either tested after a night’s sleep or a day of wakefulness. They found that the recall of studied words was significantly higher
for those who slept, and, more interestingly, those who had slept also falsely
recalled more of the critical lures (nonstudied semantically related words).
Therefore, slow-wave sleep may make individuals more prone to false memories because of the reorganization of memory that occurs during consolidation. This is consistent with the more-is-less pattern discussed by Toglia,
Neuschatz, and Goodwin (1999). That is, the recall of more of the studied
items is accompanied by more memory errors. However, this pattern is not
always apparent. Diekelmann et al. (2011) found that the reactivation of memory through odor presentation during slow-wave sleep stabilized memories
and protected against memory errors. Future research must determine the
extent to which slow-wave sleep promotes the stabilization of memories versus enhancing the creation of false memories.
DISTINGUISHING TRUE FROM FALSE MEMORIES
Researchers have begun to investigate the neurological basis of true and false
memories using neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging) and event-related potentials (EEGs). This is an exciting
avenue of research because it could potentially be used to help resolve legal
cases (Schacter & Loftus, 2013). The hope would be that, although we cannot
be certain about whether to trust what a defendant reports about an event,
an examination of his or her brain might reveal the underlying truth. Participant’s brains have been scanned as they complete the recognition portion
of the DRM paradigm. Neuroimaging studies have shown that many of the
same brain regions are active when true and false memories are retrieved.
However, there are some differences in activations. Specifically, brain areas
associated with sensory and perceptual information during encoding and
retrieval tend to be more active when true as opposed to false memories
are retrieved (Schacter & Loftus, 2013; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986;
Slotnick & Schacter, 2004).
Although provocative, there are many issues to overcome before we know
if these brain-based methods can provide an unfettered window into the
truth of a memory (Schacter, Chamberlain, Gaesser, & Gerlach, 2012). Will
neuroscience serve as a panacea for ferreting true from false memories, liars

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from truth tellers in the courtroom? Schacter and Loftus (2013) are skeptical
that this will happen anytime soon and suggest that the best use of neuroimaging in the courtroom, currently, is to educate jurors and bolster general
claims regarding the reconstructive nature of memory.
MEMORY CONFORMITY
Another emerging area of research involves the effect of cowitness suggestion, where witnesses discuss an event before reporting it. This can alter one’s
memory for the original event to conform to what was discussed instead
of what a witness actually saw. Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, and Gabbert
(2009) referred to this phenomenon as memory conformity. One approach
to studying memory conformity is to have a confederate leak information,
both accurate and inaccurate, after a witnessed event. Memory conformity
occurs because individuals often report the inaccurate information that the
confederate reports.
Wright et al. (2009) offered three explanations for memory conformity. Normative influence occurs when the participants do not want to disagree with
the confederate so they accept the information over what they may remember. In this case, the cost of disagreeing with the confederate is greater than
the price of being accurate. Informational influence occurs when participants
accept the confederate’s memory of the event as more accurate than their
own. Lastly, the memory distortion explanation suggests that people remember the information but forget its source. As a consequence, the participants
believe that they saw particular events when in fact they only heard about it
from the cowitness. Future research must determine the circumstances and
the extent to which each of these explanations play a role in producing memory conformity.
ADAPTIVE ERRORS
>Most lay people view memory errors as hindrances or incidents to bemoan;
however, researchers have come to view them as adaptive features of our
memory system (Schacter & Wagner, 1999). Schacter, Guerin, and St. Jacques
(2011) propose that memory errors and distortions are a by-product of
memory’s adaptive functioning. The authors use imagination inflation to
illustrate the adaptive nature of memory errors. Imagination inflation is
when the veracity of false memories increase as a result of participants
imagining that an event may be true. For example, in one experiment,
participants imagined themselves or an experimenter performing an action.
Neuroimaging studies utilizing fMRI have shown that the brain areas
associated with visual imagery were active for items that were imagined

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and falsely remembered (Gonsalves & Paller, 2002). Research has shown that
remembering past events and imaging future events use many of the same
brain systems (Schacter & Addis, 2009). This overlap in neural subsystems
could explain how memory and imagining get confused. Nevertheless,
Schacter et al. went on to argue that such a system is adaptive, because it
allows stored information to be used flexibly to simulate a variety of future
outcomes. If our memory for the past was perfect, such that there were no
gaps to fill, we would be unable to flexibly simulate the future. The adaptive
nature of memory errors and the relationship between memory for the past
and imaging the future is an emerging and exciting line of inquiry.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
MERGING BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACHES
Neuroscience-based approaches have begun to transform psychology. But
these techniques are still new to many researchers and require specialized
(and expensive) equipment and knowledge. Future research on memory
gaps and memory errors will continue to discover interesting new phenomena, and useful new paradigms for the study of these phenomena.
But the capability now exists to understand these phenomena to a degree,
and in a manner, that was impossible 15 years ago. We need to continue to
integrate our best behavioral work with these remarkable new neuroscience
technologies.
INTERPLAY OF DATA AND THEORY
Another key for future research involves the continuing interplay of data
and theory. New phenomena without an explanation are simply curiosities;
patterns of brain activations are baffling without guidance from theory
regarding the regions on which to focus. Wixted and Mickes (2013) argued
that the path for understanding must work both ways. Specifically, they
noted that theory must inform how we interpret fMRI, and fMRI must
inform how we evaluate cognitive theories. In addition, there are several
theoretical frameworks that already have played important roles in understanding memory gaps and errors including source monitoring (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), activation monitoring (Mather, Henkle, &
Johnson, 1997; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001), and fuzzy trace theory
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Formal models also must play a role. Kimball,
Smith, and Kahana (2007) developed a computational model of DRM recognition errors. Arndt and Hirshman (1998) showed that an exemplar model
(MINERVA 2, Hintzman, 1986) could reproduce several false recognition
phenomena (but see John & Jones, 2010). Clark (2003) developed a formal

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model for eyewitness identification decisions (see also Goodsell, Gronlund,
& Carlson, 2010). Applied researchers in particular will benefit from greater
guidance by theory (Clark, 2008).
There are important questions to be answered about how memory works,
and the potential consequences when memory goes awry can be devastating.
Therefore, we call on researchers, those with more of an orientation toward
laboratory research, as well as those more interested in real-world applications, to work together to address key issues (see also Lane & Meissner, 2008).
Understanding how our memory functions can benefit a variety of endeavors (e.g., best practices in education). Understanding memory also benefits
society. For example, the criminal justice system will continue to benefit from
the use of memory experts in battling faulty eyewitness identifications (innocenceproject.org). Although we have come a long way since Bartlett’s (1932)
original demonstration of the reconstructive nature of memory, there is much
left to do.
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JEFFREY S. NEUSCHATZ SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Jeffrey S. Neuschatz received his BS at Roger Williams University in 1992
and his PhD at Binghamton University in 1999, and is a Professor and Chair
of the Psychology Department at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.
Dr. Neuschatz is the coauthor of more than 30 scholarly works. His work has
appeared in leading academic journals including Law and Human Behavior
and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. He is
the recipient of the University of Alabama-Huntsville Foundation Award for
Creative Achievement.
STACY A. WETMORE SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Stacy A. Wetmore is a doctoral candidate in Cognitive Psychology at the University of Oklahoma. She previously obtained a BA in Psychology and MA
in Experimental Psychology from the University of Alabama in Huntsville
where she received the Psychology Department Outstanding Thesis Award.
Her primary area of research interest concerns issues in eyewitness memory
and, more specifically, on identification procedures to enhance discriminability and improve memory.
SCOTT D. GRONLUND SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Scott D. Gronlund is a Professor of Psychology and the Roger and Sherry
Teigen Presidential Professor at the University of Oklahoma. Scott earned
his undergraduate degree in Psychology from UC Irvine and his PhD from
Indiana University. Before arriving at the University of Oklahoma, he completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Northwestern University. Scott prepared
an Amicus Brief for the US Supreme Court for petitioner Kevin Keith. He has
served on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
and is a Fellow of the Association of Psychological Science (APS) and the
Psychonomics Society.
RELATED ESSAYS
The Inherence Heuristic: Generating Everyday Explanations (Psychology),
Andrei Cimpian
Social Aspects of Memory (Psychology), William Hirst and Charles B. Stone
Implicit Memory (Psychology), Dawn M. McBride
Attention and Perception (Psychology), Ronald A. Rensink



Memory Gaps and Memory Errors
JEFFREY S. NEUSCHATZ, STACY A. WETMORE, and SCOTT D. GRONLUND

Abstract
Memory is a reconstructive process, relying on pre-existing shared knowledge to
help us comprehend and interpret what we experience. A reliance on prior knowledge is a vital aid to communication and comprehension, but, as a consequence,
results in the modification of some details in an event, the addition of other details,
or even the fabrication of entire new events. We review classic research that first
demonstrated the phenomenon of reconstructive memory and the capability of
prior knowledge to influence what people remember. We next discuss cutting-edge
research involving memory gaps and memory errors, including autobiographical
memories, distinguishing true from false memories, memory conformity, and
potential adaptive reasons for memory errors. Finally, we point to directions for the
future research.

INTRODUCTION
A generally accepted theory of memory was introduced by Neisser (1967)
and has been reworked and refined over the last half-century (e.g., Loftus,
1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Schacter, 1995). However, the basic tenets of
the theory remain similar to those originally described; people are active
information processors, encoding and sometimes altering information as it
is perceived. In other words, memory is not like a passive recording device
(e.g., video camera or DVR). Instead, people encode bits and pieces of information or details they experience, and these details are then integrated with
other sources of information. Thereafter, memories continue to be acted upon
and influenced by preexisting knowledge and newly learned information.
Memories are fluid entities that change, sometimes dramatically. Every time
a person thinks about an event—revisits his or her memory—the memory
has the potential to change. Such changes take many forms. For instance,
information that is consistent with the person’s beliefs about what must have
happened can be integrated into the memory to fill in gaps, or information
not originally encoded can be subsequently added. These beliefs about what

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

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may have happened arise as a result of top-down processing. That is, people make inferences from what they know is likely to occur in a situation,
and these inferences can become part of the memory. Often time, inferences
accurately reflect what occurred; however, at other times inferences can lead
to errors. In addition, details that do not seem to fit a coherent story of what
happened can be stripped away.
The current state of a memory can be quite different from the memory
that an individual originally encoded. For example, Neisser reported
remembering listening to a baseball game on the radio when the program
was interrupted to announce the attack on Pearl Harbor. He later recounted
that this was impossible because baseball is not played in December, when
the attack occurred (Neuschatz, Lampinen, Toglia, Payne, & Cisneros, 2007).
Thus, memory is constructive (or reconstructive) and often incomplete,
compelling a person to fill gaps in memory with what can be inferred
from past experiences as well as new information collected from other
sources (e.g., suggestions). This entry examines the seminal research that
ignited interest in memory gaps and errors, identifies promising lines of
investigation, and recognizes key questions that remain to be investigated.
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
The genesis of research on memory errors and gaps can be traced back to
Sir Fredric Bartlett (1932), who is generally credited as the founder of the
reconstructive memory approach. Bartlett had Cambridge University students read and remember the Native American folktale, “The War of the
Ghosts.” Bartlett then repeatedly tested participants’ memory for the folktale. He found that participants frequently filled in the gaps of their memories
with information that was not actually in the folktale. The students generally
added information that made the story conform to their own individual experiences and expectations through addition, modification, and elimination.
The changes made the stories more consistent with what the Cambridge students had learned to expect despite the inaccuracy introduced by the changes
to the actual tale.
Research regarding memory errors was relatively dormant in the ensuing
years (but see Deese, 1959; Underwood, 1965). However, in the early
1970s, researchers studying sentence memory also found evidence for
constructive memory errors. Bransford and Franks (1971) had participants
study short propositions that could be combined to form longer, more
complex sentences. These sentences generally conformed to a short story or
theme. For example, the thematic sentence, “The girl who lived next door
broke the large window on the porch,” could be broken down into several
propositions: “The girl lived next door; The girl broke the large window; The

Memory Gaps and Memory Errors

3

girl who lived next door broke the large window,” and so on. The complex
sentence that contained all four propositions was never presented during
study. Nevertheless, Bransford and Franks found that participants were not
only more likely to say that the complex sentence was presented, but that
they were more confident about this than the sentences that were actually
studied.
At around the same time, Loftus and colleagues (Loftus, 1979; Loftus
& Greene, 1980; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) developed the misleading
postevent information (MPI) paradigm. In the typical procedure, participants witness some event and are then asked questions that are either true
or false about the event. For example, participants might watch a videotape
of an office scene in which a Diet Coke can was seen on the desk in the
office. Participants then answer a questionnaire about the event. Some
participants received only neutral information about the scene (e.g., there
was a soda can on the desk), whereas other participants were exposed
to misleading information (e.g., the can on the desk was a 7-up). On the
ensuing recognition memory test, participants who were misled are more
likely to indicate that the original can was a 7-up than those who received
neutral information. Loftus and colleagues found that participants not
only update their memories with misleading information but also change
their memory depending on the information. For instance, participant will
remember broken glass from an automobile accident when in fact there
was no broken glass, based on being questioned using the word “smashed”
(Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
Loftus and colleagues suggested that the memory trace for the original
information (e.g., Diet Coke in the previous example) was altered and
replaced by the misinformation (e.g., 7-up). They argued that a memory
error occurred because there was no way to retrieve the original information
once the trace had been altered. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) criticized
the trace alteration position by contending that the standard procedure
used by Loftus produced a bias toward the misinformation. They argued
that there were inherent demand characteristics pointing to the misleading
information because the misleading information was more recent, and
was provided by a source with more knowledge of the event (i.e., the
experimenter). Using an alternative test that reduced experimenter bias,
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985; Bekerian and Bowers, 1983) demonstrated
that the original memory trace was still accessible. Although an incorrect
memory might compete with rather than replace the original memory, the
end result is the same, a false report.
In the 1980s, psychologists started examining more naturalistic events
and again found evidence for constructive memory errors. Memory for
naturalistic events relies on schemas or mental models of what typically

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happens in a particular situation. These retrieval structures guide encoding
and retrieval processes (Neuschatz, Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, & Toglia,
2002). However, the reliance on schemas can lead to the reporting of information that is typical of a scene even if the information was never presented. In
other words, schemas fill in gaps. Brewer and Treyens (1981) demonstrated
that participants who were seated in a graduate student’s office later falsely
recalled and recognized objects (e.g., a stapler) that were consistent with
an office schema but were not present. Similarly, Nakamura, Graesser,
Zimmerman, and Riha (1985) had students view a lecture by a speaker
who performed relevant (e.g., underlining a word on the blackboard) or
irrelevant (e.g., sipping coffee) actions. They found that participants falsely
remembered relevant actions that were never actually performed by the
lecturer.
More recently, the Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995, DRM)
paradigm has become a popular tool for investigating memory errors. In the
DRM paradigm, participants are presented with lists of words (e.g., bed, rest,
nap) that are semantically related to a single nonpresented critical lure (e.g.,
sleep). This procedure results in high rates of false recognition and recall of
the critical lure (Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Payne et al., 2009;
Read, 1996). Participants also report these critical lures with high confidence.
We will return to the DRM paradigm below; the ease with which false memories can be created makes it widely used.
This abbreviated history of the study of memory and its errors elucidates
some consistent patterns. Memory is not a verbatim copy of what we experience, despite what most lay people believe (Simons & Chabris, 2011). In
order to compensate for our imperfect memories, gaps are often filled with
information that is plausible, given the context in which the event occurred.
A common feature of these memory error phenomena is that they rely on
the contribution of top-down knowledge. This might seem disquieting, but
a reliance on top-down knowledge is crucial in everyday cognition. For
example, it facilitates communication due to shared knowledge. If I invite
someone over for dinner, I do not have to tell my guest not to eat in advance.
When I go for lunch at a restaurant, I know not to walk into the kitchen to
grab what I want. But given how readily, and necessarily, we fill in unstated,
but expected, information, it is no surprise that it can be tricky to keep
separate what actually happened from what typically happened or what I
inferred should have happened. But where has the field gone since these
seminal early studies on reconstructive memory? We turn next to emerging
areas in reconstructive memory research.

Memory Gaps and Memory Errors

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CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH
The last 15 years has seen an explosion of research on the constructive
nature of memory as it relates to autobiographical memory errors and false
memories. The dramatic growth has been fueled, in part, by media accounts
of repressed/recovered memories in high-profile court cases (e.g., George
Franklin and Paul Ingram; Franklin v. Duncan, 1995; State of Washington v.
Ingram, 1988) and DNA exonerations involving (primarily) faulty eyewitness identifications (e.g., Junkin & Bloodsworth, 2004; Thompson-Cannino,
Cotton, & Torneo, 2009). The interest in memory errors also has spurred study
of these false memories in neuroscience. Researchers have started using
neuroimaging techniques to understand underlying structures and processing, as well as the role sleep plays in reinforcing true versus false memories.
In addition, researchers have begun examining whether neuroimaging
techniques can be used to distinguish true from false memories.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY ERRORS AND FALSE MEMORIES
Many researchers have explored a powerful laboratory paradigm known as
the familial informant false narrative procedure, or, more colloquially, the “lost in
the mall” technique to study false memories (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade,
& Garry, 2004; Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Davis, 2006; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).
In this paradigm, participants are asked to recall several events from their
childhood. The experimenter concocts one false event from true details the
participant provided and creates an event like, being lost in the mall at age
5. After the initial interview, participants attempt to recall more details about
the true and false events (perhaps through writing in a journal), which is
then followed by repeated interviews. On the final interview, participants are
asked to recall all the events. As many as 30% of the participants “remember”
specific details about the false event and report them as actually occurring
(Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Lindsay et al., 2004; Loftus & Pickrell,
1995; Pezdek & Hodge, 1999). These estimates vary with the plausibility of
the events. It is harder to implant memories for implausible events such as
having a rectal enema (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997) than more plausible
scenarios such as spilling a punch bowl (Hyman & Pentland, 1996). However,
it is not impossible (Sharman & Scoboria, 2009).
SLEEP
False memories and memory errors, whether plausible or implausible, also
can be affected by sleep (Diekelmann, Buchel, Born, & Rasch, 2011; Dieklemann, Landolt, Lahl, Born, & Wagner, 2008; Payne, 2011). Sleep is known
best for its contribution to consolidation—a process that transforms newly

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encoded memories into a more stable representation to be integrated into preexisting long-term memories. But there is currently some debate as to what
phase of sleep is best for consolidation [e.g., rapid-eye movement (REM) or
slow-wave sleep], and how exactly these phases of sleep affect memory. To
investigate the effects of slow-wave sleep on memory and memory errors,
Payne et al. (2009) had participants complete a DRM task (discussed earlier). Participants were either tested after a night’s sleep or a day of wakefulness. They found that the recall of studied words was significantly higher
for those who slept, and, more interestingly, those who had slept also falsely
recalled more of the critical lures (nonstudied semantically related words).
Therefore, slow-wave sleep may make individuals more prone to false memories because of the reorganization of memory that occurs during consolidation. This is consistent with the more-is-less pattern discussed by Toglia,
Neuschatz, and Goodwin (1999). That is, the recall of more of the studied
items is accompanied by more memory errors. However, this pattern is not
always apparent. Diekelmann et al. (2011) found that the reactivation of memory through odor presentation during slow-wave sleep stabilized memories
and protected against memory errors. Future research must determine the
extent to which slow-wave sleep promotes the stabilization of memories versus enhancing the creation of false memories.
DISTINGUISHING TRUE FROM FALSE MEMORIES
Researchers have begun to investigate the neurological basis of true and false
memories using neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI (functional magnetic
resonance imaging) and event-related potentials (EEGs). This is an exciting
avenue of research because it could potentially be used to help resolve legal
cases (Schacter & Loftus, 2013). The hope would be that, although we cannot
be certain about whether to trust what a defendant reports about an event,
an examination of his or her brain might reveal the underlying truth. Participant’s brains have been scanned as they complete the recognition portion
of the DRM paradigm. Neuroimaging studies have shown that many of the
same brain regions are active when true and false memories are retrieved.
However, there are some differences in activations. Specifically, brain areas
associated with sensory and perceptual information during encoding and
retrieval tend to be more active when true as opposed to false memories
are retrieved (Schacter & Loftus, 2013; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986;
Slotnick & Schacter, 2004).
Although provocative, there are many issues to overcome before we know
if these brain-based methods can provide an unfettered window into the
truth of a memory (Schacter, Chamberlain, Gaesser, & Gerlach, 2012). Will
neuroscience serve as a panacea for ferreting true from false memories, liars

Memory Gaps and Memory Errors

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from truth tellers in the courtroom? Schacter and Loftus (2013) are skeptical
that this will happen anytime soon and suggest that the best use of neuroimaging in the courtroom, currently, is to educate jurors and bolster general
claims regarding the reconstructive nature of memory.
MEMORY CONFORMITY
Another emerging area of research involves the effect of cowitness suggestion, where witnesses discuss an event before reporting it. This can alter one’s
memory for the original event to conform to what was discussed instead
of what a witness actually saw. Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, and Gabbert
(2009) referred to this phenomenon as memory conformity. One approach
to studying memory conformity is to have a confederate leak information,
both accurate and inaccurate, after a witnessed event. Memory conformity
occurs because individuals often report the inaccurate information that the
confederate reports.
Wright et al. (2009) offered three explanations for memory conformity. Normative influence occurs when the participants do not want to disagree with
the confederate so they accept the information over what they may remember. In this case, the cost of disagreeing with the confederate is greater than
the price of being accurate. Informational influence occurs when participants
accept the confederate’s memory of the event as more accurate than their
own. Lastly, the memory distortion explanation suggests that people remember the information but forget its source. As a consequence, the participants
believe that they saw particular events when in fact they only heard about it
from the cowitness. Future research must determine the circumstances and
the extent to which each of these explanations play a role in producing memory conformity.
ADAPTIVE ERRORS
>Most lay people view memory errors as hindrances or incidents to bemoan;
however, researchers have come to view them as adaptive features of our
memory system (Schacter & Wagner, 1999). Schacter, Guerin, and St. Jacques
(2011) propose that memory errors and distortions are a by-product of
memory’s adaptive functioning. The authors use imagination inflation to
illustrate the adaptive nature of memory errors. Imagination inflation is
when the veracity of false memories increase as a result of participants
imagining that an event may be true. For example, in one experiment,
participants imagined themselves or an experimenter performing an action.
Neuroimaging studies utilizing fMRI have shown that the brain areas
associated with visual imagery were active for items that were imagined

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and falsely remembered (Gonsalves & Paller, 2002). Research has shown that
remembering past events and imaging future events use many of the same
brain systems (Schacter & Addis, 2009). This overlap in neural subsystems
could explain how memory and imagining get confused. Nevertheless,
Schacter et al. went on to argue that such a system is adaptive, because it
allows stored information to be used flexibly to simulate a variety of future
outcomes. If our memory for the past was perfect, such that there were no
gaps to fill, we would be unable to flexibly simulate the future. The adaptive
nature of memory errors and the relationship between memory for the past
and imaging the future is an emerging and exciting line of inquiry.
KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
MERGING BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACHES
Neuroscience-based approaches have begun to transform psychology. But
these techniques are still new to many researchers and require specialized
(and expensive) equipment and knowledge. Future research on memory
gaps and memory errors will continue to discover interesting new phenomena, and useful new paradigms for the study of these phenomena.
But the capability now exists to understand these phenomena to a degree,
and in a manner, that was impossible 15 years ago. We need to continue to
integrate our best behavioral work with these remarkable new neuroscience
technologies.
INTERPLAY OF DATA AND THEORY
Another key for future research involves the continuing interplay of data
and theory. New phenomena without an explanation are simply curiosities;
patterns of brain activations are baffling without guidance from theory
regarding the regions on which to focus. Wixted and Mickes (2013) argued
that the path for understanding must work both ways. Specifically, they
noted that theory must inform how we interpret fMRI, and fMRI must
inform how we evaluate cognitive theories. In addition, there are several
theoretical frameworks that already have played important roles in understanding memory gaps and errors including source monitoring (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), activation monitoring (Mather, Henkle, &
Johnson, 1997; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001), and fuzzy trace theory
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Formal models also must play a role. Kimball,
Smith, and Kahana (2007) developed a computational model of DRM recognition errors. Arndt and Hirshman (1998) showed that an exemplar model
(MINERVA 2, Hintzman, 1986) could reproduce several false recognition
phenomena (but see John & Jones, 2010). Clark (2003) developed a formal

Memory Gaps and Memory Errors

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model for eyewitness identification decisions (see also Goodsell, Gronlund,
& Carlson, 2010). Applied researchers in particular will benefit from greater
guidance by theory (Clark, 2008).
There are important questions to be answered about how memory works,
and the potential consequences when memory goes awry can be devastating.
Therefore, we call on researchers, those with more of an orientation toward
laboratory research, as well as those more interested in real-world applications, to work together to address key issues (see also Lane & Meissner, 2008).
Understanding how our memory functions can benefit a variety of endeavors (e.g., best practices in education). Understanding memory also benefits
society. For example, the criminal justice system will continue to benefit from
the use of memory experts in battling faulty eyewitness identifications (innocenceproject.org). Although we have come a long way since Bartlett’s (1932)
original demonstration of the reconstructive nature of memory, there is much
left to do.
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JEFFREY S. NEUSCHATZ SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Jeffrey S. Neuschatz received his BS at Roger Williams University in 1992
and his PhD at Binghamton University in 1999, and is a Professor and Chair
of the Psychology Department at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.
Dr. Neuschatz is the coauthor of more than 30 scholarly works. His work has
appeared in leading academic journals including Law and Human Behavior
and Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. He is
the recipient of the University of Alabama-Huntsville Foundation Award for
Creative Achievement.
STACY A. WETMORE SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Stacy A. Wetmore is a doctoral candidate in Cognitive Psychology at the University of Oklahoma. She previously obtained a BA in Psychology and MA
in Experimental Psychology from the University of Alabama in Huntsville
where she received the Psychology Department Outstanding Thesis Award.
Her primary area of research interest concerns issues in eyewitness memory
and, more specifically, on identification procedures to enhance discriminability and improve memory.
SCOTT D. GRONLUND SHORT BIOGRAPHY
Scott D. Gronlund is a Professor of Psychology and the Roger and Sherry
Teigen Presidential Professor at the University of Oklahoma. Scott earned
his undergraduate degree in Psychology from UC Irvine and his PhD from
Indiana University. Before arriving at the University of Oklahoma, he completed a postdoctoral fellowship at Northwestern University. Scott prepared
an Amicus Brief for the US Supreme Court for petitioner Kevin Keith. He has
served on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
and is a Fellow of the Association of Psychological Science (APS) and the
Psychonomics Society.
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